J-A10007-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
JAMI L. HUBER, ESQUIRE : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
SUSAN M. NOONAN, ESQUIRE :
:
Appellant : No. 3706 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Dated October 13, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County
Civil Division at No(s): 2017-0830
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and RANSOM*, J.
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED OCTOBER 23, 2018
Appellant, Susan M. Noonan, Esquire, appeals from the order entered in
the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas, which granted in part and denied
in part her motion to quash subpoena/motion for a protective order regarding
the subpoena of Appellee, Jami L. Huber, Esquire, to produce documents of
Appellant’s former client, relevant to estate litigation pending in Florida. We
affirm.
The pertinent facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
Appellant is a Pennsylvania attorney. On January 24, 1995, Appellant assisted
Clara Anna Claitor (“Decedent”) with the preparation of estate-planning
documents, including a trust. Decedent was a Pennsylvania resident at that
time. On May 5, 2015, Decedent sent Appellant a termination letter, stating
she no longer wanted Appellant’s law firm to represent her. Shortly after,
________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Decedent relocated to Florida to live with her great-niece, Karen Nannette
Woods. On June 15, 2015, while living in Florida and with the assistance of a
Florida attorney, Decedent revised her estate plan, including the trust.
Significantly, Ms. Woods is the sole beneficiary under Decedent’s revised trust.
Decedent died in Florida on April 11, 2016.
On November 23, 2016, Decedent’s relatives, William R. Irey, Dianne L.
McDonald, Susanne Buff, and Steven Irey, filed a complaint in the probate
division of Osceola County, Florida, against Ms. Woods, individually and as
beneficiary of the revised trust, and the co-trustees, asserting claims of
Decedent’s lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, and tortious
interference, in an effort to set aside the revised trust.1 The plaintiffs claimed
they were beneficiaries under Decedent’s Pennsylvania testamentary
documents which Appellant had drafted. Appellee represents the plaintiffs in
the Florida litigation.
On March 21, 2017, Appellee filed a subpoena in the Lehigh County
Court of Common Pleas, for the production of Appellant’s entire estate file on
Decedent. Specifically, the subpoena sought:
Documents to be Produced:
1. [Appellant’s] entire file for [Decedent], including but not
limited to copies of all estate planning documents contained
therein, including Wills, Trusts, deeds, powers of attorney,
advance directives, notes, memorandum, transcripts,
correspondence, deeds, e-mails, texts, billing records,
pictures and/or audio and video tape recordings.
1 See McDonald v. Woods, No. 16CP771TR (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct. Nov. 23, 2016).
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2. Any and all documents relating to any communications
between [Appellant] (or [Appellant’s] firm) and [Decedent].
3. Any and all documents relating to any communications
between [Appellant] (or [Appellant’s] firm) or [Decedent]
and any and all of [Decedent’s] doctors, attorneys, care
givers, health care providers, friends, and/or acquaintances,
including Defendants.
4. Any and all documents relating to any communications
between [Appellant] (or [Appellant’s] firm) or [Decedent]
and any and all of [Decedent’s] banks and brokerage firm.
5. Any and all documents relating to any communications
between [Appellant] (or [Appellant’s] firm) or [Decedent]
and/or any other family member of [Decedent].
6. All documents, including all communication, records or
correspondence, in [Appellant’s] file or which may have
been exchanged with any other individual concerning
[Decedent], individually or as trustee of any trust, or any
other individual(s) acting [on] [Decedent’s] behalf.
7. Any and all documents concerning preparation, execution
or validity of any testamentary instruments or testamentary
substitutes for or concerning [Decedent].
8. Any and all documents concerning any office policies or
procedures for preparation, execution and/or storage of
testamentary documents or substitutes concerning
[Decedent].
(Appellee’s Subpoena for Production of Documents, filed March 21, 2017, at
10; R.R. at 19a). The subpoena was served on Appellant on April 18, 2017.
On May 8, 2017, Appellant filed a motion to quash subpoena/motion for
protective order, claiming, inter alia, the documents sought are protected by
the attorney/client privilege and/or work product doctrine. The trial court
granted Appellant’s motion on June 19, 2017, based on Appellee’s failure to
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respond in a timely manner. On June 23, 2017, Appellee filed a motion for
reconsideration and leave to file an answer nunc pro tunc. On July 10, 2017,
the court granted reconsideration, vacated its June 19, 2017 order, and
scheduled a hearing.
