T.C. Memo. 1996-215
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
BARBARA ANN TUDYMAN, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 9883-93. Filed May 2, 1996.
Sandra G. Scott and Stephen M. Moskowitz, for petitioner.
Margaret S. Rigg, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
COLVIN, Judge: Respondent determined deficiencies in
petitioner’s Federal income tax and additions to tax as follows:
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Accuracy-Related
Additions to Tax Penalty
Year Deficiency Sec. 6653(a)1 Sec. 6661 Sec. 66622
1985 $10,985 $549 $2,746 --
1986 8,076 404 2,019 --
1987 13,083 654 3,271 --
1988 1,961 98 -- --
1989 3,406 -- -- $578
1
Respondent determined that petitioner is liable for
additions to tax for 1986 and 1987 under sec. 6653(a)(1)(A)
and (B).
2
Respondent determined that petitioner is liable for
negligence under sec. 6662(a), not substantial understatement
or valuation misstatement. See sec. 6662(b), (c), (d), and (e).
Thus, we do not consider whether petitioner is liable under
sec. 6662(d) or (e).
The issues for decision are:
1. Whether petitioner had a deductible casualty loss of
$270,265 from the Loma Prieta earthquake in 1989 as petitioner
contends, zero as respondent contends, or some other amount. We
hold that her deductible casualty loss was $108,000 for 1988,
after reducing the amount of her loss by an insurance
reimbursement of $42,000.
2. Whether petitioner is liable for: (a) Additions to
tax for negligence under section 6653(a) for 1985 to 1988, (b)
additions to tax for substantial understatement under section
6661 for 1985 to 1987, and (c) the accuracy-related penalty under
section 6662 for 1989. We hold that she is not.
Section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in
effect for the years in issue. Rule references are to the Tax
Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
A. Petitioner
Petitioner resided in San Carlos, California, when she filed
her petition. She is a special education teacher for San Mateo
County. She has taken no tax or accounting courses.
B. Petitioner’s Home
Petitioner bought her home at 11 Buttercup Lane, San Carlos,
California, on November 4, 1988, for $324,000. Petitioner’s unit
is one of 277 condominiums in Crestview Park. Petitioner is a
member of the Crestview Park Condominium Homeowners’ Association
(Homeowners’ Association).
Petitioner’s home was built in 1982. It is the center of
three attached units. She owns one-third of the building,
including the roof, the foundation, and the supporting walls.
Petitioner owns: (1) The interior of her unit; (2) an undivided
one-third interest in the common areas, such as outside perimeter
walls, balconies, bearing walls, subfloors, unfinished floors,
pipes, plumbing, wires, and other utilities except the outlets
thereof in each unit; and (3) a membership in the Homeowners'
Association which owns the pool, tennis courts, and recreation
room.
Petitioner insures her home with the USAA Casualty Insurance
Co. (USAA).
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The Homeowners’ Association is responsible for repairing,
maintaining, and insuring the common areas, including individual
units from the interior paint out. If proceeds from the
Homeowners’ Association insurance policy are insufficient to
repair damage, the Homeowners' Association may use its own funds
or specially assess its members. The Homeowners’ Association was
short on funds in 1989 and 1990.
Before she bought her home, petitioner contracted with J.D.
Hise (Hise) to inspect it. Hise is a licensed general contractor
who inspected homes for home buyers. He has worked in the
building industry since 1963. Hise inspected the property on
October 25, 1988. At that time, the foundation had no cracks,
the floors were level, the doors fit, 25 roof tiles were broken,
the garage slab had minor cracks, the master bath carpet had
water damage, the master bath vanity had settled away from
the tile splash, and the living room windows leaked. Hise
recommended no structural repairs for the house.
C. The Loma Prieta Earthquake
The Loma Prieta earthquake (the earthquake) occurred on
October 17, 1989. Petitioner was at home during the earthquake.
The earthquake damaged petitioner’s home and personal property.
During the earthquake, petitioner’s house shook, articles fell
from the wall and cabinets, tile cracked, and the front door
sprang open and would not reclose. The earthquake measured 7.1
on the Richter scale. The earthquake area, including the area
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where petitioner lived, was declared a national disaster area.
Notice 89-108, 1989-2 C.B. 445.
Petitioner continued to live in her home after the
earthquake.
D. Structural Damage
1. The Foundation
a. Description
Each of the three units in petitioner's building has a
garage. Petitioner's garage is built on flat land. Part of the
foundation of each unit is separate from the garage on a steep
slope. Petitioner's unit has a pier and grade beam foundation
other than for the garage. The grade beams rest on piers. The
piers are 18 inches in diameter and 18 feet deep.
The foundation of petitioner’s home was weakened by the
earthquake. The earthquake caused about 25 cracks in the
foundation, including several under the main supports for
the house.
b. Inspection by Bob Cook
Shortly after the earthquake, petitioner hired a contractor,
Bob Cook (Cook), to inspect her home. Cook made two estimates of
the cost of structural repairs to petitioner’s home. He made a
preliminary estimate on December 5, 1989, of $37,900, and a final
estimate on December 20, 1989, of $48,100. Cook had engineers
consider whether the foundation needed to be replaced or could be
salvaged using chemical adhesive injection (i.e., epoxy). On
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December 5, 1989, he estimated that replacing the foundation
would cost from $90,000 to $130,000, and that chemical adhesive
injection would cost about $30,000. On December 20, 1989, Cook
estimated that foundation repairs would cost from $30,000 to
$150,000. Petitioner submitted Cook’s estimate to USAA.
c. Construction Management Associates and Frank Lewis
The Homeowners’ Association hired Construction Management
Associates (CMA) to oversee the repair of damage caused by the
earthquake. Frank Lewis (Lewis) worked for CMA. Lewis is a
civil engineer and a land surveyor. He has extensive knowledge
of earthquake damage. He examined 40 to 50 homes damaged by the
Loma Prieta earthquake.
