D.G.B. v. W.K.

J. S58040/18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

D.G.B., ON BEHALF OF N.G.A. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
W.K., : No. 734 WDA 2018
:
Appellant :

Appeal from the Order, April 18, 2018,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Elk County
Domestic Relations Division at No. 2018-269

BEFORE: OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 13, 2018

W.K. (“appellant”) appeals from the final protection from abuse order

(“PFA Order”) entered against him in the Court of Common Pleas of Elk

County on April 18, 2018. After careful review, we affirm.

The record reflects that on April 16, 2018, appellee filed with the trial

court a petition for protection from abuse on behalf of N.G.A.,1 in which she

alleged that appellant removed N.G.A. from his bicycle by grabbing his neck.

(Petition for PFA, 4/16/18 at ¶ 11.) The trial court entered a temporary PFA

order on April 16, 2018, and scheduled a hearing for a final PFA order. (See

temporary PFA order, 4/16/18.) On April 18, 2018, the trial court held a

hearing for a final PFA order. Appellant did not appear for the hearing, and

1 Appellant and appellee are N.G.A.’s biological parents.
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the trial court only heard testimony from appellee. (See notes of testimony,

4/18/18 at 1-9.) Following the hearing, the trial court entered the final PFA

order against appellant in which appellant was, inter alia, evicted and

excluded from appellee’s residence and appellee was granted full temporary

custody of N.G.A. (Final PFA order, 4/18/18 at 1-2.) Additionally, the order

permits appellee to authorize supervised visits between appellant and N.G.A.

(Id. at 2.)

Appellant filed a notice of appeal with this court on May 14, 2018.

Appellant simultaneously filed a concise statement of errors complained of

on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On June 20, 2018, the trial court

issued an order in lieu of a formal opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

I. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of
law in proceeding with the protection from
abuse hearing when the appellant was not
present, when said appellant was in the Elk
County Jail, which was connected to the
courthouse?

II. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of
law in granting the protection from abuse when
the only evidence presented was the testimony
of [appellee], with no supporting
documentation with respect to any danger
concerning the minor child?

III. Whether the trial court erred in ordering a
three (3) year protection from abuse on the
minor child against appellant, and requiring
supervised visitation to be controlled by
[appellee], when appellant had primary
custody of said minor child?

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Appellant’s brief at 4 (full capitalization omitted).

“In the context of a PFA order, we review the trial court’s legal

conclusions for an error of law or abuse of discretion.” Drew v. Drew, 870

A.2d 377, 378 (Pa.Super. 2005) (citation omitted). The purpose of the

Protection From Abuse Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6101-6122 (“PFAA”), is not to

punish abusers for past violent behavior, but to advance the prevention of

domestic violence from abusive perpetrators. Fonner v. Fonner, 731 A.2d

160, 161 (Pa.Super. 1999). This court has emphasized that “[t]he purpose

of the [PFAA] is to protect victims of domestic violence from those who

perpetrate such abuse, with the primary goal of advance prevention of

physical and sexual abuse.” Buchhalter v. Buchhalter, 959 A.2d 1260,

1262 (Pa.Super. 2008). Under the PFAA, the petitioner bears the burden of

proving the allegations of abuse by a preponderance of the evidence. See

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6107(a). For proceedings where, as here, the petitioner

commences proceedings under the PFAA, the PFAA defines “abuse” as:

“[k]nowingly engaging in a course of conduct or repeatedly committing acts

toward another person, including following the person, without proper

authority, under circumstances which place the person in reasonable fear of

bodily injury.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102(a)(5).

In his first issue on appeal, appellant contends that the trial court

erred when it held the final PFA hearing in appellant’s absence, thereby

violating appellant’s due process rights. (Appellant’s brief at 11.) In his

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argument, appellant relies on this court’s decision in Plowman v.

Plowman, 597 A.2d 701 (Pa.Super. 1991). Id. Specifically, appellant

argues that the trial court violated the Plowman court’s application of

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1915.9, which prohibits judgment by default or on the pleadings

in custody proceedings. (Appellant’s brief at 14, citing Pa.R.Civ.P. 1915.9.)

