IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 45656
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: October 22, 2018
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
ERIK DAVID REYNOLDS, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Deborah A. Bail, District Judge.
Judgment of conviction and unified sentence of seven years, with a minimum
period of confinement of two years, for possession of a controlled
substance, affirmed.
Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Kimberly A. Coster,
Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________
Before GRATTON, Chief Judge; GUTIERREZ, Judge;
and HUSKEY, Judge
________________________________________________
PER CURIAM
Erik David Reynolds pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance. Idaho Code
§ 37-2732(c). The district court sentenced Reynolds to a unified term of seven years with two
years determinate. Reynolds appeals asserting that the district court abused its discretion by
imposing an excessive sentence and by not giving Reynolds the opportunity to participate in the
retained jurisdiction program.
Sentencing is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the
factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established and
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need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-
15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App.
1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing
the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho
722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record
in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.
The primary purpose of the retained jurisdiction program is to enable the trial court to
obtain additional information regarding the defendant’s rehabilitative potential and suitability for
probation, and probation is the ultimate objective of a defendant who is on retained jurisdiction.
State v. Chapel, 107 Idaho 193, 687 P.2d 583 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565,
567, 650 P.2d 707, 709 (Ct. App. 1982). There can be no abuse of discretion in a trial court’s
refusal to retain jurisdiction if the court already has sufficient information upon which to
conclude that the defendant is not a suitable candidate for probation. State v. Beebe, 113 Idaho
977, 979, 751 P.2d 673, 675 (Ct. App. 1988); Toohill, 103 Idaho at 567, 650 P.2d at 709. Based
upon the information that was before the district court at the time of sentencing, we hold that the
district court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to retain jurisdiction.
Therefore, Reynolds’ judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.
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