Lewis first inspected petitioner's unit on December 8, 1989.
He investigated whether the house was safe after the earthquake.
At trial, he said that a foundation has serious problems if it
has 20 or more cracks. He said that the foundation for
petitioner’s home had 4 cracks wider than three thirty-seconds of
an inch (about the width of a nickel), and at least 25 hairline
cracks. On February 5, 1990, he said that the earthquake caused
petitioner’s home to appear to be rotating off its foundation.
Graham & Kellam were structural engineers who reviewed the
structural adequacy of the Crestview Park units for CMA in 1990.
After inspecting petitioner’s home with Lewis on April 19, 1990,
Leslie Graham (Graham) of Graham & Kellam said that the
foundation was stable.
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After further inspection in April 1990, Lewis said that
the foundation was sound. He recommended that the Homeowners’
Association inject epoxy into the large cracks in petitioner’s
foundation. The hairline cracks were too small to inject.
d. Philip Barrett
Petitioner hired a contractor, Philip Barrett (Barrett), to
repair her home shortly after the earthquake. Barrett remodeled
petitioner’s bathrooms, fixed the living room fireplace, and
rehung several doors that were out of plumb. He saw stress
cracks and apparent movement in the foundation.
e. Gary Halpin
Petitioner hired Gary Halpin (Halpin) to estimate the value
of her home after the earthquake. Halpin inspected many
buildings damaged by the Loma Prieta earthquake. Halpin first
saw petitioner's unit on August 25, 1994, nearly 5 years after
the earthquake. He also inspected her unit on November 20, 1994.
Halpin thought that there were too many cracks to be
repaired with epoxy injection. Halpin concluded that the
foundation should be replaced to restore it to its pre-earthquake
condition.
f. Foundation Repairs
In November 1990, the Homeowners' Association hired Hensley
Homes (Hensley) to retrofit the foundation of petitioner’s home
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(to bring the foundation into compliance with the building code)
and do drainage work for petitioner’s home. The contract was for
$7,381. Hensley injected epoxy in the foundation and installed
plywood shear walls in the crawl space under petitioner’s home.
Hensley also added studs, shearwall, and tie-downs to the
foundation of petitioner's unit. Petitioner did not have any
other foundation repairs done.
2. The Roof
The roof of petitioner’s home was defective when petitioner
bought the unit. The earthquake did not damage the roof.
At the time of the earthquake, the Homeowners’ Association
was involved in litigation with the developers of Crestview Park.
The Homeowners’ Association alleged that construction was
substandard. In 1992, the developers and the Homeowners’
Association agreed to a settlement for faulty roof design. The
Homeowners’ Association repaired the roofs on the three units in
petitioner’s building for about $7,500.
3. The Garage
The crack in petitioner's garage floor was larger after
the earthquake than when petitioner bought her home, and it was
heaving. Cook estimated that it would cost $8,000 to replace the
garage floor.
4. Floors
The earthquake caused the first and second floors of
petitioner’s home not to be level. On April 19, 1990, Graham
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observed that the first and second floors of petitioner’s home
were not level.
In 1990, petitioner hired Jack Santangelo (Santangelo) to
install marble tile in the entryway, master bathroom, fireplace,
upstairs bathroom vanity, bar in the den, and dining room, and on
the stairs from the living room to the dining room. He leveled
the floors where he installed new tile. The marble tile he
installed cost a few hundred dollars more than the tile that was
there previously. The only areas that are level are those that
Santangelo leveled: The entryway, the dining room, the stairs
to the living room and den, the downstairs half bath, and the
upstairs second bath and master bath.
Halpin and Lewis recommended that petitioner’s unit be
jacked up to level the floors. Halpin also recommended that the
roof be renailed to prevent stress in the roof line. However,
jacking up the building could cause several problems and might
not result in restoring petitioner’s home to its pre-earthquake
condition. Jacking up the middle unit could damage the
connections at the party walls and at the roof line. Jacking up
the building would force the plumb components (such as the second
floor walls) out of plumb. Finally, jacking up the unit would
put the part of the first floor that Santangelo had already
leveled out of level. Petitioner wanted a guaranty that the work
would not damage her marble tile. The Homeowners' Association
would not make that guaranty.
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5. Doors
The doors to the hallway closet and the master bath were out
of plumb and did not hang properly after the earthquake. Barrett
rehung them and used better quality hardware. Other doors did
not stay open and some stuck. Petitioner replaced several doors
after the earthquake.
6. The Fireplace and Chimney
The earthquake caused the fireplace mantle to separate from
the wall. Some stucco cracked and fell from the chimney and had
to be patched.
7. Kitchen Floor/Linoleum
The earthquake caused a bump in the linoleum on the kitchen
floor. Petitioner has not replaced the linoleum.
8. Other Structural Damage
There were cracks in the plaster in areas not specified in
the record. The bathroom tile cracked at the tile splash. Grout
joints separated from the tub, vanities, and floors. Tiles in
the entryway cracked, and some did not adhere to the floor after
the earthquake. The stairs were not level, and the stair
railings were loose. An upstairs toilet cracked. An upstairs
bathroom (not the master bath) carpet, not reported by Hise as
damaged when he inspected petitioner’s house before the
earthquake, was damaged by water which splashed from the toilet
during the earthquake.
9. Halpin’s Estimate of Damages to Petitioner’s Residence
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Halpin estimated the casualty loss to petitioner’s home by
comparing its fair market value before and after the earthquake.
He concluded that the fair market value of petitioner’s home was
$324,000 before and $116,700 after the earthquake, for a $207,300
loss in value. He estimated the loss in value by considering the
cost of restoring petitioner’s home to its pre-earthquake
condition.
