J-S63021-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
EMANUEL HOWARD :
:
Appellant : No. 318 WDA 2018
Appeal from the PCRA Order February 6, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-26-CR-0001069-2016
BEFORE: OTT, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED OCTOBER 31, 2018
Emanuel Howard (Appellant) appeals from the order dismissing his
petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
A prior panel of this Court set forth the relevant facts of this case:
On December 29, 2015, Christine Arthur (hereinafter “Victim”)
was employed as a waitress at the Canton Restaurant on Fayette
Street in Uniontown, Fayette County, Pennsylvania.
Approximately [30] minutes into her shift, a man described by
Victim as a young black male, with facial hair, distinguished eyes
and wearing a dark hooded sweatshirt came into the restaurant
and placed an order. The man grabbed a can of pop out of the
refrigerator cooler and set it down on the counter where Victim
was working. After Victim requested payment for the order, the
man went around the counter, pointed an object that was covered
up with a handkerchief into her side and demanded money from
the cash register. The assailant then ran off after taken [sic]
approximately sixty dollars. Victim testified she complied with the
demand because she “was afraid for my life.”
About five minutes after the assailant fled the restaurant,
Lieutenant Tom Kolencik with the Uniontown Police Department
____________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S63021-18
arrived on scene and spoke with Victim. Lieutenant Kolencik also
took into evidence the pop can that was handled by the assailant
during the commission of the crime. The conclusion of the lab
results was that a set of fingerprints on the pop can belonged to
Appellant.
Commonwealth v. Howard, 1549 WDA 2016 at 1-2 (Pa. Super. 2016)
(unpublished memorandum) (quoting Trial Court Opinion, 12/5/16, at 2-3).
The PCRA court summarized the procedural history as follows:
On September 7, 2016, following a trial by jury, [] Appellant .
. . was convicted of the following charges: Robbery; Theft by
Unlawful Taking; Receiving Stolen Property; and Simple Assault.
On September 14, 2016, the [trial court] sentenced [] Appellant
to undergo a period of incarceration of no less than seven (7)
years nor more than twenty (20) years. Appellant filed his direct
appeal to this Court on October 13, 2016. On June 21, 2017, this
Court affirmed the [trial c]ourt’s sentence and entered judgment
accordingly.
On [August 9], 2017, Appellant filed his pro se PCRA petition.
The [PCRA c]ourt appointed [counsel] to represent [] Appellant.
[PCRA Counsel] filed Appellant’s Amended PCRA Petition on
November 9, 2017. The [PCRA c]ourt held a hearing on
Appellant’s amended petition on January 30, 2018. By Order
dated February 6, 2018, the [PCRA c]ourt denied Appellant’s
amended petition. On February 28, 2018, Appellant filed his direct
appeal to this Court. Subsequently, the [PCRA court] entered an
Order directing Appellant to file his concise issues. On March 21,
2018, Appellant filed two concise issues with this Court.
PCRA Court Opinion, 4/9/18, at 2-3 (footnote omitted).
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for review:
1. Did the Commonwealth violate [] Appellant’s constitutional
rights when it failed to provide the defense with a copy of the
photo array that was presented to the witness?
2. Was [Trial Counsel] ineffective for failing to conduct a
reasonably substantial investigation, was generally unprepared
-2-
J-S63021-18
for trial, and failed to adequately question [] Appellant as to his
location on the incident date?
Appellant’s Brief at 10.
“In reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, we examine whether the PCRA
court’s determination is supported by the record and free of legal error.”
Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa. 2014) (quotations and
citations omitted). “To be entitled to PCRA relief, [an] appellant must
establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, [that] his conviction or
sentence resulted from one or more of the enumerated errors in 42
Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9543(a)(2)[.]” Id.
First, Appellant argues that the PCRA court erred in rejecting his Brady1
claim. Appellant’s Brady claim is underdeveloped and difficult to understand.
From what we can discern, Appellant asserts that the Commonwealth violated
his constitutional rights because it failed to produce a photo lineup that
Appellant claims the police gave to the Victim at Appellant’s preliminary
hearing to assist the Victim in identifying Appellant as the perpetrator of the
robbery.
