T.C. Memo. 1997-385
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
DONALD N. AND ROSEMARIE F. MERINO, Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 14555-85. Filed August 21, 1997.
Bernard S. Mark and Richard S. Kestenbaum, for petitioners.
Barry J. Laterman and Paul Colleran, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
DAWSON, Judge: This case was assigned to Special Trial
Judge Norman H. Wolfe pursuant to the provisions of section
7443A(b)(4) and Rules 180, 181, and 183. All section references
are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the tax years in
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issue, unless otherwise indicated. All Rule references are to
the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. The Court agrees
with and adopts the opinion of the Special Trial Judge, which is
set forth below.
OPINION OF THE SPECIAL TRIAL JUDGE
WOLFE, Special Trial Judge: This case is part of the
Plastics Recycling group of cases. For a detailed discussion of
the transactions involved in the Plastics Recycling cases, see
Provizer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-177, affd. without
published opinion 996 F.2d 1216 (6th Cir. 1993). The facts of
the underlying transactions and the Sentinel recyclers in this
case are substantially identical to those considered in Provizer.
In a notice of deficiency dated April 9, 1985, respondent
determined deficiencies in petitioners' joint Federal income
taxes for the years 1978, 1979, 1980, and 1981 in the respective
amounts of $505, $12,647.87, $4,503, and $32,463. Respondent
also determined that interest on the deficiencies accruing after
December 31, 1984, would be calculated at 120 percent of the
statutory rate under section 6621(c).1
1
The deficiency notice refers to sec. 6621(d). This section
was redesignated as sec. 6621(c) by sec. 1511(c)(1)(A) of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, 2744 and
repealed by sec. 7721(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1989 (OBRA 1989), Pub. L. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106, 2399,
effective for tax returns due after Dec. 31, 1989, OBRA 1989 sec.
7721(d), 103 Stat. 2400. The repeal does not affect the instant
case. For simplicity, we refer to this section as sec. 6621(c).
The annual rate of interest under sec. 6621(c) for interest
(continued...)
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In a first amendment to answer, respondent asserted
additions to tax for negligence for the years 1978, 1979, and
1980 under section 6653(a) in the respective amounts of $25,
$632, and $239,2 and for 1981 under section 6653(a)(1) in the
amount of $1,582, and under section 6653(a)(2) in the amount of
50 percent of the interest due on $31,645. Respondent also
asserted an addition to tax for 1981 under section 6659 for
valuation overstatement in the amount of $6,645.
The parties filed a Stipulation of Settled Issues concerning
the adjustments relating to petitioners' participation in the
Plastics Recycling Program. The stipulation provides:
1. Petitioners are not entitled to any deductions,
losses, investment credits, business energy investment
credits or any other tax benefits claimed on their tax
returns as a result of their participation in the
Plastics Recycling Program.
2. The underpayments in income tax attributable to
petitioners' participation in the Plastics Recycling
Program are substantial underpayments attributable to
tax motivated transactions, subject to the increased
rate of interest established under I.R.C. §6621(c),
formerly section 6621(d).
3. This stipulation resolves all issues that relate to
the items claimed on petitioners' tax returns resulting
from their participation in the Plastics Recycling
Program, with the exception of petitioners' potential
liability for additions to the tax for valuation
1
(...continued)
accruing after Dec. 31, 1984, equals 120 percent of the interest
payable under sec. 6601 with respect to any substantial
underpayment attributable to tax-motivated transactions.
2
The deficiencies for 1978, 1979, and 1980 derived from
disallowed credit carrybacks from 1981.
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overstatements under I.R.C. §6659 and for negligence
under the applicable provisions of Section 6653(a).
4. With respect to the issue of the addition to the
tax under I.R.C. §6659, the petitioners do not intend
to contest the value of the Sentinel Recycler or the
existence of a valuation overstatement on the
petitioners' returns; however, petitioners preserve
their right to contest the issue of whether I.R.C.
§6659 is applicable under the facts and circumstances
of this case.
The issues remaining in this case are: (1) Whether
petitioners are liable for the additions to tax for negligence
under section 6653(a) for the years 1978, 1979, and 1980, and
under section 6653(a)(1) and (2) for 1981; and (2) whether
petitioners are liable for the addition to tax under section 6659
for underpayment of tax attributable to a valuation overstatement
for 1981.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
The stipulated facts and attached exhibits are incorporated
herein by this reference.
A. The Plastics Recycling Transactions
This case concerns petitioners' investment in Northeast
Resource Recovery Associates (Northeast), a limited partnership
that leased seven Sentinel expanded polyethylene (EPE) recyclers.
The transactions involving the Sentinel EPE recyclers leased by
Northeast are substantially identical to those in the Clearwater
Group limited partnership (Clearwater), the partnership
considered in Provizer v. Commissioner, supra. Petitioners have
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stipulated substantially the same facts concerning the underlying
transactions as we found in the Provizer case.
In transactions closely resembling those in the Provizer
case, Packaging Industries, Inc. (PI), manufactured and sold
seven Sentinel EPE recyclers to ECI Corp. for $981,000 each. ECI
Corp., in turn, resold the recyclers to F & G Corp. for
$1,162,666 each. F & G Corp. then leased the recyclers to
Northeast, which licensed the recyclers to FMEC Corp., which
sublicensed them back to PI. The sales of the recyclers from PI
to ECI Corp. were financed with nonrecourse notes. Approximately
7.5 percent of the sales price of the recyclers sold by ECI Corp.
to F & G Corp. was paid in cash with the remainder financed
through notes. These notes provided that 10 percent of the notes
were recourse but that the recourse portion of the notes was only
due after the nonrecourse portion, 90 percent, was paid in full.
All of the monthly payments required among the entities in
the above transactions offset each other. These transactions
were done simultaneously. Although the recyclers were sold and
leased for the above amounts under the structure of simultaneous
transactions, the fair market value of a Sentinel EPE recycler in
1981 was not in excess of $50,000.