Halpin estimated that it would cost $157,364.02 to restore
petitioner’s home to its pre-earthquake condition. He estimated
that it would cost $50,000 for a pier foundation retrofit
required by the 1988 State building code. There was an existing
pier foundation, but the earthquake made it inadequate.
Halpin estimated the cost of repairs as follows:
General Items
Project management $7,340.10
Progressive/postconstruction
cleanup 2,264.80
Architectural/engineering
services 3,500.00
Soils report/engineering 2,250.00
General labor (materials and
equipment handling) 4,320.00
Interior/exterior
scaffolding 2,050.00
Content move-out/packing 4,250.00
Content move-back/unpacking 4,250.00
Content storage 250.00
Permit fees 665.00
Detach/reset window treatment
for all rooms 445.00
General repair allowance
(e.g., rafters, joists) 1,100.00
Subtotal 32,684.90
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Other Items
Substructure 51,498.40
Garage 5,146.35
Kitchen 2,767.46
Dining room 957.22
Entry 3,215.24
Hall bath 1,347.19
Living room 4,134.28
Den 1,671.98
Stairways 1,208.28
Bath #2 2,966.21
Bedroom #2 1,478.35
Master bedroom 2,398.68
Master bath 4,328.13
Front elevation 1,500.00
Rear elevation 1,425.00
Roof 7,163.55
Subtotal 125,891.22
Overhead @ 10% 12,589.12
Profit @ 10% 12,589.12
Contingency @ 5% 6,294.56
Total cost of repairs 157,364.02
Retrofit 50,000.00
Total diminution in value 207,364.02
E. Personal Property Damage
The earthquake destroyed or damaged personal property in
petitioner’s home, such as rugs, mirrors, and a chandelier in
the entryway; the fireplace mantle and mirrors in the living
room; vases, china, crystal, and a chandelier in the dining room;
dishes, glasses, a clock, and some appliances in the kitchen;
books, vases, a clock, and a statue in the den; a mirror and
figurines in the bedroom; clocks, pictures, and stained glass
in the bathrooms; and clothing and various other personal items.
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Petitioner inventoried and estimated the value of her
damaged personal property shortly after the earthquake.
Petitioner’s accountant, Robert Kern, gave her an Internal
Revenue Service worksheet to complete before he prepared her
amended 1988 return. On the worksheet, petitioner estimated the
cost and fair market value of her damaged personal property
items. She spent 50 to 100 hours researching the cost and fair
market value of the damaged items. She called stores to get the
cost of items for which she did not have receipts.
The earthquake destroyed some of petitioner’s personal
property, such as mirrors, statues, vases, and figurines. It
damaged other items such as bookcases, tables, chairs, a
grandfather clock, rugs, and appliances. Petitioner had to have
some of the damaged items repaired. For example, petitioner had
the buffet server, table, and chairs repaired.
Petitioner asked an appraiser, Mervyn Cohn (Cohn), to verify
the cost and fair market value of the damaged items. He checked
price guides, called retailers, and concluded that petitioner’s
estimates were reasonable. He discounted the pre-earthquake cost
or fair market value by 40 percent. He estimated that the value
of petitioner's personal property was $86,398 before the
earthquake. He assumed that the personal property listed by
petitioner as damaged by the earthquake had no salvage value.
He did not separately estimate the salvage value of each item.
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Cohn did not see petitioner’s personal property or
photographs of it. Cohn relied on information from petitioner
consisting of an attachment to her tax return, some handwritten
schedules, and a few receipts.
Petitioner had received some of the personal property that
was damaged by the earthquake as gifts. Her grandmother gave her
some leather-bound books, a magazine rack, and some stemware.
Petitioner did not establish the donor's basis in any of the
gifts. Petitioner inherited some items, including the dining
room chandelier and books, from her aunt.
F. Property Tax Assessment
In January 1990, petitioner applied for a reduction in the
property tax assessment of her home because of the earthquake
damage. San Mateo County reduced the property tax assessment of
her home by $202,200 from $317,000 to $114,800 based on repair
estimates by Cook ($150,000 for foundation repair and $47,600
for other structural repairs) and Arbor Electrical ($4,593 for
electrical repairs) and a telephone conversation with
petitioner’s realtor, Clare Box (Box). Box estimated that the
value of petitioner's home was $389,000 before the earthquake and
$188,057 after the earthquake, for a loss in value of $200,943.
In March 1991, in response to a questionnaire from San Mateo
County, petitioner said that the foundation had been reinforced
to prevent future damage but that the floors had not been
leveled. In March 1993, in response to a questionnaire from San
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Mateo County, petitioner said that she had repaired the damage to
her property. The County reappraised the property at $350,705.
G. Petitioner's Insurance Claim
Petitioner was insured for earthquake damage up to $42,000
by USAA. Petitioner submitted a claim to USAA for personal
property damage of $59,967.99.
A USAA inspector estimated that petitioner’s real property
damage was $40,000 to $60,000, which exceeded the $30,000 policy
limit. Lentom General, a building contractor, estimated that it
would cost $50,000 to $55,000 to jack up the building to level
the floors. Lentom General sent its estimate to USAA.
On February 16, 1990, USAA paid $12,000 to petitioner for
personal property damage and $30,000 for real property damage
caused by the earthquake. This amount ($42,000) was the maximum
allowed by her policy.
H. Homeowners’ Association Insurance
The Homeowners’ Association insured the condominium complex
with Aetna Life & Casualty (Aetna). On April 10, 1990, Aetna
denied coverage for the earthquake damage. Aetna concluded that
petitioner’s damage was less than the deductible (5 percent of
the cost of her building). The policy excluded damage to the
foundation. Aetna did not consider foundation damage in
concluding that the damage was less than the deductible.