Appellant also quotes Plowman as follows: “While this rule ostensibly

applies to final orders of custody, Rule 1915.9, Explanatory Note, we find it

applicable where the result of any order substantially affects the rights of

either parent, or the minor children.” (Appellant’s brief at 14, quoting

Plowman, 597 A.2d at 706.)

Appellant’s reliance on Plowman is misplaced. Plowman was

decided in the context of a father’s allegation that “he was denied procedural

due process since he was not afforded a full evidentiary hearing” before the

trial court permitted the child to relocate to Maryland with his mother.

Plowman, 597 A.2d at 705. Here, the record indicates that at 1:30 p.m. on

April 16, 2018, the Elk County Sherriff’s Office served appellant at the Elk

County Jail with a copy of the notice of the April 18, 2018 final PFA hearing.

Although appellant asserts that he requested to appear at the hearing, there

is no evidence of record to support that appellant requested to be

transported from the Elk County Prison to the courthouse so that he may

appear for the final PFA hearing, and the trial court found as such.

Moreover, the PFAA only requires that a defendant be given notice of a final

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PFA hearing. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6107(a). Accordingly, appellant’s first

issue is without merit.

In his second issue on appeal, appellant avers that the evidence was

not sufficient to warrant the trial court granting a PFA order. (Appellant’s

brief at 16-17.) Within his argument, appellant appears to raise two

arguments. The first of appellant’s arguments alleges that appellee’s

testimony was not credible, as it was based wholly on “hearsay and

speculation.” (Id.) Appellant further contends that the conduct of which

appellant was accused did not rise to the level of abuse contemplated by the

PFAA and that appellant’s conduct was “parental discipline and not abuse.”

(Id. at 17.)

This court reviews sufficiency of the evidence claims pertaining to

protection from abuse hearings as follows:

When a claim is presented on appeal that the
evidence is not sufficient to support an order of
protection from abuse, we review the evidence in the
light most favorable to the petitioner and granting
her the benefit of all reasonable inference[s],
determine whether the evidence was sufficient to
sustain the trial court's conclusion by a
preponderance of the evidence. This Court defers to
the credibility determinations of the trial court as to
witnesses who appeared before it. Furthermore, the
preponderance of the evidence is defined as the
greater weight of the evidence, i.e., to tip a scale
slightly is the criteria or requirement for
preponderance of the evidence.

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Ferko-Fox v. Fox, 68 A.3d 917, 926-927 (Pa.Super. 2013), quoting

Thompson v. Thompson, 963 A.2d 474, 477 (Pa.Super. 2008) (quotations

and citations omitted).

As noted by the Ferko-Fox court, we defer credibility determinations

to the trial court. Accordingly, because appellant’s argument rests solely on

the credibility of appellee’s testimony, which we are not entitled to reweigh,

we find that appellant’s first sufficiency of the evidence argument is without

merit.

Appellant next takes exception to the trial court’s conclusion that his

alleged conduct rose to the level of abuse contemplated by the PFAA.

(Appellant’s brief at 17.) The PFAA defines “abuse,” in relevant part, as the

“occurrence of one or more of the following acts between family or

household members . . . . (4) Physically . . . abusing minor children.”

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102(a)(4).

During the final protection from abuse hearing, appellee testified as

follows:

And [N.G.A.] was riding his bike sometime during
this altercation right before, and [appellant] told him
to get off the bike. And [N.G.A.] didn’t. And
[appellant] grabbed [N.G.A.] by his throat and took
him off the bike. And I have a picture here that I
took, and I brought him to the State Police and
asked if that was also documented when they
arrested [appellant] on the charges against his wife,
since it was the same night. And they said that
[N.G.A.] had a hoody on and a big heavy coat and
he was really scared from what he [had] just seen,

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and he didn’t say anything. But they didn’t see the
mark on his neck because of what he was wearing.

I got a call Sunday morning to pick [N.G.A.] up, and
when he got on his booster seat, he looked up and I
[saw] on his neck. And I asked [N.G.A.] what
happened, and he told me his dad grabbed him by
the throat and ripped him off his bike because he
wouldn’t get off the bike right when [appellant] told
him to get off the bike.

Notes of testimony, 4/18/18 at 5-6.

Clearly, this testimony established the context in which the PFA order

was sought. The testimony involved acts of violence committed by appellant

toward his wife in the presence of the children, as well as his failure to

further control his anger toward N.G.A. Appellee further provided

photographic evidence of the mark she discovered on N.G.A.

