T.C. Memo. 1996-499
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
LEE W. YATES AND WENDY S. YATES, Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 3121-95. Filed November 6, 1996.
Bruce J. Berger, for petitioner.
Andrew P. Crousore, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
PANUTHOS, Chief Special Trial Judge: This case was heard
pursuant to the provisions of section 7443A(b)(3) and Rules 180,
181, and 182.1 Respondent determined deficiencies in
1
All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code
as amended, unless otherwise indicated. All Rule references are
to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
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petitioners' Federal income taxes, as well as accuracy-related
penalties, in the following amounts:
Accuracy-Related Penalty
Year Deficiency Sec. 6662(a)
1991 $6,098 $1,220
1992 6,794 1,359
The issues for decision are: (1) Whether petitioners'
horse-breeding activities constitute an activity engaged in for
profit for the purposes of sections 162 and 183; and (2) whether
petitioners are liable for the accuracy-related penalty under
section 6662(a).
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated, and they are so
found. The stipulation of facts and the attached exhibits are
incorporated herein by this reference. At the time of filing the
petition, petitioners resided in Clovis, California.
During the years in issue, petitioners were each employed
full time as registered nurse supervisors. Since 1991,
petitioners also operated a medical/legal consulting firm. The
firm reviewed medical charts upon request. Petitioners reported
combined gross income from this employment during the period 1991
through 1994 in the following amounts:
Year Amount
1991 $105,992
1992 133,572
1993 138,042
1994 145,475
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Petitioners also reported consulting income on line 23 of Forms
1040 for 1991 and 1992 in the amounts of $2,481 and $1,162.
In 1985, petitioners bought a horse as a gift for their
daughter. Prior to purchasing the horse, petitioners attended a
6- to 8-week course on equine care and maintenance. While
attending the class, they met Dr. Keith Lane, who introduced
petitioners to the Paso Fino, a breed of horse possessing a
smooth gait and agreeable disposition.
In 1988, petitioners decided to breed Paso Fino horses and
commenced operating the Silk Oak Paso Fino Ranch (Silk Oak).
Petitioners established Silk Oak on 4.84 acres of property where
their personal residence was located. Petitioners had acquired
the land for $47,500 in 1985 and constructed a residence at a
cost of $113,000 in the same year. The parties agree that, at
the time of trial, the fair market value of the property was
$295,000.2
Before beginning the operation of Silk Oak, petitioners met
with several successful breeders of Paso Fino horses, who
convinced petitioners that they could profitably run a Paso Fino
ranch. Petitioners were advised on such topics as basic horse
care, showing, advertising, cost control, and breeding.
2
Cliff Hathaway, an appraiser hired by petitioners,
determined the value of the property by comparing the sale prices
of similar personal residences recently sold in the area.
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Petitioners also met with an accountant, who assisted petitioners
in setting up a bookkeeping system and separate checking
accounts. Petitioners, however, did not draft a detailed
business plan and did not compute any written financial
projections.
By early 1996, petitioners owned 8 purebred Paso Fino horses
and had owned a maximum of 10. Petitioners have also sold five
horses since establishing Silk Oak. The horses owned by Silk Oak
at the date of trial, their acquisition costs, and their
estimated values are as follows:
Name Acquisition Cost Estimated F.M.V.
1. Mancebo de Coral $10,000 $12,000--18,000
2. La Hija del Centaur 4,000 6,500
3. Vitrina del Dulce 12,000 15,000--18,000
4. Reya de Seda foaled 4,000---6,500
5. El Coete de Seda foaled 2,500---3,500
6. Alas de Seda foaled 2,500---3,500
7. Elegancia de Seda foaled 5,000---6,000
8. Latina de Seda foaled 5,000---6,000
Total 26,000 52,500--68,000
The five horses sold by petitioners, including original
acquisition costs and selling prices, are as follows:
Name Acquisition Cost Sale Price Gain
1. Cobre de Seda foaled $1,500 $1,500
2. Noche Caliente -0- 250 250
3. Fernando Bravo $1,500 4,000 2,500
4. Tuaca del Centaur 7,000 9,000 2,000
5. Sombra de Seda foaled -0- -0-
Total 8,500 14,750 6,250
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From 1988 to 1994, petitioners reported income and expenses
relating to the operation of Silk Oak on Schedule C in the
following amounts:
Year Ranch Expenses1 Gross Income Ranch Losses
1988 --- --- ($10,000)
1989 --- --- (16,559)
1990 --- --- (21,742)
1991 $21,601 $ 500 (21,101)
1992 21,772 250 (21,522)
1993 32,173 4,000 (29,673)
1994 32,183 7,270 (24,913)
2
Total (145,510)
1
The record does not include information regarding
petitioners' income and expenses for 1988, 1989, and 1990.
