T.C. Memo. 1996-194
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
CARLTON H. PERRY, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 7548-94. Filed April 22, 1996.
Carlton H. Perry, pro se.
Paul G. Robeck, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
CHIECHI, Judge: Respondent determined a deficiency in
petitioner's Federal income tax for 1989 in the amount of $6,058.
The issues remaining for decision are:
(1) Is petitioner entitled to deduct for 1989 any of the
expenses with respect to the use of his motor home that he
claimed in Schedule E of his Federal income tax return for that
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year (1989 return)? We hold that he is not.
(2) Is petitioner entitled to deduct for 1989 any of the
expenses with respect to meals claimed in Schedule E of his 1989
return? We hold that he is not.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
Petitioner resided in Portland, Oregon, at the time the
petition was filed. Petitioner and his former wife Barbara J.
Perry (Ms. Perry) filed a joint 1989 return.1
During 1989, petitioner spent time researching and writing a
novel that had not been published or sold as of the end of that
year. He also held certain investments during that year.
Petitioner's income for 1989, as reported in his 1989
return, included (1) interest income from savings, (2) dividend
income from investments in various securities, (3) rental income
from investments in rental real estate, and (4) capital gains
from the sale of stocks and the sale of rental real estate.
Motor Home Expenses
During 1989, petitioner owned a 1987 Pace Arrow motor home
(motor home) that was 33 to 34 feet in length and that was
equipped with a kitchen, a bath, a sleeping area, a living area,
a television, and a videocassette recorder.
1
Respondent's notice of deficiency (notice) for 1989 was issued
to both petitioner and his former wife Ms. Perry. Ms. Perry did
not file a petition with respect to that notice, and, according-
ly, she is not a party in the present case.
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During the year at issue, petitioner, accompanied by his
then wife Ms. Perry, used the motor home for the purpose of
taking trips to various locations in Oregon. They used the motor
home to reach their destination, and they slept and ate in the
motor home during the course of those trips. The trips that
petitioner and Ms. Perry took during 1989 were for the purpose of
personal pleasure and recreation and were not business related.
During 1989, petitioner did not at any time operate the motor
home as a rental property.
During 1989, petitioner maintained a two-page handwritten
log, entitled "MILAGE [sic] RECORDS For 1989" (mileage log), in
which he recorded the following at the time he purchased gasoline
for the motor home: The date of the purchase of gasoline, the
city in which it was purchased, the odometer reading of the motor
home, the generator use of the motor home, the number of gallons
of gasoline purchased, the dollar amount paid for the purchase of
gasoline, and other miscellaneous motor home expenses, such as
propane refills. The mileage log did not in any way indicate
that there was any business purpose for the trips that petitioner
and Ms. Perry took in, or for any other use of, the motor home
during 1989.
During 1989, petitioner also maintained a handwritten log
(handwritten log) consisting of 61 pages of notes that described
in detail the trips that he and Ms. Perry took in the motor home
during that year. In that handwritten log, petitioner noted that
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(1) he and Ms. Perry took a total of 10 trips during 1989;
(2) those trips were taken during the months of April through
October 1989; (3) each such trip lasted from two to 15 days; and
(4) the total number of days that they spent on those trips was
70 days. Petitioner also described in detail in the handwritten
log his experiences during such trips, including the places at
which he and Ms. Perry camped, the walks and hikes they took, the
flowers, plants, and wildlife they saw, an old grave site they
visited, the sunrises and the sunsets they watched, and the food
they ate. The handwritten log did not in any way indicate that
there was any business purpose for the trips that petitioner and
Ms. Perry took in, or for any other use of, the motor home during
1989.
In his 1989 return, petitioner reported the following
expenses totaling $17,442 that he claimed were associated with
the maintenance of the motor home:
Depreciation $8,106
Equipment repairs 363
Gas, lube, tune-up 1,469
General maintenance and repair 1,669
Groceries and related items 939
Household miscellaneous expenses 285
Insurance 929
Interest 3,682
Petitioner allocated 50 percent of the total reported
expenses of $17,442 to his rental real estate activities and
claimed a deduction of $8,721 in Schedule E of his 1989 return
for the use of the motor home in connection with those activi-
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ties. He allocated approximately 25 percent of those reported
expenses to activities relating to his researching and writing a
novel during 1989 and claimed a deduction of $4,360 in Schedule C
of his 1989 return for the use of the motor home in connection
with those activities. Petitioner allocated the remaining por-
tion of those reported expenses to his personal activities and
did not claim a deduction for the use of the motor home in
connection with those activities.
