T.C. Memo. 1996-372
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
ESTATE OF ROSS H. FREEMAN, DECEASED,
DENNIS HERSEY, EXECUTOR, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 22427-93. Filed August 13, 1996.
R determined a deficiency in estate tax. The sole
issue for decision is the fair market value on the date
of decedent's death of certain shares of common stock
and an option to acquire additional shares of common
stock that were properly includable in decedent's gross
estate.
Held: R's valuation of such shares and the option
is sustained, except that allowance will be made for
the exercise price of the option shares.
Leroy J. Neider, for petitioner.
Kimberley J. Peterson, for respondent.
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MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
HALPERN, Judge: Respondent determined a deficiency in
Federal estate tax of $1,489,660. The adjustment giving rise to
the deficiency is on account of respondent’s increase in the
value of certain shares of stock (and an option to acquire
additional shares of stock) included in the gross estate.
Petitioner has assigned error to that adjustment, and we must
decide the value of those shares.
Unless otherwise noted, all section references are to the
Internal Revenue Code as in effect at the time of decedent’s
death, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of
Practice and Procedure.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some facts have been stipulated and are so found. The
stipulation of facts filed by the parties and the accompanying
exhibits are incorporated herein by this reference. Some of
respondent's proposed findings of fact have been conceded by
petitioner and, accordingly, are so found.1
1
In part, Rule 151 provides as follows:
RULE 151. BRIEFS
* * * * * * *
(e) Form and Content: * * *
* * * * * * *
(3) * * * In an answering or reply brief, the party
(continued...)
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Introduction
Decedent died on October 22, 1989. Among the assets
includable in decedent’s gross estate are: (1) 702,000 shares of
common stock in Xilinx, Inc. (the corporation), and (2) an option
to acquire from the corporation an additional 13,333 of its
common shares (hereafter, both (1) such already owned shares and
(2) such option shares being referred to, without distinction, as
either “the shares” or “the shares of the corporation”).2
1
(...continued)
shall set forth any objections, together with the
reasons therefor, to any proposed findings of any other
party, showing the numbers of the statements to which
the objections are directed; in addition, the party may
set forth alternative proposed findings of fact.
Petitioner has filed an answering brief, but petitioner has
failed therein to set forth objections to the proposed findings
of fact made by respondent. Petitioner has simply set forth
therein the proposed findings made in its opening brief and again
asked the Court to make those findings. Accordingly, we must
conclude that petitioner has conceded respondent's proposed
findings of fact as correct except to the extent that
petitioner's proposed findings are clearly inconsistent
therewith. See Fein v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-370; Estate
of Stimson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-242; Cunningham v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-260.
2
In the stipulation of facts and in their briefs, the parties
have generally referred to the 702,000 shares of common stock and
the 13,333 option shares as the “shares” of the corporation.
Each party has argued for a particular value to be applied to
each of the shares; i.e., the same value to be applied both to
each of the shares already acquired by decedent and to each of
the option shares. Indeed, in the estate tax return, petitioner
states a “unit value” for each of the option shares ($1.05) that
is the same as the per-share value of each of the acquired
shares. The parties, however, have entered into a subsequent
stipulation that the value of the option shares is equal to the
value of the shares of common stock, reduced by 35 cents, which
(continued...)
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Petitioner timely made an estate tax return on Form 706,
United States Estate (and Generation-Skipping Transfer) Tax
Return (the Estate tax return). Petitioner did not elect
alternate valuation. In the estate tax return, petitioner valued
the shares at $1.05 per share.
Respondent determined a deficiency in estate tax by a letter
dated July 21, 1993. In a statement attached to that letter,
respondent explained her determination by stating that she had
increased the value of the shares to $4.94 per share.
Organization of the Corporation
The corporation is a California corporation, organized in
1985. Decedent was one of the founders of the corporation. The
corporation’s Standard Industrial Code is 3674, Semiconductors
and Related Devices. The corporation is a leader in the field of
programmable logic devices. The annual accounting period of the
corporation is a fiscal year ending on March 31. (Hereafter,
when referring to financial data of the corporation for a
particular year, we will be referring to financial data for the
fiscal year ending on March 31 of that year.)
