T.C. Memo. 1996-152
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
TOWER LOAN OF MISSISSIPPI, INC., Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 570-93. Filed March 26, 1996.
Leonard D. Van Slyke, Jr., and Denise F. Schreiber
(specially recognized), for petitioner.
Thomas R. Ascher and Kim A. Palmerino, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
PARR, Judge: Respondent determined deficiencies in
petitioner’s Federal income tax for 1988 and 1989 of $370,317 and
$490,267, respectively.
The issues for decision are: (1) Whether certain commission
income should be reallocated to petitioner from petitioner’s
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wholly owned subsidiary pursuant to section 482.1 We hold that
it should not. (2) Whether petitioner can take a bad debt
deduction pursuant to section 166 for the 1989 tax year. We hold
that it cannot.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
The stipulation of facts filed by the parties and its
accompanying exhibits are incorporated herein by this reference.
At the time the petition was filed herein, petitioner, Tower Loan
of Mississippi, Inc., had its principal place of business in
Jackson, Mississippi.
Petitioner is engaged in the business of making small
consumer loans, ranging from $100 to $5,000. Petitioner is not a
bank or a savings and loan association. Petitioner was
incorporated in 1972 as a business corporation under the
Mississippi Business Corporation Act. Petitioner used the
accrual method of accounting during the years in issue.
In February 1983, petitioner organized two wholly owned
subsidiary insurance companies, the American Federated Life
Insurance Co. (AFLIC) and the American Federated Insurance Co.
(AFIC). In addition to providing financing to its customers,
petitioner makes available credit life insurance to its
1
All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in
effect for the taxable years in issue, and all Rule references
are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, unless
otherwise stated.
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customers. Prior to its organization of AFLIC and AFIC in 1983,
petitioner had received and retained a portion of the premium
payments from the sale of the credit life insurance. However,
petitioner was sued by several customers who claimed that because
petitioner received insurance commissions, effectively, the loans
were usurious and unenforceable. Other finance companies were
being sued on this theory as well. The primary purpose for the
formation of the insurance companies was to avoid the legal
problems associated with petitioner’s charging and receiving
premiums from the sale of credit life insurance. AFIC is in the
business of providing property and casualty insurance. AFIC
files consolidated returns with petitioner.
AFLIC is primarily in the business of providing credit life
and disability insurance. AFLIC files its returns separately
from petitioner.2 AFIC and AFLIC continued to exist as wholly
owned subsidiaries of petitioner during the years in issue.
Petitioner gives its customers the option of purchasing credit
insurance for their loans.3 Credit insurance policies offer
protection to the creditor and debtor by providing for payment of
the loan in the event of certain occurrences such as death or
2
Pursuant to sec. 1504(b)(2), AFLIC is not an includable
corporation and therefore is not eligible to file in the
consolidated returns.
3
Petitioner also offers property insurance. We will not
discuss property insurance policies, as they are not relevant to
the issues in this case.
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disability of the debtor, depending on the type of policy. Prior
to the formation of AFLIC, petitioner employed licensed insurance
agents who sold insurance policies underwritten by outside
insurance companies. Petitioner was not and never has been
licensed under Mississippi law as an insurance agent; it has
always employed licensed agents who sold the insurance. Some
portion of the premiums from these sales was remitted to
petitioner as commissions.
After the formation of AFLIC, petitioner offered only AFLIC
credit insurance to its customers. Petitioner required all of
its branch managers to acquire a license to sell the insurance.
If a customer chose to purchase insurance, then the premiums were
added to the amount of the loan. Petitioner would then remit the
entire premium amount to AFLIC. AFLIC would not pay the licensed
branch managers or petitioner commissions or other compensation
for selling AFLIC insurance. Petitioner, however, would pay
bonuses to its licensed branch managers based on the amount of
insurance each manager sold.