2
The stipulation of facts miscalculated total losses as
$145,702.
Petitioners deducted the losses resulting from the operation of
Silk Oak. Respondent disallowed petitioners' deductions for 1991
and 1992, concluding that petitioners did not engage in the
running of Silk Oak with the requisite profit motive.
Petitioners have hired professional trainers to work with
their horses, averaging 1 to 3 months per horse. To increase
profitability, petitioners have improved their own abilities to
personally train their horses, thereby mitigating the expenses of
hiring an outside trainer. In addition, petitioners have sought
to increase profitability by "breeding up"; i.e., breeding their
horses to horses with stronger pedigrees. Petitioners have
advertised their horses for sale in the local newspaper, have
posted flyers offering their horses for sale or stud services,
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and have participated in various horse shows. Furthermore, in
1995 and 1996, petitioners were seeking to sell their ranch in
California and relocate to Texas, where purportedly lower costs
and a better market for Paso Fino horses render profitability
more likely.
OPINION
Taxpayers seeking to deduct expenses under section 162 must
establish that the underlying activity was engaged in for an
actual and honest profit objective. Dreicer v. Commissioner, 78
T.C. 642, 644-646 (1982), affd. without published opinion 702
F.2d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1983). If a taxpayer's activity is deemed
not to be engaged in for the purposes of earning a profit, the
deductibility of expenses resulting from the activity is
restricted by section 183. Particularly, section 183(b)(2)
provides that expenses which result from an activity not engaged
in for profit, and which would be allowable only if the activity
were engaged in for profit, are deductible only to the extent of
income derived from the activity. Generally, taxpayers bear the
burden of proving that the activities in question were entered
into for a profit. Rule 142(a); Golanty v. Commissioner, 72 T.C.
411, 426 (1979), affd. without published opinion 647 F.2d 170
(9th Cir. 1981).
To determine whether a taxpayer has entered into an activity
for a profit, we must consider all of the facts and
circumstances, placing greater weight upon objective facts than
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upon a taxpayer's mere statements of intent. Dreicer v.
Commissioner, supra at 645. Nevertheless, there is no
requirement that the taxpayer reasonably expect profits from the
activity in question. Elliott v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 960, 970
(1988), affd. without published opinion 899 F.2d 18 (9th Cir.
1990). Section 1.183-2(b), Income Tax Regs., provides nine
factors to be considered when determining whether an activity is
engaged in for profit. These are: (1) The manner in which the
taxpayer carries on the activity; (2) the expertise of the
taxpayer or his advisors; (3) the time and effort expended by the
taxpayer in carrying on the activity; (4) the expectation that
assets used in the activity may appreciate in value; (5) the
success of the taxpayer in carrying on other similar or
dissimilar activities; (6) the taxpayer's history of income or
losses with respect to the activity; (7) the amount of occasional
profits, if any, which are earned; (8) the financial status of
the taxpayer; and (9) the elements of personal pleasure or
recreation that may be present. No single factor is controlling.
Abramson v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 360, 371 (1986); sec. 1.183-
2(b), Income Tax Regs. We will separately discuss each factor.
1. The Manner in Which Petitioners Carried On the Horse-
Breeding Activity
Taxpayers who carry on the activity in question in a
businesslike manner, and maintain complete and accurate books and
records, are more likely to establish that the activities in
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question were engaged in for a profit. Sec. 1.183-2(b)(1),
Income Tax Regs. The record indicates that petitioners
maintained thorough accounts of revenue and expenditures
connected with Silk Oak's operations, using a computer program
recommended by their accountant. Petitioners also maintained
separate accounts for Silk Oak's finances. Respondent concedes
that petitioners maintained books and records in a businesslike
manner.