2
(...continued)
amount represents the exercise price of those option shares. For
purposes of this opinion, we will adopt the convention of the
parties and, without distinction, generally refer to both the
shares already acquired by decedent and to the option shares as
the “shares” of the corporation.
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Capital Structure
At the time of decedent’s death, there were outstanding one
series of common stock of the corporation and eight series of
preferred stock. With the exception of the Series F preferred
stock, all series of preferred stock were convertible to common
stock at the ratio of 1 to 1. The Series F preferred stock was
convertible at the ratio of 1.05 shares of common stock to
1 share of preferred.
Financial Performance
From 1986 through 1989, the corporation’s revenues and net
income were as follows:
FYE Revenues Net Income
1986 $435,000 ($4,928,000)
1987 4,375,000 (5,080,000)
1988 13,755,000 (1,689,000)
1989 30,445,000 4,382,000
Private Sales of Stock
From its inception through June 1990, the corporation sold
13,331,060 shares of preferred stock at prices ranging from $1 to
$4.
On August 24, 1989, common stock of the corporation was
authorized to be sold to certain outside sales representatives of
the corporation for $1.25 a share. On December 8, 1989, common
stock of the corporation was authorized to be sold to certain
outside sales representatives of the corporation for $2.25 a
share. The purpose of those sales was to give those sales
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representatives a direct financial interest in the success of the
corporation.
On July 7, December 8, and December 31, 1989, incentive
stock options were granted to certain employees for $1.25, $2.25,
and $2.25 a share, respectively. All such options were to vest
over 5 years.
Public Offering
The corporation had an initial public offering of stock in
June 1990, at a price of $10 per share. The possibility of an
initial public offering was discussed at a meeting of the board
of directors of the corporation on August 24, 1989.
Technology Sharing Agreement
On June 9, 1986, the corporation entered into a 3-year
technology sharing agreement (the agreement) with Monolithic
Memories, Inc. (MMI). Among other things, the agreement accorded
MMI rights in certain present and future technology of the
corporation. In April 1987, Advanced Micro Devices (AMD)
acquired MMI and succeeded to MMI’s rights under the agreement.
In 1990, the agreement was terminated.
Respondent’s Expert
Respondent presented as her expert witness Herbert T. Spiro
(Spiro), who was accepted by petitioner as an expert and whose
written report was received in evidence as his direct testimony.
Spiro reached the conclusion, supported by his report, that the
aggregate fair market value of the shares, as of October 22,
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1989, on an illiquid minority basis, was $3,530,575, or $4.94 a
share. Subsequently, respondent came to realize that Spiro had
made a computational error, and offered a correction to Spiro’s
conclusion; viz, that the value of the shares was $3,004,399, or
$4.20 a share.
In reaching his conclusion, Spiro relied on numerous
factors, including, specifically, the following: (1) An analysis
of the corporation’s operating results and financial condition;
(2) an analysis of the U.S. economy and the semiconductor
industry; (3) a forecast of operations after the date of
valuation; and (4) an investigation of the prices that investors
were paying for the stock of comparable publicly traded
companies.
Spiro’s analysis of the corporation’s financial condition
was based primarily on his review of the corporation’s annual
reports and Forms 10-K and 10-Q for 1985 through 1989, an income
statement of the corporation for the 6-month period ending
September 30, 1989, and a Form S-1, filed on April 27, 1990, in
connection with the corporation’s initial public offering.
For the first half of 1990, revenue was $21,771,000, which,
if annualized, would be $43,542,000 for 1990, a 43-percent
increase over 1989. Spiro concluded, however, that, given the
corporation’s growth in sales, it was unlikely that there would
be no growth in sales during the second half of 1990. Therefore,
he expected that the corporation’s growth in sales for 1990 would
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exceed 43 percent. Spiro thought that the company’s growth rate
was “meteoric” when compared to a 25-percent growth rate in 1989
for the semiconductor industry. Spiro concluded that the
corporation’s growth rate was higher than any publicly traded
comparable company that he examined other than one.
