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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 76962-6-1
)
Respondent, ) DIVISION ONE
)
v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
JEFFREY JOSEPH BAUS, )
)
Appellant. ) FILED: November 5, 2018
ANDRUS, J. — A jury convicted Jeffrey Joseph Baus of rape in the second
degree and assault in the second degree. He contends that he was prejudiced
by the prosecutor's improper remarks during closing argument. He also
challenges the imposition of a condition of community custody prohibiting him
from frequenting drug areas, as defined by his community corrections officer.
Baus fails to establish prosecutorial misconduct warranting reversal. Because
the community custody condition related to drug areas is unconstitutionally
vague, we remand to strike the condition. Otherwise, we affirm the judgment and
sentence.
FACTS
The State charged Jeffrey Baus, by amended information, with second
degree assault and second degree rape.' According to the testimony at Baus's
trial, R.M. spent the evening of April 22, 2016, at the Quilceda Creek Casino in
Marysville. R.M., who was homeless and addicted to heroin, spent a
I The State initially charged Baus with rape in the third degree.
No. 76962-6-1/2
considerable amount of time at the casino. Friends were often there and it was
open all night, warm, and safe.
That evening, R.M.'s plans for the night fell through and she had "nowhere
to go." R.M. was distressed and she was wearing four-inch high heels that were
"killing" her.
At some point, R.M. noticed Baus, who appeared to be watching her. At
around 11 p.m., when R.M.'s friend walked away and she was alone, Baus
approached her. Baus commented that she appeared to be having a difficult
time. After R.M. explained her situation, Baus said, "today may be your lucky
day." Baus told R.M. that he had a house in Granite Falls and invited her there to
"hang out" and "Dlelax." Baus assured her there were Inio expectations."
R.M. and Baus "flirted a little bit" and talked about Alaska. R.M. grew up
in Alaska and Baus said he wanted to retire there. This common interest made
R.M. feel slightly more inclined to trust Baus. After an hour or so, Baus suddenly
announced that he was leaving and that if R.M. wanted to come with him, it was
"now or never." R.M. did not have a cell phone and wanted to find her friend first
to tell him where she was going. Baus refused to wait for her.
Although R.M. felt uneasy, she left with Baus. As they drove, they passed
the home of one of R.M.'s friends. R.M. asked Baus to stop so she could quickly
talk to her friend. Again, he refused.
During the 30-minute drive to Baus's wooded neighborhood, the
conversation turned more overtly sexual. Baus told R.M. that she was pretty and
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No. 76962-6-1/3
described sex acts he wanted to engage in. R.M. "kind of blew it off' and vaguely
said, "[w]ell, I'm not sure about that."
When they arrived at his home, Baus gave R.M. a tour. Baus showed her
a survivalist room and told her he had everything necessary for the two of them
to "disappear into the woods for a month without anybody knowing where we
were." R.M. was afraid, but felt she could not leave without money, a cell phone,
or shoes she could easily walk in.
R.M. ate a tuna fish sandwich and some peanut butter. And because she
was nervous, she also smoked "three or four hits" of heroin, which was just
enough to relax her and make her feel "normal." Meanwhile, Baus continued to
drink beer and smoked marijuana. Baus offered R.M. beverages, but she
declined, fearing that he might drug her.
Baus let R.M. use the bathroom, but then continually banged on the door,
demanding that she come out. R.M. was increasingly worried. Partly to escape
from Baus, she asked to take a shower. The pocket door in the master bathroom
did not lock properly. A few minutes after R.M. got into the shower, Baus
appeared, naked, and tried to enter. R.M. yelled at him to leave. Baus
responded, "Oh come on. Don't you see the toys in there? Don't you want to
play?" After R.M. continued to yell, he left.
R.M. believed she was truly in danger and started to panic. After her
shower, she ran to the other bathroom and locked the door. For about 15
minutes, she sat on the toilet seat while Baus forcefully pounded on the door and
badgered her. Finally, because she "had enough" of his yelling and thought he
No. 76962-6-1/4
might break down the door, she opened the door, grabbed her purse, and
returned to the master bath. While she tried to calm herself and decide what to
do, she took Q-tip cotton swabs from her purse and cleaned her ears.