PI allegedly sublicensed the recyclers to entities that
would use them to recycle plastic scrap. The sublicense
agreements provided that the end-users would transfer to PI 100
percent of the recycled scrap in exchange for a payment from FMEC
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Corp. based on the quality and amount of recycled scrap. Neither
PI nor the end-users carried out the terms of the sublicense
faithfully. In practice, those terms regularly were ignored.
Both Clearwater and Northeast leased Sentinel EPE recyclers
from F & G Corp. and licensed those recyclers to FMEC Corp.
Apart from leasing and licensing seven recyclers instead of six,
the underlying transactions involving Northeast do not differ in
any substantive respect from the Clearwater transactions
considered in the Provizer case.
For convenience, we refer to the series of transactions
among PI, ECI Corp., F & G Corp., Northeast, FMEC Corp., and PI
as the Northeast transactions. In addition to the Northeast
transactions, a number of other limited partnerships entered into
transactions similar to the Northeast transactions, also
involving Sentinel EPE recyclers and Sentinel expanded
polystyrene (EPS) recyclers. We refer to these collectively as
the Plastics Recycling transactions.
B. Northeast Resource Recovery Associates
Northeast is a New York limited partnership that closed on
October 7, 1981. Richard Roberts (Roberts) is the general
partner of Northeast.
A private placement memorandum for Northeast was distributed
to potential limited partners. Reports by F & G Corp.'s
evaluators, Dr. Stanley M. Ulanoff (Ulanoff), a marketing
consultant, and Dr. Samuel Z. Burstein (Burstein), a mathematics
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professor, were appended to the offering memorandum. Ulanoff
owns a 1.27-percent interest in Plymouth Equipment Associates and
a 4.37-percent interest in Taylor Recycling Associates. Burstein
owns a 2.605-percent interest in Empire Associates and a 5.82-
percent interest in Jefferson Recycling Associates. Like
Northeast, Plymouth Equipment Associates, Taylor Recycling
Associates, Empire Associates, and Jefferson Recycling Associates
are partnerships that leased Sentinel recyclers. Burstein also
was a client and business associate of Elliot I. Miller (Miller),
the corporate counsel to PI.
The Northeast offering memorandum states that the general
partner will receive fees from Northeast in the amount of
$25,000. The offering memorandum further states that the general
partner "may retain as additional compensation all amounts not
paid as sales commissions or offeree representative fees".
According to the offering memorandum, it was anticipated that 10
percent of the proceeds from the offering--$95,000--would be
allocated to the payment of sales commissions and offeree
representative fees. Roberts therefore was to receive a minimum
of $25,000 and up to $120,000 from Northeast.
The offering memorandum lists significant business and tax
risk factors associated with an investment in Northeast.
Specifically, the offering memorandum states: (1) There is a
substantial likelihood of audit by the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS), and the purchase price paid by F & G Corp. to ECI Corp.
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probably will be challenged as being in excess of fair market
value;3 (2) Northeast has no prior operating history; (3) the
general partner has no prior experience in marketing recycling or
similar equipment; (4) the limited partners have no control over
the conduct of Northeast's business; (5) there is no established
market for the Sentinel EPE recyclers; (6) there are no
assurances that market prices for virgin resin will remain at
their current costs per pound or that the recycled pellets will
be as marketable as virgin pellets; and (7) certain potential
conflicts of interest exist.
The Sentinel EPE recycler had a "nuts and bolts", or
manufacturing, cost of $18,000. It was a simple batch type
machine designed to grind expanded polyethylene foam and film
into a densified form called "popcorn" that could be further
processed to produce resin pellets suitable for some uses in the
plastics industry. The Sentinel EPE recycler was incapable of
recycling low density polyethylene by itself and had to be used
in connection with grinders, extruders, and pelletizers.
Operation of the Sentinel EPE recycler was performed by low wage
factory help with minimal training. The Sentinel EPE recyclers
3
The offering memorandum notes that "Such purchase price is
the basis for computing the regular investment and energy tax
credits to be claimed by the Partnership" and that "if a
challenge by the [Internal Revenue] Service with respect to the
fair market value of the Sentinel Recyclers * * * were
successfully made, all or part of the regular investment and
energy tax credits * * * would be lost."
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were placed with end-users that did not have sufficient amounts
of scrap ever to pay off the notes on the machines. There is no
evidence that FMEC Corp. ever made payments to end-users although
on occasion PI made some payments for scrap produced by end-
users.
Although the offering memorandum represented that the
Sentinel EPE recycler was a unique machine, it was not.
Specially designed systems for densifying polyethylene and
polystyrene were commercially available prior to 1981 from such
companies as Cumberland Engineering Division of John Brown
Plastics Machinery and the NRM Corp. Ranging in price from
$20,000 to $200,000, other plastics recycling machines available
during 1981 included the Foremost Densilator, Nelmor/Weiss
Densification System (Regenolux), Buss-Condux Plastcompactor, and
Cumberland Granulator. See Provizer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1992-177. The Regenolux, for example, was fully capable of
recycling expanded polyethylene or polystyrene, and worked better
than either the Sentinel EPE or EPS recycler. It sold for
$38,000 in 1981.
C. Richard Roberts
Roberts is a businessman and the general partner in
Northeast and many other limited partnerships that leased and
licensed Sentinel EPE recyclers. He also is a 9-percent
shareholder in F & G Corp., the corporation that leased the
recyclers to Northeast. From 1982 through 1985, Roberts
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maintained the following office address with Raymond Grant
(Grant), the sole owner and president of ECI Corp.:
Grant/Roberts
Investment Banking
Tax Sheltered Investments
745 Fifth Avenue, Suite 410
New York, New York 10022
Grant was instrumental in the hiring of Ulanoff as an evaluator
of the Plastics Recycling transactions. The two had met on a
cruise. Roberts and Grant together have been general partners in
other investments.
Prior to the Northeast transactions, Roberts and Grant were
clients of the accounting firm H. W. Freedman & Co. (Freedman &
Co.). Harris W. Freedman (Freedman), a certified public
accountant (C.P.A.) and the named partner in Freedman & Co., was
the president and chairman of the board of F & G Corp. He also
owned 94 percent of a Sentinel EPE recycler. Freedman & Co.
prepared the partnership returns for ECI Corp., F & G Corp., and
Northeast. It also provided tax services to John D. Bambara
(Bambara). Bambara is the 100-percent owner of FMEC Corp., as
well as its president, treasurer, clerk, and director. He, his
wife, and his daughter also owned directly or indirectly 100
percent of the stock of PI.