For the first 6 months of 1990, operating income was
$3,606,000, which, if annualized, would be $7,212,000. Spiro
concluded, however, that, if sales for the first 6 months of 1990
continued to grow, and expenses continued to decline as a
percentage of sales, then operating income would be even greater.
The corporation’s actual operating income for 1990 was
$8,846,000.
Spiro’s analysis of the corporation’s financial position
also included an examination of the corporation’s gross profit
margins, research and development expenses, marketing, general
and administrative expenses, interest income and expenses, tax
position, profitability, assets, liabilities, and book equity
value.
Spiro determined the value of the shares using both an
income and a market approach.
Under the income approach, Spiro projected the cash-flow
available for distribution for 5 years. He made assumptions
about future levels of sales, expenses, and taxes to estimate
annual available cash-flow. After making certain adjustments, he
calculated the present value of that income stream and added to
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it an amount to reflect the future value of the corporation at
the end of 5 years. He then divided that result by the number of
shares that were outstanding on the appropriate valuation date to
derive a value for each such share. The value he so derived was
$5.65. Because shares of the corporation were not readily
marketable on that date, he then applied a liquidity discount to
yield a final estimate of value. Although he recognized that a
35-percent liquidity discount had come to be regarded as an
average discount, he applied a discount of only 10 percent. He
did so because he thought that an initial public offering of
shares of the corporation was likely, based on (1) the ownership
of a substantial portion of the corporation by venture
capitalists, (2) the recent history of public offerings by
similar companies, and (3) his assumption that decedent would
have been aware of (and would have communicated to any potential
buyer) steps towards a public offering that already had been
taken by the corporation. Spiro thus computed a per-share fair
market value for the shares of $5.09 using the income approach.
Under the market approach, Spiro first made a list of public
companies that he considered comparable to the corporation. He
then identified those on the list that resembled the corporation
sufficiently closely in terms of both earnings per share and
growth in earnings per share. For those three companies, he used
certain market value indicators (e.g., the ratio of price to
recent earnings) to derive a range of market values for shares of
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the corporation. He then averaged the appropriate market values
to derive a value for a share of the corporation of $5.41. As
with the income approach, Spiro applied a liquidity discount of
10 percent to arrive at a per-share value of $4.87 under the
market approach.
Spiro then reconciled the values he had reached under the
income and market approaches by assigning weights to the results
reached under each. Because of the difficulty associated with
forecasting the financial performance of startup, high growth
companies, Spiro accorded greater weight to the result reached
under the market value approach. He gave the market value
approach a 70-percent weight and gave the income approach a
30-percent weight. Using that approach, he concluded that the
aggregate fair market value of the shares was $3,530,575, or
$4.94 a share.
Spiro erred in calculating the value of the shares under the
income approach. He erred in calculating the future value of the
corporation after 5 years. Correcting that error results in a
value per share under the income method of $2.63 and a weighted
average fair market value of $4.20 per share, or $3,004,399 for
all the shares.
Petitioner’s Expert
Petitioner presented as its expert witness David L. Klemm
(Klemm), who was accepted by respondent as an expert and whose
written report was received in evidence as his direct testimony.
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Klemm reached the conclusion, supported by his report, that the
fair market value of the shares, as of October 22, 1989, on a
minority interest basis, was $729,700, or $1.02 a share.3
In reaching his conclusion, Klemm relied on numerous sources
of information, including, specifically, the following:
1. Financial statements for the corporation for 1986
through 1989;
2. An equipment list and a depreciation schedule as of the
end of 1989;
3. Industry information gathered from various sources;
4. Information on the U.S. economy gathered from
various sources;
5. Information on comparative publicly traded companies
gathered from various sources; and
6. An interview with Bernard V. Vonderschmitt, president of
the corporation.
Klemm did not analyze financial statements for the
corporation for the first 6 months of 1990. He did consider
financial results for the first quarter of 1990, and he concluded
that revenue and pretax earning levels were “generally in line”
with such levels for the prior two quarters. Klemm did not make
any forecasts of future growth or sales.
3
Klemm calculates a value for the shares of $729,700 by
multiplying the number of shares (715,333) by $1.02. The number
715,333 multiplied by $1.02 is $729,640, rounded to the nearest
dollar.