AFLIC sells credit insurance to debtors of other creditors
besides petitioner through agents who are not employees of
petitioner. AFLIC pays these other agents sales commissions,
usually between 45 and 65 percent of the premium.
AFLIC has no employees or offices. It does not advertise.
It pays another company to do its tax returns, compute its
reserves, and do its actuarial work.
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On its amended 1988 and 1989 U.S. Life Insurance Company
Income Tax Returns, Forms 1120L, AFLIC respectively reported
$3,000,498 and $2,958,091 in gross premiums and respectively took
deductions for commissions paid in the amounts of $1,366,543 and
$1,360,371.4
Respondent sent petitioner a notice of deficiency dated
October 28, 1992, which included increases to petitioner’s gross
income in the amounts of $1,083,197 and $1,140,414, for the years
1988 and 1989, respectively, to clearly reflect commission income
from the sale of credit insurance during 1988 and 1989.
On or about September 23, 1985, Matheney Ford, Inc.
(Matheney Ford), executed a loan agreement and promissory note
(the loan agreement) whereby AFLIC and AFIC agreed to and did
lend Matheney Ford $225,000. The president of Matheney Ford was
George O. Cooper, Jr. (Cooper). AFIC and AFLIC were granted a
security interest in Matheney Ford’s used cars and certain
accounts. Cooper executed a guaranty for Matheney Ford’s debt.
As security for his guaranty, Cooper and his wife executed a deed
of trust on their residence in favor of AFLIC and AFIC. The deed
of trust was subordinate to a first deed of trust held by
Trustmark National Bank (Trustmark) as security for promissory
4
AFLIC’s commission deductions include the commission
income allocated to petitioner under sec. 482. The commission
deductions were claimed on the amended return to preserve the
deduction in the event respondent prevailed on the proposed sec.
482 adjustment.
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notes that Cooper executed to Trustmark (the Trustmark notes).
The loan agreement further provided for the assignment to AFIC
and AFLIC of life insurance policies issued by Lamar Life
Insurance Co. (the Lamar policies) on Cooper’s life. In January
1986, Mrs. Cooper, the owner of the Lamar policies, so assigned
the Lamar policies.
Matheney Ford defaulted on the loan, leaving Cooper indebted
to AFLIC in the amount of $140,000 (hereinafter sometimes
referred to as the Cooper debt). On May 24, 1988, the Coopers
and AFLIC executed a second loan agreement (the second loan
agreement). Under the second loan agreement, AFLIC agreed to
purchase the outstanding Trustmark notes and the Trustmark deed
of trust for $210,000 and to renew Cooper’s $140,000 indebtedness
in exchange for new promissory notes from the Coopers. In
accordance with the second loan agreement, the Coopers executed
the following, with AFLIC as payee: (1) A promissory note in the
amount of $328,500 and (2) a nonrecourse promissory note in the
amount of $21,500. The second loan agreement provided that the
Lamar policies remained assigned to AFLIC.
AFLIC foreclosed on the deed of trust, purchased the Cooper
residence, and subsequently sold it, applying the proceeds to
reduce the Coopers’ debt. On or about June 22, 1989, Cooper and
AFLIC entered into a third loan agreement (the third loan
agreement), whereby they agreed to refinance the Coopers’
indebtedness by having Cooper execute a new promissory note to
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AFLIC for the balance of the debt, $93,595, payable in
installments beginning January 15, 1990. The third loan
agreement further provided that Mrs. Cooper would be released
from liability, but that the Lamar policies would remain assigned
to AFLIC. On or about July 21, 1989, AFLIC assigned all its
interest in the third loan agreement to AFIC.
Cooper was sent to prison sometime in 1989. As of December
1989, the Lamar policies had a total cash value of $853. On its
1989 Federal income tax return petitioner claimed a bad debt
deduction in the amount of $118,356 relating to the debts of
AFIC.5
OPINION
Issue 1. Section 482 Issue
Petitioner sold credit insurance policies written by AFLIC,
its wholly owned subsidiary, to its customers. Petitioner
remitted all the premiums to AFLIC and, in turn, received no
commissions or payments for selling the insurance. Respondent,
pursuant to section 482, reallocated 45 percent of the premiums
as commission income to petitioner.