Petitioners' detailed bookkeeping does not, by itself,
indicate an intent to generate a profit. Golanty v.
Commissioner, supra at 426. A lack of profit motive may exist
where a taxpayer fails to abandon unprofitable methods, change
operations, or adopt new techniques in an attempt to improve
profitability. Sec. 1.183-2(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.
Accordingly, the maintenance of detailed books and records may
reveal the mere "trappings" of a profit business, particularly
when a taxpayer fails to produce income statements, profit plans,
or business plans created to alter operations in an attempt to
reverse mounting losses. Osteen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1993-519, affd. in part and revd. in part 62 F.3d 356 (11th Cir.
1995).
In this instance, petitioners commenced operation of Silk
Oak with neither expertise in running a profitable ranch nor a
detailed written plan fashioned to enable them to earn a profit.
Petitioners, however, contend that before conducting any ranching
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activities, they consulted with individuals who have had some
success in breeding Paso Fino horses. Petitioners also argue
that since commencing operation of Silk Oak, they have attempted
to increase profitability by improving their training techniques,
enhancing the bloodlines of their foals, and proposing a move of
their ranching activities to Texas, where expenses are
purportedly lower. Respondent asserts that petitioners'
testimony concerning advice received from other Paso Fino
breeders was vague and self-serving and yielded no written
business plan. Likewise, respondent contends that petitioners
offered no specific evidence to establish that a relocation to
Texas would enhance profit opportunities. Furthermore,
respondent maintains that Silk Oak's consistent losses indicate
that the changes implemented by petitioners were modest and have
had little impact.
The record indicates that expenses and losses have steadily
increased over time, and petitioners have not presented a
detailed written profit plan. Although petitioners sought advice
from several successful Paso Fino breeders, their testimony in
this regard was vague and the meetings yielded no concrete plan
of operation. Petitioners decided to commence operation of Silk
Oak with little concept of the expenses involved or of the steps
involved to achieve cost efficiency and an eventual profit.
Daley v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-259. Furthermore, in the
face of mounting losses, petitioners have failed to materially
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alter their operations or their prospects of generating profits.
Golanty v. Commissioner, supra at 428. With respect to their
proposed move to Texas, petitioners have failed to introduce
specific evidence to indicate that increased profit potential
would result. For this reason, we regard petitioners'
expectations of enhancing profitability by moving to Texas as
being too speculative to support their position. Accordingly, we
find that this factor favors respondent.
2. The Expertise of Petitioners or Their Advisors
Preparing to enter into an activity by extensively studying
accepted business, economic, and scientific practices, as well as
consulting with experts, may indicate that the taxpayer has a
profit motive. Sec. 1.183-2(b)(2), Income Tax Regs. While we
have found that petitioners have knowledge of Paso Fino horses,
they did not engage in the activity with expertise about running
a profitable ranch. The record indicates that the 6- to 8-week
course in which petitioners enrolled narrowly pertained to horse
care and maintenance and did not instruct petitioners in regard
to the day-to-day operations of a profitable ranch. This factor
favors respondent.
3. The Time and Effort Expended by Petitioners in Carrying
On the Activity
Taxpayers expending substantial amounts of personal time in
conducting an activity, particularly where there is no
recreational element involved, are more likely to be deemed to
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have engaged in the activity for profit. Sec. 1.183-2(b)(3),
Income Tax Regs. While withdrawal from an occupation to spend
more time on the activity suggests a profit motive, taxpayers who
spend limited amounts of time on an activity may nevertheless
possess the requisite profit motive if they use the services of
qualified persons. Thus, the fact the petitioners were employed
full-time as registered nurses does not necessarily preclude a
finding that they bred horses with a profit motive. Petitioners
credibly maintain that they and their daughter have averaged a
total of 40 to 60 hours per week on the care and training of
their horses, as well as on the maintenance of Silk Oak. Silk
Oak is a modest ranch, and we believe that petitioners performed
much of the necessary and unpleasant labor themselves.
