T.C. Memo. 1996-379
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
SARAH R. ELGART AND STEPHEN K. GLASSMAN, Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 4941-96. Filed August 15, 1996.
Phyllis A. Steinhauer, for petitioners.
Marilyn Devin, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
DAWSON, Judge: This case was assigned to Special Trial
Judge Larry L. Nameroff pursuant to section 7443A(b) and Rules
- 2 -
180-182.1 The Court agrees with and adopts the opinion of the
Special Trial Judge, which is set forth below.
OPINION OF THE SPECIAL TRIAL JUDGE
NAMEROFF, Special Trial Judge: This case is before us on
respondent's Motion to Dismiss For Lack of Jurisdiction on the
ground that petitioners failed to file their petition within the
time period prescribed by section 6213(a).
Background
Prior to March of 1995, respondent commenced an examination
of petitioners' 1992 return. On March 16, 1995, petitioners
signed and filed Form 2848, Power of Attorney and Declaration of
Representative, appointing their attorney, Phyllis A. Steinhauer
(Ms. Steinhauer), 128 Eighth Street, Manhattan Beach, California
90266, as their attorney-in-fact for the taxable year 1992. Line
7 of the Form 2848 provides:
Notices and Communications.--Notices and other written
communications will be sent to the first representative
listed in line 2. [i.e., Ms. Steinhauer]
On the Form 2848, petitioners showed their home address as 703
Palms Boulevard, Venice, California 90291-3848 (the Palms
address).
1
All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code.
All Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and
Procedure.
- 3 -
By notice of deficiency dated December 14, 1995, respondent
determined a deficiency in petitioners' 1992 Federal income tax
in the amount of $23,842, plus an addition to tax under section
6651(a)(1) in the amount of $1,745 and an accuracy-related
penalty under section 6662(a) in the amount of $4,768. The
notice of deficiency was sent by certified mail to petitioners at
the Palms address. According to the certified mail receipt, the
deficiency notice was delivered by the U.S. Postal Service and
signed for on December 15, 1995.
In a letter dated December 14, 1995, Richard R. Orosco,
District Director of the Los Angeles Office of the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS), advised Ms. Steinhauer that materials
pertaining to the petitioners were being furnished to her
pursuant to a power of attorney on file with the IRS. A copy of
the notice of deficiency, clearly dated December 14, 1995 and
stamped "ORIGINAL", was attached to the letter. The envelope
containing this letter and the copy of the deficiency notice has
an illegible postmark date; however, the envelope and its
contents were stamped as "received" by Ms. Steinhauer on December
18, 1995. The copy of the deficiency notice was not sent by
certified mail or registered mail to Ms. Steinhauer.
On December 18, 1995, Ms. Steinhauer telephoned Cynthia
Lowden, assistant manager of the 90-day section of the Los
Angeles IRS Office, regarding the final date for filing a
- 4 -
petition with this Court. Ms. Steinhauer was advised that the
final due date for filing a petition with this Court was March
14, 1996. Ms. Steinhauer sent a letter confirming this
information to Ms. Lowden at the IRS on December 18, 1995.
On January 25, 1996, petitioner Stephen K. Glassman and Ms.
Steinhauer attended a meeting with Revenue Agent Kim Slater.
During that meeting they were advised by Ms. Slater that a
petition with this Court could be filed and was due by March 14,
1996.
Petitioners filed a petition for redetermination with this
Court on March 18, 1996. The petition was delivered to the Court
by certified mail in an envelope bearing a U.S. postmark date of
March 14, 1996. The 90-day period for filing a petition with
this Court expired on Wednesday, March 13, 1996, which date was
not a legal holiday in the District of Columbia.