I. Petitioner’s Tax Returns
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Petitioner timely filed a Federal income tax return for
1988. Petitioner properly elected under section 165(i) to claim
a loss deduction in the immediately preceding tax year. She
filed an amended 1988 return on April 9, 1990, to claim a
casualty loss of $290,262,1 for the damage caused by the
earthquake.
The Homeowners’ Association had made minimal repairs to
her home when she filed her amended 1988 return. Aetna denied
coverage under the Homeowners’ Association policy for the
earthquake damage to petitioner’s home on April 10, 1990.
Petitioner filed amended returns for 1985, 1986, and 1987 on
June 6, 1990. She carried back net operating losses of $250,661
to 1985, $208,242 to 1986, and $172,919 to 1987 from the unused
1988 casualty loss. She carried forward $121,814 of the unused
casualty loss to 1989.
Petitioner filed her 1989 return around April 15, 1990.
1
Petitioner calculated her casualty loss deduction as
follows:
Personal property damage $134,411
Real property damage 202,200
Subtotal 336,611
Less:
Insurance proceeds 42,000
Sec. 165(h)(1) limit 100
Sec. 165(h)(2) limit 4,247
46,347
Casualty loss 290,264
Petitioner deducted $290,262 as a casualty loss deduction.
There is no explanation in the record for the $2 discrepancy.
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By notices of deficiency issued on February 19, 1993,
respondent disallowed all of petitioner's casualty loss deduction
and associated carrybacks and carryforward.
OPINION
A. Casualty Loss Deduction
1. Contentions of the Parties
Petitioner argues that she may deduct her losses from the
earthquake as a casualty loss. She contends that she offered
evidence showing the difference between the fair market values of
her home and personal property before and after the earthquake
and the adjusted bases of the property, and that respondent
offered no evidence that the earthquake did not cause the damage.
Respondent contends that petitioner has not proven that her
losses exceeded the amount of insurance proceeds she received, or
that the fair market value of the property was less after the
earthquake than before.
As discussed below, we conclude that petitioner’s losses
were greater than her insurance reimbursement but less than the
amount she deducted.
2. Eligibility for a Casualty Loss Deduction
Individuals generally may deduct losses to property caused
by casualties such as earthquakes. Sec. 165(c)(3). The loss
must exceed $100 and 10 percent of the individual’s adjusted
gross income. Sec. 165(h)(1) and (2)(A)(ii). Taxpayers may not
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deduct amounts compensated by “insurance or otherwise.” Sec.
165(a).
Taxpayers who suffer disaster losses in an area declared a
disaster area by the President may elect to deduct the loss in
the tax year immediately preceding the year in which the disaster
occurred. Sec. 165(i)(1).
To be eligible for a casualty loss deduction based on the
decrease in the fair market value, petitioner must prove: (a)
The fair market value of the property immediately before and
immediately after the earthquake, (b) the amount of insurance
reimbursement, and (c) the adjusted basis in the property.
Helvering v. Owens, 305 U.S. 468 (1939); Lamphere v.
Commissioner, 70 T.C. 391, 395-396 (1978); Cornelius v.
Commissioner, 56 T.C. 976, 979 (1971); sec. 1.165-7(a)(2), Income
Tax Regs.2
2
Sec. 1.165-7(a)(2), Income Tax Regs., provides:
(2) Method of valuation. (i) In determining the
amount of loss deductible under this section, the fair
market value of the property immediately before and
immediately after the casualty shall generally be
ascertained by competent appraisal. This appraisal
must recognize the effects of any general market
decline affecting undamaged as well as damaged property
which may occur simultaneously with the casualty, in
order that any deduction under this section shall be
limited to the actual loss resulting from damage to
the property.
(ii) The cost of repairs to the property damaged
is acceptable as evidence of the loss of value if the
taxpayer shows that (a) the repairs are necessary to
(continued...)
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The cost of repairs may be considered if the taxpayer shows
that: (a) The repairs are necessary to restore the property to
its condition immediately before the casualty, (b) the amount
spent for the repairs is not excessive, (c) the repairs are made
only to the damaged portion of the property, and (d) the repairs
do not cause the value of the property to exceed the value of
the property immediately before the casualty. Lamphere v.
Commissioner, supra; Farber v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 714, 719
(1972); sec. 1.165-7(a)(2)(ii), Income Tax Regs.
Respondent's determination is presumed to be correct. Rule
142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).
3. Structural Damage to Petitioner’s House
The fair market value of petitioner’s house before the
earthquake was $324,000, the amount petitioner had paid for it
about 11 months earlier.
The parties each called expert witnesses to give their
opinions about the structural damage to petitioner's house caused
by the earthquake. Expert witnesses' opinions can help the Court
to understand subjects requiring specialized training, knowledge,
or judgment. However, the Court is not bound by the experts'
2
(...continued)
restore the property to its condition immediately
before the casualty, (b) the amount spent for such
repairs is not excessive, (c) the repairs do not care
for more than the damage suffered, and (d) the value
of the property after the repairs does not as a result
of the repairs exceed the value of the property
immediately before the casualty.
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opinions. Helvering v. National Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282, 295
(1938). We weigh the opinions of expert witnesses according to
their qualifications and other relevant evidence. Anderson v.
Commissioner, 250 F.2d 242, 249 (5th Cir. 1957), affg. in part
and remanding in part T.C. Memo. 1956-178; Johnson v.
Commissioner, 85 T.C. 469, 477 (1985).
Respondent’s expert, Lewis, gave no opinion about the fair
market value of petitioner’s house after the earthquake.
Petitioner’s expert, Halpin, estimated that the postearthquake
value was $116,700.
a. Halpin’s Valuation
Halpin inspected petitioner’s home on August 25 and
November 20, 1994. He reviewed various documents that petitioner
gave him, including Cook’s December 5, 1989, estimate; memos from
CMA to Graham & Kellam; Lewis’ written report dated January 31,
1990, describing his findings and recommendations concerning the
postearthquake damage to petitioner’s home after on-site
inspections on December 8, 1989, and January 19, 1990 (Exhibit
12-L); a May 11, 1990, letter from Graham reviewing the condition
of petitioner’s home; and a November 15, 1990, letter and
application from CMA for a permit to retrofit petitioner’s home.