D. Petitioners and Their Introduction to Northeast Resource
Recovery Associates
Petitioners resided in Tenafly, New Jersey, at the time
their petition was filed. Hereafter, reference to petitioner in
the singular denotes Donald N. Merino.
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Petitioner earned a master's degree in industrial
engineering in 1963 and a Ph.D. in managerial economics in 1975.
He has been a licensed professional engineer in industrial
engineering and has been a member of the American Institute of
Industrial Engineers, the American Society of Mechanical
Engineers, and the National Society of Professional Engineers.
Petitioner's professional experience includes employment with
Standard Brands, Exxon Corp., Mobil Corp. (Mobil), and the
Celanese Corp. (Celanese). At Mobil, petitioner worked as a
financial analyst, a project manager for distribution facilities,
and as a senior consultant for marketing and distribution in
Mobil's international division. In the latter capacity he was
employed in analysis of the economics of the oil business.
Petitioner left Mobil after 10 years and in 1974 joined Celanese,
where he remained employed through the tax years in issue.
Petitioner started at Celanese as manager of the
hydrocarbons planning group of the company, which was the largest
merchant buyer of ethylene in the United States. Celanese's
primary business concerned hydrocarbons--plastics, chemicals, and
fibers. According to petitioner, at one point Celanese was the
100th largest corporation in the United States and had revenues
of approximately $4 billion. Celanese subscribed to services
provided by nearly every major forecasting entity, including
Arthur D. Little, Inc., the Stanford Research Institute, and Data
Resources, Inc. It budgeted approximately $500,000 annually for
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consultants and purchased a broad range of reports. Celanese
also subscribed to numerous magazines and trade publications such
as Chemical Reporter, Modern Plastics, Plastics World, and
Plastics Technology. In 1975 or 1976, Celanese participated in a
series of conferences presented by the Department of Energy (DOE)
in connection with the National Energy Policy Plan. When the DOE
published one of the periodic updates of the National Energy
Policy Plan concerning energy projections in July 1981, Celanese
held internal seminars analyzing the report and circulated
internal reports commenting on its conclusions.
As manager of the hydrocarbons planning group at Celanese,
petitioner forecasted prices for crude oil, ethylene, and related
products, and helped establish a purchasing pattern for ethylene
and propylene. Subsequent positions held by petitioner included
director of the Celanese Chemical Co.; worldwide director of
chemicals, plastics, and specialties for Celanese; corporate
director of new business development; director of the quality
program; and director of strategic business development.
Petitioner was at various times responsible for "the planning and
economics of" plastics, petrochemicals, chemicals, and capital
expenditures; and new business ventures. In two of his
positions, petitioner had responsibilities related to the
budgeting and appropriation of funds for new materials and
equipment such as extruders and machinery to manufacture
plastics.
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In 1981, through a nominee, petitioner acquired a 24-percent
interest in two limited partnership units in Northeast for
$24,000.4 As a result of petitioner's investment in Northeast,
on their 1981 return petitioners claimed an operating loss in the
amount of $19,526.16, and investment tax and business energy
credits totaling $22,431.29.5 Petitioners carried back a total
of $18,279 in unused business energy credits to their 1978, 1979,
and 1980 returns.6 Respondent disallowed petitioners' claimed
operating loss and credits related to Northeast in full.
Petitioner learned of the Plastics Recycling transactions
and Northeast from a personal friend Norman Lewis (Lewis), who
was a C.P.A. Lewis was considering the Plastics Recycling
transactions for some of his clients, and he asked petitioner to
examine the proposal. Petitioner agreed to do so, and Lewis sent
him the offering materials for Northeast and another Plastics
Recycling partnership. Before and after reviewing the offering
materials, petitioner spoke to Roberts. Petitioner questioned
whether PI was "a real company" and whether it had a "real
4
Petitioner's nominee was Norman Lewis (Lewis). Lewis
acquired a 10.421050-percent interest in Northeast for $100,000.
Petitioners therefore indirectly owned an approximately 2.5
percent interest in Northeast (24 percent x 10.421050 percent =
2.5 percent).
5
Petitioners' interest in Northeast generated $20,355 in
investment tax credits and $20,355 in business energy credits.
However, their business energy credit was subject to limitation
in the amount of $2,326.
6
The record does not reveal the respective amounts of the
claimed carrybacks to petitioners' 1978, 1979, and 1980 returns.
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machine". Petitioner told Roberts: "If you have a demonstration
of this, and I'm going to do this, I certainly understand the
economics. I understand what you're trying to do, but I want to
see it working." He explained: "I would never invest in
anything unless I saw it".
Roberts suggested that petitioner visit the PI plant in
Hyannis, Massachusetts, and arranged a date for him to visit. PI
was located near a house on Cape Cod where petitioners vacationed
at the time. At PI, petitioner spent the first "hour to two
hours" in Bambara's office discussing and examining samples of
plastics products made by PI. Bambara "asked [petitioner] to
sign a secrecy agreement, and sort of twisted [his] arm a little
bit about nondisclosure, and things like that." After signing
the agreement, petitioner was allowed to tour the plant.
Petitioner recalled that the PI representatives "were a little
uncomfortable that somebody that knew plastics technology and
plastics economics was going to visit the plant" and "were very
reluctant to give me any information." According to petitioner,
the PI representatives refused to give petitioner any of the
information that he asked for, such as company records,
purportedly because petitioner was there to perform due diligence
and was not an investor.
Petitioner viewed a demonstration of the machine, which he
recalled as follows:
What they did was they took the plastic scrap that
they were manufacturing * * * [and] ran it through one
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of the machines, made the popcorn material. Had a very
small-barrelled extruder. They ran it through the
extruder.
And they took the pellets that came out of the
extruder and they put it back in the process, which was
very difficult to do, by the way, because they used
cyclone feeding.
