FILED
COURT OF APPEALS DIV I
STATE OF WASHINGTON
2010 NOV -5 AM 9: 41
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
EVERETT HANGAR, LLC, a Washington
limited liability company, No. 77842-1-1
Respondent, DIVISION ONE
V.
KILO 6 OWNERS ASSOCIATION, a
Washington nonprofit corporation; KILO UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SIX, LLC, a Washington limited liability
company; HISTORIC HANGARS, LLC, a
Washington limited liability company;
HISTORIC FLIGHT FOUNDATION, a
Washington nonprofit corporation; and
JOHN SESSIONS, an individual, FILED: November 5, 2018
Appellants.
LEACH, J. — Historic Hangars LLC and Historic Flight Foundation
(collectively the Museum) challenge the trial court's order finding the Museum in
contempt. The Museum claims that the trial court must implicitly find that it
intended to disobey a court order before finding it in contempt, which the trial
court did not do. But a defendant who intentionally acts contrary to a court order,
with actual or constructive knowledge of the order's existence and effect,
intentionally disobeys that order. The Museum does not contest its knowledge of
the order's existence and effect nor does it claim that its intentional acts did not
violate the trial court's order. We affirm.
No. 77842-1-1 /2
BACKGROUND
This lawsuit involves neighboring lots 11, 12, and 13 at the Snohomish
County Airport (Paine Field) in Everett. Snohomish County (County) owns the
underlying land and leases it to each party, individually. The lessees of lots 11
and 12 own the hangars constructed on them. In May 2007, Kilo Six LLC leased
the area now comprising lots 11, 12, and 13. It assigned its interest in lot 11 to
Historic Hangars LLC, which subleased lot 11 to the Historic Flight Foundation
(the Foundation). The Foundation holds public and private events on the exterior
lot 11 ramp and the Paine Field ramp and uses lot 13, with Kilo Six's permission,
for public parking and events.
John Sessions is the managing and sole member of Historic Hangars and
Kilo Six. He is also the president, chief executive officer, sole director, and sole
member of the board of directors of the Foundation.
Everett Hangar LLC, a subsidiary of Weidner Investment Services Inc.,
leases lot 12 and owns the aircraft hangar on it. Weidner conducts its flight
operations on lot 12.
Kilo Six still owns the leasehold interest in lot 13.
To facilitate separate ownership and operation of the three lots, the
County agreed to execute covenants, conditions. and restrictions (the CC&Rs).
The CC&Rs provide for an easement to each lot for aircraft movement. Sessions
is the president, treasurer, and controlling owner and director of the Kilo 6
-2-
No. 77842-1-1 / 3
Owners Association (Association), which is created by the CC&Rs and enforces
them. The CC&Rs apply to all lessees and sublessees of lots 11, 12, and 13.
The frequency of Everett Hangar's flight operations and the Museum's
events lead to "constant conflicts" between Everett Hangar and the Museum,
including "a dozen serious incidents caused by these conflicts in the past six
years." In February 2015, Everett Hangar sought injunctive relief to protect its
easement rights to the Kilo 7 taxiway providing access from its hangar to the
airport runway and to address and mitigate safety and security concerns created
by the Museum's activities on lots 11 and 13.
After a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the CC&Rs provided
Everett Hangar an express easement right for movement of its airplanes and a
recognized safety and security right. It granted Everett Hangar an injunction,
finding that defendants, the Association, Kilo Six, Historic Hangars, and the
Foundation, violated those rights.
The defendants appealed. In an unpublished opinion, this court reversed
a portion of the trial court's injunctive relief and remanded to the trial court to
enter additional findings of fact about its attorney fees award to Everett Hangar.1
On remand, the trial court entered an amended injunction and the supplemental
findings.
1 Everett Hangar, LLC v. Kilo 6 Owners Ass'n, No. 73504-7-1, slip op. at
30-31 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2016)(unpublished),
http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/735047.pdf, review denied, 187 Wn.2d
1007 (2017).
