NUMBER 13-16-00630-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
DONEL SALAZAR JR., Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 370th District Court
of Hidalgo County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Longoria and Hinojosa
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria
Appellant Donel Salazar Jr. was convicted of two counts of continuous sexual
assault of a child. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02 (West, Westlaw through 1st 2017
C.S.). The trial court sentenced him to thirty-five years’ imprisonment. Salazar’s court-
appointed counsel has filed an Anders brief. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744
(1967). We affirm.
I. ANDERS BRIEF
Pursuant to Anders, Salazar’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief
and a motion to withdraw with this Court, stating that his review of the record yielded no
grounds of error upon which an appeal can be predicated. See id. Counsel’s brief meets
the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation demonstrating why
there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d
403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically
advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record
references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.”)
(citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no
pet.)); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.]
1978), Salazar’s counsel carefully discussed the evidence adduced at the trial, pointed
out where pertinent testimony may be found in the record, referred to pages in the record
where objections were made, the nature of the objection, the trial court’s ruling, and
discussed either why the trial court’s ruling was correct or why Salazar was not harmed
by the ruling of the court. Counsel has informed this Court, in writing, that counsel has:
(1) notified Salazar that counsel has filed an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw; (2)
provided Salazar with a copy of the Anders brief and motion to withdraw; (3) informed
Salazar of his rights to file a pro se response 1 and review the record preparatory to filing
1 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “the pro se response need not comply with the
rules of appellate procedure in order to be considered. Rather, the response should identify for the court
those issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in deciding whether the case
presents any meritorious issues.” In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 409 n.23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
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that response; and (4) provided Salazar with a form motion for pro se access to the
appellate record with instructions to file the motion in this Court. See Anders, 386 U.S. at
744; Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 319; Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510 n.3; see also In re Schulman,
252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23. More than adequate time has passed, and Salazar has not filed
a response.
II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW
Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the
proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.
75, 80 (1988). We may determine the appeal is wholly frivolous and issue an opinion after
reviewing the record and finding no reversible error. Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824,
826–827 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Alternatively, if we determine that arguable grounds for
appeal exist, we must remand for the appointment of new counsel to brief those issues.
Id. at 827.
We have conducted an independent review of the record, including appellate
counsel’s brief and Salazar’s pro se response, and find no reversible error. See Anders,
386 U.S. at 744; Garner v. State, 300 S.W.3d 763, 766 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Bledsoe,
178 S.W.3d at 826–27. We agree with counsel that the record presents no arguably
meritorious grounds for review and the appeal is frivolous. See Garner, 300 S.W.3d at
766; Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 827.
III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW
ln accordance with Anders, Salazar’s attorney has asked this Court for permission
to withdraw as counsel. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also ln re Schulman, 252
S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779–80 (Tex. App.—Dallas
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1995, no pet.) (“[I]f an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must withdraw from
representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the appointed attorney must
file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the appellate court that the
appeal is frivolous.”) (citations omitted)). We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. Within
five days of the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of this
opinion and this Court’s judgment to Salazar and to advise him of his right to file a petition
for discretionary review. 2 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also ln re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d
at 412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
IV. CONCLUSION
Counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
NORA L. LONGORIA
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the
1st day of November, 2018.
2 No substitute counsel will be appointed. If Salazar seeks further review of this case by the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary review or file a
pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed within thirty days
from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing or timely motion for en banc
reconsideration was overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. Any petition for discretionary review
should comply with the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 68.4. See id. R. 68.4.
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