So, getting the pellets back in the process wasn't
easy.
Petitioner observed at the demonstration: "It worked. You know,
on the scale that they gave, everything worked."
Attorneys from the law firm of Windels, Marx, Davies & Ives
(WMDI) visited the PI plant on the same day as petitioner. WMDI
prepared the offering memorandum, tax opinion, and other legal
documents for all of the 1981 Plastics Recycling partnerships,
including Northeast. During a lunch break, petitioner asked the
attorneys some questions about the legal aspects of the venture,
such as whether the transactions qualified for the recently
enacted safe-harbor leasing provisions of section 168(f).
Petitioner "knew that the government was not happy with"
nonrecourse leveraged lease transactions, and he considered the
Northeast transaction to be "a classic leveraged lease deal."
After lunch petitioner questioned Bambara, particularly with
respect to factors bearing on the price of resin, which he
purportedly considered "the crucial part of the economics of this
deal". Petitioner understood that PI purchased resin at "a
volume discount", but Bambara did not indicate the amount of the
discount. Petitioner also learned that because PI received resin
shipments by truck instead of rail, it paid a penalty that
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petitioner estimated at "about a 4-cent per pound penalty". In
addition, PI was not in a good location; trucks had difficulty
getting in and out, especially during the summer, and therefore
it also paid a "location differential" that petitioner estimated
at several cents per pound.
Petitioner also questioned Bambara about the sources of PI's
recyclable scrap. Petitioner testified that in his view "it's
difficult to make money in plastics recycling. You need to have
enough product in terms of the volume." Petitioner understood
from Bambara that PI's customers purchased plastic foam from an
average of 3 to 5 suppliers. Consequently, petitioner reasoned,
"if the machines went to those suppliers, it was not only PI's
volume that could supply those machines, but also two or three or
four other suppliers could supply that". Petitioner also
understood from Bambara that PI had been working on the machine
for "a long time" and had been using it in practice. To confirm
this claim, petitioner allegedly spoke to one of his Cape Cod
neighbors who worked in PI's machine shop in Hyannis. Petitioner
claims that he understood from his neighbor that PI first began
working on the Sentinel EPE recycler under a prior president at
PI, and that it had been using the machine in practice.
Petitioner recalled being satisfied that the Sentinel EPE
recycler was unique because it recycled 1- to 2-pound low density
polyethylene foam. He recalled:
I was surprised that they could do this, the 1- to
2-pound. I read pretty much all the literature.
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* * * [I]f somebody else had had a machine that
did 1- to 2-pound low density polyethylene foam, you
would have seen an article in one of the, you know,
whatever, Modern Plastics, or Technology, whatever.
Petitioner stated that he was familiar with the Foremost
Densilator, Regenolux, Buss-Condux Plastcompactor, and Cumberland
Granulator. He attended a number of plastics shows and "pretty
much all those companies advertised their goods to" Celanese.
Also, Celanese had a technical laboratory where it "had pretty
much just about every plastics machine, grinder, [and] piece of
equipment that you can imagine to test for their customers",
including "basically" all the machines mentioned. Petitioner
asserted that he questioned the testing facility personnel about
PI's reputation, the Sentinel EPE recycler, and other machines.
Petitioner used the projections in the Northeast offering
memorandum to run "a series of sort of back of the envelope
calculations to see whether or not the business made any sense
from an economic standpoint." He described the Northeast
transaction as "basically a closed loop deal", which "is very
important to the economics of this". Petitioner analyzed the
economics from both a full equity basis and a cash basis. In so
doing, he did not give any consideration to the manufacturing
costs of the recycler. Petitioner explained:
Manufacturing costs, per se, of this particular
item is only a small part of the economics. In this
particular case, I didn't really think it had much
relevance to the decision.
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Petitioner claims that after analyzing the projections on an
equity and cash basis, he concluded that the economics of the
transaction made sense.
Petitioner explained his consideration of the fair market
value of the Sentinel EPE recycler as follows:
When I looked at the price of the machine and the
business deal, I looked at it as a business deal. From
a business perspective, * * * it's not just the price
of the machine. It's really the price of the business
deal, of which the machine is one part of it.
* * * * * * *
So, when you looked at it, you didn't look at it
to see whether or not it costs $50,000 or $100,000 to
build the machine. You looked to see whether or not
the overall economics justified that kind of investment
and made sense.
So it was really a systems, or a group look at the
whole thing.
When asked for his assessment of the fair market value of the
machine, petitioner replied: "As part of the overall system, it
was worth the million dollars that was in the prospectus."
However, petitioner claimed that he could not properly place a
value on the Sentinel EPE recycler if considered in isolation
from "the overall system".
Price difficulties arose soon after petitioner invested in
Northeast. He recalled that even though the price of crude oil
continued to rise during the latter part of 1981 and into the
next year, the price of low density polyethylene actually
decreased. Petitioner visited PI to inquire about the machines
during his summer vacation trips to Cape Cod, but became "very
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discouraged after about maybe a year and a half or 2 years into
this deal". He "gave up after that point because then it really
became apparent that the price of crude [oil] was really
declining." Petitioners never made a profit in any year from
their participation in Northeast.
OPINION
We have decided a large number of the Plastics Recycling
group of cases. Provizer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-177,
affd. without published opinion 996 F.2d 1216 (6th Cir. 1993),
concerned the substance of the partnership transaction and also
the additions to tax. See also Singer v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1997-325; Gottsegen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-314;
Greene v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-296; Kaliban v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-271; Sann v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1997-259 (and cases cited therein). The majority of these
cases, like the present case, raised issues regarding additions
to tax for negligence and valuation overstatement. We have found
the taxpayers liable for such additions to tax in all but one of
the opinions to date on these issues.
In Provizer v. Commissioner, supra, a test case for the
Plastics Recycling group of cases, this Court (1) found that each
Sentinel EPE recycler had a fair market value not in excess of
$50,000, (2) held that the Clearwater transaction was a sham
because it lacked economic substance and a business purpose, (3)
upheld the section 6659 addition to tax for valuation
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overstatement since the underpayment of taxes was directly
related to the overstatement of the value of the Sentinel EPE
recyclers, and (4) held that losses and credits claimed with
respect to Clearwater were attributable to tax-motivated
transactions within the meaning of section 6621(c). In reaching
the conclusion that the Clearwater transaction lacked economic
substance and a business purpose, this Court relied heavily upon
the overvaluation of the Sentinel EPE recyclers.