Then, with a "dark" and "Ig]lazed over" look on his face, Baus "body
bumped" R.M. When she yelled, he snatched the towel she was wearing, picked
her up, and threw her on the bed.2 He jumped on the bed and straddled her. He
tied her wrists and one leg with thin ropes that were already secured to the
bedposts. R.M. screamed and tried to free herself. Baus hit her in the face.
R.M. felt like her face "exploded" and fluid poured from her nose and mouth.
R.M. pleaded with Baus to stop. He shoved his erect penis into her mouth three
or four times. She gagged and found it difficult to breathe.
As R.M. continued to plead with him, Baus walked across the room,
picked up a knife on his dresser, and "taunted" her with it for about 10 minutes.
He held the blade to her skin and moved it over her naked body, touching her
legs, vagina, chest, breasts, neck, and arms. R.M. believed he was going to kill
her. Then suddenly, using the same knife, Baus cut the restraints. Baus said to
R.M., "I don't think this thing is going to work out. Some bitches like this sort of
thing."
R.M. retrieved her clothes that were scattered throughout the house.
Although she was terrified, R.M. tried to pretend that she was still interested in
Baus and was not really hurt. She eventually persuaded Baus to drive her to a
nearby Walmart. R.M. rode with the window rolled down and her hand on the
2 R.M. is 4 feet 11 inches tall and weighs 118 pounds, while Baus is 6 feet tall and about
100 pounds heavier.
4
No. 76962-6-1/5
door handle, so that she could jump out if necessary. En route, Baus changed
his mind and said he was taking her back to his house and that she could leave
later. As Baus slowed the car to enter a roundabout, R.M. jumped out. Baus
gave her the finger and said,"See you, bitch."
R.M. walked along the highway for 30 to 40 minutes until she came to an
open service station. The store clerk, Grant Jensen, immediately noticed that
R.M. was injured. Her face was bruised and bleeding. R.M. was frantic and
crying. She told Jensen that a man beat her up after she refused to have sex.
Jensen gave R.M. ice for the swelling on her face, lent her his cell phone, and
encouraged her to call 911. R.M. declined to call for assistance because there
were warrants for her arrest. A customer later drove R.M. to the Walmart where
a friend picked her up.
Over the next 24 hours, R.M. arranged to store her vehicle and other
personal items. Then, on the morning of April 24, 2016, a friend drove R.M. back
to Baus's home so she could obtain the address and then she called the police.3
Despite the risk of going to jail, R.M. decided to report the crime because
"nobody should do that to anybody."
Michael Mansur and Thomas Dalton of the Snohomish County Sheriffs
Office met R.M. at the Granite Falls police station that morning. They observed
her recent injuries, including black eyes, an apparently broken nose, and one eye
that was nearly swollen shut. There were faint ligature marks on her wrists.
R.M. was very emotional and shaken. She identified Baus in a photomontage
3 R.M. was familiar with Baus's neighborhood because she had a friend who lived there
and had worked in that neighborhood in the past.
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No. 76962-6-1/6
and prepared a written statement. The police officers arranged for R.M. to go to
the hospital for treatment. Both at the hospital and earlier at the police station,
officers took photographs of R.M.'s injuries. At the hospital, R.M. declined to talk
to the forensic nurse examiner.4
Items recovered in a search of Baus's home and DNA5 testing of some of
those items corroborated R.M.'s presence in Baus's home and several details of
her account.
At trial, in addition to R.M., several witnesses testified on behalf of the
State, including Jensen, police officers involved in the investigation, and a
Washington State Patrol forensic scientist. Baus did not testify.
Baus did not deny that R.M. had been in his home. The defense argued,
however, there was insufficient evidence to establish that the contact between
R.M. and Baus occurred on the charging date, "on or about" April 23, 2016.
Counsel also pointed out that there was no video surveillance footage from the
casino or any other evidence showing that Baus approached R.M., and not the
other way around. Considering R.M.'s difficult circumstances at the time and her
acknowledgment that she had flirted with Baus, the defense suggested that R.M.
may have "prey[ed] on" Baus. The defense also argued that R.M.'s memories
and her statement were unreliable because of her drug use and that a sexual
assault examination would have shown whether R.M. had sexual intercourse with
Baus or someone else. The jury convicted Baus as charged.
