T.C. Memo. 1996-511
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
JAMES LESLIE CLARK VALARIAN, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 10037-94. Filed November 19, 1996.
James Leslie Clark Valarian, pro se.
James B. Ausenbaugh, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
CARLUZZO, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant
to the provisions of section 7443A(b)(3) and Rules 180, 181, and
182.1 Respondent determined a deficiency in petitioner's 1990
Federal income tax in the amount of $1,230.
1
All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in
effect for the year at issue. All Rule references are to the Tax
Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
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The issue for decision is whether petitioner is entitled to
dependency exemption deductions for four of his children.
Some of the facts have been stipulated, and they are so
found. At the time of the filing of the petition, petitioner
resided in West Valley City, Utah.
Background
Petitioner married Karen Inman Silver (Ms. Silver) in 1973.
They had four children: Michael, Marjorie, Susan, and Brigette
(the children). Petitioner and Ms. Silver were divorced in 1983.
Pursuant to the divorce decree, custody of the children was
awarded to Ms. Silver, with liberal visitation rights to
petitioner. The divorce decree also required petitioner to pay
child support of $150 per child per month. Petitioner's child
support obligation was subsequently reduced to $125 per child per
month. The divorce decree contains no reference to the
dependency exemption deductions for the children.
During 1990, the children remained in the custody of Ms.
Silver and resided with her. They spent approximately 30 hours
per week with petitioner. He paid for the children's food while
they stayed with him, provided each child with an allowance, and
paid for their life and health insurance. In addition, he paid
$6,000 ($125 per child per month for 12 months) in child support
payments to Ms. Silver during 1990.
On his 1990 return, petitioner claimed dependency exemption
deductions for Michael, Marjorie, Susan, and Brigette. Although
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not entirely clear from the record, it appears that for the year
1990, Ms. Silver also claimed dependency exemption deductions for
the children. Respondent disallowed the dependency exemption
deductions claimed by petitioner with respect to the children,
explaining in the notice of deficiency that "the [divorce] decree
does not state that you are entitled to claim the children for
tax purposes and we have not received a [written declaration]
signed by the custodial parent releasing the exemption to you".
Discussion
We begin by noting that deductions are a matter of
legislative grace, and taxpayers must satisfy the specific
statutory requirements of any deduction claimed. INDOPCO, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); New Colonial Ice Co. v.
Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934).
Section 151(c) allows a taxpayer a dependency exemption
deduction for each dependent as defined in section 152. The term
"dependent" includes certain individuals, such as a son or
daughter, "over half of whose support for the calendar year * * *
was received from the taxpayer (or is treated * * * as received
from the taxpayer)". Sec. 152(a). In the case of a child of
divorced parents, generally the custodial parent is treated as
providing over one-half of the support of the child. Sec.
152(e)(1).
There are three exceptions to this rule. The custodial
parent is not treated as providing over one-half of the support
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of the child if: (1) The custodial parent signs a written
declaration that he or she will not claim the child as a
dependent for any (or a certain) taxable year, and the
noncustodial parent attaches such written declaration to his or
her return for the appropriate year; or (2) over one-half of the
support of the child is treated as having been received from a
different individual under a multiple support agreement; or (3) a
pre-1985 decree of divorce or separate maintenance, or written
agreement provides that the noncustodial spouse is entitled to
the dependency exemption deduction for the child, and the
noncustodial spouse contributes at least $600 for support of such
child during the relevant taxable year. Sec. 152(e)(2) through
(4).
None of the above exceptions is applicable in this case.
Consequently pursuant to section 152(e)(1), Ms. Silver, the
custodial parent, is considered to have provided over one-half of
the support of the children during 1990. It follows, therefore
that petitioner is not entitled to claim dependency exemption
deductions for any of the children for the year 1990 because they
are not his dependents as that term is defined in section 152(a).
At trial and on brief, petitioner made various
constitutional arguments in support of his position that we
should find that there is no deficiency in his 1990 Federal
income tax. Although not entirely clear to us, we believe that
petitioner's constitutional arguments focus not so much upon the
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allowance of the deductions here in dispute, but upon whether he
should be entitled to exclude from income earnings over which, in
his view, he had no discretionary control. To the extent we
understand petitioner's arguments, we find them to have no merit.
Suffice it to say that similar arguments have been previously
rejected by the Court. See Knight v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1992-710, affd. without published opinion 29 F.3d 632 (9th Cir.
1994).
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be
entered for respondent.