Section 482 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
5
Of the disallowed $118,356, $104,641 stems from the
Cooper debt. Respondent disallowed the balance, $13,715, because
petitioner failed to establish that a debt existed or became
worthless during 1989. Petitioner fails to address the $13,715.
We therefore assume that petitioner concedes that amount, and we
so find. Rule 151(e)(4) and (5); Petzoldt v. Commissioner, 92
T.C. 661, 683 (1989); Money v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 46, 48
(1987).
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In any case of two or more organizations, trades,
or businesses * * * owned or controlled directly or
indirectly by the same interests, the Secretary may
distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income,
deductions, credits, or allowances between or among
such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he
determines that such distribution, apportionment, or
allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of
taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such
organizations, trades, or businesses. * * *
Section 1.482-1(b)(1), Income Tax Regs., explains the purpose of
section 482 as follows:
The purpose of section 482 is to place a controlled
taxpayer on a tax parity with an uncontrolled taxpayer,
by determining, according to the standard of an
uncontrolled taxpayer, the true taxable income from the
property and business of a controlled taxpayer. * * *
Generally put, section 482 is designed to prevent artificial
distorting of the true net incomes of commonly controlled
entities. The Commissioner has broad discretionary power to
allocate income, and a heavier than normal burden is placed on
the taxpayer to prove that the allocation is arbitrary or
unreasonable. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 323,
331 (1990), affd. 961 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1992). In meeting its
burden, petitioner must show that it did not improperly utilize
its control to shift income. Id.
Petitioner concedes that it and AFLIC are under common
control. Petitioner, however, argues that it did not improperly
utilize its control over itself and AFLIC to shift commission
income from itself to AFLIC, because under Mississippi law it
would have been illegal for petitioner, during the years in
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issue, to receive the commission income. Petitioner, in this
regard, relies primarily on the Supreme Court’s decision in
Commissioner v. First Security Bank, 405 U.S. 394 (1972), a case
whose facts are strikingly similar to those now before us. In
First Security, two banks, wholly owned subsidiaries of a holding
company, offered credit insurance to their borrowers. The
premiums would be forwarded to an independent insurer, which
would then reinsure the policies with an insurance company which
was also wholly owned by the holding company. The subsidiary
insurance company would receive 85 percent of the premiums, and
the outside insurance company, which furnished actuarial and
accounting services, kept the remaining 15 percent. The banks
received no commissions or payments for selling the insurance.
The Commissioner, pursuant to section 482, determined that a
percentage of the premiums was allocable to the banks to properly
reflect commission income.
The Supreme Court set aside the Commissioner’s allocation.
The Court emphasized that, under Federal law, the banks were
prohibited from receiving commissions. Id. at 401. Since the
banks could not have legally received that income, the Court
determined that the holding company did not improperly utilize
its control over its subsidiaries to distort income. Id. at 403-
404. In its analysis, the Court found no decision of the Supreme
Court wherein a person had been found to have taxable income that
he did not receive and that he was prohibited from receiving.
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Id. at 403. Moreover, in cases dealing with the concept of
income, it has been assumed that the person to whom the income
was attributed could have received it. Id. The underlying
assumption always has been that in order to be taxed for income,
a taxpayer must have complete dominion over it. Id. (citing
Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378 (1930)).
We understand the Supreme Court’s opinion to forbid
allocation of income to a taxpayer when restrictions imposed by
law prohibit the taxpayer from receiving such income. See
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Commissioner, supra at 336; see also
Salyersville Natl. Bank v. United States, 613 F.2d 650 (6th Cir.
1980); Bank of Winnfield & Trust Co. v. United States, 540 F.