Although petitioners have not agreed to be bound by
Provizer, they have stipulated that their investment in the
Sentinel EPE recyclers in this case is similar to the investment
described in Provizer v. Commissioner, supra. The underlying
transactions in this case, and the Sentinel EPE recyclers
purportedly leased by Northeast, are the same type of
transactions and same type of machines considered in Provizer v.
Commissioner, supra.
Based on the entire record in this case, including the
extensive stipulations, testimony of respondent's experts, and
petitioner's testimony, we hold that the Northeast transaction
was a sham and lacked economic substance. In reaching this
conclusion, we rely heavily upon the overvaluation of the
Sentinel EPE recyclers. Respondent is sustained on the question
of the underlying deficiencies. We note that petitioners have
explicitly conceded this issue in the stipulation of facts and
stipulation of settled issues filed shortly before trial. The
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record plainly supports respondent's determinations regardless of
such concession. For a detailed discussion of the facts and the
applicable law in a substantially identical case, see Provizer v.
Commissioner, supra.
A. Section 6653(a)--Negligence
Respondent asserted the additions to tax for negligence
under section 6653(a)(1) and (2) for 1981, and under section
6653(a) for the years 1978, 1979, and 1980, in an amended answer.
Because these additions to tax were raised for the first time in
an amended answer, respondent has the burden of proof. Rule
142(a); Vecchio v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 170, 196 (1994); Bagby
v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 596, 612 (1994).
Section 6653(a) for 1978, 1979, and 1980, and section
6653(a)(1) for 1981, impose an addition to tax equal to 5 percent
of the underpayment if any part of an underpayment of tax is due
to negligence or intentional disregard of rules or regulations.
Section 6653(a)(2) for 1981 imposes an addition to tax equal to
50 percent of the interest payable with respect to the portion of
the underpayment attributable to negligence or intentional
disregard of rules or regulations.
Negligence is defined as the failure to exercise the due
care that a reasonable and ordinarily prudent person would employ
under the circumstances. Neely v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 934, 947
(1985). The question is whether a particular taxpayer's actions
in connection with the transactions were reasonable in light of
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his experience and the nature of the investment or business. See
Henry Schwartz Corp. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 728, 740 (1973).
When considering the negligence addition to tax, we evaluate the
particular facts of each case, judging the relative
sophistication of the taxpayers, as well as the manner in which
they approached their investment. McPike v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1996-46. Compare Spears v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-
341 with Zidanich v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-382.
Petitioners contend that they were reasonable in claiming
deductions and credits with respect to Northeast. They maintain
that petitioner "conducted a good faith investigation of the
Northeast transaction and did not merely rely on the offering
memorandum or other materials supplied by the investment vendor."
Petitioners further assert that they reasonably expected to make
a profit from Northeast because plastic is an oil derivative and
the United States was experiencing a so-called oil crisis during
the latter 1970's and early 1980's.
Petitioner's educational background and professional
experience should have enabled him to make a reasonable and
informed assessment of the Sentinel EPE recycler and the
Northeast transaction. His own testimony is that he reviewed the
offering memorandum repeatedly; visited PI and viewed a
demonstration of the machine; spoke with members of WMDI,
Roberts, Bambara, and Celanese personnel; and analyzed the
economics of the transaction. However, the record in this case,
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particularly the basic sham nature of the transaction, undermines
critical aspects of petitioner's testimony and analysis and does
not support the conclusions he purportedly reached with respect
to the Sentinel EPE recycler and the Northeast transaction.
1. Petitioner's Investigation of the Transaction Was
Inadequate
The Northeast offering memorandum warned: (1) Northeast had
no prior operating history; (2) management of Northeast's
business was dependent upon the general partner, who had no prior
experience in marketing recycling or similar equipment; (3) the
general partner had other business commitments that required a
substantial portion of his time; (4) the general partner was
required to devote only such time to Northeast as he, in his
absolute discretion, deemed necessary; (5) the limited partners
had no control over the conduct of Northeast's business; and (6)
there was no established market for the Sentinel EPE recyclers.
In addition, PI faced added costs because it shipped resin by
truck instead of rail, and because PI was in an inconvenient
location with high costs for supplies.
To some extent these added costs were offset by a volume
discount PI purportedly received on its resin purchases.
However, Bambara did not tell petitioner the amount of the
discount, nor, for that matter, did he tell petitioner how much
PI paid in added costs as a "location differential". The PI
representatives refused to provide petitioner with any of the
records or information that he requested, ostensibly because he
- 24 -
"was doing due diligence and * * * was not an investor."
Petitioner testified that he did not find this refusal odd. Yet
petitioner was visiting PI as a potential investor; Roberts
arranged for his visit because petitioner "would never invest in
anything unless [he] saw it." Moreover, petitioner had signed a
secrecy agreement, and the offering memorandum disclosed that PI
did not intend to seek patent protection. Petitioner knew from
experience that "it's difficult to make money in plastics
recycling," even for a preeminent corporation such as Celanese.
The business risk factors listed in the offering memorandum, PI's
high costs, petitioner's knowledge of the basic difficulty in
making money in plastics recycling, and the uncooperative
attitude of the PI personnel in simply refusing to furnish any
information concerning corporate finance or actual operating
costs should have raised serious questions in petitioner's mind
about the financial and economic viability of Northeast.
2. Petitioner Failed To Show That the Sentinel EPE Recycler
was Unique
Petitioner claims that he concluded that the Sentinel EPE
recycler was unique because it could recycle 1-to-2 pound density
polyethylene. He testified:
At that time--this is August of 1981--I was not
aware, and neither were any of the people I talked to
aware of any machines that [recycled] low density
[polyethylene] down in the 1 and 2 pound range.