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Klemm determined the value of the shares based on (1) a
capitalization of the corporation’s 1989 earnings, (2) a
capitalization of the corporation’s 1989 revenues, and (3) a
return-on-equity analysis using the book value per share as of
the end of 1989.
To capitalize the corporation’s 1989 earnings Klemm utilized
a capitalization rate that, in his report, he did not relate to
any specific publicly traded companies but merely stated was
“appropriate” after discussing the “price/earnings ratio of the
Dow Jones Industrial Average” at October 20, 1989, and the range
of that average for 5 years. In his report, Klemm did not
explain the capitalization rate that he used to capitalize the
corporation’s revenues. To perform his return-to-equity
analysis, Klemm again referred to Dow Jones Industrial Averages
but failed to specify any companies comparable to the
corporation. Klemm had prepared an earlier report valuing the
shares, which was appended to the estate tax return filed by
petitioner. In that earlier report, Klemm listed eight publicly
traded companies that he considered comparable to the
corporation. Seven of those eight companies were omitted from
the report received as Klemm’s testimony. One company (Altera
Corp.) is mentioned, but no analysis of that company to support
Klemm’s valuation methods is provided.
Using his three approaches, Klemm arrived at the following
three indications of value for each of the shares:
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Approach Indicated Value
Capitalization of 1989 earnings $1.87
Capitalization of revenues 1.75
Price/book value 1.48
Without explaining the weight to be given to each approach, other
than stating that the most weight should be given to 1989
earnings, less weight should be given to price/book value, and
the least value should be given to revenues, Klemm opined that
the publicly traded equivalent value of the shares on a per-share
basis, as of October 22, 1989, was $1.70
Klemm then applied two discounts to the $1.70 per-share
value. He first applied a 20-percent discount to reflect the
minority position that an owner of the shares would have. He
then applied a 25-percent discount to reflect the lack of an
established market for the shares.
Taking into account the two discounts that he had applied,
Klemm concluded that the fair market value of the shares, on a
minority interest basis, was $729,000, or $1.02 per share.
In his interview with Bernard V. Vonderschmitt, president of
the corporation, Klemm did not inquire as to whether, on
October 22, 1989, the corporation had any plans for a public
offering of stock. He did not consider the potential for a
public offering in valuing the shares.
Value of the Shares
The fair market value of the shares, on a per-share basis,
was $4.20 on October 22, 1989.
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OPINION
I. Introduction
We must determine the fair market value of the shares of the
corporation on October 22, 1989, the date of decedent’s death.
The shares were included by petitioner in the gross estate and
reported on the estate tax return at a value of $1.05 per share.
In determining a deficiency in estate tax, respondent valued the
shares at $4.94. Respondent now argues that the value of the
shares is no less than $4.20 per share. We interpret
respondent’s change in position as a concession of a portion of
the deficiency, and we accept that concession. Petitioner now
argues that the value of the shares is $1.02 per share. A
decision for petitioner on that basis would necessarily mean that
petitioner had overpaid the estate tax. Petitioner failed to
raise the issue of an overpayment in the petition. Because we
find no overpayment, we need not deal with the consequences of
that failure.
II. Law
Section 2001(a) imposes a tax on “the transfer of the
taxable estate of every decedent who is a citizen or resident of
the United States.” Section 2031(a) provides: “The value of the
gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including to
the extent provided for in this part, the value at the time of
his death of all property, real or personal, tangible or
intangible, wherever situated.”
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The standard of valuation is fair market value. Section
20.2031-1(b), Estate Tax Regs., defines fair market value as:
“the price at which the property would change hands between a
willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any
compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of
the relevant facts.” Future events that were reasonably
foreseeable at the valuation date may be taken into account in
determining fair market value. Gray v. Commissioner, 2 B.T.A.
672, 682 (1925); Estate of Livermore v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1988-503. In determining the value of unlisted stock and
securities, we take into consideration, among other factors, the
value of publicly traded stock or securities of corporations in
the same or a similar line of business. Sec. 2031(b).
Petitioner bears the burden of proof. Rule 142(a).