Halpin prepared a report describing the damages to petitioner's
home caused by the earthquake and the repairs needed to restore
the house to its pre-earthquake condition. He subtracted his
estimate of the cost of repairs and his estimate of the cost of
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retrofitting the foundation to get the postearthquake loss in
value of petitioner's home.
Respondent argues that Halpin improperly used a cost-of-
repair method. We disagree. Halpin valued petitioner's home by
comparing its fair market value before and after the earthquake.
An appraiser may consider repair cost estimates in deciding
postcasualty fair market value. Pfalzgraf v. Commissioner, 67
T.C. 784, 788 (1977); Abrams v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1981-231. In Abrams, an appraiser used repair estimates to
confirm his estimate of postearthquake fair market value, which
he based on the market method. In Pfalzgraf, we held that, in
estimating the amount of a casualty loss, an appraiser may
consider the cost of repairing property to restore it to its
precasualty status. 67 T.C. at 788. We rejected the taxpayers’
method of estimating their loss based on the difference between
the prefire fair market value and the postfire fair market value
because the taxpayers’ method included losses or expenses not
caused by the fire. Id. at 789-791.
Respondent contends that Abrams and Pfalzgraf do not stand
for the proposition that repair estimates may be used to
calculate a casualty loss. We disagree. The taxpayer's expert
in Abrams concluded that a prospective buyer would discount the
value of the damaged building by the cost of needed repairs. He
subtracted the estimated cost of repairs from the precasualty
fair market value. Similarly, Halpin estimated the loss in value
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of petitioner’s home by subtracting the estimated cost of repairs
from its pre-earthquake fair market value.
In Pfalzgraf, we approved an appraiser’s estimate of the
cost of repairing property as a measure of the taxpayers’
casualty loss. 67 T.C. at 788. Here, Halpin figured
petitioner’s casualty loss by estimating the cost of restoring
petitioner's home to its pre-earthquake condition.
Respondent argues that Halpin’s testimony should be given
little weight because he is not an engineer. We disagree.
Halpin was a credible and knowledgeable witness.
Respondent argues that we should give Halpin’s report less
weight because Halpin first saw petitioner's property 5 years
after the earthquake. We agree. We give Halpin’s report less
weight because some of the property damage could have occurred
during those 5 years.
Respondent pointed out that Halpin testified that the second
floor was sloped, yet Halpin did not measure the second floor and
did not note that it was sloped on his diagram of that floor. In
his diagram of the first floor, he noted that it was sloped. We
do not think Halpin’s failure to measure the second floor is
significant. He testified that he could feel the slope by
walking across the floor, and that he did not take measurements
because it would be expensive to do so and because he thought it
was sufficient to measure the first floor. Santangelo testified
that he had to level the second floor before he retiled it.
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Graham wrote to Lewis on May 11, 1990, that the second floor was
out of level.
Respondent argues that the earthquake did not worsen the
crack in the concrete garage slab. We disagree. Cook viewed
the garage shortly after the earthquake. He concluded that the
earthquake worsened the crack in the garage floor and that the
garage floor should be replaced.
There are defects in Halpin's valuation. He used 1994 labor
and materials cost estimates instead of 1989 costs. He included
repairs that may have been required by wear and tear on the
property during the 5 years between the earthquake and his
survey, such as interior and exterior painting. He estimated
that it would cost $50,000 to retrofit the foundation of
petitioner's home although the Homeowners' Association had paid
Hensley $7,381 in November 1990 to retrofit the foundation of her
home. He double-counted a $2,600 estimate to perform certain
electrical work in the foundation. He incorrectly included in
his estimate $8,750 for petitioner to vacate her unit and store
her belongings during repairs. Millsap v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.
751 (1966), affd. 387 F.2d 420 (8th Cir. 1968) (additional living
expenses, e.g., moving expenses and temporary accommodations
expenses, resulting from a casualty are not deductible as part of
a casualty loss).
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b. Respondent’s Expert--Frank Lewis
i. Admissibility of Respondent’s Expert’s Report
Respondent’s expert at trial was Frank Lewis.
Rule 143(f) provides that, unless otherwise permitted by the
Court upon timely request, any party who calls an expert witness
shall cause that witness to prepare a written report to submit to
the Court and the opposing party not later than 30 days before
the calendar call. Rule 143(f)(1). We will exclude expert
witness testimony for failure to comply with the provisions of
Rule 143(f) unless the failure is due to good cause, and the
failure to comply with the Rule does not unduly prejudice the
opposing party. Id.
The Court granted respondent’s request at trial to designate
Exhibits 12-L, T (pages 26-27), and Z as Lewis’ expert report.
Exhibit 12-L is Lewis’ report dated January 31, 1990, describing
his findings and recommendations concerning the earthquake damage
to petitioner’s home after inspections on December 8, 1989, and
January 19, 1990. The report includes about 25 photographs of
the foundation of petitioner’s home. Pages 26 and 27 of Exhibit
T are a letter dated June 13, 1990, from Lewis to Graham &
Kellam, recommending that the floors of petitioner’s unit be
leveled by removing, reconstructing, and stabilizing the pony
walls and without jacking up her unit. Exhibit Z is Lewis’
curriculum vitae.
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Petitioner contends that we should not have allowed
respondent to designate those exhibits as Lewis’ expert report
because respondent failed to do so 30 days before the calendar
call. Petitioner also contends that we should strike Lewis’
testimony because respondent listed Lewis in the pretrial
memorandum as a fact witness, not as an expert. Petitioner
argues that she was prejudiced because Halpin did not fully
respond to Lewis’ report in his report and because petitioner’s
counsel could not adequately prepare for cross-examination of
Lewis.
