MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Nov 08 2018, 8:00 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William T. Myers Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Marion, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
James B. Martin
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Nicolas Rasheed Taylor, November 8, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-1318
v. Appeal from the
Grant Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable
Appellee-Plaintiff. Jeffrey D. Todd, Judge
Trial Court Cause Nos.
27D01-1712-F6-617
27D01-1501-F4-1
27D01-1502-F4-9
Kirsch, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1318 | November 8, 2018 Page 1 of 7
[1] Nicolas R. Taylor (“Taylor”) appeals his sentences for both the revocation of
his probation and new offenses, raising two restated issues:
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Taylor
to serve the entirety of the previously suspended sentences; and
II. Whether Taylor’s sentences for the probation revocation and
the new offenses are inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule
7(B).
We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On October 26, 2015, Taylor pleaded guilty under Cause Number 27D01-1501-
F4-1 (“Cause F4-1) to Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a
serious violent felon; Level 6 felony criminal recklessness with a deadly
weapon; and Level 6 felony conspiracy to commit criminal recklessness with a
deadly weapon. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 15. That same day, he pleaded guilty
to Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon and
Level 5 felony attempted battery with a deadly weapon under Cause Number
27D01-1502-F4-9 (“Cause F4-9). Id. Under Cause F4-1, the trial court
sentenced Taylor to two years, with one year executed and one year suspended
to probation, and under Cause F4-9, it sentenced Taylor to six years on each
count, with three years executed and three years suspended to probation. Id. at
16. The sentences within each case were to be served concurrently to one
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1318 | November 8, 2018 Page 2 of 7
another, but consecutive to the sentences imposed in the other case, for an
aggregate executed term of four-and-one-half years. Tr. Vol II at 34
[3] On December 1, 2017, under Cause Number 27D01-1712-F6-617 (“Cause F6-
number 617”), Taylor was charged with, inter alia, Level 6 felony resisting law
enforcement, Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, and Class A
misdemeanor driving while suspended. Id. at 2. On February 27, 2018, the
State filed petitions to revoke Taylor’s probation under Cause F4-1 and Cause
F4-9. Id. at 22-25. On April 30, 2018, Taylor pleaded guilty, without a plea
agreement, to Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement, and to Class A
misdemeanor driving while suspended under Cause F6-617. Taylor also
pleaded guilty to having violated the terms of his probation. Tr. Vol. II at 14;1
Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 3, 26-29.
[4] Sentencing was held on May 3, 2018. At the sentencing hearing, the State
presented as aggravating factors Taylor’s two previous convictions for unlawful
possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, a robbery conviction, and
other offenses. Tr. Vol. II at 30. When he addressed the trial court, Taylor
acknowledged his drug addiction and his continued use of drugs while
incarcerated, but asked for leniency because he has three children, with a fourth
child soon on the way, and that by pleading guilty, he was taking responsibility
for his actions. Id. at 31-32. In explaining its sentencing decision, the trial court
1
Although Taylor does not style the substantive transcript as “Transcript Volume II,” we will refer to it as
such since Taylor submitted a separate volume for the table of contents for the transcript.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1318 | November 8, 2018 Page 3 of 7
noted Taylor’s substantial criminal history and observed that “every past effort
at rehabilitation has been unsuccessful so I- I don’t think you’re a good
candidate for probation.” Id. at 33-34. For the new offenses under Cause F6-
617, the trial court imposed less than the advisory sentences, 2 sentencing Taylor
to two concurrent six-month terms and ordered the previously suspended terms
imposed in Cause F4-1 and Cause F4-9 to be served consecutive to one another
and to the six-month terms ordered under Cause F6-617. Appellant’s App. Vol. II
at 27. Thus, Taylor’s aggregate sentence was four-and-one-half years. Tr. Vol II
at 34. The trial court found as a mitigating factor that Taylor pleaded guilty
without a plea agreement. Id. at 33. In explaining why it did not impose the
maximum sentences for Taylor’s new convictions, the trial court cited Taylor’s
honesty and willingness to take responsibility for his actions. Tr. Vol. II at 34.
Taylor now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[5] A trial court’s sentencing decision for probation violations is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). An abuse
of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of
the facts and circumstances. Id. If the trial court finds that a defendant has
violated a condition at any time before termination of the period, it may order
execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial
2
The advisory sentence for a Level 6 felony is one year, see Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(b), and the advisory
sentence for a Class A misdemeanor is up to one year, see Ind. Code § 35-50-3-2.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1318 | November 8, 2018 Page 4 of 7
sentencing. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(g); Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 186. Sentences for
probation violations cannot be reviewed under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).
Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188.
[6] Appellate Rule 7(B) is available for sentences on direct review, such as Taylor’s
sentences under Cause F6-617. The purpose of appellate review is to leaven the
outliers, not to achieve a perceived correct result. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d
1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). Thus, we review an inappropriate-sentence claim with
substantial deference to the trial court. Messel v. State, 80 N.E.3d 230, 233 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied.
[7] Taylor argues that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to the
entirety of the previously suspended sentences in the probation cases. He
contends that since the trial court imposed concurrent, less-than-advisory
sentences in Cause F6-617, it should have not have ordered him to serve the
entirety of the suspended sentences in the revocation cases. He offers no
authority for this argument.
[8] Taylor also asks this court to review his aggregate sentence under Appellate
Rule 7(B). Appellant’s Br. at 8-9. He recognizes that this kind of review is not
available for sentences arising from a revocation of probation. Id. However, he
claims that Article 7, Section 6 of the Indiana Constitution requires such review
under what he considers the unusual circumstances of his case, where the trial
court imposed a lenient sentence for his new offenses yet imposed the most
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severe possible sentences for the revocation of his probation. Again, Taylor
offers no authority for this proposition.
[9] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Taylor to serve the
previously suspended terms for his convictions under Cause F4-1 and Cause
F4-9. The trial court noted Taylor’s substantial criminal history. Tr. Vol. II at
33. It was well within its discretion to order him to serve the previously
suspended sentences. If a trial court finds that a person has violated a term of
probation, it may “order execution of all or part of the sentence that was
suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” I.C. § 35-38-2-3(h)(3) (emphasis
added); see also Castillo v. State, 67 N.E.3d 661, 665 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans.
denied.
[10] Although he argues that this court should review his aggregate sentence under
Appellate Rule 7(B), Taylor acknowledges that the Indiana Supreme Court has
held that such review is not available for sentences resulting from the revocation
of probation. Appellant’s Br. at 8-9. Appellate Rule 7(B) “is not the correct
standard to apply when reviewing a sentence imposed for a probation
violation.” Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188.
[11] While an argument may be made under Appellate Rule 7(B) for his new
convictions, Taylor does not use the proper analysis. After acknowledging that
this analysis requires consideration of the nature of the offense and the
character of the offender, his brief is silent as to how the nature of his offenses
and his character justify a reduced sentence. A “litigant who fails to support his
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1318 | November 8, 2018 Page 6 of 7
arguments with appropriate citations to legal authority and record evidence
waives those arguments for our review.” Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267
(Ind. 2015). Taylor has waived the issue for lack of cogent reasoning and
citations to relevant authority. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a).
[12] Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Riley, J., concur.
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