UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 17-4774
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LLOYD MACK ROYAL, III,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
Theodore D. Chuang, District Judge. (8:09-cr-00048-TDC-1)
Submitted: October 31, 2018 Decided: November 6, 2018
Before WILKINSON, KING, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Baltimore, Maryland, Joanna Silver, Assistant
Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. John M. Gore, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
Thomas E. Chandler, Dayna J. Zolle, Civil Rights Division, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Lloyd Mack Royal, III, was resentenced to 360 months of imprisonment for
conspiracy to commit sex trafficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012), three counts
of sex trafficking minor victims by force, fraud, or coercion, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1591 (2012), conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 846 (2012), and two counts of distribution of cocaine and PCP to persons under the age
of 21, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 859 (2012). Royal challenges his sentence, arguing that
it is substantively unreasonable because the district court did not sufficiently take into
consideration the totality of the circumstances of Royal’s abusive home life and
postoffense rehabilitation. Finding no error, we affirm.
“As a general matter, in reviewing any sentence whether inside, just outside, or
significantly outside the Guidelines range, we review for an abuse of discretion.” United
States v. Bolton, 858 F.3d 905, 911 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We must first ensure that the district court did not commit a significant procedural error.
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). If there is no procedural error, we then
assess the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, taking into account the totality of
the circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. It is well established that “[a] within-Guidelines
range sentence is presumptively reasonable.” United States v. White, 850 F.3d 667, 674
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2252 (2017).
Royal contends that the district court did not sufficiently weigh or consider the
evidence of his childhood trauma of an abusive home life, which was not included in the
first presentence report or presented at the original sentencing hearing. Royal also sought
2
a lower sentence based on his postoffense rehabilitation. We conclude that Royal’s
sentence is substantively reasonable. The district court responded to defense counsel’s
arguments meaningfully, and explained its chosen sentence. The court recognized the
traumatic experiences witnessed and experienced by Royal as a youth and also that Royal
appeared to have vastly improved his life while in prison, even in the face of a lengthy
sentence.
“A defendant’s disagreement with the propriety of the sentence imposed does not
suffice to rebut the presumption of reasonableness that attaches to a within-Guidelines
sentence,” United States v. Isgar, 739 F.3d 829, 842 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Because there is a range of permissible outcomes for any given case, an
appellate court must resist the temptation to “pick and choose” among possible sentences
and rather must “defer to the district court’s judgment so long as it falls within the realm
of these rationally available choices.” United States v. McComb, 519 F.3d 1049, 1053
(10th Cir. 2007); see United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 679 (4th Cir. 2011)
(observing that “district courts have extremely broad discretion when determining the
weight to be given each of the § 3553(a) factors”); United States v. Carter, 538 F.3d 784,
790 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting substantive reasonableness “contemplates a range, not a
point” (internal quotation marks omitted)). With these standards in mind, we conclude
that there was no abuse of discretion because the district court considered, but rejected,
the arguments proffered by the defense in favor of a lower sentence, and rationally found
that a 360-month sentence was appropriate considering the totality of the circumstances.
3
We therefore affirm Royal’s sentence. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court
and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4