T.C. Memo. 1996-182
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
KEITH ROBERT BRADBURY, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 23890-92. Filed April 15, 1996.
Keith Robert Bradbury, pro se.
Michael D. Zima, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GOLDBERG, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant
to section 7443A(b)(3) and Rules 180, 181, and 182.1 Respondent
determined deficiencies in petitioner's 1988 and 1989 Federal
income taxes in the respective amounts of $998 and $1,389. In
addition, respondent determined that petitioner was liable for an
1
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the
Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years at issue, and all
Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and
Procedure.
2
addition to tax under section 6653(a) for 1988 in the amount of
$50, and an accuracy-related penalty under section 6662 with
respect to 1989 in the amount of $278.
The issues are: (1) Whether this Court is unconstitutional
and lacks jurisdiction over petitioner's tax deficiencies; (2)
whether petitioner was engaged in the trade or business of being
a broker during the years at issue, and, if so, whether
petitioner is entitled to various deductions as claimed on his
Schedules C for those years; (3) whether petitioner is liable for
an addition to tax pursuant to section 6653(a) for 1988; and (4)
whether petitioner is liable for an accuracy-related penalty with
respect to 1989 pursuant to section 6662.
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
The stipulation of facts and exhibits received into evidence are
incorporated by this reference. Petitioner resided in Inverness,
Florida, at the time his petition was filed in this case.
In or around 1979, petitioner resided in Indianapolis,
Indiana, and worked as a business broker and consultant. He
formed K.R. Bradbury & Associates, Inc. (KRBA) in or about 1980,
a corporation engaged in selling businesses and in management
consulting. In 1982, petitioner sold one-third of KRBA to Ray
Leonard, a licensed real estate agent, and changed the corporate
name to Bradbury, Leonard & Associates, Inc. (BLA). Shortly
thereafter, petitioner sold his remaining interest in BLA to a
third party and formed Executive Computer Corp. (ECC), a
3
corporation engaged in the development and sale of computers and
software.
ECC was ultimately unsuccessful, and, in 1985, petitioner
abandoned the corporation and moved to Florida. Petitioner
obtained a Florida real estate broker license, and went to work
for IBEX Business Brokers, Inc. (IBEX). According to his own
testimony, petitioner did not sell a single property during his
tenure with IBEX, and, at some point thereafter, he went to work
for the School Board of Pinellas County as an engineer and
consultant. During 1988 and 1989, the years at issue, petitioner
earned an annual income from his position with the School Board
in the respective amounts of $20,989.55 and $28,116.43.
Petitioner testified that although he worked full time for
the School Board, approximately 40 hours each week, he had time
during the day for other activities. He further testified that
he used this time, in addition to evenings and weekends, to
independently pursue his brokerage activities, spending 15 to 20
hours per week trying to list and sell properties. To date, he
has yet to sell any such property.
Petitioner maintained no formal ledgers or records of his
brokerage activities, nor did he maintain separate bank accounts.
He did not have a separate business telephone number and did not
advertise his services on a regular basis.
4
On the Schedules C attached to his 1988 and 1989 Federal
income tax returns, petitioner claimed the following deductions
with respect to his brokerage activities:
Expense 1988 1989
Advertising $114 $83
Bank service charges 10 9
Car and truck expenses 1,440 1,009
Depreciation 4,190 3,088
Dues and publication 81 -0-
Freight -0- 606
Insurance 42 -0-
Legal and professional fees 153 287
Office expenses 99 271
Supplies 45 269
Travel 62 222
Meals 96 145
Utilities 138 -0-
"Biof Project" 196 -0-
"R & D Tools" -0- 600
"Elect. Resc." -0- 62
"ANW Srvcs." -0- 135
Postage -0- 59
Total 6,666 6,845
Petitioner reported no income during 1988 and 1989 other than the
wages he earned as an engineer for the School Board.
Respondent determined that petitioner did not engage in
brokerage activities for profit and therefore disallowed all of
the deductions claimed attributable thereto. Alternatively,
respondent determined that petitioner failed to substantiate the
deductions and to prove that the expenditures were ordinary and
necessary to any business that he conducted.
As a preliminary matter, petitioner argues that the U.S. Tax
Court is unconstitutional because it unfairly shifts the burden
5
of proof to the taxpayer and allegedly denies taxpayers their
right under the Seventh Amendment to a jury trial. Petitioner's
arguments have been consistently rejected by this Court and
others, and we have no persuasive reason to depart from the
analysis of these cases. E.g., Freytag v. Commissioner, 89 T.C.