III. Testimony
Both petitioner and respondent rely heavily, if not
exclusively, on expert testimony to establish the value of the
shares on the date of decedent’s death. Indeed, respondent’s
only witness was respondent’s expert witness, Spiro. Petitioner
also called one expert witness, Klemm. Petitioner called two lay
witnesses, Bernard V. Vonderschmitt and Frank Quattrone, neither
of whom had an opinion as to the value of the shares.
We found both of petitioner’s lay witnesses to be
straightforward and believable. We have taken their testimony
into account. Like the parties, however, we rely heavily on
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expert testimony in making our finding as to the value of the
shares. We found Spiro to be convincing, and we agree with his
valuation, as corrected by respondent, as to the value of the
shares. We had difficulty with Klemm’s valuation, and we will
set forth some of our more significant concerns. We accorded
Klemm’s valuation no weight.
IV. Klemm’s Testimony
A. Approaches to Valuation
Klemm followed three approaches in valuing the shares:
Capitalization of earnings, capitalization of revenues, and
return on equity. His aim was to find the price that the market
would set for a share of the common stock of the corporation on
October 22, 1989. Under each approach, such a market price was
the unknown to be discovered. Under each approach, that unknown
was a function of two variables, one particular to the
corporation (e.g., earnings) and one reflective of the market
(i.e., a variable characteristic of publicly traded companies
comparable to the corporation). Our first major concern is with
Klemm’s identification of variables characteristic of publicly
traded companies comparable to the corporation. Simply put,
petitioner has failed to persuade us that Klemm identified
companies comparable to the corporation and used data with
respect to those companies to derive the appropriate market-
reflective variables. In our findings of fact, we pointed out
the discrepancy between Klemm’s earlier report and his expert
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testimony with respect to the identification of comparable
companies. Except perhaps for one company, no comparable
companies are identified in his expert testimony. During his
oral testimony, Klemm tried to explain that discrepancy; he also
asked that his expert testimony be amended to make his earlier
identification of comparable companies part of that testimony.
We cannot reconcile his explanation of why he took the
comparables out (which we do not fully comprehend) with his
request to amend his expert testimony and add them back in. We
have little confidence in his quantification of appropriate
variables reflective of the market (e.g., capitalization rates).
Klemm’s oral testimony has raised for us serious doubts as to his
understanding of the approaches to valuation that he selected.
That, alone, is sufficient reason for us to reject the
conclusions resulting from those approaches.
We are also concerned that in relying on his three
approaches Klemm ignored the dynamic state of the corporation,
which had experienced exceptional growth in both revenues and
earnings since its inception. We can find in neither Klemm’s
identification of (1) market variables or (2) variables
particular to the corporation (e.g., earnings) nor in his
manipulation of those variables any recognition that future
earnings and revenues might be any different than they were in
1989 (i.e., that earnings and revenues would continue to grow).
Although, in the body of his report, Klemm takes note of the
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growth since inception of both the corporation’s earnings and
revenues, and although an income statement for the first 6 months
of 1990 was reasonably available to him, which showed continued
growth in both earnings and revenues, Klemm does not specifically
acknowledge such growth (or any future growth) in any of the
approaches that he adopted. He seems to contradict his own
statement, in introducing his valuation approaches, that “Value
measures generally take into account the trends in growth,
performance, and stability of * * * [earnings, revenue, and book
value].” We are unpersuaded that his static view of the
corporation’s future was either necessary or correct.
We are unconvinced that, either individually, or in
conjunction, Klemm’s approaches to valuation of the shares
produce a reliable result.
B. Public Offering
The corporation had an initial public offering of stock in
June 1990, at a price of $10 per share. The possibility of an
initial public offering was discussed at a meeting of the board
of directors of the corporation on August 24, 1989. In his
report, Klemm states specifically that (1) during his interview
with Bernard V. Vonderschmitt, president of the corporation, he
did not inquire as to whether, on October 22, 1989, the
corporation had any plans for a public offering of stock, and
(2) he did not consider the potential for a public offering in
carrying out his valuation assignment.