Therefore, despite petitioners' full-time employment as
registered nurse supervisors during the years in issue, we find
that this factor favors petitioners.
4. The Expectation That Assets Used in the Activity May
Appreciate in Value
The term "profit" may contemplate appreciation in the value
of assets, including land, used in the activity. Sec. 1.183-
2(b)(4), Income Tax Regs. Petitioners argue that the increased
value of the property where Silk Oak is located should be
considered to offset past losses. In this instance, however, the
appreciation in value of Silk Oak must derive from petitioners'
ranching activities, rather than from independent factors.
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Stubblefield v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-480; Ruben v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-260, affd. without published
opinion 852 F.2d 1290 (9th Cir. 1988). Petitioners purchased and
held the property as a personal residence for 3 years before
converting it into a ranch. Silk Oak still serves as
petitioners' residence, and the valuation in question, stipulated
by the parties, used a market comparison approach to real estate
valuation. The properties used by the appraiser in comparison to
petitioners' property were residential properties, rather than
ranches. The appreciation of the real estate in question,
therefore, is based upon its use as a residence, rather than as a
horse ranch. Ruben v. Commissioner, supra. Consequently, we
will not consider the real estate as an appreciated "asset" held
by petitioners to offset Silk Oak's losses. Id.
Petitioners also argue that they had hoped that appreciation
in the value of their horses would yield a profit in the future.
Petitioners' losses from the operation of Silk Oak total
$145,510. At the time of trial, petitioners owned eight horses
and had never generated more than $2,500 in profit from the sale
of any one horse. Even if their entire stock of horses were
liquidated at fair market value, the maximum profit generated
would be $42,000. It is, therefore, unlikely that petitioners
will generate any profits from the sale of their horses in the
near future that would recoup more than a fraction of the past
losses. This factor favors respondent.
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5. The Success of Petitioners in Carrying On Other Similar
or Dissimilar Activities
The fact that a taxpayer has engaged in similar activities
in the past and converted them from unprofitable to profitable
may indicate a profit motive with respect to the activity in
question, regardless of recent profits. Sec. 1.183-2(b)(5),
Income Tax Regs. Before commencing the operation of Silk Oak,
petitioners had never run a profitable ranch and had little
knowledge of the business. We, therefore, conclude that this
factor favors respondent.
6. Petitioners' History of Income and Losses With Respect
to the Activity
The presence of consistent losses militates against a
finding that an activity was engaged in for a profit. Sec.
1.183-2(b)(6), Income Tax Regs. An activity, however, may be
deemed to be engaged in for profit despite a history of losses in
initial or startup stages. Id. Therefore, if losses continue to
be sustained beyond the period which is normally necessary to
bring the operation into profitable status, we will consider such
losses as an indication of a lack of profit motive. Golanty v.
Commissioner, 72 T.C. at 426. With respect to horse-breeding, we
stated in Golanty v. Commissioner, supra at 427 (quoting
Bessenyey v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 261, 274 (1965), affd. 379
F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1967)):
"the presence of losses in the formative years of a
business, particularly one involving the breeding of
horses, is not inconsistent with an intention to
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achieve a later profitable level of operation, bearing
in mind, however, that the goal must be to realize a
profit on the entire operation, which presupposes not
only future net earnings but also sufficient net
earnings to recoup the losses which have meanwhile been
sustained in the intervening years."
In this instance, petitioners sustained substantial losses
from their horse-breeding activities for 7 years from 1988 to
1994. The aggregate net losses over the course of these years
was $145,510. Losses grew steadily over the first 6 years of
operation. Petitioners' operating expenses in each of the years
in issue exceeded $21,000, while they have never realized a
profit greater than $2,500 on the sale of any one horse. It is,
therefore, unlikely that petitioners will generate sufficient
profits from the activity to make up for past losses. Despite
petitioners' sincere devotion to the operation of Silk Oak, we
find this to be highly probative evidence that petitioners do not
expect their horse-breeding activity to become profitable. See
id. This factor favors respondent.