As indicated, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack
of Jurisdiction on the ground that the petition was not filed
within the 90-day period prescribed in section 6213(a). On June
3, 1996, petitioners filed an objection to respondent's motion to
dismiss, alleging that respondent failed to mail the original
deficiency notice by registered or certified mail to their last
known address, which they contend is the address of their
authorized representative Ms. Steinhauer, and, as a result, the
90-day period to file a petition did not begin to run until the
- 5 -
actual receipt of the deficiency notice by Ms. Steinhauer on
December 18, 1995. In addition, petitioners contend that they
received and relied on advice from the IRS regarding the due date
of the petition.
Discussion
This Court's jurisdiction to redetermine a deficiency
depends upon the timely issuance of a valid notice of deficiency
and a timely filed petition. Rule 13(a), (c); Monge v.
Commissioner, 93 T.C. 22, 27 (1989); Normac, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 90 T.C. 142, 147 (1988). Section 6212(a)
authorizes the Secretary or his delegate, upon determining that
there is a deficiency in income tax, to send a notice of
deficiency "to the taxpayer by certified or registered mail."
Section 6212(b) provides that a notice of deficiency, in respect
of an income tax, "shall be sufficient", if it is "mailed to the
taxpayer at his last known address". Generally, the Commissioner
has no duty to effectuate delivery of the notice after it is
mailed. Monge v. Commissioner, supra at 33.
Neither section 6212 nor the regulation promulgated
thereunder, section 301.6212-1, Proced. & Admin. Regs., defines
what constitutes a taxpayer's "last known address". We have
defined it as the taxpayer's last permanent address or legal
residence known by the Commissioner, or the last known temporary
address of a definite duration to which the taxpayer has directed
- 6 -
the Commissioner to send all communications during such period.
Weinroth v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 430, 435 (1980); Alta Sierra
Vista, Inc. v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 367, 374 (1974), affd.
without published opinion 538 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1976). Stated
otherwise, it is the address to which, in light of all the
surrounding facts and circumstances, the Commissioner reasonably
believed the taxpayer wished the notice to be sent. Weinroth v.
Commissioner, supra. The relevant focus is thus on the
Commissioner's knowledge, rather than on what in fact may have
been the taxpayer's actual address in use. Brown v.
Commissioner, 78 T.C. 215, 219 (1982) (citing Alta Sierra Vista,
Inc. v. Commissioner, supra.)
In Abeles v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 1019 (1988), we held that
a taxpayer's last known address is the address shown on his most
recent return, absent clear and concise notice of a change of
address. Monge v. Commissioner, supra at 28. However, once
respondent has become aware of a change in address, she must use
reasonable care and diligence in ascertaining and mailing the
notice of deficiency to the correct address. Whether respondent
has properly discharged this obligation is a question of fact.
Weinroth v. Commissioner, supra at 435-436; Alta Sierra Vista,
Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at 374.
A validly executed power of attorney may suffice to render
an attorney's address as the taxpayer's "last known address" if
- 7 -
it directs that all original notices and written communications
be sent to the taxpayer at the attorney's address. See D'Andrea
v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Reddock v.
Commissioner, 72 T.C. 21 (1979); Lifter v. Commissioner, 59 T.C.
818, 821 (1973).
The Forms 2848 executed by the parties in the above-cited
cases directed the taxpayers to choose between having originals
or copies of all notices and written communications sent to their
representatives. The new Form 2848, which was revised in March
of 1991 and which is involved in this case, provides simply that
"notices and other written communications will be sent" to the
taxpayer's designee. We have previously held that such language
is sufficient to render the address of the taxpayer's
representative as the "last known address" of the taxpayer. See
Honts v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-532.
Even if a validly executed power of attorney directs that
all notices and communications relating to the taxpayers be
delivered to the attorney, the failure to send a notice of
deficiency to the attorney, as directed, is not necessarily
fatal. See Paul v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1985-21. It is
clearly established that if mailing results in actual notice
without prejudicial delay, the notice of deficiency meets the
conditions of section 6212(a) no matter what address was used.
McKay v. Commissioner, 886 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1989), affg. 89
- 8 -
T.C. 1063 (1987); Clodfelter v. Commissioner, 527 F.2d 754 (9th
Cir. 1975), affg. 57 T.C. 102 (1971); Needham v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1993-440.
