FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT November 5, 2018
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
ANTHONY CHARLES MURPHY,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 18-4100
(D.C. No. 1:17-CV-00064-CW)
JUDGE THOMAS WILLMORE, First (D. Utah)
District Court for Cache Co. Utah;
SPENCER WALSH, Chief Prosecutor,
Office of the District Attorney, Logan,
Utah; BARBARA LOCHMAR, Assistant
District Attorney, Office of the District
Attorney, Logan, Utah; TRAVIS ALLEN,
Detective, Smithfield City Police
Department, Utah; FNU ZITTERKOFT,
Officer, Smithfield City Police
Department, Utah,
Defendants - Appellees.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
_________________________________
Before BRISCOE, HOLMES, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Plaintiff Anthony Charles Murphy, a Utah state prisoner appearing pro se,
filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 effectively challenging the
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
validity of his arrest and subsequent criminal conviction in Utah state court. The
district court dismissed the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Murphy now appeals from the order of dismissal. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the district court’s order of dismissal and deny
Murphy’s motion for leave to proceed on appeal without prepayment of fees and
costs.
I
Murphy, who is currently incarcerated in the Sanpete County Jail in Manti,
Utah, filed a pro se civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 naming as
defendants the state court judge, the prosecutors, and two police officers who were
involved in his arrest in 2009 and his subsequent prosecution and conviction in state
court. Murphy alleged in his complaint that the defendants violated his constitutional
rights during the course of his arrest and ensuing criminal trial. For instance, the
complaint alleged that the state court judge violated Murphy’s rights under the
Confrontation Clause by refusing to allow him to ask certain questions of a witness.
The complaint in turn, under the heading “INJURY,” alleged that Murphy, “[d]ue to
the actions of these defendants,” had “lost [his] liberty, been subjected to public
embarrassment, lost a job [he] truly loved, lost [his] friendly neighbors, [and] the
place [he] called home.” Dist. Ct. Docket No. 3 at 5. In the section of his complaint
entitled “REQUEST FOR RELIEF,” Murphy asked for the criminal charges against
him to be “dismissed,” “retrial barred due to [government] misconduct,” and that he
be awarded “all fees associated with filing and defending th[e] case.” Id. at 6.
2
The district court reviewed the complaint before it was served on defendants
and concluded that it should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
In its memorandum decision and order of dismissal, the district court first concluded
that the state court judge named as a defendant in Murphy’s complaint was entitled to
absolute judicial immunity because he “was acting in his judicial capacity in
presiding over th[e] [criminal] case” when the alleged constitutional violations
occurred. Dist. Ct. Docket No. 16 at 2. The district court in turn concluded that the
two prosecutors named in Murphy’s complaint were “entitled to absolute
prosecutorial immunity from th[e] lawsuit.” Id. at 3. The district court also
concluded that Murphy’s claims amounted to an attack on the validity of his
underlying state criminal conviction, and were thus subject to dismissal under Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994). In addition, the district court concluded
that Murphy’s “requests to have his conviction invalidated and for release from
incarceration [could] be properly raised only in a habeas corpus petition” filed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Dist. Ct. Docket No. 16 at 4. Lastly, the district court
concluded that Murphy’s “search and seizure claim [wa]s untimely” because “[t]he
claim accrued on the date of the search, June 5, 2009,” and the applicable “statute of
limitations expired . . . on June 5, 2013,” nearly four years before Murphy filed his
complaint. Id.
3
Final judgment in the case was entered on June 4, 2018. Murphy filed a notice
of appeal on June 25, 2018. 1
II
We review de novo the district court’s order dismissing Murphy’s complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th
Cir. 2007). Section 1915(e)(2)(B) provides, in pertinent part, that in a civil action
brought by a prisoner proceeding without prepayment of filing fees, a court “shall
dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . .
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
In considering the dismissal of a complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii),
“[w]e employ the same standard of review . . . that we employ for Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Kay, 500
F.3d at 1217. “In particular, we look to the specific allegations in the complaint to
determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief.” Id. at 1218
1
On June 11, 2018, approximately two weeks before Murphy filed his notice
of appeal, he filed motion to reconsider with the district court. The district court
issued a one-page order denying the motion to reconsider on July 10, 2018,
approximately two weeks after Murphy filed his notice of appeal. Murphy did not
file a new notice of appeal or an amended notice of appeal following the district
court’s July 10, 2018 order. Although Murphy did file a motion on August 2, 2018,
to proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs or fees, that motion did not meet
the requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 3(c) to qualify as a notice of appeal. See
generally Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 245 (1992) (“hold[ing] that a document
intended to serve as an appellate brief may qualify as the notice of appeal required by
Rule 3.”). Consequently, we do not have jurisdiction over the district court’s July 10,
2018 order denying Murphy’s motion to reconsider.
4
(quotation marks omitted). Further, when dealing with a pro se complaint, we must
construe the allegations in the complaint liberally. Id.
Having carefully examined and liberally construed Murphy’s pro se complaint,
we agree with the district court that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. More specifically, we agree with the district court that: (1) the
doctrines of judicial and prosecutorial immunity preclude Murphy’s claims against
the state court judge and prosecutors, see Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991)
(discussing judicial immunity); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424 (1976)
(discussing prosecutorial immunity); (2) the Supreme Court’s decision in Heck
prevents Murphy from challenging the validity of his state court conviction by way of
a § 1983 action; and (3) Murphy’s challenge to the validity of his arrest was
untimely, see Garza v. Burnett, 672 F.3d 1217, 1219 (10th Cir. 1995) (applying
Utah’s four-year residual statute of limitations to claim brought under § 1983).
The judgment of the district court is therefore AFFIRMED. Murphy’s motion
to reconsider appointment of counsel is denied as moot.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
5