* * * * * * *
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I specifically asked people who were knowledgeable
in the area whether they knew of anybody in that area,
that anybody had produced. And, the answer was no.
So I felt that from a technology standpoint that
[PI] had worked on something unique.
Petitioner acknowledged that he was familiar with other plastics
recycling machines, such as the Foremost Densilator, Buss/Condux
Plastcompactor, Cumberland Granulator, and the Regenolux.
Nonetheless, he contends that he understood from Celanese
personnel that there was no recycler comparable to the Sentinel
EPE recycler, and that he was unaware of any advertisements or
articles pertaining to any comparable machines in any of the
plastics industry trade journals.
However, respondent's expert witnesses, Richard S. Lindstrom
(Lindstrom) and Steven Grossman (Grossman), testified otherwise.
Lindstrom, who consulted in plastics and plastics equipment at
Arthur D. Little, Inc. from 1956 until 1989, testified that
"there were available in 1981 commercial units that could be
purchased for $50,000 or less that were totally equal to the
Sentinel EPE Recycler in function, product quality, and
capacity." Grossman, who has a Ph.D. in Polymer Science and
Engineering and was at the time a professor of Plastics
Engineering at the University of Massachusetts-Lowell, testified
that the Sentinel EPE recycler "represented no new technology to
the plastics recycling industry at the time of its offering", and
that comparable and "more efficient technology was available to
recycle film/foam polyethylene scrap." See Gottsegen v.
- 26 -
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-314; Provizer v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1992-177. Consistent with this expert testimony,
petitioners stipulated that information published prior to the
Plastics Recycling transactions indicated that several machines
capable of densifying low density materials were already on the
market in 1981. Moreover, the Northeast offering memorandum
disclosed that FMEC could encounter significant competition, and
that PI did "not intend to apply for a patent for protection
against appropriation and use by others." Consequently, any
unique capabilities of the Sentinel EPE recycler were subject to
appropriation, and any competitive advantage derived therefrom
would likely have been short lived. As an experienced business
executive, petitioner knew or should have known that in the
absence of patent protection, even if PI's machine had possessed
advantageous design capabilities, those capabilities would soon
have been incorporated into the designs of competitors if the
characteristics of the PI machine had been of significant
commercial value.
The offering memorandum also disclosed that "competition
could adversely affect the amount of Additional Rent which the
[recyclers] are anticipated to produce". This admission
undermines petitioner's argument for a purported fair market
value for the machine based upon a projected stream of royalty
income. See Provizer v. Commissioner, supra. In his testimony,
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petitioner did not directly address this matter of competition
affecting the allegedly anticipated flow of income.
3. Petitioner's Argument Concerning Valuation of the
Recycler Erroneously Requires Acceptance of a Sham Transaction as
Though It Were Valid
With respect to the fair market value of the recycler,
petitioner claims that he did not view the investment as a
purchase of the machines standing alone, and that he did not
"look at it to see whether or not it costs $50,000 or $100,000 to
build the machine." Instead, he "looked to see whether or not
the overall economics justified that kind of investment and made
sense." Petitioner asserted that the Sentinel EPE recycler could
not be valued in isolation from the Northeast transactions, but
within the context of said transactions, he concluded that it was
worth $1,162,666.
However, as petitioners stipulated, the fair market value of
a Sentinel EPE recycler was not in excess of $50,000 in 1981.
Respondent's expert Lindstrom testified that prices of
commercially available machines that were similar to the Sentinel
EPE recycler were in the range of $50,000 in 1981. An example of
a machine "that provided equivalent capability of recycling
polyethylene and polystyrene film and foam waste", according to
respondent's expert Grossman, was the Foremost Densilator, which
had been available since 1978 and sold for approximately $20,000
in 1981. Petitioner testified that he was familiar with the
Foremost Densilator, as well as other plastics recycling
- 28 -
machines. In view of the gross disparity in the prices of such
other machines and the Sentinel EPE recycler, petitioner's
purported valuation estimate was not reasonable.
Petitioner's testimony to the effect that the Sentinel EPE
recycler was worth $1,162,666, within the context of the
artificial Northeast transactions, is specious. Petitioner's
refusal to value the EPE recycler by itself and his insistence on
valuing it only as part of an "overall system" amounts to
considering the sham transaction as though it were a valid
transaction. In his calculations of value, petitioner allows an
investment credit of 20 percent of $1,162,666 and allows
depreciation on the basis of the same inflated value. He treats
the nonrecourse loans as though they were enforceable loans. In
his discussion, he ignores all possibility of competition from
users of machines purchased for $50,000 or less. In short,
petitioner's valuation of the "overall system" is based on an
artificial inflation of values in isolation from real-world
prices or influences. As the rapid collapse of the sham
transaction demonstrated, the EPE machines were grossly
overvalued by comparison with similar machinery.
4. The Carmagnola Reports
In support of the reasonableness of his valuation estimate,
petitioner submitted into evidence preliminary reports prepared
for respondent by Ernest D. Carmagnola (Carmagnola), the
president of Professional Plastic Associates. Carmagnola had
- 29 -
been retained by the IRS in 1984 to evaluate the Sentinel EPE and
EPS recyclers in light of what he described as "the fantastic
values placed on the [recyclers] by the owners." Based on
limited information available to him at that time, Carmagnola
preliminarily estimated that the value of the Sentinel EPE
recycler was $250,000. However, after additional information
became available to him, Carmagnola concluded in a signed
affidavit, dated March 16, 1993, that the machines actually had a
fair market value of not more than $50,000 each in the fall of
1981.
We accord no weight to the Carmagnola reports submitted by
petitioners. The projected valuations therein were based on
inadequate information, research, and investigation, and were
subsequently rejected and discredited by their author. In one
preliminary report, Carmagnola states that he has "a serious
concern of actual profit" of a Sentinel EPE recycler and that to
determine whether the machines actually could be profitable, he
required additional information from PI. Carmagnola also
indicates that in preparing the report, he did not have
information available concerning research and development costs
of the machines and that he estimated those costs in his
valuations of the machines.
