T.C. Memo. 1997-125
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
LARS E. FREDRICKSON, JR., & DONNA J. FREDRICKSON, Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 24751-95. Filed March 11, 1997.
Lars E. Fredrickson Jr., and Donna J. Fredrickson, pro sese.
Allan D. Hill, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
FOLEY, Judge: By notice dated September 21, 1995,
respondent determined a deficiency in petitioners' 1992 Federal
income tax of $31,071. The issues for decision are as follows:
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1. Whether petitioners, pursuant to section 104(a)(2), are
entitled to exclude amounts received in settlement of a class
action suit. We hold they are not.
2. Whether petitioners, pursuant to section 162, are
entitled to an above-the-line deduction for legal fees. We hold
they are not.
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code as in effect for the year in issue, and
all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and
Procedure.
Background
The facts have been fully stipulated under Rule 122 and are
so found. At the time the petition was filed, petitioners
resided in Eureka, California.
On June 1, 1979, a class action suit against State Farm
General Insurance Co., State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co., State Farm Life Insurance Co., and State Farm Fire and
Casualty Co. (State Farm) was filed in the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California, Kraszewski, et al. v.
State Farm Gen. Ins. Co.. The plaintiffs alleged that State
Farm, in violation of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(Title VII), had discriminated against women in the hiring of its
insurance agents. On November 6, 1981, the District Court
bifurcated the litigation into a liability and a remedy phase.
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On April 29, 1985, the District Court ruled in the liability
phase that State Farm was liable under Title VII for classwide
discrimination on the basis of sex. Specifically, it ruled that
women who attempted to become trainee agents were "lied to,
misinformed, and discouraged in their efforts to obtain the entry
level sales position." The court found State Farm liable with
respect to "all female applicants and deterred applicants who, at
any time since July 5, 1974, have been, are, or will be denied
recruitment, selection and/or hire as trainee agents by defendant
companies within the State of California."
On May 1, 1987, Donna Fredrickson (petitioner) applied to
become a State Farm trainee agent. State Farm rejected her
application and appointed a male applicant. Petitioner
subsequently joined the class action suit against State Farm.
The parties to the class action subsequently reached an agreement
in a consent decree as to the remedy phase of the litigation.
The consent decree provided for individual hearings to determine
each claimant's entitlement to damages and the amount of such
damages.
Petitioner ultimately prevailed in her claim against State
Farm. In February of 1992, petitioner and State Farm entered
into a settlement agreement entitled "Settlement Agreement and
General Release". That agreement provided in relevant part:
The approximate full value of [petitioner's] claim
under the Consent Decree damage formula as of February
1, 1992, is $173,057.00, which represents back pay as a
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State Farm agent accrued from the year of the
challenged appointment to February 1, 1992, plus six
months of front pay from that date forward.
b. Settlement Cash at 87.5% Acceptance Rate:
State Farm offers [petitioner] Settlement Cash of
$135,000.00, which is approximately 78% of the
estimated full Consent Decree value of her claim, to
release her claims against State Farm.
* * * * * * *
c. Incentive Cash for Acceptance Rate Above
90%: The Incentive Cash will be $1,800.00 per claimant
for each full percentage point by which the Acceptance
Rate * * * exceeds 90%.
* * * * * * *
e. Attorney's Fees: The payments State Farm
is offering to [petitioner] include her attorneys' fees
and costs * * *. That is, [petitioner] will have to
pay her attorneys' fees * * * out of the payment State
Farm makes to her. * * *
Petitioner accepted the terms of the settlement agreement.
As a result, in 1992 State Farm issued petitioner and her
attorney a $151,200 check ($135,000 plus a $16,200 Acceptance
Rate bonus amount). Petitioner's attorney retained legal fees of
$37,841 and the $113,359 balance was paid to petitioner.
Petitioners reported on their 1992 joint Federal income tax
return $5,270 of the $151,200 amount. Respondent determined that
the entire $151,200 should have been included in petitioners'
gross income. The petition in this case was filed on November
24, 1995.
Discussion
I. Excludability of Settlement Proceeds Under Section 104(a)(2)
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Except as otherwise provided, gross income includes income
from all sources. Sec. 61; Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.,
348 U.S. 426 (1955). While section 61(a) is to be broadly
construed, statutory exclusions from income must be narrowly
construed. Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct.