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Petitioner has cited to us no authority prohibiting an
inquiry into plans for a public offering. We assume that a
potential purchaser would be interested in such plans and might
pay a premium depending on her judgment of the likelihood of such
an offering. Indeed, in his report, Klemm tells us that
(1) professional investment firms had purchased the preferred
stock in the corporation, and (2) it is typical for a high
technology startup company to sell convertible preferred shares
to venture capital investors. We assume that venture capital
investors invest with the hope, if not the expectation, that a
public offering will not be too far off.
Klemm’s failure to take any account of a public offering,
which actually occurred within 8 months of decedent’s death, and
the possibility of which was discussed before his death, seems to
us unwarranted. It seems to us that Klemm turned his back on a
datum that he should have considered. Klemm’s decision to ignore
the possibility of a public offering adds to our dissatisfaction
with his report. Cf. Messing v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 502, 509
(1967) (public offering price is a factor to be taken into
account in valuing shares of stock in a company that was
privately held on the valuation date; due regard must be give "to
the time span involved between the critical dates and the dates
of sale to the public, as well as to the contingencies inherent
in the successful culmination of a contemplated public
offering.").
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C. Minority Discount
Klemm applied a 20-percent discount to reflect what he
believed would be the minority position that a purchaser of the
shares would have. We think that that is inappropriate. Klemm
did not arrive at a value for the corporation and then try to
determine the value of minority interest. He arrived at a market
equivalent value for a share of the corporation and then
multiplied to arrive at the value of the shares. We assume that,
in valuing a single share of stock, the market would recognize
the minority position of that share, and that no further minority
discount would (or could) be demanded.
V. Spiro’s Testimony
A. Analysis
We will summarize our reasons for agreeing with respondent’s
valuation of the shares.
We found Spiro’s use of the income and market approaches to
be straightforward and reasonable. With respect to his use of
the income approach, we agree with his adjustments to income and
his use of a 5-year projection. We do not think that he
overestimated either base revenues, expected revenue growth, or
the other factors and adjustments going into the calculations of
expected cash-flows. We are satisfied with his choice of a
discount rate of 23.3 percent as appropriate for the corporation.
We agree with his calculation of the present value of the 5-year
expected cash-flows. We agree with the necessity to add to that
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sum the present value of cash-flows expected after year 5 (the
reversion). We agree with respondent’s corrected computation of
the present value of the reversion.
Also, we are satisfied with his use of the market approach.
Indeed, three of the companies selected by Spiro as comparable
were selected by Klemm in his initial report, which accompanied
the estate tax return.
We agree with Spiro’s application of a liquidity discount of
10 percent. We also agree with the weight he gave the results
reached under the two approaches.
B. Petitioner’s Criticism
Petitioner has criticized Spiro’s testimony on numerous
grounds. Implicitly, we have dealt with most of that criticism
in our analysis of Spiro’s report. We have not, however, dealt
with petitioner’s claim that Spiro failed to recognize the effect
on the value of the shares of the June 9, 1986, technology
sharing agreement (agreement) entered into with Monolithic
Memories, Inc. (MMI). The agreement was terminated in 1990. The
agreement, argues petitioner, decreased the corporation’s
earnings potential (and therefore decreased the value of the
corporation) because MMI (and later its successor, AMD) could
produce and sell, at lower prices, products using the
corporation’s technology.
We do not think that Spiro failed to take the agreement into
account. The pace of change for technology in the computer
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industry is rapid. If the agreement had had any effect on
earnings, it is likely that that effect would have made itself
felt during 1989 and the first half of 1990. Spiro relied
heavily on the financial figures for those periods. Implicitly,
he took the agreement into account. The agreement was canceled
in 1990.
Petitioner’s expert, Klemm, testified that he did not assign
a particular value or a particular discount to the shares due to
the agreement.
We conclude that the agreement was of little consequence to
the value of the shares.
VI. Conclusion
We have found that the fair market value of the shares, on a
per-share basis, was $4.20 on October 22, 1989. The value of the
715,333 shares in issue is, thus, $3,004,399. Petitioner
understated the value of the gross estate, and we sustain
respondent’s determination of a deficiency to the extent
necessary to reflect the values that we have found and the
stipulation of the parties as to the option shares.
Decision will be entered
under Rule 155.