Respondent rejected the Carmagnola reports and considered
them unsatisfactory for any purpose, and there is no indication
in the record that respondent used them as a basis for any
- 30 -
determinations in the notice of deficiency. Even so, counsel for
petitioners obtained copies of these reports and urge that they
support the reasonableness of the value reported on petitioners'
1981 return. Not surprisingly, counsel for petitioners did not
call Carmagnola to testify in this case, but preferred instead to
rely solely upon his preliminary ill-founded valuation estimates.
(Carmagnola has not been called to testify in any of the Plastics
Recycling cases before us.) The Carmagnola reports were a part
of the record considered by this Court and reviewed by the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in the Provizer case, where we
held the taxpayers negligent. We find in this case, as we have
found previously, that the reports prepared by Carmagnola are
unreliable and of no consequence.
5. The Oil Pricing Argument
Petitioner testified that he reasonably expected to make an
economic profit from Northeast and that speculation regarding
crude oil prices "was the critical factor" in his decision to
invest. He indicated that the price of plastic is directly
proportional to the price of crude oil, and that when he invested
in Northeast, the prevailing opinion in both the public and
private sectors was that, due to the so-called oil crisis, the
price of crude oil was going to increase significantly. As
evidence of such speculation, petitioners placed into the record
several articles from Modern Plastics, dated April 1980, May
1981, and August 1981, and an energy projections report from the
- 31 -
DOE, published in July 1981. The prefatory overview to the DOE
report, however, cautioned about "the tremendous uncertainties
underlying energy projections" and warned "that [the] projections
[in the report] do not constitute any sort of blueprint for the
future." Reflective of such uncertainties, the April 1980 Modern
Plastics article contemplated resin price hikes, while the May
1981 article predicted a leveling of prices, market disruptions,
and an industrywide shakeout.
In contrast to petitioner's testimony, respondent's expert
Grossman explained that the price of plastics materials is not
directly proportional to the price of oil. In his report,
Grossman stated that less than 10 percent of crude oil is
utilized for making plastics materials and that studies have
shown that "a 300% increase in crude oil prices results in only a
30 to 40% increase in the cost of plastics products." An even
greater disparity was reported in the May 1981 article from
Modern Plastics, which stated: "A rule-of thumb unproven by
cost-accounting but apparent from price history is that with
every $1/barrel hike for Saudi marker crude, the per-pound price
of ethylene increases by about half a cent." (Emphasis added.)
Indeed, petitioner recalled that during the latter part of 1981
and for some months thereafter, while the price of crude oil
rose, the price of low density polyethylene actually decreased.
Petitioners' reliance on Krause v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 132
(1992), affd. sub nom. Hildebrand v. Commissioner, 28 F.3d 1024
- 32 -
(10th Cir. 1994), and Rousseau v. United States, 71A AFTR 2d 93-
4294, 91-1 USTC par. 50,252 (E.D. La. 1991), is misplaced. In
the Krause case, the taxpayers invested in limited partnerships
whose investment objectives concerned enhanced oil recovery (EOR)
technology. The Krause opinion states that during the late
1970's and early 1980's, the Federal Government adopted specific
programs to aid research and development of EOR technology. In
holding that the taxpayers in the Krause case were not liable for
the negligence additions to tax, this Court noted that one of the
Government's expert witnesses acknowledged that "investors may
have been significantly and reasonably influenced by the energy
price hysteria that existed in the late 1970's and early 1980's
to invest in EOR technology." Krause v. Commissioner, supra at
177. Similarly, in Rousseau v. United States, supra, the
District Court rejected the negligence additions to tax because,
inter alia, the property underlying the investment was equipment
capable of producing ethanol, which was widely considered at that
time to be a viable fuel alternative to oil, and its potential
for profit was apparent.
In the present case, however, as explained by respondent's
expert Grossman (and the May 1981 Modern Plastics article
submitted by petitioners), the price of plastics materials is not
directly proportional to the price of oil. The Krause and
Rousseau cases involved ventures in which the so-called oil
crisis provided a reasonable basis for the respective taxpayers'
- 33 -
decisions to invest. EOR was in the forefront of national policy
and the media during the late 1970's and 1980's, and ethanol was
widely considered to be a viable fuel alternative to oil. In
contrast, there is no showing in the record of this case that the
so-called energy crisis would provide a reasonable basis for
petitioners' investing in recycling of polyethylene, particularly
in the machinery here in question. Accordingly, we do not
consider petitioners' arguments with respect to the Krause and
Rousseau cases applicable.
Petitioners also cite a number of cases in which courts
rejected the negligence additions to tax because the taxpayers
reasonably relied upon offering materials and/or qualified expert
advice. Mollen v. United States, 72 AFTR 2d 93-6443, 93-2 USTC
par. 50,585 (D. Ariz. 1993); Brifman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1992-375; Gralnek v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-433; Butler v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1985-613. However, we are not convinced
that petitioner placed a great deal of reliance on the offering
materials. The record shows that petitioner did not give due
consideration to many of the caveats and warnings contained in
the offering memorandum, particularly the business risk factors
and PI's express disregard for patent protection. With respect
to expert advice, petitioner's own testimony is the only account
in the record regarding any discussions he had with others, and
he did not adequately relate the substance of any advice he may
have received. The record does not convince us that petitioner
- 34 -
reasonably relied upon the offering memorandum or any expert
advice. Accordingly, we consider petitioners' reliance on the
Mollen, Brifman, Gralnek, and Butler cases misplaced.
6. Conclusion
In view of petitioner's educational background and extensive
experience in plastics and the nature and extent of his
investigation, he learned or should have learned that the
Sentinel EPE recycler was not unique and not worth in excess of
$50,000, and that Northeast lacked economic substance and had no
potential for profit. Petitioner's self-serving testimony to the
contrary is not credible, and this Court is not required to
accept it as true. Wood v. Commissioner, 338 F.2d 602, 605 (9th
Cir. 1964), affg. 41 T.C. 593 (1964); Niedringhaus v.
