Scagliotta v. Commissioner

T.C. Memo. 1996-498

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

STEVEN J. AND MICHELE D. SCAGLIOTTA, Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 107-95. Filed November 6, 1996.

Steven J. Scagliotta, pro se.

Peter M. Kardel, for petitioner Michele D. Scagliotta.

James A. Whitten, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

COUVILLION, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard

pursuant to section 7443A(b)(3) and Rules 180, 181, and 182.1

1
Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the
Internal Revenue Code in effect for the year at issue. All Rule
references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
 - 2 -

Respondent determined a deficiency of $6,741 in petitioners'

1990 Federal income tax and an accuracy-related penalty of

$1,348.20 under section 6662(a).

The issues for decision are: (1) Whether petitioners are

entitled to deductions under section 162(a) for expenses incurred

from a real estate development and marketing activity of Steven

J. Scagliotta (petitioner); (2) whether petitioners are entitled

to a business bad debt deduction under section 166(a) for the

year at issue; and (3) whether petitioners are liable for the

accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) for negligence or

disregard of rules or regulations.

Some of the facts were stipulated, and those facts, with the

annexed exhibits, are so found and are incorporated herein by

reference. At the time the petition was filed, petitioners'

legal residence was Bridgewater, New Jersey.

In 1982, petitioner developed a strategy for trading on the

commodity futures market. He documented his strategy, which

relies on various charting methods, in a manual that he intended

to market to the public. Petitioner began an operation using the

trade name Commodity Investment Strategists (CIS) to effectuate

this activity. Petitioner sold some of his manuals in the early

1980's but overall did not have much success in marketing his

trading strategy. He, thereafter, discontinued this activity and

sold the manual in only isolated and incidental situations. No
 - 3 -

income or expenses are attributable to this activity for the year

at issue.

Petitioner, thereafter, started a real estate development

and marketing activity using the same CIS trade name. He

envisioned purchasing parcels of real estate, developing such

property for residential use by building, for sale, luxury "build

to suit" homes that would be constructed by petitioner on the

real estate. In 1983 and 1986, petitioner purchased two vacant

lots located at Bridgewater, New Jersey (Bridgewater property),

and Clinton/Readington, New Jersey (Clinton property), for such

development. With respect to the Bridgewater property, although

the record is not clear, it appears that, as of 1990, the year at

issue, petitioner had never obtained a building permit for that

property. However, petitioner, thereafter, obtained a permit to

build a single family home on the Bridgewater lot and, in 1992,

secured a $175,000 loan for the purposes of building and selling

a house on the property. The house has never been built. With

respect to the Clinton property, petitioner obtained a building

permit shortly after the purchase of the property and, in 1988,

"secured plans on houses" that he wanted to build for potential

buyers. This entailed designing home floor plans with the help

of builders and engineers, determining a reasonable cost and

profit for each house plan, listing the property for sale on a

"build to suit" basis, and obtaining financing. Since 1989,
 - 4 -

petitioner has listed the Clinton property for sale on a "build

to suit" basis with different realtors but to no avail. To date,

no house has been built on the Clinton property. Petitioner

continues owning both properties.

During the 1980's and early 1990's, petitioner also began

another real estate activity unrelated to the Bridgewater and

Clinton properties. Petitioner purchased, during that time, 50-

percent interests in three rental properties located at

Knoxville, Tennessee, at the following addresses: 1365 Armstrong

Avenue and 1000 and 1006 Thompson Place. The other 50-percent

interest in these properties was owned by Cabell J. Marshall (Ms.

Marshall), a real estate professional from the State of Georgia.2

Petitioner and Ms. Marshall also purchased, along with a third

individual, George Mitchell, interests of one-third each in real

property located at 1503 Coker Avenue, Knoxville, Tennessee.

Additionally, Ms. Marshall independently owned rental real estate

located at 1424 Armstrong Avenue, Knoxville, Tennessee. All of

these properties were located in an older section of Knoxville

and consisted of large old homes that had been renovated and

converted into rental units by the owners. The rental office for

all of these properties was located at the 1424 Armstrong Avenue

2
The record in this case does not indicate how petitioner
came to know Ms. Marshall, or how they became involved in
purchasing rental real estate together. Ms. Marshall was an
attorney and was admitted to the Georgia State Bar.
 - 5 -

address. The properties in which petitioner owned interests were

rented out.