The court held oral argument on September 6, 2017. The court framed
the issue as whether an attorney who prepared estate planning documents for
a client can be compelled to turn over her client’s file during a will contest
after the client’s death. The parties initially discussed whether Pennsylvania
or Florida law applied to the issue under a choice of law analysis. Appellant
claimed, inter alia, Pennsylvania law applies because the communications
between Appellant and Decedent occurred in Pennsylvania while Appellant and
Decedent were living in Pennsylvania, and Appellant drafted the relevant
estate planning documents in Pennsylvania. Appellant maintained
Pennsylvania’s attorney/client privilege protects the communications at issue
and prohibits her from turning over her former client’s file. Appellant claimed
the subpoena also sought notes, correspondence, and other memoranda in
relation to her representation of Decedent, which are protected by
Pennsylvania’s work product doctrine.
Appellee argued, inter alia, Florida law should control the outcome of
this dispute because Decedent died in Florida, Decedent’s estate was probated
in Florida, litigation concerning Decedent’s estate is pending in Florida, and
the situs of the assets at issue is in Florida. Appellee explained the documents
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sought are discoverable under Florida law because Florida has a “testamentary
exception” to the attorney/client privilege.
On October 13, 2017, the trial court granted Appellant’s motion to quash
subpoena/motion for a protective order in part, concerning any portion of the
subpoena requesting “opinion work product”; the court denied Appellant’s
motion in all other respects. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on
November 10, 2017. On December 8, 2017, the trial court ordered Appellant
to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b); Appellant timely complied on December 13, 2017.
Appellant raises three issues for our review:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY FOLLOW
PENNSYLVANIA LAW GOVERNING THE CHOICE OF LAW
ANALYSIS IN DISPUTES INVOLVING CLAIMS OF PRIVILEGE,
WHERE PENNSYLVANIA LAW REQUIRES A COURT TO APPLY
THE LAW OF THE STATE WITH THE GREATER PUBLIC
POLICY INTEREST IN PROTECTING THE COMMUNICATIONS
AT ISSUE, RATHER THAN THE GREATER INTEREST IN THE
LITIGATION AS A WHOLE?
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT
FLORIDA LAW APPLIED TO THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE
CONTENTS OF [APPELLANT’S] ESTATE PLANNING FILE, FOR
HER FORMER CLIENT [DECEDENT], WAS PROTECTED FROM
DISCLOSURE BY THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, AS
PENNSYLVANIA IS THE STATE WITH THE GREATER POLICY
INTEREST IN APPLYING ITS ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
LAW?
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ORDERING
[APPELLANT] TO PRODUCE THE ESTATE PLANNING FILE
FOR HER FORMER CLIENT, [DECEDENT], AS SUCH IS
PROTECTED BY THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, AND
THERE IS NO TESTAMENTARY EXCEPTION TO THE
PRIVILEGE UNDER PENNSYLVANIA LAW?
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(Appellant’s Brief at 4).2
Preliminarily: “[T]he appealability of an order directly implicates the
jurisdiction of the court asked to review the order.” Knopick v. Boyle, 189
A.3d 432, 436 (Pa.Super. 2018) (internal citation omitted). “Accordingly, this
Court has the power to inquire at any time, sua sponte, whether an order is
appealable.” Id. “If the discovery order requires the appealing party to
produce materials which the appealing party has asserted are privileged,
[Pa.R.A.P.] 313 applies, and we accept jurisdiction.” Id. at 437. See also
Pa.R.A.P. 313 (defining collateral order); Estate of Paterno v. National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), 168 A.3d 187 (Pa.Super. 2017)
(explaining general rule that discovery orders compelling disclosure of
potentially confidential and privileged materials are immediately appealable
as collateral to principal action); Berkeyheiser v. A–Plus Investigations,
Inc., 936 A.2d 1117, 1126 (Pa.Super. 2007) (recognizing that appellant’s
“colorable claim” of attorney/client privilege and work product doctrine can
2 In a footnote of her brief, Appellant mentions the court’s application of
Florida law to the work product doctrine and refers to that portion of the
court’s order directing Appellant to produce “fact work product.” Appellant,
however, did not specify that claim in her Rule 1925(b) statement, so any
issue of what constitutes “fact” work product is waived for purposes of this
appeal. See Greater Erie Indus. Development Corp. v. Presque Isle
Downs, Inc., 88 A.3d 222 (Pa.Super. 2014) (en banc) (holding failure to
comply with Rule 1925(b) order in civil cases constitutes automatic waiver of
issues raised on appeal); Lineberger v. Wyeth, 894 A.2d 141 (Pa.Super.
