IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 17-0387
Filed October 24, 2018
JAMIE LEE COLE,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Delaware County, Bradley J. Harris,
Judge.
Appeal from the denial of an application for postconviction relief filed
pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 822 (2015). AFFIRMED.
Thomas M. McIntee, Waterloo, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Darrel L. Mullins, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ.
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McDONALD, Judge.
This case arises out of Jamie Cole’s challenge to his conviction and
sentence for operating while intoxicated, third offense, in violation of Iowa Code
section 321J.2 (2015). In his application for postconviction relief, Cole requested
the district court order the Iowa Department of Corrections to place him in a
rehabilitation facility rather than prison. In the alternative, Cole requested his guilty
plea and conviction be vacated and he be allowed to plead anew. Following a trial
on the merits of the postconviction application, in which Cole represented himself,
the district court denied Cole’s application for postconviction relief. Cole timely
filed this appeal.
By way of background, in March 2015, Cole was charged with operating
while intoxicated, third offense, in Delaware County. As part of a plea agreement,
Cole pleaded guilty to the charge, and the State agreed to dismiss other counts.
In addition, the parties agreed Cole would be placed in a chapter 321J
rehabilitation program rather than prison. The district court agreed to be bound by
the parties’ plea agreement. The sentencing order was in accord with the parties’
agreement. It provided Cole was committed to the “custody of the Director of the
Iowa Department of Corrections for placement in the 321J Program at West Union,
administered by the First Judicial District Department of Correctional Services.”
At the time Cole pleaded guilty to the Delaware County charge, he also had
pending a charge in Buchanan County for operating while intoxicated. At the time
of his plea and sentencing in the Delaware County case, the district court asked
Cole whether he understood the court could not control the sentence in the
Buchanan County case:
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THE COURT: And do you understand that I can’t make any
guarantees that you’ll receive the same sentence or consecutive or
concurrent sentence in Buchanan County? I have no control over
that.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
In April 2015, Cole pleaded guilty to operating while intoxicated, third offense, in
Buchanan County. The sentence in that case did not require or prohibit his entry
into the 321J rehabilitation program.
Following his plea and sentencing in the Buchanan County case, Cole
remained in jail while the department of corrections reviewed his application for
admission into the rehabilitation program. During that time, Cole indecently
exposed himself to one correctional officer and acted aggressively toward another.
Cole was charged with and convicted of indecent exposure because of this
conduct. Shortly after, the department of corrections denied Cole’s application for
the rehabilitation program, citing his recent violent actions and conviction for
indecent exposure. Cole was then committed to the custody of the department of
corrections and placed in prison.
Cole filed this application for postconviction relief challenging only his
Delaware County conviction. He contends the district court should have ordered
the department of corrections to place him in the rehabilitation facility. In the
alternative, he contends the district court should have vacated his guilty plea and
conviction. Our review is for the correction of errors at law. See Perez v. State,
816 N.W.2d 354, 356 (Iowa 2012). The court will affirm the lower court if “the law
was correctly applied” and there was substantial evidence supporting findings of
fact. Id. (quoting Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 520 (Iowa 2003)).
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We cannot conclude the district court committed legal error in denying the
application for postconviction relief. Cole pleaded guilty to operating while
intoxicated, third offense, in Delaware County. In that case, he received the
sentence for which he bargained. At the time of the plea and sentencing in
Delaware County, Cole stated he understood the district court could not control
what occurred in the Buchanan County case. After pleading guilty to operating
while intoxicated in Buchanan County, Cole was convicted of indecent exposure.
It was this additional offense conduct that precluded Cole from being placed in the
rehabilitation program. It was Cole’s conduct that precluded the execution of his
bargained-for sentence. As the district court noted, “The fact that applicant has
been confined pursuant to the terms of his sentences in other cases does not affect
the validity, constitutionality or the legality of the sentence which is the subject of
this action.” We agree. There is no legal reason to vacate his plea, conviction, or
sentence in the Delaware County case.
For the first time on appeal, Cole contends his plea counsel provided
constitutionally deficient representation in allowing Cole to plead guilty without first
explaining it might be possible Cole would not be placed in the rehabilitation
program. This claim was not raised in Cole’s application for postconviction relief.
The error was not preserved for appellate review. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641
N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that
issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we
will decide them on appeal.”).
Cole appears to claim his postconviction counsel was ineffective in failing
to assert a claim that his plea counsel was ineffective for not explaining it might be
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possible Cole would not be placed in the rehabilitation program. Cole also asserts
his postconviction counsel was ineffective in failing to subpoena Cole’s plea
counsel to testify at the postconviction trial. These claims are without merit. Cole
moved to represent himself in this civil proceeding. The district court granted
Cole’s request after Cole filed a disciplinary complaint against his postconviction
counsel. An applicant cannot prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance when
representing oneself. See State v. Hutchison, 341 N.W.2d 33, 42 (Iowa 1983)
(“[T]he defendant cannot knowingly and intelligently make an election to proceed
pro se and then, having lost his trial on the merits, seek a reversal on appeal by
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.”).
Finally, Cole contends the postconviction court failed to make necessary
findings and conclusions in ruling on his application. When ruling on an application
for postconviction relief “[t]he court shall make specific findings of fact, and state
expressly its conclusions of law, relating to each issue presented.” Iowa Code
§ 822.7. “[S]ubstantial compliance is sufficient.” Gamble v. State, 723 N.W.2d
443, 446 (Iowa 2006).
We conclude the district court substantially complied with the rule. In the
order denying Cole’s application for PCR, the court listed the issues that Cole
raised:
A. A conviction or sentence was in violation of the
constitution of the United States or the constitution and laws of this
state.
B. The court was without jurisdiction to impose
sentence.[1]
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The Court’s order skips from B to D.
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D. There exists evidence of material facts, not previously
presented or heard, that require vacation of the conviction or
sentence in the interests of justice.
E. Applicant’s probation, parole or conditional release has
been unlawfully revoked.
F. Applicant is otherwise unlawfully held in custody or
other restraint.
The court concluded that Cole “failed to provide any evidence of any of the grounds
alleged to allow the court to grant him the requested relief.” Nothing more was
required of the court.
AFFIRMED.