On July 2, 1987, petitioner lent $38,000 to Ms. Marshall.

This loan, which had a rate of interest of 12 percent per annum,

was secured by Ms. Marshall's interests in the three Knoxville

properties in which she and petitioner each owned 50-percent

interests. Of the $38,000 lent, approximately $17,000 was used

by Ms. Marshall for her share of the downpayment on the purchase

of her one-half interest in the property located at 1365

Armstrong Avenue. The remaining $21,000 was used by Ms. Marshall

to avoid foreclosure of the property she owned at 1424 Armstrong

Avenue. Since the rental office was located at that address and

potential tenants saw this property first, petitioner considered

the 1424 Armstrong Avenue property to be the "anchor" or

"showcase" for the remainder of the rental real estate he had

interests in. Accordingly, he wanted to avoid foreclosure of

that property and, therefore, agreed to the use of the $21,000 by

Ms. Marshall on this property.

In June 1990, petitioner advanced $4,962.95 to Ms. Marshall

for the purpose of paying the mortgage creditors on the 1000

Thompson Place property the monthly mortgage payments from

January through May 1990, which Ms. Marshall had not paid. Ms.

Marshall failed to remit the $4,962.95 to the mortgage creditors,

and petitioner made the payment himself to the creditors.
 - 6 -

Petitioner claims an indebtedness of $4,962.95 owing to him by

Ms. Marshall arising from these two transactions.3 Shortly

after, on July 17, 1990, petitioner lent $10,000 to Ms. Marshall

for her share of a payment to the mortgage creditors on the 1000

Thompson Place property. Both the $4,962.95 and the $10,000

advances were unsecured obligations.

To date, Ms. Marshall has not made any payments on the

$38,000, the $10,000, and the $4,962.95 loans made to her by

petitioner. On August 6, 1990, Ms. Marshall filed a petition for

relief with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District

of Georgia, Savannah Division (Bankruptcy Court), under chapter

11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. By order dated April 30, 1992,

the Bankruptcy Court decreed that petitioner held unsecured

claims of $10,000 and $4,962.95 against Ms. Marshall arising out

of the transactions described above. As to the $38,000 loan, the

3
The record is confusing as to how $4,962.95 is determined to
be the amount due petitioner. Since petitioner and Ms. Marshall
each owned a one-half interest in the 1000 Thompson Place
property, Ms. Marshall's share of the liability for the
delinquent mortgage payments would have been $2,481.47 (one-half
of $4,962.95). Since petitioner advanced $4,962.95, one-half of
this amount, or $2,481.47, would be considered as a debt owing to
petitioner by Ms. Marshall. Thereafter, when petitioner paid the
$4,962.95 directly to the mortgage creditors, that entire amount
would be considered as a debt owing by Ms. Marshall to
petitioner. Thus, it appears to the Court that these events
would indicate an indebtedness of $7,444.42 owing by Ms. Marshall
to petitioner ($2,481.47 plus $4,962.95). The Court surmises
that an accounting of some sort occurred between petitioner and
Ms. Marshall so that the indebtedness owing by her to petitioner
was fixed at $4,962.95.
 - 7 -

Bankruptcy Court decreed that petitioner held a secured claim of

$18,913.02 against Ms. Marshall. Even though Ms. Marshall had

made no payments on the $38,000 loan, the Bankruptcy Court found

that, in the informal agreement between petitioner and Ms.