Meal Expenses
During 1989, petitioner incurred expenses for meals at var-
ious restaurants in the total amount of $6,500. Those expenses
reflected the cost of meals for petitioner and Ms. Perry. During
the year at issue, petitioner did not at any time buy meals for
prospective tenants and did not typically buy meals for then
current tenants. Petitioner allocated 25 percent of the total
meal expenses of $6,500 to his rental real estate activities and
claimed a deduction with respect thereto in the amount of $1,625
in Schedule E of his 1989 return.
OPINION
Petitioner bears the burden of proving that respondent's
determinations are erroneous. Rule 142(a);2 Welch v. Helvering,
290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Deductions are strictly a matter of
2
All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code (Code)
in effect for the year at issue. All Rule references are to the
Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
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legislative grace, and petitioner bears the burden of proving
that he is entitled to any deduction claimed. New Colonial Ice
Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934).
Petitioner attempted to satisfy his burden of proof in this
case through his own testimony and certain documentary evidence.
We found petitioner's testimony at times questionable, general,
vague, conclusory, and evasive. Under the circumstances present-
ed here, we are not required to, and we do not, rely on petition-
er's testimony to sustain his burden of establishing error in
respondent's determinations. See Lerch v. Commissioner, 877 F.2d
624, 631-632 (7th Cir. 1989), affg. T.C. Memo. 1987-295; Geiger
v. Commissioner, 440 F.2d 688, 689-690 (9th Cir. 1971), affg. per
curiam T.C. Memo. 1969-159; Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74,
77 (1986). As for the documentary evidence on which petitioner
relies, for the reasons discussed below, we find that those
documents do not support petitioner's contentions and/or are
unreliable.
Motor Home Expenses
Section 162(a) generally allows a deduction for ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in
carrying on a trade or business.3 To be entitled to a deduction
3
Sec. 212 allows a deduction for all ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year for the produc-
tion or collection of income or for the management, conservation,
or maintenance of property held for the production of income.
Petitioner has not expressly argued that he is entitled to a
(continued...)
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under section 162(a), the taxpayer must establish, inter alia,
that the expense for which a deduction is claimed was incurred
primarily for business, rather than personal, reasons and that
there is a proximate relationship between the expense and the
taxpayer's business. See Henry v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 879, 884
(1961); Larrabee v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 838, 841 (1960). The
determination of whether an expenditure satisfies the require-
ments of deductibility under section 162 is a question of fact.
Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 475 (1943).
Section 167(a) allows as a depreciation deduction a reasona-
ble allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear of property used
in a trade or business or for the production of income. No
depreciation deduction is allowed for property that is used
solely for pleasure. Sec. 1.167(a)-2, Income Tax Regs.; see sec.
262.
Section 280A(a) generally disallows a deduction, otherwise
allowable under the Code, with respect to the use of a dwelling
unit, including a "mobile home * * * or similar property", if the
taxpayer's personal use of the unit during the year exceeds the
greater of 14 days or 10 percent of the number of days during
such year for which the unit is rented at a fair rental. Sec.
280A(a), (d)(1), and (f)(1)(A).
3
(...continued)
deduction under that section for any of the motor home expenses
at issue. Nor would the record support such an argument, since,
as we hold infra, petitioner has failed to establish that the
motor home was used in connection with his rental real estate,
rather than personal, activities.
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Section 280A(c) provides certain exceptions to the general
disallowance rule of section 280A(a). The pertinent exception in
the instant case is that prescribed by section 280A(c)(1). That
section provides that section 280A(a) shall not apply to any item
to the extent the taxpayer can establish that such item is
allocable to a portion of his or her dwelling unit that is used
(1) exclusively, (2) on a regular basis, and (3) for one of the
following purposes:
(a) As the principal place of business for any trade or
business of the taxpayer,
(b) as a place of business that is used by patients, cli-
ents, or customers in meeting or dealing with the taxpayer in the
normal course of his or her trade or business, or
(c) in the case of a separate structure which is not at-
tached to the dwelling unit, in connection with the taxpayer's
trade or business.4
Although petitioner's argument is not altogether clear, he
appears to contend that (1) he is entitled to a deduction for
1989 under sections 162(a) and 167(a) for the motor home expenses
reported in Schedule E of his 1989 return because the motor home
was used in connection with his rental real estate activities and
4
In order to satisfy the requirements of sec. 280A(c)(1), the
taxpayer must establish, inter alia, that an expense item is
allocable to a portion of his or her dwelling unit that such
taxpayer used in connection with an activity that constitutes a
trade or business within the meaning of sec. 162(a), and not
merely in connection with an activity that constitutes an income-
producing activity within the meaning of sec. 212. Curphey v.