2006) (explaining appellant’s failure to include or specify issue in Rule 1925(b)
statement waives that issue for purposes of appellate review).
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establish propriety of immediate appellate review).
Instantly, Appellant presents a colorable claim of privilege concerning
the documents requested in Appellee’s subpoena, to satisfy the collateral
order doctrine. Thus, our jurisdiction is proper; and we can reach the merits
of Appellant’s issues. See Pa.R.A.P. 313; Knopick, supra; Estate of
Paterno, supra; Berkeyheiser, supra.
For purposes of disposition, we combine Appellant’s issues. Appellant
argues there is a “true conflict” between Pennsylvania and Florida law
concerning application of the attorney/client privilege to this discovery dispute
because Florida has a statutory broad testamentary exception to the
attorney/client privilege whereas Pennsylvania does not. Appellant asserts
the trial court misdirected the choice of law analysis, because it determined
Florida had the greater policy interest in the underlying estate litigation,
instead of focusing on which state had the greater interest concerning the
limited issue of attorney/client privilege. Appellant asserts Florida’s interest
in the particular matter at hand (attorney/client privilege) is minimal and
exceedingly attenuated. Appellant stresses that Pennsylvania’s strong
interest in protecting attorney/client communications made between
Pennsylvania attorneys and their Pennsylvania clients within this
Commonwealth requires application of Pennsylvania law. Appellant highlights
that Pennsylvania is: the state where the subpoena was served and all
discovery efforts are directed against Appellant; the situs of the entire
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attorney/client relationship in question, between Appellant and Decedent; and
where all communications between Appellant and Decedent took place.
Appellant concludes Pennsylvania law applies to this discovery dispute, the
requested documents are protected under the Pennsylvania attorney/client
privilege, and this Court must reverse the portion of the court’s order denying
her motion to quash subpoena/motion for a protective order. We disagree.
“Whether [the] attorney-client privilege protects a particular
communication is a question of law. Our standard of review is de novo and
our scope of review is plenary.” Estate of Paterno, supra at 194 (internal
citations omitted). In conducting a choice of law analysis, the first step “is to
determine whether a conflict exists between the laws of the competing states.”
Budtel Associates, LP v. Continental Cas. Co., 915 A.2d 640, 643
(Pa.Super. 2006). If the laws of the competing jurisdictions do not conflict,
then further analysis is unnecessary, and we apply Pennsylvania law. Id. at
643-45. “[A conflict] exists if there are relevant differences between the
laws.” McDonald v. Whitewater Challengers, Inc., 116 A.3d 99, 106 (Pa.
Super. 2015), appeal denied, 634 Pa. 749, 130 A.3d 1291 (2015). If the laws
of the competing states do conflict, however, then the second step is to
analyze the governmental interests underlying each of the conflicting laws.
Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).3 “The
3 In Griffith, our Supreme Court abandoned the earlier “place of the injury”
rule, providing that the laws of the state in which the injury or incident
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merit of such a rule is that it gives to the place having the most interest in the
problem paramount control over the legal issues arising out of a particular
context and thereby allows the forum to apply the policy of the jurisdiction
most intimately concerned with the outcome of the particular litigation.” Id.
at 22, 203 A.2d at 806 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). This
choice-of-law framework applies in discovery disputes implicating claims of
privilege and in estate cases. See Carbis Walker, LLP v. Hill, Barth and
King, LLC, 930 A.2d 573, 578 (Pa.Super. 2007); In re Agostini’s Estate,
457 A.2d 861, 871 (Pa.Super. 1983).
In conducting the interest analysis, the court must decide which state
has the most significant relationship or contacts with the issue before the
court. Budtel, supra at 643. This analysis does not involve simply counting
the number of contacts each state has with the matter at hand. Cipolla v.
Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 566, 267 A.2d 854, 856 (1970). Rather, “[t]he
weight of a particular state’s contacts must be measured on a qualitative
rather than quantitative scale.” Id. “[T]his means we must determine which
state…has demonstrated, by reason of its policies and their connection and
relevance to the matter in dispute, a priority of interest in the application of
its rule of law.” In re Agostini’s Estate, supra at 871.
Pennsylvania law defines the attorney/client privilege by statute:
§ 5928. Confidential communications to
occurred governed the dispute, in favor of a more flexible approach. See id.
at 21, 203 A.2d at 805.
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attorney
In a civil matter counsel shall not be competent or
permitted to testify to confidential communications made to
[her] by [her] client, nor shall the client be compelled to
disclose the same, unless in either case this privilege is
waived upon the trial by the client.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5928. The purpose of the attorney/client privilege is to “foster
a confidence between attorney and client that will lead to a trusting and open
dialogue.” Gocial v. Independence Blue Cross, 827 A.2d 1216, 1222
(Pa.Super. 2003). “While the attorney-client privilege is statutorily mandated,
it has a number of requirements that must be satisfied in order to trigger its
protections. First and foremost is the rule that the privilege applies only to
confidential communications made by the client to the attorney in connection
with providing legal services.” Id. In some instances, in camera review may
be required to decide whether documents requested in discovery are protected
by the attorney/client privilege. Id. at 1223.
Florida law codifies its attorney/client privilege, in pertinent part, as
follows:
90.502. Lawyer-client privilege
(1) For purposes of this section:
* * *
(c) A communication between lawyer and client is
“confidential” if it is not intended to be disclosed to third
persons other than:
1. Those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the
rendition of legal services to the client.
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2. Those reasonably necessary for the transmission of
the communication.
(2) A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to
prevent any other person from disclosing, the contents of
confidential communications when such other person
learned of the communications because they were made in
the rendition of legal services to the client.
* * *
(4) There is no lawyer-client privilege under this section
when:
* * *
(b) A communication is relevant to an issue between
parties who claim through the same deceased client.
F.S.A. § 90.502(1)(c), (2), (4)(b). The explanatory note to Section
90.502(4)(b) provides, in relevant part:
Subsection (4) This subsection codifies several well-
established exceptions to the privilege:
* * *
(b) When multiple parties claim through the same
decedent, as in a will contest or a challenge to testate or
intestate succession, each party claims to best represent the
interests of the deceased. To allow any or all parties to
invoke the lawyer-client privilege prevents the swift
resolution of the conflict and frustrates the public policy of
expeditiously distributing estates in accordance with the
testator’s wishes. …
F.S.A. § 90.502(4)(b), Note. See also Caputo v. Nouskhajian, 871 So.2d
266 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004), appeal denied, ___ Fla. ___, 884 So.2d 23 (2004)
(explaining Section 90.502(4)(b) permits discovery of communications
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otherwise protected by attorney/client privilege when multiple opposing
parties claim through same deceased client).
Instantly, the trial court conducted a choice of law analysis to decide
whether Pennsylvania or Florida law governed application of the
attorney/client privilege to this discovery dispute in the Florida estate case, as
follows:
A. WHETHER FLORIDA LAW OR PENNSYLVANIA LAW
IS CONTROLLING?
This matter has been brought in a Pennsylvania court.
Therefore, Pennsylvania choice of laws analysis provides the
framework to decide whether Pennsylvania or Florida law
applies. …
First, the court must determine whether there is an actual
conflict between the potentially applicable laws. Here, an
actual conflict exists between the laws of Pennsylvania and
Florida as it relates to this discovery issue. Florida has a
statute and ample supporting case law that recognize a
broad testamentary exception to the attorney-client
privilege. Pennsylvania, on the other hand, has no statutory
authority that provides a testamentary exception to the
attorney-client privilege. Further, there is no Pennsylvania
appellate authority addressing the issue. A handful of
Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas decisions have
discussed a limited testamentary exception, but these
decisions have been much more limited than the broad
Florida rule, which eliminates all of the attorney-client
protections in a trust dispute. Based on the above analysis,
it appears that there are significant differences between the
laws of Pennsylvania and Florida regarding this discovery
issue.