We disagree. Petitioner was not prejudiced in any way by
the admission into evidence of Lewis’ expert report and expert
testimony. Halpin referred to and relied on Exhibit 12-L (Lewis’
report) in preparing his own expert report. Halpin had Exhibit
12-L and petitioner’s counsel had pages 26-27 of Exhibit T
several months before trial. Halpin became thoroughly familiar
with these items before he testified at trial. Our consideration
of the points made by Lewis in those exhibits was identical
whether or not we treated the exhibits as Lewis’ expert report.
Respondent listed Lewis as a fact witness for this trial session
and one the year before. His expert testimony directly related
to his factual knowledge gained from his investigation of
petitioner’s residence after the earthquake. Petitioner had
every opportunity at trial to have Halpin respond to Lewis’
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testimony, and petitioner’s counsel used this opportunity
effectively. Permitting Lewis to testify as an expert did not
prejudice petitioner in any way. Cf. Chagra v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1991-366 (taxpayers' motion to strike expert testimony
was granted because taxpayers did not have access to the
Commissioner's expert's conclusions and their underlying bases
before trial), affd. without published opinion 990 F.2d 1250 (2d
Cir. 1993).
Petitioner cites Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784 (10th
Cir. 1980), in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit concluded that the defendant had been prejudiced by
expert testimony. In Smith, the plaintiff failed to provide
adequate advance information about proposed testimony of a
medical expert witness, and the plaintiff elicited testimony from
the witness that was outside the scope of the plaintiff's
description of his proposed testimony. Defendant's counsel had
only 11 minutes to prepare for cross-examination of the expert
witness. Id. at 791 n.3. In contrast, as discussed above, long
before trial, petitioner’s expert and petitioner’s counsel were
thoroughly familiar with the items that we treated as Lewis’
expert report, and petitioner was not prejudiced by the admission
of Lewis' expert testimony or expert report.
ii. Lewis’ Conclusions
Lewis and Graham said that the foundation of petitioner's
house was structurally sound and could be repaired by injecting
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epoxy into the cracks. Respondent attempts to minimize the fact
that Lewis said that the foundation was not sound, that the house
appeared to be rolling off its foundation, and that a foundation
should be replaced if it has more than 20 cracks. The foundation
in petitioner's home had 25 cracks after the earthquake.
Petitioner points out that Lewis worked for CMA, which had been
retained by the Homeowners' Association. These facts lead us to
give Lewis’ opinion less weight.
Lewis and Graham said that the first floor of petitioner's
home was not level when it was built. We disagree. Hise
testified that the floors were level when he inspected the house.
Barrett had to rehang several of the doors, which shows that the
Graham & Kellam report erred in stating that all of the doors fit
and were plumb. Halpin concluded that the earthquake caused
petitioner's floors to be out of level. We agree.
Halpin believed that an epoxy injection would be
insufficient and that the foundation needed to be replaced.
Graham is a structural engineer and is better qualified to
evaluate the foundation than Halpin. While Halpin’s overall
testimony was credible, he is not an engineer and is less
knowledgeable about foundations than Graham.
Respondent questions whether Hise did a thorough
investigation for his $200 fee. Respondent says that Hise failed
to adequately inspect the foundation and report on its condition.
Respondent’s criticism of Hise is at best speculative.
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Respondent did not raise these criticisms when Hise testified at
trial and thus did not give Hise a chance to respond to them.
Hise is a licensed general contractor. He prepared a detailed
report on the condition of petitioner’s home. His testimony
appeared to be credible. We accept Hise’s report as a fair
representation of the condition of petitioner’s house before the
earthquake.
Respondent argues that the fact that petitioner lived in
her home after the earthquake but did not repair the foundation
shows that she believed that the building was safe. However,
respondent has not shown or even argued that a house must be
uninhabitable to lose value to the extent that petitioner
contends.
c. Improvements to Petitioner’s Home
A taxpayer must show that the repairs do not improve the
property more than the damage suffered, and that the value of the
property after the repairs does not, as a result of the repairs,
exceed the value of the property immediately before the casualty.
Sec. 1.165-7(a)(2)(ii), Income Tax Regs. Respondent points out
that some of petitioner's expenses were for improvements to her
home. For example, petitioner installed marble tile worth a
couple of hundred dollars more than the tile that was there
previously, and she upgraded some fixtures and door hardware.
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d. Conclusion
We conclude that the earthquake caused the foundation to
crack in 25 places and the floors to slope. We also conclude,
based primarily on the Graham & Kellam report, that the
foundation of petitioner's home could be repaired. However, we
believe a buyer would pay much less for a home in that condition
than he or she would pay for the same property undamaged. Even
though the Homeowners’ Association was liable for making some of
the repairs, we believe a prospective buyer would pay less for
this property than for identical property where no repairs were
required because of the possibility that it would take effort to
ensure that the work was done. We conclude that petitioner’s
home lost $115,000 in value because of the earthquake.
4. Personal Property
Petitioner’s personal property was also damaged by the
earthquake. She deducted $134,411 on her 1988 return for loss
to her personal property. She attached an appendix to her brief
showing that she had a personal property loss of $110,065. We
treat the appendix as petitioner's position in this case relating
to her personal property loss.
Petitioner compiled a detailed inventory of her personal
property that was damaged or destroyed as a result of the
earthquake. She spent 50 to 100 hours researching the cost of
the damaged items. Cohn said that the values petitioner used
were reasonable. Petitioner contends that, although she did not
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testify about or have notes on each item on her list, based on
her testimony, notes and receipts, and Cohn’s testimony, we
should conclude that she prepared an honest inventory of her
damaged property.