Commissioner, 73 T.C. 766, 770 (1980).
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(2) those expenses are not disallowed under section 280A(a)
because his use of the motor home as the principal place of
business for the operations of those activities falls within the
exception provided by 280A(c)(1).5
Respondent contends that petitioner is not entitled for 1989
to a deduction for the motor home expenses at issue because he
failed to prove that the motor home was used in connection with
his rental real estate, rather than personal, activities. Re-
spondent further contends that even if the deductions were other-
wise allowable by the Code, they are disallowed under section
280A(a) because petitioner has failed to establish that he used
the motor home exclusively in connection with his rental real
estate activities as required by section 280A(c)(1).
Petitioner relies on three documents to support his conten-
tion that he used the motor home in connection with his rental
real estate activities and claims that those documents corrobo-
rate his testimony that he used the motor home as a place to meet
with tenants, as a vehicle by which to transport material, as a
storage place to store equipment, and as a vehicle to travel to
various destinations in Oregon in search of new real estate
investments.
Two of the documents on which petitioner relies are the
5
Petitioner concedes that he is not entitled to a deduction for
1989 for the reported motor home expenses that he allocated to
activities relating to his researching and writing a novel during
1989 and for which he claimed a deduction in Schedule C of his
1989 return.
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mileage log and the handwritten log. The mileage log contained
information relating to the dates on which petitioner purchased
gasoline for the motor home, the cities in which it was pur-
chased, the odometer readings of the motor home, the generator
use of the motor home, the number of gallons of gasoline pur-
chased, the respective dollar amounts paid for the gasoline
purchased, and other miscellaneous motor home expenses, such as
propane refills. The handwritten log consisted of 61 pages of
notes in which petitioner described in detail his experiences
during the trips that he and Ms. Perry took in the motor home
during the months of April through October 1989, including the
places at which they camped, the walks and hikes they took, the
flowers, plants, and wildlife they saw, an old grave site they
visited, the sunrises and the sunsets they watched, and the food
they ate. Neither the mileage log nor the handwritten log in any
way indicated that there was any business purpose for the trips
that petitioner and Ms. Perry took in, or for any other use of,
the motor home during 1989.6 To the contrary, the handwritten
6
Petitioner testified that notations made in the far right
margin of the mileage log in the form of slash marks under a
column labeled "Calls" represent the times that he met with his
tenants in the motor home with respect to matters relating to his
real estate rentals. Petitioner further testified inconsistently
as to whether those notations were contemporaneous records of
those alleged meetings. The mileage log contained no notations
of (1) the names of the tenants with whom petitioner allegedly
met in the motor home, (2) the dates or the times of such alleged
meetings, or (3) the subjects that he discussed during such
alleged meetings. On the instant record, we place no particular
weight on the slash marks in the mileage log or, for the reasons
stated above, on petitioner's testimony concerning them in
(continued...)
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log establishes that petitioner used the motor home to take trips
that were for the purpose of personal pleasure and recreation and
that were not related to petitioner's rental real estate activi-
ties.
The third document on which petitioner relies is entitled
"1989 Pace Summary of R.E [sic] Investment/Travel Activity" (real
estate log). We have serious reservations about the reliability
of that document. It purports to be a list of the real proper-
ties that petitioner allegedly visited during the trips in 1989
that he and Ms. Perry took in the motor home. The real estate
log was created by petitioner on his personal computer and was
saved on a computer diskette. Petitioner produced that log on
October 2, 1995, two days prior to the trial herein and after
having been informed by respondent's counsel that, as far as
respondent was concerned, the documents petitioner had presented
to respondent's counsel failed to establish a business purpose
for the motor home during 1989. On cross-examination, when
petitioner was asked whether he had made any substantive changes
to the real estate log prior to the trial, he was evasive in his
response. In addition, the real estate log contained a general
and vague description of the real properties that petitioner
purportedly visited during 1989 and did not contain any specific
information relating to such properties, such as the addresses
6
(...continued)
determining whether the motor home was used in connection with
petitioner's rental real estate activities.
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thereof, the names and phone numbers of sellers or real estate
brokers, or the asking prices of any such properties.