4 R.M. felt she did not need a sexual assault exam because she was not vaginally
assaulted.
5 Deoxyribonucleic acid.
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No. 76962-6-1/7
Prosecutorial Misconduct
Baus alleges several instances of prosecutorial misconduct during closing
and rebuttal argument. We reject this argument as a basis for overturning the
conviction.
Prosecutorial misconduct may deprive a defendant of his right to a fair
trial. See State v. Jones, 144 Wn. App. 284, 290, 183 P.3d 307 (2008). The
appellant bears the burden of demonstrating prosecutorial misconduct on appeal
and must establish that the conduct was both improper and prejudicial. State v.
Stenson, 132 Wn.2d 668, 718, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997). "Allegedly improper
arguments should be reviewed in the context of the total argument, the issues in
the case, the evidence addressed in the argument, and the instructions given."
State v. Russell, 125 Wn.2d 24, 85-86, 882 P.2d 747 (1994). Prosecuting
attorneys have wide latitude during closing arguments to argue facts and
reasonable inferences from the evidence. State v. Thorgerson, 172 Wn.2d 438,
453, 258 P.3d 43(2011). This latitude allows a prosecutor to "freely comment on
witness credibility based on the evidence." State v. Lewis, 156 Wn. App. 230,
240, 233 P.3d 891 (2010).
To establish prejudice sufficient to require reversal, a defendant who
timely objected to the challenged conduct in the trial court must "show a
substantial likelihood that the misconduct affected the jury verdict." In re
Glasmann, 175 Wn.2d 696, 704, 286 P.3d 673 (2012). Reversal is not required
where the alleged error could have been obviated by a curative instruction. State
v. Gentry, 125 Wn.2d 570, 596, 888 P.2d 1105 (1995). The "failure to object to
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No. 76962-6-1/8
an improper remark constitutes a waiver of error unless the remark is so flagrant
and ill intentioned that it causes an enduring and resulting prejudice that could
not have been neutralized by an admonition to the jury." Thorgerson, 172 Wn.2d
at 443(quoting Russell, 125 Wn.2d at 86).
Presumption of Innocence
Baus contends that the prosecutor committed flagrant misconduct by
undermining the presumption of innocence. Defense counsel stated in closing
argument that the presumption of innocence "continues throughout the entire trial
unless, during your deliberations, you find it has been overcome by the evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt." Counsel further elaborated, "it's the end of the trial
and the law says he sits here right now innocent."
The prosecutor argued in rebuttal,
Defense counsel started with kind of a discussion of the
presumption of innocence. What I heard her say was you're not
allowed to come to any other conclusion. Well, that's really not
what it says. The defendant is presumed innocent until you're
convinced otherwise. It doesn't mean a plea of not guilty means
end of story and you just dismiss what anyone else has to say to
the contrary. That's not what it means. You evaluate the evidence
and you determine whether or not — I mean, why are we here if the
presumption of innocence means he's innocent.
During the same argument the prosecutor also described the phrase "an abiding
belief" as "something that you believe yesterday, today, tomorrow."
The "presumption of innocence continues 'throughout the entire trial' and
may be overcome, if at all, only during the jury's deliberations." State v.
Veneqas, 155 Wn. App. 507, 524, 228 P.3d 813(2010)(quoting 11 WASHINGTON
PRACTICE: WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 4.01, at 85 (3d ed.
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No. 76962-6-1/9
2008)). The prosecutor's argument did not suggest otherwise. The argument
was consistent with the jury's instructions.6 Unlike the argument at issue in
Venegas, the prosecutor did not indicate that the presumption of innocence
erodes as the State presents evidence of the defendant's guilt during the trial.