-3-
No. 77842-1-1/ 4
The amended permanent injunction enjoined only the Museum from
specific activities. It prohibited the Museum from placing, parking, or maintaining
any objects within a specified area or blocking Everett Hangar's access to the
west or east exits to the Kilo 7 taxiway. It also barred the Museum from allowing
people to enter described areas at specific times or access lot 12 unless
permitted by the CC&Rs or Everett Hangar. It further enjoined the Museum from
propping open any security gate, door, or entry point on lots 11 or 13 without a
security guard immediately present at all times.
In October 2017, Everett Hangar asked the court to find the Museum in
contempt, claiming that it committed multiple violations of the amended
injunction. The trial court found a total of seven violations of the injunction. It
imposed sanctions of $5,000 per violation. At the Museum's request, the trial
court reconsidered and reduced its sanctions award to the statutorily authorized
maximum of $2,000 per incident. The Museum appeals the trial court's contempt
order.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
An appellate court reviews contempt rulings for an abuse of discretion.2 A
trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or
based on untenable grounds or reasons.3
2 Moreman v. Butcher, 126 Wn.2d 36, 40, 891 P.2d 725 (1995).
3 Moreman, 126 Wn.2d at 40.
-4-
No. 77842-1-1 / 5
ANALYSIS
Contempt Order
The Museum correctly notes that the contempt statute requires that a
party must intentionally disobey a court's order to be in contempt. It claims that
the record does not show that the Museum intentionally disobeyed the amended
permanent injunction and the trial court abused its discretion by finding the
Museum in contempt. We disagree.
First, the Museum claims that the contempt statute requires that Everett
Hangar prove the Museum intentionally disobeyed the trial court's injunction.
RCW 7.21.010(1)(b) states, "Contempt of court' means
intentional . . .[d]isobedience of any lawful judgment, decree, order, or process
of the court." In In re Structured Settlement Payment Rights of Rapid
Settlements, Ltd.,4 Division Three of this court confirmed that RCW
7.21.010(1)(b) requires that an individual must act intentionally to be found in
contempt of court. But, in affirming the trial court's contempt order, it held that
the trial court was not required to make an express written finding that
defendants' violations of the injunction were intentional.5 The court explained the
challenged contempt order satisfied the statutory requirement of intentional
disobedience because the defendants' "acts and omissions identified by the
contempt order as violations were supported by evidence that established their
4 189 Wn. App. 584, 604-05, 359 P.3d 823(2015).
5 Rapid Settlements, 189 Wn. App. at 605.
-5-
No. 77842-1-1 /6
inherently intentional character."6 It held that the trial court's implicit finding that
defendants' acts and omissions were intentional satisfied the statute.7 Further,
although chapter 7.21 RCW does not define "intentional," the contempt statute
requires that a defendant must have actual or constructive knowledge of the
"existence and substantive effect of the court's order or judgment."8
Second, the Museum claims that the court's findings do not show the
"inherently intentional character" of the Museum's conduct. The Museum does
not challenge the trial court's findings; it claims only that the court did not
implicitly find that it intentionally violated the injunction. Because we treat
unchallenged findings of fact as true on appeal, we accept the trial court's
findings.9 The trial court found that the Museum violated paragraphs 4 and 5 of
the injunction. Paragraph 4 prohibits the Museum from
allowing, permitting or suffering any person, including an officer,
agent, employee, invitee and guest of each of them, to enter upon
or gain access to Lot 12 from its properties, except to the extent
permitted by the applicable Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions
for Kilo 6 Hangars, or by other agreement with the Plaintiff.
The trial court found the Museum violated paragraph 4 of the injunction on four
occasions:
a. On July 15, 2017, the Defendants' flight museum ("the
Museum") hosted a barbecue on the airside of Lot 11, during which
6 Rapid Settlements, 189 Wn. App. at 605.
7 Rapid Settlements, 189 Wn. App. at 605.
8 In re Estates of Smaldino, 151 Wn. App. 356, 365, 212 P.3d 579(2009)
(citing In re Koome,82 Wn.2d 816, 821, 514 P.2d 520 (1973)).
9 Davis v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 94 Wn.2d 119, 123, 615 P.2d 1279
(1980).