Respondent argues that we should not consider Cohn's
appraisal because he did not see petitioner’s personal property
or photographs of property, and he lacked information about some
of the items. We agree in part and disagree in part. Cohn
appeared to be knowledgeable, and he readily disclosed the limits
inherent in the methodology he used. On the other hand, Cohn
lacked necessary information, such as the age, original cost, or
pre-earthquake fair market value of some of petitioner’s items.
He incorrectly assumed that none of the property had salvage
value. Cohn did not know the size of or the number of lights in
the chandeliers, or the amount of crystal in them. He did not
know the height, type, quality, or condition of the grandfather
clock. He did not know the size or quality of the antique bells
or whether they were made of metal. Cohn valued 20 books at $20
per book without knowing their titles, age, or condition.
Petitioner’s estimates of the amount of her personal
property damage were flawed in part. She used the wrong year
of purchase for a few of the items. The refrigerator, stove,
carpeting, and the entrance hall chandelier had all been in the
unit since it was built in 1982, yet petitioner listed the date
of purchase as 1988, the year she bought the condominium.
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Appliances and carpeting are worth much less after 7 years than
after 1 year.
For a few items that had lost value before the earthquake,
petitioner deducted cost rather than the fair market value. She
did not consider depreciation in estimating the precasualty fair
market value of her clothes that were damaged.
Petitioner had some items repaired that had been damaged by
the earthquake, such as the buffet server and the dining room
table and chairs. If a taxpayer has repaired property damaged by
a casualty, the cost of repairs may be a better measure of the
loss than an appraisal. Clapp v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 12 (9th
Cir. 1963), affg. 36 T.C. 905 (1961); Pfalzgraf v. Commissioner,
67 T.C. at 791; Keith v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 41, 49 (1969).
Petitioner incorrectly used a diminution in value method rather
than the actual repair cost to measure her loss for these items.
Petitioner claims that things fell on and scratched her
refrigerator and stove. She also claims that heavy things fell
on and bent and scratched her knives and forks. We think
petitioner overestimated the extent of damage to these items.
We are not convinced that the earthquake extensively damaged her
refrigerator, oven, blender, electric iron, kitchen sink, ladder,
utensils, telephone, rack, and all clocks, or that it destroyed
napkins, tablecloths, towels, and a bath mat. We are not
convinced that she lost $520 of canned goods, $4,000 of plumbing
fixtures, 400 pieces of china, and 122 pieces of stemware.
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As discussed at paragraph A-2 above (p. 17), petitioner
must prove her adjusted basis in property for which she claims
a casualty loss. A taxpayer who acquires property by gift takes
a basis in the property equal to the lesser of the donor's basis
or the fair market value at the time of the gift. Sec. 1015. A
taxpayer who inherits property takes a basis in the property
equal to its fair market value at the date of the decedent's
death. Sec. 1014(a). Petitioner did not establish the basis she
had in property that she received by gift or inheritance. For
example, she did not show that the fair market value she provided
was determined at the time of the earthquake or at the time of
her aunt's death. She said that the chandelier, which she valued
at $14,500, was not listed as an asset in her aunt's estate tax
return. Petitioner did not show what her basis is for these
items.
Petitioner’s personal property was damaged by the
earthquake, but we think she overestimated the amount of damage.
We conclude that petitioner had personal property loss of
$35,000.
5. Insurance Payment
We conclude that the decrease in fair market value of
petitioner’s home due to the earthquake exceeded her insurance
recovery.
Petitioner received $42,000 ($30,000 plus $12,000) as
insurance reimbursement, the maximum allowed under her policy.
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As discussed above, petitioner sustained losses of $115,000 to
the structure of her home and $35,000 to her personal property.
This exceeds her insurance recovery by $108,000.
6. Year of Loss
a. Reasonable Prospect of Recovery
Petitioner may deduct her casualty loss only to the extent
it is not compensated by “insurance or otherwise”, e.g., by the
Homeowners' Association. Sec. 165(a). Respondent argues that
petitioner did not have an uncompensated loss because the
prospects of repair by the Homeowners’ Association were very high
in 1990 when petitioner filed her amended 1988 return. Whether
there is a reasonable prospect of recovery is decided based on
all the facts known in the taxable year. Coastal Terminals, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 1053 (1956); sec. 1.165-1(d)(2)(i),
Income Tax Regs.3 Petitioner filed her amended 1988 return
3
Sec. 1.165-1(d)(2)(i), Income Tax Regs., provides:
If a casualty or other event occurs which may
result in a loss and, in the year of such casualty
or event, there exists a claim for reimbursement with
respect to which there is a reasonable prospect of
recovery, no portion of the loss with respect to which
reimbursement may be received is sustained, for
purposes of section 165, until it can be ascertained
with reasonable certainty whether or not such
reimbursement will be received. Whether a reasonable
prospect of recovery exists with respect to a claim for
reimbursement of a loss is a question of fact to be
determined upon an examination of all facts and
circumstances. Whether or not such reimbursement will
be received may be ascertained with reasonable
certainty, for example, by a settlement of the claim,
by an adjudication of the claim, or by abandonment of
(continued...)
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shortly before Aetna denied her claim for damage under the
Homeowners’ Association policy.4 Respondent argues that
petitioner had a reasonable prospect of recovery when she filed
her return because Aetna had not yet denied her claim. We
disagree. The Homeowners’ Association was short on funds in 1990
and had made only minimal repairs to petitioner's home in April
1990 when she filed her amended 1988 return. It was uncertain
whether it could afford to make all of the repairs for which it
was responsible. Notwithstanding the fact that the Homeowners’
Association could have specially assessed its members to pay for
repairs, there is no evidence that it did so in 1990.5 The fact
that it could have done so did not give petitioner a reasonable
prospect of recovery in 1990. We conclude that petitioner had
losses from the earthquake for which she had no reasonable
prospect of recovery from insurance or otherwise and which she
properly deducted on her amended 1988 return.
b. Role of the Homeowners’ Association
3
(...continued)
the claim. * * *
4
Petitioner contends that she filed her amended 1988 return
on Apr. 14, 1990, after Aetna Life & Casualty (Aetna) denied her
claim for damage under the Crestview Park Condominium Homeowners'
Association (Homeowners' Association) policy. The record clearly
shows, however, that she filed her return on Apr. 9, 1990, before
Aetna denied her claim.