2159, 2163 (1995).
Under section 104(a)(2), gross income does not include "the
amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement and
whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of
personal injuries or sickness". Section 1.104-1(c), Income Tax
Regs., provides that "The term 'damages received (whether by suit
or agreement)' means an amount received * * * through prosecution
of a legal suit or action based upon tort or tort type rights, or
through a settlement agreement entered into in lieu of such
prosecution." Thus, an amount may be excluded from gross income
only when it was received both: (1) Through prosecution or
settlement of an action based upon tort or tort type rights and
(2) on account of personal injuries or sickness. Commissioner v.
Schleier, 515 U.S. at ___, 115 S. Ct. at 2166-2167
Where amounts are received pursuant to a settlement
agreement, the nature of the claim that was the actual basis for
settlement controls whether such amounts are excludable under
section 104(a)(2). United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 237
(1992); Robinson v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 116, 126 (1994), affd.
in part, revd. in part and remanded 70 F.3d 34 (5th Cir. 1995).
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The critical question is "in lieu of what was the settlement
amount paid?" Bagley v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 396, 406 (1995).
Determination of the nature of the claim is a factual inquiry.
Robinson v. Commissioner, supra at 127.
The amounts petitioner received under the settlement
agreement were intended to settle petitioner's claim under Title
VII. Although the settlement agreement does not contain a
specific statement to that effect, the surrounding circumstances
establish that Title VII is the underlying claim. Petitioner was
a member of a class action suit asserting a claim of
discrimination under Title VII. The District Court ruled that
State Farm was liable under Title VII to all members of the class
who had been discriminated against and ordered individual
hearings. State Farm and the plaintiffs to the class action suit
agreed on a procedure and a formula to ascertain the amount owed,
if any, to each individual claimant. Petitioner's damages under
the consent decree were ascertained, and petitioner was paid an
amount equal to 78 percent of her full claim under the consent
decree, plus a bonus amount. Thus, the consent decree
implemented the District Court's ruling that State Farm was
liable under Title VII, and the settlement agreement represented
a compromise and settlement of petitioner's rights under the
consent decree. As a result, we conclude that petitioner's
settlement proceeds were intended to settle her Title VII claim
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and that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Burke, supra, controls.
In Burke, the Court considered whether amounts received in
settlement of a claim under Title VII were excludable under
section 104(a)(2). The Court analyzed Title VII and concluded
that it did not provide for remedies to recompense claimants for
tort type personal injuries. Instead, the Court noted that the
statute offered only injunctions, back and front pay, and other
equitable relief. Id. at 238-239. As a result, the Court
concluded that Title VII did not redress tort type personal
injuries and consequently that settlement proceeds based on such
a claim are not excludable under section 104(a)(2).
Petitioner contends that remedies available to her under
other laws redressed tort type personal injuries, and that the
settlement was partially intended to settle these claims.
Petitioner emphasizes that the consent decree indicated that
State Farm was concerned about its liability under other laws and
that the settlement agreement provided that petitioner released
all claims she had against State Farm under Title VII and other
laws. Petitioner has failed, however, to establish the amount,
if any, attributable to claims under other laws. As a result,
petitioner has failed to prove that any part of the settlement
proceeds is excludable. See Getty v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 160,
175-176 (1988), affd. on this issue, revd. on other issues 913
F.2d 1486 (9th Cir. 1990).
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Accordingly, we conclude that petitioners are not entitled
to exclude any part of the $151,200 settlement proceeds under
section 104(a)(2).
II. Deductibility of Legal Fees
Petitioner contends that her legal fees are ordinary and
necessary business expenses deductible under section 162.
Respondent contends that the legal fees are deductible under
section 212(1) as an expense for the production of income and
treated as a miscellaneous itemized deduction under section 67.
We agree with respondent. Such legal fees are deductible to the
extent they exceed 2 percent of petitioners' adjusted gross
income. See also sec. 1.67-1T(a)(1)(ii), Temporary Income Tax
Regs., 53 Fed. Reg. 9875 (Mar. 28, 1988).
We have considered all other arguments made by the parties
and found them to be either irrelevant or without merit.
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered
under Rule 155.