T.C. Memo. 1996-4
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
BRENDA J. GAMMON, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 15553-95. Filed January 11, 1996.
Brenda J. Gammon, pro se.
Stuart Spielman and Michael R. McMahon, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
ARMEN, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant to
the provisions of section 7443A(b)(3) and Rules 180, 181, and
182.1
1
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the taxable years in
issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of
This case is before the Court on respondent's Motion To
Dismiss For Failure To State A Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be
Granted, and the Amendment thereto, filed pursuant to Rule 40.
Petitioner resided in Lacey, Washington, at the time the
petition was filed in this case.
Respondent's Notice of Deficiency
Respondent issued a notice of deficiency to petitioner dated
May 15, 1995. In said notice, respondent determined a deficiency
in petitioner's Federal income tax for the taxable year 1992 in
the amount of $1,204 and an addition to tax under section
6651(a)(1) for failure to timely file in the amount of $291.50.2
The deficiency in income tax is based on respondent's
determination that petitioner failed to report wage and allocated
tip income from various payors as reflected in the following
schedule:
Income Payor Amount
Wages Manpower Int'l Inc. $75
Wages South Sound Red Robin Inc. 53
Wages Kokua, Inc. 1,386
Wages Shari's Management Corp. 87
Wages Hawks Prairie Inn Corp. 2,774
Tips " " 1,125
Wages Evergreen Ballroom 106
Restaurant
Wages TNT, Inc. 4,662
Practice and Procedure.
2
By Order dated Nov. 28, 1995, such part of this case that
related to a redetermination of FICA taxes, any addition to tax
or penalty with respect thereto, statutory interest, and
withholding tax credits was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
and stricken from the petition.
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Tips " " 3,556
Wages Denny's Restaurants 58
Tips " " 49
The addition to tax under section 6651(a)(1) is based on
respondent's determination that petitioner's failure to timely
file an income tax return for the taxable year in issue was not
due to reasonable cause.
Petitioner's Petition
Petitioner filed her petition on August 14, 1995. The crux
of petitioner's position is that wages are not income, apparently
because of the provisions of section 83 and the notion that a
person's labor is property in which the person has a basis equal
to its fair market value. Thus, the petition includes the
following allegations:
8. Until a compleat [sic] and concise explanation of
why intangible property is not a cost when it is
disposed of to obtain other property and tangible
property IS, 26 CFR 1.83-3(g) must be held to protect
sums received under contract for the purchase of
services from inclusion in gross income. After all, §
61(a) applies only to "gross income" ("Gross Income
Defined") and does not apply to compensation which may
be "excluded by law" (See 1.61-1, -2). Cost is always
excluded.
9. Until these arguments can be statutorily disposed
of, Petitioner contends that the FMV of services can be
included in gross income only by violating § 1001 and,
26 CFR 1.1001-1(a).
Petitioner attached several documents to her petition
composed of over 100 pages of typewritten materials expanding on
the arguments set forth above.
Respondent's Rule 40 Motion and Subsequent Developments
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As indicated, respondent filed a Motion To Dismiss For
Failure To State A Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted, and
the Amendment thereo. On October 6, 1995, the day after
respondent filed her motion to dismiss, the Court issued an order
calendaring respondent's motion for hearing and also directing
petitioner to file a proper amended petition in accordance with
the requirements of Rule 34. In particular, the Court directed
petitioner to file a proper amended petition setting forth with
specificity each error allegedly made by respondent in the
determination of the deficiency and separate statements of every
fact upon which the assignments of error are based. Petitioner
failed to respond to the Court's order.
Respondent's motion to dismiss was called for hearing in
Washington, D.C., on November 8, 1995. Counsel for respondent
appeared at the hearing and presented argument on the pending
motion. Petitioner did not appear at the hearing nor did she
file a Rule 50(c) statement with the Court.3
Discussion
Rule 40 provides that a party may file a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
We may grant such a motion when it appears beyond doubt that the
party's adversary can prove no set of facts in support of a claim
which would entitle him or her to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355
3
Petitioner was reminded of the applicability of Rule
50(c) in the Court's Order dated Oct. 6, 1995.
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U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Price v. Moody, 677 F.2d 676, 677 (8th
Cir. 1982).