5
Petitioner said that the Homeowners' Association made a
special assessment equal to 6 months of dues, but it appears that
was in 1991 or later.
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Respondent contends that the Homeowners’ Association was
responsible for making various repairs to petitioner's home.
However, petitioner did not have a reasonable prospect of
recovery from the Homeowners’ Association when she filed her
amended 1988 return. Thus, she may deduct as a casualty loss
her real property loss even if the Homeowners’ Association was
responsible for making repairs to her home.6
B. Additions to Tax
1. Negligence
Negligence is a lack of due care or failure to do what a
reasonable and ordinarily prudent person would do under the
circumstances. Zmuda v. Commissioner, 731 F.2d 1417, 1422 (9th
Cir. 1984), affg. 79 T.C. 714 (1982); Marcello v. Commissioner,
380 F.2d 499, 506 (5th Cir. 1967), affg. in part and remanding
in part 43 T.C. 168 (1964) and T.C. Memo. 1964-299; Neely v.
Commissioner, 85 T.C. 934, 947 (1985). Petitioner must show that
she acted reasonably and prudently and exercised due care. Neely
v. Commissioner, supra.
Respondent argues that petitioner did not use reasonable
care in assessing her casualty loss from the earthquake. We
disagree.
6
Respondent does not contend that petitioner may not (as a
matter of law) deduct a casualty loss for damage to the common
areas.
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Petitioner has no tax or accounting background. She used a
competent contractor to contemporaneously estimate the amount of
damage to her home. She was reasonably careful in preparing her
loss estimate, and she reasonably relied on her accountant to
prepare her return. She gave her accountant all necessary
information to prepare her return. She attached to Form 4684,
Casualties and Thefts, a detailed inventory of her personal
property loss and the $202,200 reduction in the value of her real
property by the San Mateo County tax assessor's office. She
hired a personal property appraiser to verify her estimates of
her personal property loss. Petitioner made a reasonable attempt
to figure the amount of her casualty loss. We hold that she was
not negligent.
2. Substantial Understatement
The next issue for decision is whether petitioner is liable
for the addition to tax for substantial understatement of income
tax under section 6661(a) for tax years 1985-87. Section 6661(a)
provides for an addition to tax in the amount of 25 percent of
the amount of any underpayment attributable to a substantial
understatement of income tax.
An understatement is the amount by which the correct tax
exceeds the tax reported on the return. Sec. 6661(b)(2)(A). An
understatement is substantial if it exceeds the greater of 10
percent of the tax required to be shown on the return or $5,000.
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Sec. 6661(b)(1)(A). Petitioner bears the burden of proving
that imposition of the addition to tax under section 6661 is
erroneous. Rule 142(a); Tweeddale v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 501,
506 (1989).
If a taxpayer has substantial authority for the
tax treatment of any item on the return, the understatement
is reduced by the amount attributable to it. Sec.
6661(b)(2)(B)(i). Similarly, the amount of the understatement
is reduced for any item adequately disclosed either on the
taxpayer's return or in a statement attached to the return.
Sec. 6661(b)(2)(B)(ii). A taxpayer’s position may be adequately
disclosed either in a statement attached to the tax return, or
on the tax return itself. Id. Respondent contends that
petitioner did not have substantial authority for her position
but does not deny that she adequately disclosed the casualty loss
on her 1985, 1986, and 1987 returns. We consider whether
petitioner adequately disclosed her position on her 1985, 1986,
and 1987 returns.
Disclosure can be accomplished under section 6661 by
providing sufficient information on the tax return to enable the
Commissioner to identify the potential controversy. Schirmer v.
Commissioner, 89 T.C. 277, 285-286 (1987).
The Commissioner may promulgate revenue procedures which
prescribe the circumstances in which information provided on a
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tax return is adequate disclosure under section 6661. Sec.
1.6661-4(c), Income Tax Regs. Section 4(a)(5) of Rev. Proc. 89-
11, 1989-1 C.B. 797, 798, provides that to adequately disclose a
casualty loss for purposes of section 6661, the taxpayer must
complete Form 4684 and attach it to the return.
Petitioner attached Forms 4684 to the amended returns she
filed for 1985, 1986, and 1987. In them, she described her real
and personal property loss from the earthquake. She included a
detailed inventory of her personal property that was damaged
or destroyed by the earthquake. We conclude that petitioner
adequately disclosed her casualty loss on her 1985, 1986,
and 1987 returns. Rev. Proc. 89-11, sec. 4(a)(5). Thus, we
hold that petitioner is not liable for the addition to tax under
section 6661 for 1985, 1986, and 1987.
3. Accuracy-Related Penalty
Taxpayers are liable for a penalty equal to 20 percent
of the part of the underpayment attributable to negligence or
disregard of rules or regulations. Sec. 6662(a) and (b)(1).
Negligence includes a failure to make a reasonable attempt to
comply with the provisions of the internal revenue laws or to
exercise ordinary and reasonable care in the preparation of a
tax return. Sec. 6662(c).
Petitioner bears the burden of proving that she is
not liable for the accuracy-related penalty. Rule 142(a).
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For the reasons stated at paragraph B-1, above (pp. 34-35),
we hold that petitioner is not liable for the accuracy-related
penalty for 1989.
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered
under Rule 155.