Our reservations about the reliability of the real estate
log are compounded by the results of an examination of the com-
puter diskette on which the real estate log was saved that was
conducted by Leslie Sawyer (Ms. Sawyer), a computer investigative
specialist employed by the Internal Revenue Service. The first
and last entries in the real estate log relating to the real
properties that petitioner purportedly visited during 1989 were
dated February 12, 1989, and December 7, 1989, respectively. Ms.
Sawyer printed a directory listing of the computer diskette on
which the real estate log was saved, and that directory listing
indicated that that log was last saved at a time when the com-
puter system's date was set on December 7, 1989, which is consis-
tent with the date of the last entry in that log. Ms. Sawyer
also used a computer program, known as "Norton Utilities", to
retrieve a document that was at one time saved on that computer
diskette and later deleted. That document was substantially
identical to the real estate log and was last saved at a time
when the computer system's date was set on January 1, 1989.
Petitioner did not offer an adequate explanation as to why a
document that was saved at a time when the computer system's date
was set on January 1, 1989, contained information with dates
after that date.
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Based on the state of the record in this case, we do not
place any particular weight on the real estate log in resolving
whether petitioner used the motor home in connection with his
rental real estate activities. Even assuming arguendo that we
were willing to place any weight on that log, we do not believe
that it establishes that the trips taken by petitioner in the
motor home during 1989 were primarily for business, rather than
personal, purposes, nor does it establish any other business use
of the motor home during that year.7
Based on our review of the entire record in this case, we
find that petitioner has failed to establish that the motor home
was used in carrying on his rental real estate activities within
the meaning of section 162(a) or that it was used in or for those
activities within the meaning of section 167(a).8 Consequently,
we find that petitioner has failed to establish that he is en-
titled for 1989 to the deductions he claimed under sections
162(a) and 167(a) with respect to the motor home.
Even assuming arguendo that the motor home expenses at issue
were allowable deductions under sections 162(a) and 167(a), those
7
Although petitioner also testified about the real properties
that he allegedly visited during the trips in 1989 that he and
Ms. Perry took in the motor home, his testimony with respect to
that matter was general, vague, and/or conclusory. As stated
above, we are unwilling to rely on petitioner's testimony to
sustain his burden of proof in this case.
8
In fact, petitioner has failed to establish that during the
year at issue his rental real estate activities were sufficiently
systematic and continuous so as to constitute a trade or busi-
ness. See Curphey v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. at 775.
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deductions would be disallowed by section 280A(a). The motor
home owned and used by petitioner during 1989 was a dwelling unit
within the meaning of section 280A(f)(1)(A). See Haberkorn v.
Commissioner, 75 T.C. 259, 260 (1980). In addition, the motor
home was a residence within the meaning of section 280A(d)(1)
because (1) petitioner did not at any time operate the motor home
as a rental property and (2) petitioner concedes that he used the
motor home for personal purposes and does not dispute that his
personal use exceeded 14 days. See sec. 280A(d)(1). According-
ly, assuming arguendo that deductions for the motor home expenses
at issue were allowable under sections 162(a) and 167(a), those
deductions would be disallowed under section 280A(a) unless
petitioner were to establish that they were allocable to a por-
tion of the motor home that was used exclusively and on a regular
basis in connection with his rental real estate activities for
one of the purposes enumerated in section 280A(c)(1).
The exclusive use requirement of section 280A(c)(1) requires
that the taxpayer use a portion of a dwelling unit solely for the
purpose of carrying on a trade or business and that there be no
personal use of that part of the dwelling unit. See Cadwallader
v. Commissioner, 919 F.2d 1273, 1275 (7th Cir. 1990), affg. T.C.
Memo. 1989-356; Goldberger, Inc. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1532,
1557 (1987) (quoting S. Rept. 94-938 (1976), 1976-3 C.B. (Vol. 3)
49, 186; H. Rept. 94-658 (1975), 1976-3 (Vol. 2) 695, 853)). The
use of a portion of a dwelling unit for both personal and busi-
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ness purposes does not meet the exclusive use requirement of
section 280A(c)(1). Goldberger, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at
1557. Petitioner has failed to establish that he used any
portion of the motor home solely for the purpose of carrying on
his rental real estate activities. Accordingly, petitioner has
failed to satisfy the exclusive use requirement of section
280A(c)(1). Consequently, assuming arguendo that deductions for
the motor home expenses at issue were allowable under sections
162(a) and 167(a), those deductions would be disallowed under
section 280A(a).9
Based on our review of the entire record before us, we
sustain respondent's determination that petitioner is not en-
titled to deduct for 1989 the motor home expenses at issue.