Marshall in their ownership of the subject properties, each party

was to make equal contributions of money and labor and that labor

provided by a coowner would be valued at $7 to $10 per hour. The

Bankruptcy Court found that Ms. Marshall had provided excess

labor to the properties that accounted for reduction of the

indebtedness from $38,000 to $18,913.02. In total, the

Bankruptcy Court decreed Ms. Marshall's indebtedness to

petitioner to be $33,875.97 based upon the following:

Loan on July 2, 1987 $38,000.00
Loan on July 17, 1990 10,000.00
Jan. through May 1990 mortgage payments 4,962.95
Total loans and advances (exclusive of interest) 52,962.95
Less credit on the $38,000 indebtedness (19,086.98)
Net indebtedness $33,875.97

The Bankruptcy Court ordered a sale of the properties owned by

Ms. Marshall, including the four properties in which petitioner

owned undivided interests. Of the net proceeds from the sale of

these properties, petitioner received $17,756 for his interests

in the properties. With respect to Ms. Marshall's interests in

the properties, $17,756 was turned over to the bankruptcy trustee

to be held for distribution to the creditors of the bankruptcy

estate. As of trial of this case, petitioner had not received
 - 8 -

any amount out of these proceeds to be applied to his claims

against the estate.

During 1990, petitioner was employed on a full-time basis

with United Energy Services Corp. doing work in the field of

information systems. He reported salary and wage income of

$74,154.61 from his employer for 1990.

On their 1990 Federal income tax return, petitioners

reported on Schedule C, Profit or Loss from Business, income of

zero, expenses of $37,726, and a net loss of $37,726 from CIS.

Included in the amount of expenses claimed was a business bad

debt deduction of $12,500 representing a portion of the

$52,962.95 loans and advances by petitioner to Ms. Marshall.

Petitioner included the bad debt deduction on Schedule C for CIS

because he contends that CIS is a business that includes both his

non-rental-related activities, with respect to the Bridgewater

and Clinton properties, and his rental-related activities, with

respect to the property he and Ms. Marshall owned in Knoxville.

However, petitioners reported the rental income and other

expenses from the properties in Knoxville on Schedules E,

Supplemental Income and Loss, of their 1990 Federal income tax

return.

In the notice of deficiency, respondent disallowed all of

the expenses claimed by petitioners on Schedule C of their 1990

return. Respondent determined that petitioners were not entitled
 - 9 -

to deduct the $12,500 business bad debt expense because

petitioners had not established that the debt became worthless in

1990, nor had petitioners proven that the debt was a business bad

debt such that a partial amount of the debt could be deducted

under section 166(a)(2). Respondent determined that the

remaining expenses of $25,226 claimed on Schedule C were not

allowable because petitioners had not established that

petitioner's real estate development and marketing activity

constituted a trade or business under section 162.

Alternatively, respondent determined that, if petitioner's

activity did constitute a trade or business, the expenses

represented startup expenses that should have been capitalized

under section 195 pursuant to an appropriate election by

petitioners. Substantiation of the expenses claimed by

petitioners is not at issue.4 Respondent made no adjustments to

the Schedule E rental income and expenses reported by

petitioners.

4
In the notice of deficiency, $12,710.29 and $548,
respectively, for mortgage interest expenses and real estate
taxes that were disallowed as trade or business expenses were
allowed as itemized Schedule A deductions. The mortgage interest
expense of $12,710.29, which related to the Bridgewater and
Clinton properties, was treated as investment interest under sec.
163(d)(3), and, after applying the limitation of sec. 163(d),
$5,348 was allowed as a deduction for 1990, with the remainder
allowed as a carryforward of disallowed interest under sec.
163(d)(2). Respondent further allowed petitioners an itemized
deduction of $1,389 for State income taxes and disallowed the
standard deduction of $5,450 claimed by petitioners on their 1990
return.
 - 10 -

During the trial, petitioners orally moved to amend their

pleadings to conform with the evidence to increase the amount of

their business bad debt deduction from $12,500 to $31,650. The

Court granted this motion pursuant to Rule 41(b). Petitioner's

testimony and the record are not clear as to how petitioner

arrived at this figure; however, it appears, and the Court so

finds, that the claimed amount of $31,650 represents essentially

the amount found by the Bankruptcy Court to be petitioner's claim

against Ms. Marshall, $33,875.97.

The determinations of the Commissioner in a notice of

deficiency are presumed correct, and the burden is on the

taxpayer to prove that the determinations are in error. Rule

142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933).

Deductions are a matter of legislative grace and "'only as

there is clear provision therefor can any particular deduction be

allowed.'" Deputy v. duPont, 308 U.S. 488, 493 (1940) (quoting

New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934)).