Commissioner, 99 T.C. 202, 212 (1992); Tokarski v. Commissioner,
87 T.C. 74, 77 (1986); Snyder v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-
285; Sacks v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-217, affd. 82 F.3d
918 (9th Cir. 1996). In contrast, the reports of respondent's
experts Lindstrom and Grossman, which reach opposite conclusions
from petitioner's, are reasonable and persuasive, and the
testimony of these experts is supported by other portions of the
record. See Gottsegen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-314;
Provizer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-177.
Under the circumstances of this case, petitioners failed to
exercise due care in claiming a large loss deduction and tax
credits with respect to Northeast on their Federal income tax
- 35 -
returns for the years 1978, 1979, 1980, and 1981. The direct
reductions claimed on petitioners' tax returns for those years,
from the investment tax credits alone, equaled 170 percent of
their cash investment. Therefore, like the taxpayers in Provizer
v. Commissioner, supra, "except for a few weeks at the beginning,
petitioners never had any money in the * * * [Northeast
transaction]." The record shows that petitioner was on notice
that the Northeast transaction was a sham transaction primarily
intended to generate tax benefits, and that his decision to
invest was tax driven, not economically driven. See Zfass v.
Commissioner, 118 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 1997), affg. T.C. Memo.
1996-167. We hold, upon consideration of the entire record, that
petitioners are liable for the negligence additions to tax under
section 6653(a) for 1978, 1979, and 1980, and under section
6653(a)(1) and (2) for 1981. Respondent is sustained on this
issue.
B. Section 6659--Valuation Overstatement
In the amended answer, respondent asserted that petitioners
were liable for the section 6659 addition to tax on the portion
of their underpayment attributable to valuation overstatement.
Because the section 6659 addition to tax was raised for the first
time in the amended answer, respondent has the burden of proof.
Rule 142(a); Vecchio v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. at 196; Bagby v.
Commissioner, 102 T.C. at 612.
- 36 -
A graduated addition to tax is imposed when an individual
has an underpayment of tax that equals or exceeds $1,000 and "is
attributable to" a valuation overstatement. Sec. 6659(a), (d).
A valuation overstatement exists if the fair market value (or
adjusted basis) of property claimed on a return equals or exceeds
150 percent of the amount determined to be the correct amount.
Sec. 6659(c). If the claimed valuation exceeds 250 percent of
the correct value, the addition is equal to 30 percent of the
underpayment. Sec. 6659(b).
Petitioners claimed tax benefits, including investment tax
credits and business energy credits, based on a purported value
of $1,162,666 for each Sentinel EPE recycler. Petitioners
concede that the fair market value of a Sentinel EPE recycler in
1981 was not in excess of $50,000. Therefore, if disallowance of
petitioners' claimed tax benefits is attributable to such
valuation overstatement, petitioners are liable for the section
6659 addition to tax at the rate of 30 percent of the
underpayment of tax attributable to the tax benefits claimed with
respect to Northeast.
Petitioners contend that respondent erroneously failed to
waive the section 6659 addition to tax. Section 6659(e)
authorizes respondent to waive all or part of the addition to tax
for valuation overstatement if taxpayers establish that there was
a reasonable basis for the adjusted bases or valuations claimed
on the returns and that such claims were made in good faith.
- 37 -
Respondent's refusal to waive a section 6659 addition to tax is
reviewable by this Court for abuse of discretion. Krause v.
Commissioner, 99 T.C. at 179. Abuse of discretion has been found
in situations where respondent's refusal to exercise such
discretion is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. See
Mailman v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 1079 (1988); Estate of Gardner
v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 989 (1984); Haught v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1993-58.
We note initially that there is no showing in the record
that petitioners timely requested a waiver. We are reluctant to
find that respondent abused any discretion in this case when
respondent was not timely requested to exercise it and there is
no direct evidence of any abuse of administrative discretion.
Haught v. Commissioner, supra; cf. Wynn v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1995-609; Klieger v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-734.
However, we do not decide this issue solely on petitioners'
failure timely to request a waiver but instead, we have
considered the issue on its merits. Petitioners urge that
petitioner "did all that one could reasonably be expected to do"
in deciding on the valuation claimed on their 1981 tax return.
However, as we explained above in finding petitioners liable for
the negligence additions to tax, petitioner's purported
conclusion with respect to the fair market value of the Sentinel
EPE recycler was not reasonable. In view of his extensive
knowledge and experience in plastics, and the resources readily
- 38 -
available to him, petitioner learned or should have learned that
the Sentinel EPE recycler was not worth in excess of $50,000 in
1981.
In support of their contention that they acted reasonably,
petitioners cite Mauerman v. Commissioner, 22 F.3d 1001 (10th
Cir. 1994), revg. T.C. Memo. 1993-23, and Rousseau v. United
States, 71A AFTR 2d 93-4294, 91-1 USTC par. 50,252 (E.D. La.
1991). However, we consider the Mauerman case and the Rousseau
case (for the same reasons discussed supra) distinguishable. In
Mauerman, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that
the Commissioner had abused discretion for not waiving a section
6661 addition to tax. Like section 6659, a section 6661 addition
to tax may be waived by the Commissioner if the taxpayer
demonstrates that there was reasonable cause for his underpayment
and that he acted in good faith. Sec. 6661(c). The taxpayer in
Mauerman reasonably relied upon independent attorneys and
accountants for advice as to whether payments were properly
deductible or capitalized. In the present case, however, the
record fails to establish that petitioner reasonably relied upon
any independent, expert advice. None of the persons that
petitioner purportedly spoke with testified in this case, and
petitioner's self-serving testimony is unpersuasive.
Consequently, we consider petitioners' reliance on the Mauerman
and Rousseau cases inapplicable.
- 39 -
For the same reasons that we held petitioners negligent,
supra, we hold that petitioners did not have a reasonable basis
for the adjusted basis or valuation claimed on their tax return
with respect to the investment in Northeast. The record in this
case does not establish an abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent but supports respondent's position. We hold that
respondent's refusal to waive the section 6659 addition to tax in
this case is not an abuse of discretion. Petitioners are liable
for the section 6659 addition to tax at the rate of 30 percent of
the underpayment of tax attributable to the disallowed tax
benefits. Respondent is sustained on this issue.
Decision will be entered
under Rule 155.