Supp. 219 (W.D. La. 1982). Thus, if we find that Mississippi law
made it illegal for petitioner to receive commissions during the
years in issue, we must hold for petitioner. See Procter &
Gamble Co. v. Commissioner, supra at 336.
Petitioner argues that Miss. Code Ann. secs. 83-17-105 and
83-17-7 (1973) prohibited it from receiving commissions during
the years in issue. For those years, Miss. Code Ann. sec. 83-17-
105 states in pertinent part:
No insurer or agent doing business in this state
shall pay, directly or indirectly, any commission or
any other valuable consideration to any person for
services as an agent within this state unless such
person shall hold a currently valid license and
certificate of authority to act as an agent, as
required by the laws of such state. Nor shall any
person other than a duly licensed agent accept any such
commission or other valuable consideration. * * *
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Miss. Code Ann. sec. 83-17-7 likewise states:
It shall be unlawful for any insurance company or
any insurance agent to pay, directly or indirectly, any
commission, brokerage or other valuable consideration
on account of any policy or policies written on risks
in this state to any person, agent, firm or corporation
not duly licensed as an insurance agent in this state,
* * *.
These statutes seem to forbid commission payments to petitioner,
as petitioner is not a “duly licensed agent”. Respondent,
however, cites Miss. Code Ann. sec. 83-53-25(1)(1973), which
states as follows:
No one shall pay, accrue, credit or otherwise
allow, either directly or indirectly, any compensation
to any creditor, person, partnership, corporation,
association or other entity in connection with any
policy, certificate or other contract of credit life
insurance or credit disability insurance which exceeds
forty-five percent (45%) of the premium rates approved
for such policy, certificate or contract.
A similar regulation, limiting the amount allowable as
compensation to any “creditor or agent” for the sale of credit
life insurance, was in place during the years in issue.
Mississippi Insurance Department Reg. No. LA & H 82-102.6 The
Supreme Court of Mississippi addressed this apparent conflict
6
Miss. Ins. Dept. Reg. No. LA & H 82-102, sec. VII
provides:
No insurance company shall pay, credit or otherwise allow
any compensation or other valuable consideration, either
directly or indirectly to any creditor or agent for the sale
of any policy, certificate or other contract of credit
insurance which exceeds fifty percent of the premium rates
specified for such policy, certificate or contract.
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among the statutes in Tew v. Dixieland Finance, Inc., 527 So. 2d
665 (Miss. 1988).
Tew involved a small loan company which, like petitioner,
sold credit life insurance through licensed employees. Like
petitioner, the loan company itself was not licensed to sell
insurance. The loan company brought suit against a borrower who
had defaulted on his loan. The borrower counterclaimed,
asserting that the loan company’s receipt of commissions on his
purchase of credit life insurance from the loan company was in
violation of Miss. Code Ann. sec. 83-17-105--as the loan company
was not a licensed agent--and in violation of Miss. Code Ann.
sec. 75-67-121.
In Tew, before deciding the issue of whether the loan
company violated section 83-17-105, the court noted that it was
common practice in the industry for unlicensed creditors to
receive commissions for the sale of credit insurance. Id. at
670. Furthermore, the court cited Miss. Code Ann. sec. 83-53-25
and Ins. Dept. Reg. 82-102 as evidence that the Mississippi
Legislature and Department of Insurance have recognized that
unlicensed creditors may receive commissions. Id. at 670-671.
However, the court emphasized that these “regulations ignore the
inconsistency of these provisions with Miss. Code Ann. §83-17-105
(Supp. 1987) which prohibits the payment of any commission to any
person who is not a licensed agent”. Id. at 671. Accordingly,
the court held “that the receiving of * * * [the] commission by
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Dixieland [i.e., the loan company] from its sale of insurance is
in violation of the Miss. Code Ann. section 83-17-105”. Id.