With respect to Brady claims, our Supreme Court has explained:
To succeed on a Brady claim, the defendant must show: (1)
evidence was suppressed by the prosecution; (2) the evidence,
whether exculpatory or impeaching, was favorable to the
defendant; and (3) prejudice resulted. Commonwealth v.
Daniels, [] 104 A.3d 267, 284 ([Pa.] 2014), citing
Commonwealth v. Tedford, [] 960 A.2d 1, 30 ([Pa.] 2008). A
____________________________________________
1 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
-3-
J-S63021-18
Brady violation exists only where the suppressed evidence is
material to guilt or punishment, i.e., where there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. Id. In determining
whether a reasonable probability of a different outcome has been
demonstrated, “[t]he question is not whether the defendant would
more likely than not have received a different verdict with the
evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial,
understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.”
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434[] (1995). A “reasonable
probability” of a different result is shown when the government’s
suppression of evidence “undermines confidence in the outcome
of the trial.” [U.S.] v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678[] (1985).
Brady claims, nevertheless, may be subject to waiver. See
[Commonwealth v. Roney, 79 A.3d 595, 609-12 (Pa. 2013)]
(several Brady claims deemed waived on PCRA appeal for failure
to raise them at trial or on direct appeal), citing Commonwealth
v. Chmiel, [] 30 A.3d 1111, 1129-30 ([Pa.] 2011);
Commonwealth v. Treiber, [] 121 A.3d 435, 460-61 ([Pa.]
2015) (Brady claim waived because it could have been raised in
an earlier proceeding), citing Chmiel, 30 A.3d at 1129-1130. See
also Commonwealth v. Bomar, [] 104 A.3d 1179, 1190-91
([Pa.] 2014) (Brady claim waived where appellant did not show
evidence was not available at trial or counsel could not have
uncovered it with reasonable diligence).
Commonwealth v. Cousar, 154 A.3d 287, 301-02 (Pa. 2017).
In this case, the PCRA court determined that Appellant waived his Brady
claim because he failed to demonstrate that through the exercise of due
diligence, he could not have raised it before the trial court or on direct appeal.
PCRA Court Opinion, 4/9/18, at 5-6. We agree. Appellant testified at his
PCRA hearing that there was a discussion at his preliminary hearing regarding
a photo array that the Commonwealth allegedly showed to the Victim. N.T.,
1/30/18, at 6. Because the record reflects that Appellant had knowledge of
the existence of the alleged photo array prior to trial, but did not raise the
-4-
J-S63021-18
Commonwealth’s failure to disclose it before the trial court or on direct appeal,
the PCRA court did not err in concluding that Appellant waived his Brady
claim. See Cousar, 154 A.3d at 301-02.
Even if Appellant’s Brady claim was not waived, it is patently meritless.
First, Appellant failed to provide any evidence that a photo array existed
beyond his own claim that the Commonwealth referenced an array at his
preliminary hearing. Second, even if the photo array did exist, Appellant does
not explain how he was prejudiced by the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose
it. In any event, the Victim specifically identified Appellant as the perpetrator
of the robbery and Appellant’s fingerprints were recovered from the soda can
purchased by the perpetrator immediately prior to the robbery. N.T., 9/6/16,
at 18-19, 90-91. Thus, regardless of any impact the alleged photo array may
or may not have had on Appellant’s trial, there was ample evidence to convict
Appellant of the crimes charged.
Next, Appellant argues that Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to
investigate his case and adequately prepare for trial. Specifically, Appellant
asserts that Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to secure the testimony of
his alibi witness, Paige Fairfax.
As the PCRA Court determined, Appellant has waived his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim because he failed to raise it in either his pro se or
amended PCRA petitions. See Amended Petition for Post Conviction Collateral
Relief, 11/9/17; Pro Se Motion for Post Conviction Collateral Relief, 8/9/17. It
-5-
J-S63021-18
is well settled that any PCRA claims not raised in a petitioner’s pro se PCRA
petition, in an amended petition, or in response to a PCRA court’s Rule 907
notice are waived. Commonwealth v. Rigg, 84 A.3d 1080, 1084-85 (Pa.
Super. 2014). Accordingly, Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim is meritless.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/31/2018
-6-