Based on this testimony, when viewed in the light most favorable to

appellee, we find that appellee presented sufficient evidence to warrant the

trial court’s granting a PFA order. Therefore, appellant’s second issue is

without merit.

Finally, appellant avers that the trial court’s granting of a three-year

PFA order was excessive and constitutes an error of law. (Appellant’s brief

at 18-19.) Appellant further argues that the custody implications brought

forth by the final protection from abuse order were also excessive. (Id. at

19.)

The PFAA provides, in relevant part:

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(a) General rule.--The court may grant any
protection order or approve any consent
agreement to bring about a cessation of abuse
of the plaintiff or minor children. The order or
agreement may include:

....

(4) Awarding temporary custody of or
establishing temporary visitation rights
with regard to minor children. In
determining whether to award
temporary custody or establish
temporary visitation rights pursuant to
this paragraph, the court shall consider
any risk posed by the defendant to the
children as well as risk to the plaintiff.
The following shall apply:

(i) A defendant shall not be
granted custody, partial custody
or unsupervised visitation where
it is alleged in the petition, and
the court finds after a hearing
under this chapter, that the
defendant:

(A) abused the minor
children of the parties or
poses a risk of abuse
toward the minor children
of the parties; or

(B) has been convicted of
violating 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 2904 (relating to
interference with custody
of children) within two
calendar years prior to the
filing of the petition for
protection order or that
the defendant poses a risk
of violating 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 2904.

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(ii) Where the court finds after a
hearing under this chapter that
the defendant has inflicted
abuse upon the plaintiff or a
child, the court may require
supervised custodial access by a
third party. The third party must
agree to be accountable to the
court for supervision and
execute an affidavit of
accountability.

(iii) Where the court finds after a
hearing under this chapter that
the defendant has inflicted
serious abuse upon the plaintiff
or a child or poses a risk of
abuse toward the plaintiff or a
child, the court may:

(A) award supervised
visitation in a secure
visitation facility; or

(B) deny the defendant
custodial access to a child.

(iv) If a plaintiff petitions for a
temporary order under section
6107(b) (relating to hearings)
and the defendant has partial,
shared or full custody of the
minor children of the parties by
order of court or written
agreement of the parties, the
custody shall not be disturbed
or changed unless the court
finds that the defendant is likely
to inflict abuse upon the
children or to remove the
children from the jurisdiction of
the court prior to the hearing
under section 6107(a). Where

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the defendant has forcibly or
fraudulently removed any minor
child from the care and custody
of a plaintiff, the court shall
order the return of the child to
the plaintiff unless the child
would be endangered by
restoration to the plaintiff.

(v) Nothing in this paragraph shall
bar either party from filing a
petition for custody under
Chapter 53 (relating to custody)
or under the Pennsylvania Rules
of Civil Procedure.

(vi) In order to prevent further
abuse during periods of access
to the plaintiff and child during
the exercise of custodial rights,
the court shall consider, and
may impose on a custody
award, conditions necessary to
assure the safety of the plaintiff
and minor children from abuse.

....

(d) Duration and amendment of order or
agreement.--A protection order or approved
consent agreement shall be for a fixed period
of time not to exceed three years. The court
may amend its order or agreement at any time
upon subsequent petition filed by either party.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6108(a)(4)(A)(iii)-(iv); (d). As noted above, within the

context of PFA orders, we review a trial court’s legal conclusions for abuse of

discretion. See Drew, 870 A.2d at 378. Abuse of discretion is defined as

“more than just an error in judgment.” Commonwealth v. Walsh, 36 A.3d

613, 620 (Pa.Super. 2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Jackson, 785 A.2d

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117, 118 (Pa.Super. 2001), appeal denied, 798 A.2d 1288 (Pa. 2002).

Rather, the record must reflect that “the judgment exercised was manifestly

unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id.

Here, after reviewing the record, we find that the trial court’s legal

conclusions and granting of the PFA order are devoid of manifestly

unreasonable judgment, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. To the

contrary, the trial court acted within the limits established by the plain

language of the PFAA. Accordingly, appellant’s third issue is without merit.

Order affirmed.

Olson, J. joins this Memorandum.

Murray, J. concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 11/13/2018

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