The first issue is whether petitioners were engaged in a

trade or business during the year 1990 entitling them to a

deduction of the expenses claimed on Schedule C of their return

(except the business bad debt deduction, which is considered

separately). Section 162(a) provides generally that there shall

be allowed as a deduction "all the ordinary and necessary

expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on
 - 11 -

any trade or business". The inquiry as to whether a taxpayer is

carrying on a trade or business is dependent on the facts and

circumstances of each case. Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480

U.S. 23, 36 (1987).

As indicated in McManus v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-

457, affd. without published opinion 865 F.2d 255 (4th Cir.

1988), three criteria are generally accepted as indicative of

carrying on a trade or business. First, the taxpayer must

undertake an activity intending to make a profit. Second, the

taxpayer must be regularly and actively involved in the activity.

Third, the taxpayer's business operations must actually have

commenced.

In the present case, although petitioner did not present any

documentary evidence to show that he could realistically make a

profit in conducting his real estate development and marketing

activity, the Court is satisfied that petitioner did intend to

make a profit in the activity. Petitioner has met his burden of

proving that the first criterion set forth in McManus v.

Commissioner, supra, has been met. The Court, however, is not

satisfied that the second and third criteria set forth in McManus

have been met with respect to petitioner's real estate

development and marketing activity. While petitioner purchased

property, obtained building permits, designed floor plans with

the help of builders and engineers, and listed the property for
 - 12 -

sale, petitioner, to date, has not accomplished the main purpose

of his activity; i.e. to construct and sell for profit a luxury

"build to suit" home. As stated in Richmond Television Corp. v.

United States, 345 F.2d 901, 907 (4th Cir. 1965), vacated per

curiam on other grounds 382 U.S. 68 (1965):

even though a taxpayer has made a firm decision to enter
into business and over a considerable period of time spent
money in preparation for entering that business, he still
has not "engaged in carrying on any trade or business"
within the intendment of section 162(a) until such time as
the business has begun to function as a going concern and
performed those activities for which it was organized. [Fn.
ref. omitted.]

Thus, "carrying on a trade or business" requires a showing of

more than initial research into business potential and

solicitation of potential customers or clients. Dean v.

Commissioner, 56 T.C. 895, 902 (1971). Further, "carrying on a

trade or business" also requires more than identifying,

contacting, and agreeing with potential partners, contractors, or

other business personnel. Richmond Television Corp. v. United

States, supra at 907. The business operations must actually have

commenced to satisfy the third of the criteria noted above.

Courts have consistently held that preopening and startup

expenses are not deductible under section 162(a).

Based on the case law cited above, petitioner's actions in

connection with his New Jersey properties did not rise to the
 - 13 -

level of carrying on a trade or business for purposes of section

162. The expenses incurred by petitioner in his real estate

development and marketing activity are, at most, startup costs

and/or organizational expenses. See sec. 195. Petitioner's

activity never actually commenced. McManus v. Commissioner,

supra. Further, petitioner failed to show the activity was

conducted on a regular and continuous basis. Id. The majority

of the actions taken by petitioner described above were in 1988.

During 1990, the year at issue, the record indicates that

petitioner merely listed the Clinton property for sale.5

Petitioner contends that he spent approximately 10 to 20 hours

per week on his real estate development and marketing activity.

However, he did not present any oral testimony or documentary

evidence to show how that time was actually spent on the

activity. Further, petitioner held a full-time job in the area

of information systems during 1990.