The second step of the inquiry is that, if a true conflict exists,
courts must conduct an “interest analysis” to determine
which state has the greater interest in the outcome of the
dispute. In making this determination, the court must
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identify the relevant contacts that each state has with the
instant dispute.
Here, it appears that Florida is the state with the largest
interest in the outcome of the underlying litigation. Florida
is where the underlying litigation is pending; Florida is
where the Defendants in that litigation reside; Florida is the
situs of the trusts at issue in the underlying litigation; and
the Circuit Court in and for Osceola County, Florida probate
division is where the ultimate outcome of the underlying
case will be decided.
Pennsylvania’s interest involves promoting confidential
communications between a Pennsylvania client and a
Pennsylvania attorney made for the purpose of obtaining
legal advice in Pennsylvania concerning Pennsylvania law.
On balance, we find that Florida is the state most intimately
concerned with the outcome of the case. Accordingly,
Florida law must control the disposition of the issue of
whether [Appellant’s] files can be withheld on the basis of
privilege.
B. WHETHER [APPELLANT] MUST PRODUCE HER FULL
AND COMPLETE ESTATE PLANNING FILE FOR
DECEDENT TO [APPELLEE]?
Florida has a statute that recognizes a broad testamentary
exception to the attorney-client privilege. See F.S. §
90.502(4)(b). … To allow any or all parties to invoke the
lawyer-client privilege prevents the swift resolution of the
conflict and frustrates the public policy of expeditiously
distributing estates in accordance with the testator’s wishes.
The overriding concern that a testator’s intent is effectuated
and the estate is administered in accordance therewith
supersedes the confidentiality otherwise afforded. Florida
law presumes that the testator would wish to have…her
intent known if the alternative might result in a wrongful
disposition of [her] estate.
The issues in this case include a claim for undue influence
as to the last known testamentary documents purportedly
executed by Decedent, after Decedent was moved to Florida
by her great-niece. In order to establish standing to contest
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the current will offered for probate, the plaintiffs have
alleged that the prior estate planning documents drafted by
[Appellant] provide that they are beneficiaries thereunder
and pursuant to the doctrine of dependent relevant
revocation, if the current estate planning documents were
set aside based on undue influence or other reason, the
prior documents would be revived as the law abhors
intestacy. While [the] Plaintiffs seek the prior documents to
establish their standing to contest Decedent’s last known
Will and Trust, they also seek to have the testimony and file
of [Appellant] to show Decedent’s longstanding intent to
provide for them. The [P]laintiffs in the Florida litigation
also believe that [Appellant’s] file will prove the factors
which establish undue influence, such as the Defendant’s
actions in cloistering [Decedent] from those she trusted.
We find that [Appellant’s] estate planning file for Decedent
must be provided to [Appellee] with some limitations. …
(Opinion in Support of Order Granting in part and Denying in part Appellant’s
Motion to Quash Subpoena/Motion for a Protective Order, filed 10/13/17, at
4-7; R.R. at 215a-218a) (most internal citations omitted).
We agree a conflict exists between Florida and Pennsylvania law on this
privilege and approve of the trial court’s choice of law analysis. The primary
action is the estate case pending in Florida. Pennsylvania is not the forum
state for that litigation, and Florida has the principal interest in its resolution.
On the other hand, Pennsylvania has no interest in the outcome of the Florida
case and is involved due only to a subpoena derivative of the Florida case.
Thus, we cannot allow Pennsylvania indirectly to control the Florida estate
litigation and defer to Florida law, which has seen fit to adapt to the particular
circumstances at issue, by way of its testamentary exception to the
attorney/client privilege.
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Consequently, under these circumstances, we conclude Florida is the
state with more significant contacts and greater concern for the primary and
principal litigation, so Florida law should also control the matter of attorney-
client privilege. See Griffith, supra; Carbis Walker, supra. Therefore,
Appellant’s claims merit no relief. Accordingly, we affirm.
Order affirmed.
Judge Ransom did not participate in the consideration or decision of this
case.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/23/18
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