Nor did the prosecutor imply that Baus was guilty merely because the State filed
charges against him. Rather, the prosecutor emphasized that the presumption of
innocence may ultimately be overcome by evidence that meets the State's
burden of proof. And to the extent that the prosecutor's explanation of the
meaning of abiding belief was inartful in that it included "yesterday," it was not
flagrant misconduct.7
Burden of Proof
Baus also contends that the prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of
proof to the defense in discussing the reasonable doubt instruction. The
prosecutor argued,
Now, the reasonable doubt instruction talks about reasonable doubt
being based on evidence or lack of evidence, but it talks about
evidence based — I mean reasonable doubt that's based on
something; right? So you can't just come here and throw out here's
a man's name, here's a man's name. Maybe it's him or maybe she
met the defendant three days earlier. Well, where's that come
from? Is that, is that the way it works? You can just throw out a
possibility over here and a possibility over here and come up with a
hypothetical and that's enough reasonable doubt even though it's
based on nothing? No. No. The law contemplates that it's based
6 Instruction No. 4 provides, in relevant part: "A defendant is presumed innocent. This
presumption continues throughout the entire trial unless during your deliberations you find it has
been overcome by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt." The same instruction also states
that jurors are "satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt," if after fairly and carefully considering all the
evidence, they have an "abiding belief in the truth of the charge."
7 Dictionary definitions of "abiding" include "continuing or persisting in the same state
without changing or diminishing" and "enduring." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 3(2002).
9
No. 76962-6-1/10
on something. The doubt is based on something, not on the fact
there is a possibility that this potential hypothetical might happen
and there's other men who she had contact with that week.
The court overruled the defendant's objection, stating, "[I]t's argument. The law
has been given and is clear."
Baus argues that the prosecutor's argument is comparable to
impermissible "fill-in-the-blank" remarks like those at issue in State v. Emery, 174
Wn.2d 741 (2012). In Emery, the prosecutor argued,
[l]n order for you to find the defendant not guilty, you have to ask
yourselves or you'd have to say, quote, I doubt the defendant is
guilty, and my reason is blank. A doubt for which a reason exists. If
you think that you have a doubt, you must fill in that blank.
174 Wn.2d at 750-51. The "fill-in-the-blank" argument was improper because it
"subtly shifts the burden to the defense" by requiring the jury to articulate a
reason to doubt. Emery, 174 Wn.2d at 760.
But here, the prosecutor did not tell the jury it had to be able to articulate a
specific reason for doubting Baus's guilt before it could acquit. The prosecutor
instead argued that based on the evidence before it, there was no reason to
doubt his guilt. The instructions and the State's argument properly informed the
jury that the State bore the burden of proof. The State's argument did not
impermissibly shift the burden of proof.
Denigration of Defense Counsel
Baus argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by denigrating his
counsel and defense counsel's role. The prosecutor began closing argument by
reminding the jury that, regardless of R.M.'s personal circumstances and poor
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No. 76962-6-1/11
choices, she was entitled to personal security. The prosecutor then recounted
some of the obstacles and indignities that R.M. endured in order to pursue
justice, including being questioned by the police and an investigator, being
photographed, and being treated unsympathetically at the hospital because of
her addiction.
The prosecutor then discussed how the trial itself subjected R.M. to further
humiliation because she was questioned by both counsel, challenged by defense
counsel, and "put under a microscope:"
She has to sit there (indicating) and she has to tell a room full of
strangers about her weaknesses, about her life, about her
mistakes, about the most terrifying thing that has ever happened to
her, something that none of us could ever imagine in front of the
guy that did it to her. I put her up there and I asked her to tell me
all these things, to explain why she did what she did, to tell me
about her bad decisions, and then when she breaks down
describing how she was pleading for her life, begging to have a
chance to see her child again, I coldly make her keep going: What
happened next?
But that's not the end. Then the defendant's lawyer starts asking
her questions insinuating her bad choices, saying things like do you
expect us to believe that? See, in ordinary polite society, we don't
talk to each other like that. If you were telling somebody
something, something humiliating, horrible and terrifying and they
said to you, do you expect us to believe that - - 18]
The trial court sustained defense counsel's objection, and instructed the
prosecutor to "move on." Defense counsel did not request a curative instruction.
"It is improper for the prosecutor to disparagingly comment on defense
counsel's role or impugn the defense lawyer's integrity." Thomerson, 172 Wn.2d
at 451 (prosecutor engaged in misconduct by referring to defense counsel's
8 During cross-examination, defense counsel questioned R.M. about her written
statement in which she indicated that at a point during the attack she "start[ed] to calm down a
bit" and asked,"So are we supposed to believe that?"