On this record, the Court holds that petitioners failed to

establish that, during 1990, petitioner's real estate development

and marketing activity had actually commenced or was being

conducted on a regular and continuous basis. Id. Petitioner

failed to prove that he was carrying on a trade or business for

purposes of section 162. Accordingly, petitioners are not

5
The Court notes that, by 1990, petitioner had not even
secured a building permit for the Bridgewater property.
 - 14 -

entitled to deduct, under section 162, the business expenses

claimed on Schedule C of their 1990 return. The mortgage

interest and real estate taxes paid in 1990 with respect to

petitioner's activity are deductible on Schedule A of

petitioners' 1990 return, as allowed by respondent in the notice

of deficiency. Respondent is sustained on this issue.6

The next issue is whether petitioners are entitled to a

business bad debt deduction with respect to the loans petitioner

made to Ms. Marshall in connection with the Knoxville, Tennessee,

properties they jointly owned. Respondent determined that the

debt owed to petitioner constituted a nonbusiness bad debt and

that the debt did not become worthless in 1990. In general,

section 166(a) allows a deduction for any debt that becomes

worthless during the taxable year. However, section 166

distinguishes between business bad debts and nonbusiness bad

debts. Sec. 166(d); sec. 1.166-5(b), Income Tax Regs. Business

bad debts may be deducted against ordinary income to the extent

that such debts become wholly or partially worthless during the

year. Nonbusiness bad debts may be deducted, but only in the

6
The Court notes that sec. 195 provides generally that no
deduction shall be allowed for start-up expenditures; however,
such expenses may, at the election of the taxpayer, be treated as
deferred expenses and allowed as a deduction prorated equally
over a period of not less than 60 months as may be selected by
the taxpayer beginning with the month in which the active trade
or business begins. This record does not support a finding that
a trade or business activity by petitioner began during 1990.
 - 15 -

same manner as short-term capital losses, and only if the debts

are wholly worthless in the year claimed. Sec. 166(d); sec.

1.166-5(a)(2), Income Tax Regs. Section 166(d)(2) provides

generally that a "nonbusiness debt" means a debt other than a

debt created or acquired in connection with a trade or business

of the taxpayer or a debt the loss from the worthlessness of

which is incurred in the taxpayer's trade or business.

This Court has concluded above that petitioner was not

engaged in a trade or business during 1990. Moreover, the

indebtedness at issue was not incurred in connection with the

activity claimed by petitioners to have been a trade or business

but rather was incurred in connection with rental properties in

Tennessee, the income and expenses from which petitioners

reported on Schedule E of their return. The loans petitioner

made to Ms. Marshall were in connection with properties

petitioner held for the production or collection of income under

section 212 and were not related to or made in connection with a

trade or business activity within the intent and meaning of

section 162(a). Thus, petitioners are precluded from claiming a

business bad debt deduction. Additionally, petitioners failed to

establish that the indebtedness owing by Ms. Marshall became

wholly worthless during 1990 to support a claim for a nonbusiness

bad debt deduction. The record shows that, in Ms. Marshall's

bankruptcy proceeding, which was initially filed under chapter 11
 - 16 -

of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and subsequent to the year at issue

was converted to a chapter 7 bankruptcy, proceeds of $17,756 were

held by the bankruptcy trustee for distribution to the creditors

of the bankruptcy estate. None of these proceeds had been

distributed at the time of trial of this case. It is likely that

petitioner will ultimately receive some amount from the

bankruptcy estate to apply to his indebtedness. Petitioner did

not have to be "an incorrigible optimist" to anticipate the

possibility of a recovery. See United States v. S.S. White

Dental Manufacturing Co., 274 U.S. 398, 403 (1927). For the year

1990, the Court holds that petitioner's claim against Ms.

Marshall was not wholly worthless, thus precluding a deduction

under section 166. Sec. 1.166-5(a)(2), Income Tax Regs.7

Respondent, therefore, is sustained on this issue.8

7
In so holding, the Court recognizes that the bankruptcy
trustee has taken the position that petitioner did not have a
valid deed of trust on Ms. Marshall's interest in the three
Knoxville, Tennessee, properties, and, therefore, petitioner's
claim of $18,913.02 (of the original $38,000 loan) was not a
secured claim. However, the record further shows that the
trustee was willing to negotiate his position that the claim was
unsecured.
8
The Court has considered whether petitioners might be
entitled to a deduction for a loss under sec. 165(a). Sec.
165(c)(2) provides generally that, in the case of an individual,
the deduction for a loss shall be limited to "losses incurred in
any transaction entered into for profit, though not connected
with a trade or business". In Spring City Foundry Co. v.
Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182 (1934), the Supreme Court held that
the predecessors of secs. 165 and 166 are mutually exclusive in
that a bad debt, although a loss, cannot be deducted under the
(continued...)
 - 17 -