Rule 34(b)(4) requires that a petition filed in this Court
contain clear and concise assignments of each and every error
that the taxpayer alleges to have been committed by the
Commissioner in the determination of the deficiency and any
addition to tax in dispute. Rule 34(b)(5) further requires that
the petition contain clear and concise lettered statements of the
facts on which the taxpayer bases the assignments of error. See
Jarvis v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 646, 658 (1982). The failure of
a petition to conform with the requirements set forth in Rule 34
may be grounds for dismissal. Rules 34(a)(1), 123(b).
In general, the determinations made by the Commissioner in a
notice of deficiency are presumed to be correct, and the taxpayer
bears the burden of proving that those determinations are
erroneous. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115
(1933). Moreover, any issue not raised in the pleadings is
deemed to be conceded. Rule 34(b)(4); Jarvis v. Commissioner,
supra at 658 n.19; Gordon v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 736, 739
(1980).
The petition filed in this case does not satisfy the
requirements of Rule 34(b)(4) and (5). There is neither
assignment of error nor allegation of fact in support of any
justiciable claim. Rather, there is nothing but tax protester
rhetoric and legalistic gibberish, as demonstrated by the
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passages from the petition previously quoted. See Abrams v.
Commissioner, 82 T.C. 403 (1984); Rowlee v. Commissioner, 80 T.C.
1111 (1983); McCoy v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 1027 (1981), affd.
696 F.2d 1234 (9th Cir. 1983).
The Court's order dated October 6, 1995, provided petitioner
with an opportunity to assign error and allege specific facts
concerning her liability for the taxable year in issue.
Unfortunately, petitioner failed to respond to the Court's order.
We see no need to catalog petitioner's arguments and
painstakingly address them. As the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit has remarked: "We perceive no need to refute these
arguments with somber reasoning and copious citation of
precedent; to do so might suggest that these arguments have some
colorable merit." Crain v. Commissioner, 737 F.2d 1417, 1417
(5th Cir. 1984). Petitioner's arguments are nothing other than a
variation on the theme that wages are not income. Suffice it to
say that both this and other Federal courts have consistently and
uniformly held for many years that wages are income and that a
taxpayer has no basis in his or her labor. E.g., Beard v.
Commissioner, 793 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1986), affg. per curiam 82
T.C. 766 (1984); Coleman v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 68, 70 (7th
Cir. 1986); Carter v. Commissioner, 784 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir.
1986); Olson v. United States, 760 F.2d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir.
1985); United States v. Burton, 737 F.2d 439, 441 (5th Cir.
1984); Gattuso v. Pecorella, 733 F.2d 709, 710 (9th Cir. 1984);
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Funk v. Commissioner, 687 F.2d 264, 265 (8th Cir. 1982), affg.
T.C. Memo. 1981-506; Lonsdale v. Commissioner, 661 F.2d 71, 72
(5th Cir. 1981), affg. T.C. Memo. 1981-122; United States v.
Romero, 640 F.2d 1014, 1016 (9th Cir. 1981) ("Compensation for
labor or services, paid in the form of wages or salary, has been
universally, held by the courts of this republic to be income,
subject to the income tax laws currently applicable."); United
States v. Buras, 633 F.2d 1356, 1361 (9th Cir. 1980); Abrams v.
Commissioner, supra at 407; Rowlee v. Commissioner, supra at
1119-1122; Reiff v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1169, 1173 (1981);
Reading v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 730 (1978), affd. 614 F.2d 159
(8th Cir. 1980); McNeel v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-211;
Fischer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-586; Zyglis v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-341, affd. without published
opinion 29 F.3d 620 (2d Cir. 1994); Fox v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1993-277, affd. without publised opinion 69 F.3d 543 (9th
Cir. 1995); Williams v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-368; Allen
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-242; Hebrank v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1982-496; see sec. 61(a)(1).
Because the petition fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, we shall grant respondent's motion to
dismiss. See Scherping v. Commissioner, 747 F.2d 478 (8th Cir.
1984).4
4
Respondent's motion includes a request that the Court
award a penalty to the United States in an appropriate amount
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In order to reflect the foregoing,
An order of dismissal and
decision will be entered.
pursuant to sec. 6673(a). In the exercise of our discretion,
however, we decline to award a penalty in this case.
Nevertheless, petitioner is advised that sec. 6673(a)(1)
authorizes the Tax Court to require a taxpayer to pay to the
United States a penalty not in excess of $25,000 whenever it
appears that proceedings have been instituted or maintained by
the taxpayer primarily for delay or that the taxpayer's position
in such proceeding is frivolous or groundless.