11
No. 76962-6-1/12
presentation of his case as "bogus" and involving "sleight of hand," but the
misconduct did not likely affect the verdict). A prosecutor's statements that
malign defense counsel are impermissible because they can damage a
defendant's opportunity to present his or her case. State v. Lindsay, 180 Wn.2d
423, 432, 326 P.3d 125 (2014). But comments that "can fairly be said to focus
on the evidence" do not constitute misconduct. Thorcierson, 172 Wn.2d at 451.
The prosecutor's comment suggesting that defense counsel challenged
the victim's testimony in a manner that was offensive to "polite society" was
disparaging to defense counsel. See Thoraerson, 172 Wn.2d at 452. However,
the larger context of the argument was not a personal attack on defense counsel
or counsel's strategy. Rather, the prosecutor was reminding the jury that R.M.
faced significant challenges in coming forward with her allegations. Counsel
highlighted the fact that all participants in the process—including the prosecutor,
the defense, and law enforcement—subjected R.M. to uncomfortable and
unwanted scrutiny. The prosecutor encouraged the jury to consider these facts
in evaluating R.M.'s credibility.
The trial court sustained defense counsel's timely objection and
specifically instructed the prosecutor to abandon her line of argument. To the
extent there was any residual prejudice, it could have been neutralized by an
instruction to disregard the argument. In State v. Lindsay, the prosecutor
characterized the defense's argument a "crock" and engaged in numerous other
instances of misconduct. Lindsay, 180 Wn.2d at 442-43. Our Supreme Court
determined that the cumulative effect of the repeated and prejudicial misconduct
12
No. 76962-6-1/13
could not have been cured by any instruction or series of instructions. Lindsay,
180 Wn.2d at 443. But here, the misconduct was neither repeated nor pervasive.
Considering the larger context of the argument, the limited nature of the
inappropriate remarks, and the weight of the evidence against Baus, there is not
a substantial likelihood that the prosecutor's comments about the manner in
which defense counsel questioned the victim affected the jury's verdict.
We conclude Baus has not established prosecutorial misconduct
warranting a reversal of his conviction.
Condition of Community Custody
At sentencing, the trial court imposed a condition of community custody
requiring Baus to avoid "drug areas, as defined in writing by the supervising
Community Corrections Officer" (CCO). Baus contends this condition is
unconstitutionally vague. We agree.
The guarantee of due process requires that laws, including sentencing
conditions, not be vague. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; WASH.CONST. art. 1, § 3;
State v. Irwin, 191 Wn. App. 644, 652, 364 P.3d 830 (2015). To withstand a
vagueness challenge, a condition of sentence must (1) provide ordinary people
fair warning of proscribed conduct, and (2) have standards that are sufficiently
definite enough to protect against arbitrary enforcement. State v. Bahl, 164
Wn.2d 739, 752-53, 193 P.3d 678 (2008); Irwin, 191 Wn. App. at 652-53. Failure
to satisfy either prong renders the condition unconstitutional. Irwin, 191 Wn. App.
at 653.
13
No. 76962-6-1/14
In Irwin, this court held that a similar community custody condition
requiring further definition by a CCO was unconstitutionally vague. Irwin, 191
Wn. App. 652. A condition of sentence barred Irwin from places where "children
are known to congregate," as defined by his CCO. Irwin, 191 Wn. App. 655.
This court concluded that "Mithout some clarifying language or an illustrative list
of prohibited locations . . . the condition does not give ordinary people sufficient
notice to 'understand what conduct is proscribed." Irwin, 191 Wn. App. 655.
Moreover, the authority given to the CCO to interpret the condition allowed for
unconstitutionally arbitrary enforcement. Irwin, 191 Wn. App. 655.
Likewise here, leaving the definition of "drug areas" subject to the CCO's
discretion deprives Baus of fair warning of the proscribed conduct. And while it is
true that he may have notice of prohibited conduct once the CCO sets forth a
definition of "drug areas" in writing, the condition still fails under the second prong
of vagueness analysis because it is vulnerable to arbitrary enforcement. See
Irwin, 191 Wn. App. at 655. For these reasons, the condition of community
custody related to "drug areas" is unconstitutionally vague.
Accordingly, we affirm Baus's convictions, but remand to strike the
challenged condition of community custody.
Ji‘liv-t-4-)7
WE CONCUR:
14