The final issue for decision is whether petitioners are

liable for the accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) for

negligence or disregard of rules or regulations. Section 6662(a)

provides for an addition to tax equal to 20 percent of the

portion of the underpayment to which the section applies. Under

section 6662(c), "'negligence' includes any failure to make a

reasonable attempt to comply with the provisions of this title,

and the term 'disregard' includes any careless, reckless, or

intentional disregard." Negligence is the lack of due care or

failure to do what a reasonable and ordinarily prudent person

would do under the circumstances. Neely v. Commissioner, 85 T.C.

934, 947 (1985). Under section 6664(c), the penalty under

section 6662(a) shall not be imposed with respect to any portion

of the underpayment if it is shown that there was reasonable

cause for the underpayment, and that the taxpayer acted in good

faith.

Petitioners claimed Schedule C deductions in the amount of

$25,226 with respect to an activity of petitioner's that neither

had commenced nor was being conducted on a regular and continuous

basis during the year at issue. Petitioners also claimed a

$12,500 bad debt deduction for a debt that they reported as a

8
(...continued)
general loss provisions of sec. 165. Therefore, petitioners here
cannot obtain any relief under sec. 165. Moreover, no
identifiable event occurred to fix the amount of any loss so as
to render it deductible under sec. 165.
 - 18 -

debt arising out of a trade or business activity when the debt

was clearly related to property held for the production of

income.

At trial, petitioner contended he was not negligent or in

disregard of rules or regulations for 1990 in claiming he was

engaged in a trade or business activity because he relied on a

position that was taken by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in

the audit of his 1983 tax return. For 1983, petitioner had

reported a trade or business activity based on a Schedule C filed

with his return, and the IRS did not challenge that his activity

was a trade or business. Petitioner did not submit to the Court

a copy of his 1983 return or the IRS audit report for his 1983

tax year but submitted a "Statement of Change To Your Account",

dated April 7, 1986, which he received from the IRS that

indicated an increase in tax for 1983 in the amount of $399 and

interest charged of $96.23, for a total amount of $455.23, which

the statement acknowledged as having been paid. Petitioner's

claim of reliance for purposes of the negligence penalty is not

substantiated. The record of this case indicates that the

principal nature of petitioner's trade or business during 1983

may well have been the commodity trading strategy and manual that

petitioner was promoting at that time. Petitioner acquired the

Bridgewater, New Jersey, property sometime during 1983 and first

sought a variance to build a three-family house on the property
 - 19 -

in 1984. The Court concludes from this that petitioner's

expenses relating to his Bridgewater property during 1983, which

he may well have claimed on a 1983 Schedule C of his return, were

minimal, and the trade or business expenses he claimed that year

related to his commodity futures activity, which the IRS may have

recognized as a trade or business activity. Petitioner could not

have justifiably relied on this IRS position for the 1990 tax

year because the Schedule C for the 1990 tax year did not involve

any expenses relating to the commodity futures activity but only

involved expenses relating to development of the Bridgewater and

Clinton, New Jersey, properties and the $12,500 bad debt

deduction relating to the Knoxville, Tennessee, properties. The

factual circumstances of 1990, therefore, were totally different

from petitioner's 1983 activity. The Court, therefore, rejects

petitioner's contention that he relied on the position taken by

respondent on his 1983 return. With respect to the $12,500 bad

debt deduction claimed on Schedule C of petitioners' 1990 return,

petitioner knew that his debt related solely to the Knoxville,

Tennessee, properties. Petitioner knew that the rental income

and expenses of these properties did not constitute a trade or

business activity for purposes of section 162(a) because he

reported the rental income and expenses from these properties on

Schedule E of his return, thus correctly treating these

properties as properties held for the production of income.
 - 20 -

Petitioner knew or should have known that the same treatment or

characteristic of the $12,500 debt applied; yet, he erroneously

attributed it to a purported trade or business activity. The

Court, therefore, sustains respondent on the section 6662(a)

penalty.

Decision will be entered

for respondent.