849, 888 (1987), affd. 904 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1990), affd. 501
U.S. 868 (1991); Swanson v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 1180, 1182
(1976) ("a taxpayer is not entitled to a jury trial in the Tax
Court") (citing Cupp v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 68 (1975), affd.
without published opinion 559 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1977); Roberts
v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 834, 838 (1974) (burden of proof); Dorl
v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 720, 721-722 (1972), affd. per curiam
507 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1974); Burns, Stix Friedman & Co., Inc. v.
Commissioner, 57 T.C. 392 (1971) (the Tax Court is an Article I
Court and its exercise of jurisdiction does not violate Article
III)). Based on the reasoning of these cases, and in light of
petitioner's failure to present any credible evidence to the
contrary, we find petitioner's arguments devoid of any legal
merit. Accordingly, respondent's determinations are presumed
correct, and petitioner bears the burden of proving otherwise.
Rule 142(a); INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84
(1992).
All taxpayers are required to keep sufficient records to
enable respondent to determine their correct tax liability. Sec.
6001; Meneguzzo v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 824, 831-832 (1965).
6
Moreover, deductions are strictly a matter of legislative grace,
and a taxpayer has the burden of establishing that he or she is
entitled to any deduction claimed on a return. Deputy v. du
Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 493 (1940); New Colonial Ice Co. v.
Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934).
Section 162(a) allows as a deduction "all the ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in
carrying on any trade or business". Where a taxpayer conducts an
activity not as a trade or business, section 183 allows
deductions generally to the extent that the activity generates
gross income. To be engaged in a trade or business within the
meaning of section 162, "the taxpayer must be involved in the
activity with continuity and regularity and * * * the taxpayer's
primary purpose for engaging in the activity must be for income
or profit." Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987).
Whether petitioner is engaged in business and real estate
brokerage for profit depends on whether the activities were
undertaken with an "actual and honest objective" of making a
profit. Elliott v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 960, 970 (1988), affd.
without published opinion 899 F.2d 18 (9th Cir. 1990); Fuchs v.
Commissioner, 83 T.C. 79, 98 (1984); Dreicer v. Commissioner, 78
T.C. 642, 644-645 (1982), affd. without opinion 702 F.2d 1205
(D.C. Cir. 1983). While a reasonable expectation of a profit is
not required, petitioner must have entered into the activity, or
continued it, with the bona fide objective of making a profit, as
7
judged by all the facts and circumstances. Taube v.
Commissioner, 88 T.C. 464, 478-479 (1987); Poast v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1994-399; sec. 1.183-2(a), Income Tax Regs.
The regulations set forth nine nonexclusive factors for
consideration in determining whether an activity is engaged in
for profit. Sec. 1.183-2(b), Income Tax Regs. These factors
are: (1) The manner in which the taxpayer carries on the
activity; (2) the expertise of the taxpayer or his advisers; (3)
the time and effort expended by the taxpayer in carrying on the
activity; (4) the expectation that assets used in the activity
may appreciate in value; (5) the success of the taxpayer in
carrying on other activities; (6) the taxpayer's history of
income or losses with respect to the activity; (7) the amount of
occasional profit, if any, which is earned; (8) the financial
status of the taxpayer; and (9) whether elements of personal
pleasure or recreation are involved. Furthermore, if a taxpayer
has substantial income from sources other than the activity in
question, it may be an indication that the activity is not
engaged in for profit, particularly if the losses from the
activity generate substantial tax benefits. Sec. 1.183-2(b),
Income Tax Regs.
No single factor is controlling. Abramson v. Commissioner,
86 T.C. 360, 371 (1986); Golanty v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 411,
426 (1979), affd. without published opinion 647 F.2d 170 (9th
Cir. 1981). The taxpayer's stated intention to make a profit is
8
not determinative; greater weight is given to objective factors
rather than to the taxpayer's mere statement of intent. Engdahl
v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 659, 666 (1979). Moreover, section 262
generally precludes a taxpayer from deducting personal, living,
or family expenses.