Because of the reliance placed on the Department of Insurance
regulations, the court made its ruling prohibiting an unlicensed
agent from collecting commissions prospective to cases arising on
and after July 1, 1989. Id. at 673. The court chose a
prospective date to allow the Legislature and Executive
Departments to deal with the inconsistencies noted. Id.7
Petitioner argues that the prospective language in Tew
relates only to the private cause of action asserted by the
defendant against the loan company, not to the legality of the
loan company’s actions. Thus, petitioner argues, it would have
been illegal for it to receive commissions even prior to July 1,
1989. We agree. The Mississippi Supreme Court clearly held that
the receiving of commissions by the loan company from the sale of
credit insurance was in violation of Miss. Code Ann. sec 83-17-
105, which required it to be a licensed agent to receive
commissions. Id.
Neither party disputes the rule of Commissioner v. First
Security Bank, 405 U.S. 394 (1972), wherein the Supreme Court
held that the Commissioner’s allocation of income to a taxpayer
7
The statutes in question were not amended after Tew v.
Dixieland Finance, Inc., 527 So. 2d 665 (Miss. 1988). However,
on July 1, 1989, the Department of Insurance promulgated Ins.
Dept. Reg. 89-102 to specifically allow an unlicensed creditor
which sells credit insurance through its licensed employees to
receive commissions.
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pursuant to section 482 was inappropriate when the taxpayer’s
receipt of such income was prohibited by local law. The Court
concluded that section 1.482-1(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.,
contemplated that the controlling interest, i.e., the holding
company, must have “complete power” to shift income among its
subsidiaries. Id. at 404. Section 1.482-1(b)(1), Income Tax
Regs., provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
The interests controlling a group of controlled taxpayers
are assumed to have complete power to cause each controlled
taxpayer so to conduct its affairs that its transactions and
accounting records truly reflect the taxable income from the
property and business of each of the controlled taxpayers.
* * *
Thus, the Court continued, it is only when this power
exists, and has been used to understate the controlled taxpayer’s
true income, that the Commissioner is authorized to reallocate
income under section 482. Id. The Court concluded that the
holding company did not have the “complete power” to shift income
between its controlled interests unless it violated the Federal
banking laws. Moreover, the Court concluded that the “complete
power” referred to in the regulations hardly includes the power
to force a subsidiary to violate the law. Id. at 405.
Applying the same type of analysis, we hold that petitioner
could not have received commission income from AFLIC without
violating Mississippi State law as provided in Miss. Code Ann.
secs. 83-17-105 and 83-17-7 (1973) and as construed by the
Mississippi Supreme Court in Tew v. Dixieland Finance, Inc.,
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supra. See Estate of Bosch v. Commissioner, 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
Petitioner has not utilized its control over AFLIC so as to
improperly shift income. Rather, there has been a deflection of
income by operation of Mississippi State law. See Procter &
Gamble Co. v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. at 341.
Accordingly, we hold that an allocation under section 482 is
unwarranted and an abuse of the respondent’s discretion.
Issue 2. Bad Debt Deduction
Petitioner took a deduction under section 166(a) for the
Cooper debt which AFLIC assigned to AFIC in July 1989.8
Section 166(a) provides a deduction for any debt which
becomes worthless during the taxable year. The amount of the
deduction for a bad debt is limited to the taxpayer’s adjusted
basis in the debt as provided in section 1011. Sec. 166(b);
Perry v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 470, 477-478 (1989), affd. without
published opinion 912 F.2d 1466 (5th Cir. 1990). Whether, and
when, a debt becomes worthless is determined by looking at all
the facts and circumstances including the value of the
collateral, if any, securing the debt and the financial condition
of the debtor. Sec. 1.166-2(a), Income Tax Regs. Generally, a
8
Since AFIC was a member of the affiliated group with
petitioner, AFIC’s operations were included in the consolidated
filing. Sec. 1.1502-76(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. The common
parent shall be the sole agent for each subsidiary in the group.