Meal Expenses
In Schedule E of his 1989 return, petitioner claimed a
deduction of $1,625 for meal expenses. Respondent determined
that petitioner is not entitled to that claimed deduction because
he has failed to establish (1) that those expenses were ordinary
and necessary expenses paid in carrying on a trade or business
under section 162(a) or for the production or collection of
income under section 212 and (2) that he complied with the sub-
stantiation requirements of section 274(d).
9
We note, however, that petitioner also has failed to satisfy
the requirements of sec. 280A(c)(1) because he has not estab-
lished that his rental real estate activities constituted a trade
or business within the meaning of sec. 162(a). See supra notes
4, 8.
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In general, for purposes of section 162(a) and section 212,
an expense is ordinary if it is considered normal, usual, or
customary in the context of the particular business or income-
producing activity out of which it arose. See, e.g., Deputy v.
du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 495-496 (1940); Estate of Davis v. Commis-
sioner, 79 T.C. 503, 507 (1982). Ordinarily, for purposes of
those sections, an expense is necessary if it is appropriate and
helpful to the operation of the taxpayer's trade or business or
income-producing activity. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Tellier,
383 U.S. 687, 689 (1966); Estate of Davis v. Commissioner, supra.
Petitioner testified generally that the meal expenses at
issue are expenses that were incurred in connection with his
rental real estate activities because he used the time that he
spent at various restaurants to establish a business relationship
with the restaurant's waiters, waitresses, and patrons, who
assisted him in the promotion of his rental real estate by refer-
ring prospective tenants to him. The meal expenses incurred by
petitioner during 1989 reflected the cost of meals for petitioner
and Ms. Perry. During that year, petitioner did not at any time
buy meals for prospective tenants and did not typically buy meals
for then current tenants. The record does not establish the
identity of any tenants or other individuals associated with his
rental real estate activities for whom petitioner bought meals
during 1989, the amounts expended on any such meals, the dates or
times that he bought any such meals, or the business that was
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discussed during any such meals. Based on the instant record, we
find that petitioner has failed to establish that the meal expen-
ses incurred during 1989 were ordinary and necessary expenses
that were incurred in connection with his rental real estate
activities.
Petitioner also failed to establish that he satisfied the
substantiation requirements of section 274(d).10 A taxpayer may
satisfy the substantiation requirements of section 274(d) by
adequate records or by sufficient evidence corroborating his or
her own statement. Sec. 1.274-5(c)(1), Income Tax Regs. To meet
the adequate records requirements of section 1.274-5(c)(1),
Income Tax Regs., a taxpayer must keep an account book, diary, or
similar document that records information required by section
10
Sec. 274(d) provides in pertinent part:
(d) SUBSTANTIATION REQUIRED.--No deduction or credit
shall be allowed--
* * * * * * *
(2) for any item with respect to an activity which is
of a type generally considered to constitute entertainment,
amusement, or recreation, or with respect to a facility
used in connection with such an activity,
* * * * * * *
unless the taxpayer substantiates by adequate records or by
sufficient evidence corroborating the taxpayer's own state-
ment (A) the amount of such expense or other item, (B) the
time and place of the * * * entertainment, amusement, re-
creation, or use of the facility or property, * * * (C) the
business purpose of the expense or other item, and (D) the
business relationship to the taxpayer of persons enter-
tained * * *.
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274(d) (including a written statement of the business purpose of
the expenditure) and that is prepared at or near the time the
expense is paid. Sec. 1.274-5(c)(2), Income Tax Regs. Where a
taxpayer fails to comply with the adequate records requirements
of that regulation, he or she may satisfy the substantiation
requirements of section 274(d) by (1) his or her own statement,
written or oral, that contains specific information in detail
relating to those substantiation requirements and (2) other
corroborative evidence sufficient to establish those require-
ments. Sec. 1.274-5(c)(3), Income Tax Regs.
Petitioner did not present any contemporaneous account book,
diary, or similar document that recorded information required by
section 274(d). In addition, petitioner testified in a general
manner about the meal expenses at issue, and his testimony did
not contain specific information in detail as to the business
purpose for those expenses and was not accompanied by any cor-
roborative evidence. Accordingly, petitioner failed to satisfy
the substantiation requirements of section 274(d).
Based on our review of the entire record in this case, we
sustain respondent's determination that petitioner is not en-
titled to deduct for 1989 the meal expenses at issue.
To reflect the foregoing and petitioner's concessions,
Decision will be entered for
respondent.