7. The Amount of Occasional Profits, If Any, Which Are
Earned
The amount of profits generated in relation to the amount of
losses incurred, and in relation to the taxpayer's investment and
the value of the assets used in the activity, may suggest the
taxpayer's intent. Sec. 1.183-2(b)(7), Income Tax Regs. From
1988 to 1994, petitioners generated a net gain of $6,350 from the
sale of four horses and two goats and $400 from the use of their
land for grazing. Petitioners' sporadic revenues from the
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operation of Silk Oak have been de minimis when compared to the
$145,510 in expenses incurred. Bischoff v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1995-34. Accordingly, this factor favors respondent.
8. The Financial Status of Petitioners
The fact that a taxpayer does not have substantial income
from sources other than the activity may indicate that the
activity is engaged in for profit. Sec. 1.183-2(b)(8), Income
Tax Regs. In this case, petitioners' income from their nursing
supervisory activities totaled $105,992 in 1991 and $133,572 in
1992. Petitioners' income is sufficient to produce a comfortable
standard of living, even upon consideration of the losses
incurred in the operation of Silk Oak. Golanty v. Commissioner,
supra. We also note that the losses reported from the operation
of Silk Oak provided petitioners with substantial tax benefits.
Id. at 429. This factor favors respondent.
9. The Elements of Personal Pleasure or Recreation That
May Be Present
The presence of personal motives in carrying on an activity
may indicate that the activity is not engaged in for profit,
especially where there are recreational or personal elements
involved. Sec. 1.183-2(b)(9), Income Tax Regs. The existence of
personal pleasure for the taxpayer, however, does not compel a
finding that the activity was not engaged in for profit. Jackson
v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 312, 317 (1972). Conversely, the
existence of hard work is not enough to distinguish a profit-
seeking activity from a hobby. Borsody v. Commissioner, T.C.
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Memo. 1993-534, affd. per curiam 92 F.3d 1176 (4th Cir. 1996);
Osteen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-519. The care and
maintenance of horses demands a large measure of laborious and
unpleasant work. Petitioners were responsible, inter alia, for
mucking and cleaning the stalls, grooming the horses, and caring
for mares which had recently foaled. However, while we do not
reject petitioners' contention that the day to day operation of
Silk Oak demands a great deal of hard work, we note that
petitioners' introduction into horse breeding was precipitated by
their daughter's love of horses. We also believe that
petitioners were partially motivated by personal reasons in
engaging in the horse-breeding activities, both enjoying life on
a farm and using the horses for recreational pleasure. This
factor favors neither party.
Given a consideration of all relevant factors, we conclude
that petitioners did not engage in the operation of Silk Oak with
the intent of generating a profit. We, therefore, sustain
respondent on this issue.
Accuracy-Related Penalty Under Section 6662(a)
Respondent determined that petitioners are liable for the
accuracy-related penalty provided under section 6662(a). The
accuracy-related penalty is equal to 20 percent of any portion of
an underpayment attributable to a taxpayer's negligence or
disregard of rules and regulations. Sec. 6662(a) and (b)(1).
The term "negligence" includes any failure to do what a
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reasonable and ordinarily prudent person would do under the same
circumstances. Neely v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 934, 947 (1985).
The penalty does not apply to any portion of an underpayment for
which there was reasonable cause and with respect to which the
taxpayer acted in good faith. Sec. 6664(c). Respondent's
determination imposing the accuracy-related penalty is presumed
correct, and petitioners bear the burden of proving that they are
not liable for the accuracy-related penalty imposed by section
6662(a). Rule 142(a); Tweeddale v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 501,
505 (1989).
Although we have sustained respondent's determination that
petitioners did not have the requisite profit objective, we find
that petitioners were not negligent. Petitioners claimed the
deductions relating to Silk Oak with a reasonable and good faith
application of the law. Accordingly, we do not sustain
respondent's determination that petitioners are liable for the
accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a). Connolly v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-218, affd. without published
opinion 58 F.3d 637 (5th Cir. 1995).
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered
for respondent as to the
deficiencies and for
petitioners as to the
penalties.