Sec. 1.1502-77(a), Income Tax Regs. As common parent, petitioner
is authorized to petition and conduct proceedings before the
Court on behalf of all members of the group. Id.
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debt will be considered worthless only when it can be reasonably
expected that the debt is without possibility of future payment
and legal action to enforce the debt would not result in
satisfaction. Hawkins v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 1069 (1953).
Petitioner bears the burden of proof, Rule 142(a), and must show
that the debt had value at the beginning of the taxable year in
question--in this case 1989--and that it became worthless during
and prior to the end of that year, Millsap v. Commissioner, 46
T.C. 751, 762 (1966), affd. 387 F.2d 420 (8th Cir. 1968).
We have found the amount of the debt, as assigned to AFIC in
1989, to be $93,595. Of that amount, petitioner concedes that
$853, the cash value of the Lamar policies, is not deductible as
a bad debt.
Petitioner proposes no findings of fact and makes no
arguments supporting its position that the debt became worthless
in 1989 other than that Cooper began serving a prison sentence
during 1989. The only evidence submitted by petitioner
pertaining to the worthlessness of the debt is Jack Lee’s
subjective testimony on the matter.9 Lee testified as follows:
Q. Well, prior to his going to prison, what effort
did you make -- after the business went defunct, what
efforts did you make to collect on the loan?
A. We went through a long history of George trying to
collect. He went from -- after the thing -- after
Cooper Ford went broke, then he bought the restaurant
9
Lee is chairman, chief executive officer, and part
owner of petitioner.
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on Highway 80; I forget the name of it. And he didn’t
make it with the restaurant.
[Trustmark] had a lien on his house, and I had a
buyer for the house, so I went up there and got
[Trustmark] to sell me their position. And we
subsequently foreclosed on that house, and I did make
some money, which reduced the debt some on the
settlement of that house. * * *
Q. And after that occurred, what happened to make you
finally conclude that the loan was uncollectible?
A. Well since that time -- since he lost -- it was
Fisherman’s Wharf was the restaurant -- since he lost
that restaurant, and he went to prison in my knowledge
George has never worked since then.
We assume that the loan that Lee was referring to was the
original loan in 1985, which was refinanced in 1988 and again in
1989. The parties have treated the 1989 note as merely a
continuation of the debt which was refinanced in 1988 by AFLIC,
and we see no difference in result by doing the same.
Assuming the 1989 note was a continuation of the earlier
debt, without anything more than Lee’s testimony, we are not
persuaded that the debt was worthless. The only evidence that
petitioner (or AFLIC) attempted to collect on the debt was the
purchase of the Coopers’ home in the 1988 foreclosure sale.
Petitioner has not shown that Cooper was without any other assets
which could have provided payment in an action to collect on the
debt. Moreover, even if the debt was worthless, the record does
not establish that it became worthless in 1989. Matheney Ford
became insolvent no later than 1988. AFLIC foreclosed on the
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Coopers’ house and sold it in 1988. Accordingly, petitioner has
failed to meet its burden of proof.
We add that if the 1989 note is viewed as a separate debt
from the earlier debt, petitioner has failed to show that such
debt had value when created, or when acquired by AFLIC. Without
that showing, a deduction is not permitted. See, e.g., Garrett
v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 316, 317 (1962).
Finally, petitioner has failed to prove AFIC’s basis in the
note, which is required in order to take a section 166 deduction.
Sec. 166(b). Normally, for section 166(b) purposes, a taxpayer’s
basis in property is the cost of such property. Secs. 1011 and
1012. The assignment agreement stated that the assignment was
“For a valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of
which is hereby acknowledged”. Lee testified that AFIC
reimbursed AFLIC for the amount of the debt; i.e., that AFLIC
furnished consideration for the debt. However, we have found no
evidence of any such payments and would not, therefore, be able
to determine the amount allowable as a deduction under section
166. Accordingly, we sustain respondent’s disallowance of
petitioner’s bad debt deduction.
Decision will be entered
under Rule 155.