Based on the record, we find that petitioner lacked the
requisite profit objective in carrying on his brokerage
activities. Petitioner contends that he carried on his brokerage
activities in a regular and continuous manner; however, the
evidence he presented at trial indicates otherwise. Petitioner
introduced 12 documents, including several form letters from
petitioner while he was associated with BLA and IBEX with names
of various companies inserted in the blanks and dated as far back
as September 10, 1982, letters regarding petitioner's membership
in a broker association, subscriptions to newsletters, lists of
potential buyers, and letters to petitioner regarding his status
as a "valued referral source" for Guaranty Acceptance Capital
Corporation (GACC) dated in late 1989 or 1990. Petitioner also
introduced a brochure for K.R. Bradbury & Associates and a
receipt for the printing thereof dated September 15, 1988.
These documents do not demonstrate a regular and continuous
pursuit of brokerage activities for profit during the years at
issue. Most of the letters are dated prior to 1988, none of the
documents are dated in 1988, and it appears that the only
document dated during 1989 was the letter to petitioner regarding
9
GACC. Petitioner did not maintain a business bank account,
despite having deducted service charges as a business expense for
both years at issue. He also admitted at trial that he failed to
keep organized records or receipts of expenses, and failed to
provide receipts supporting the majority of expenses claimed on
his returns.
Although petitioner appears to have some experience in the
area of brokerage, he conceded that he has not sold one piece of
property or business enterprise in all of his years engaged in
this activity, with the exception of the sales of one-third of
his interest in KRBA to Mr. Leonard, and, later, his remaining
interest in KRBA to third parties. Petitioner did not present
documentation of these transactions, and the record fails to
indicate whether his role in the transactions was that of a
broker or simply a seller.
Petitioner testified that he spent 15 to 20 hours per week
on brokerage activity and was regularly contacting potential
sellers and buyers. However, the receipts presented by
petitioner in support of this contention are dated almost
exclusively during the Christmas and Labor Day weekend holidays.
Moreover, the travel was largely to Indianapolis, Indiana, where
his son lives with petitioner's former wife, and several of the
receipts presented in support of his "business" expenses were for
tickets to Sea World and Disneyland.
10
Petitioner argues that his failure to achieve success in the
brokerage business should not preclude a determination that he is
engaged in such activity for profit. He insists that he has a
good faith profit motive and that the Internal Revenue Service
and this Court should not be permitted to decide otherwise since
we allegedly lack any brokerage experience. It is well settled
that we are not required to accept self-serving testimony in the
absence of corroborating evidence. Lerch v. Commissioner, 877
F.2d 624, 631-632 (7th Cir. 1989), affg. T.C. Memo. 1987-295;
Niedringhaus v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 202, 212 (1992). Based on
the foregoing, we conclude that petitioner was not engaged in a
brokerage business for profit, and, accordingly, having received
no income from that source, is not entitled to claim a deduction
for any expenses related thereto during the years at issue.
We next consider whether petitioner is liable for an
addition to tax for negligence under section 6653(a)(1) for 1988
and an accuracy-related penalty under section 6662 for 1989.
Section 6653(a)(1) imposes an addition to tax equal to 5 percent
of the underpayment if any part of an underpayment of tax was due
to negligence or intentional disregard of rules or regulations.
Negligence is defined by section 6653(a)(3) as the failure to
exercise the due care of a reasonable and ordinarily prudent
person under similar circumstances. Neely v. Commissioner, 85
T.C. 934, 947 (1985). Under section 6662, there shall be added
to the tax an amount equal to 20 percent of the portion of the
11
underpayment that is attributable to negligence or disregard of
rules or regulations. Under section 6662(c), negligence includes
any failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply with the law
and the term "disregard" includes any careless, reckless, or
intentional disregard. Failure to maintain adequate records may
constitute negligence. Schroeder v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 30, 34
(1963); Johnson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1991-346, affd.
without published opinion 8 F.3d 811 (3d Cir. 1993).
As noted, it is the responsibility of petitioner to maintain
books and records sufficient to accurately establish the amount
of his deductions. Sec. 6001. Petitioner failed to maintain
organized records and receipts of the expenses claimed on his
returns for the years at issue, clearly claimed deductions for
items of a personal nature, and did not present any evidence with
respect to his liability for the above addition and penalty. We
conclude that petitioner is liable for the addition to tax under
section 6653(a) and the accuracy-related penalty under section
6662 as determined by respondent.
Decision will be entered
for respondent.