-6-
No. 77842-1-1/ 7
dozens of individuals were walking out on the Lot 11 ramps,
viewing vintage aircraft. While some Museum personnel were
visible on the ramp wearing yellow vests during this event, one
Museum guest was allowed to walk unescorted by security from Lot
11 over onto the corner of the hangar belonging to Everett Hangar,
on the Lot 12 ramp.
b. On August 10, 2017, a man walked unescorted from
Defendants' Lot 11 directly onto the Lot 12 ramp without
permission, and entered inside of the open hangar belonging to
Everett Hangar. Afterward, he was seen by Plaintiff's staff
returning to the Museum on Lot 11.
c. On August 18, 2017, a man walked unescorted from
Defendants' Lot 11 directly onto Everett Hangar's Lot 12 ramp
without permission, and continued out to the Everett Hangar Learjet
on the ramp. The man identified himself as a Museum guest but
had no security escort and was not wearing a visitor badge. He
repeatedly sought entry into the aircraft. He was finally turned
away by Everett Hangar's pilots and returned to the [M]useum.
d. On September 1, 2017, Defendants concede that one of
their guests entered into Lot 13, the unimproved parking lot next to
Plaintiff's Lot 12, and walked past the bicycle fencing enclosing Lot
13 onto the airside of Lot 12, and traversed Everett Hangar's ramp,
using it as a shortcut to reach the Museum on Lot 11.
The trial court also found that the Museum committed three violations of
paragraph 5 of the injunction. Paragraph 5 bars defendants from "propping open
any security gate, door or entry point on the Premises of Lots 11 or 13 unless a
security guard is immediately present at the gate at all times." The trial court
found "on July 15, 2017, August 10, 2017 and September 11, 2017... , the gate
for Lot 13 parking lot was left open to the public, unlocked, and no gate attendant
was immediately present. Defendants presented no evidence to rebut these
facts."
-7-
No. 77842-1-1/ 8
The Museum contends that because it adopted policies and procedures to
ensure compliance with the injunction, it intended to comply and could not have
intentionally violated the injunction. It explained that the Museum does not
permit its guests to access the lot 11 airside ramp unless escorted by a properly
trained Museum guide. And the Museum trains its guides to prohibit access to
the ramp without escort and to keep guests off the neighboring lot 12 airside
ramp. It also posts signs on doors to airside spaces stating, "Escort Required."
But the Museum presented no evidence that it monitored compliance with this
training during its events.
And the Museum does not contest that it had knowledge of the existence
and effect of the injunction. In fact, it claims that it implemented policies to
comply with the injunction. It also makes no claim that it did not intend its
challenged acts. For example, it makes no claim that it accidentally left a gate
unlocked, that third parties unlocked a gate and left it unattended by a security
guard, or that the unauthorized individuals found on lot 12 were not its guests.
Because the Museum had the required knowledge and the trial court found that
on seven separate occasions it violated two provisions of the injunction, the trial
court implicitly found the Museum intentionally disobeyed its order. This satisfies
RCW 7.21.010(1)(b)'s requirement that an entity must act intentionally to be
found in contempt of a court order. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by
finding the Museum in contempt of the injunction.
-8-
No. 77842-1-1/ 9
Attorney Fees
Both the Museum and Everett Hangar request attorney fees on appeal
under the CC&Rs and RAP 18.1. RAP 18.1(a) allows a reviewing court to award
a party reasonable attorney fees if applicable law grants a party the right to
recover them. Here, the CC&Rs state, "In any action to enforce the provisions of
this Declaration or Association rules, the prevailing party shall be entitled to
recover all costs, including, without limitation, reasonable attorneys' fees and
court costs, reasonably incurred in such action." Because the injunction arose
from alleged violations of the CC&Rs, we award Everett Hanger attorney fees on
appeal as the substantially prevailing party, subject to its compliance with RAP
18.1(d).
CONCLUSION
The Museum does not contest that it had knowledge of the existence and
effect of the amended permanent injunction. Nor does it challenge the trial
court's findings that it violated the injunction on seven separate occasions.
Implicit in the trial court's unchallenged findings is the Museum's intentional
-9-
No. 77842-1-1/ 10
disobedience of the amended injunction. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion by finding the Museum in contempt of this injunction. We affirm.
WE CONCUR:
-10-