In the present case it is irrelevant whether Ms.
Steinhauer's address or the Palms address was petitioners' last
known address. On December 14, 1995, respondent mailed a notice
of deficiency to petitioners at the Palms address. A copy of the
deficiency notice and a letter from the IRS, both dated December
14, 1995, were also mailed to Ms. Steinhauer's address pursuant
to the power of attorney. Petitioners received the deficiency
notice on December 15, 1995, and Ms. Steinhauer received the
deficiency notice on December 18, 1995.
Regardless of which address was the last known address, an
individual at each address received the notice in time for
petitioners to timely file a petition. See Mulvania v.
Commissioner, 81 T.C. 65 (1983), affd. 769 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir.
1985). The last day to timely file a petition with this Court
was on March 13, 1996; however, the petition was not mailed until
March 14, 1996. Petitioners failed to file the petition within
the 90-day period prescribed in section 6213(a). Accordingly,
petitioners did not timely file their petition, and we lack
jurisdiction.
We disagree with petitioners' argument that respondent must
send the original notice of deficiency to petitioners' last known
- 9 -
address.2 See Mulvania v. Commissioner, supra at 67-68. We note
that the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
squarely addressed and rejected petitioners' argument in Berger
v. Commissioner, 404 F.2d 668 (3d Cir. 1968), affg. 48 T.C. 848
(1967). In Berger at 675 the Court stated:
We therefore reject a construction of the procedural
provisions of section 6212 which would yield the
startling conclusion that a notice given to clients and
their lawyer is inadequate even though they received it
in due course, simply because the lawyer's copy should
have been the original, and the channel of certified
mail which was used for the taxpayers should have been
used for the lawyer.
Moreover, petitioners' argument that because the IRS did not send
an original of the deficiency notice to Ms. Steinhauer, the date
of her receipt commences the 90-day period for filing of the
petition lacks merit.
Turning to petitioners' argument that they were advised by
several employees of the IRS that the date by which a petition
must be filed in this case was March 14, 1996, we are unable to
provide any relief for petitioners. The law is clear that
erroneous legal advice rendered by employees of the IRS generally
is not binding on the Commissioner. Dixon v. United States, 381
U.S. 68, 72-73 (1965); Schuster v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 311
(9th Cir. 1962), affg. in part and revg. in part 32 T.C. 998 and
2
However, as indicated earlier, it appears that the copy
Ms. Steinhauer received was stamped "ORIGINAL". In this day of
modern communication and photocopies, there is little to
distinguish an original from a copy stamped "ORIGINAL".
- 10 -
32 T.C. 1017 (1959); Fortugno v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 316
(1963), affd. 353 F.2d 429 (3d Cir. 1965). In any event, the
Commissioner cannot waive the jurisdictional requirements, and
jurisdiction cannot be established by estoppel. The notice of
deficiency provides "If you want to contest this determination in
court before making any payment, you have 90 days from the date
of this letter * * * to file a petition with the United States
Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency." The date
stamped on the notice of deficiency was clearly December 14,
1995. Petitioners and their counsel had the responsibility for
correctly calculating the end of the 90-day period.
Because the petition was not mailed until 91 days after the
mailing of the notice of deficiency, we conclude that the
petition was not timely filed within meaning of sections 7502(a)
and 6213(a). Accordingly, we shall grant respondent's motion to
dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction.3
In order to give effect to the foregoing,
3
Although petitioners cannot pursue their case in this
Court, they are not without a remedy. In short, petitioners may
pay the tax, file a claim for refund with the Internal Revenue
Service, and, if the claim is denied, sue for refund in the
appropriate Federal District Court or in the U.S. Court of
Federal Claims. See McCormick v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 138, 142
(1970).
- 11 -
An order will be entered
granting respondent's Motion
to Dismiss For Lack of
Jurisdiction.