T.C. Memo. 1997-459
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
DAVID WHITE, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 10350-97. Filed October 8, 1997.
David White, pro se.
Blaise Gately Dusenberry and David W. Johnson, for
respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
DAWSON, Judge: This case was assigned to Special Trial
Judge Robert N. Armen, Jr., pursuant to the provisions of section
7443A(b)(4) and Rules 180, 181, and 183.1 The Court agrees with
1
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
(continued...)
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and adopts the opinion of the Special Trial Judge, which is set
forth below.
OPINION OF THE SPECIAL TRIAL JUDGE
ARMEN, Special Trial Judge: This matter is before the Court
on respondent's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted. As explained in greater detail
below, we shall grant respondent's motion.
Background
Respondent issued a notice of deficiency to petitioner
determining deficiencies in and additions to his Federal income
taxes for the years and in the amounts as follows:
Additions to tax
Year Deficiency Sec. 6651(a) Sec. 6654(a)
1992 $10,902 $1,163 --
1993 20,659 5,165 $866
1994 10,269 2,567 $533
The notice of deficiency includes an explanation that the
adjustments to petitioner's taxable income are attributable to
petitioner's failure to file tax returns reporting various items
of income including: (1) Nonemployee compensation paid by
Lincoln Investment Planning, General American Life, and Willow
Fork Drainage District; (2) interest paid by Charles Schwab &
Co., First City Texas, and Texas Commerce Bank; (3) dividends
1
(...continued)
the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the taxable years in
issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of
Practice and Procedure.
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paid by Alger Money Market Portfolio; (4) gains derived from
stock/bond sales in 1992; and (5) prizes and awards received from
Lincoln Investment Plan in 1994. Those items of income were
reported to respondent on Forms 1099 and other information
returns submitted by the payors.
Petitioner invoked this Court's jurisdiction by filing an
imperfect petition for redetermination, followed by an amended
petition.2 The amended petition states in pertinent part:
A. The "Notice" Tax, Penalty, and Interest is in
"error" as indicated in the "Notice of Deficiency”.
B. Petitioner is not liable for said Tax, Penalty, and
Interest as indicated in said Deficiency.
C. Deficiency is based on hearsay information.
In response to the amended petition, respondent filed a
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief
Can Be Granted. Shortly thereafter, the Court directed
petitioner to file a proper second amended petition setting forth
with specificity each error that petitioner alleges was made by
respondent in the determination of the deficiencies and additions
to tax and separate statements of every fact upon which
petitioner bases the assignments of error.
Petitioner failed to comply with the Court's order to file a
proper second amended petition. To the contrary, petitioner
2
At the time that the petition was filed, petitioner
resided in Houston, Texas. Accordingly, this case is appealable
to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
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filed a response to respondent's motion to dismiss in which he
asserts that respondent's motion should be stricken.
Petitioner's response states in pertinent part:
The Commissioner by her alleged Notice of
Deficiency has failed to prove that the petitioner was
engaged in any income-producing activity during the
years of the deficiency notice. Nor is there any
evidence that the respondent's determination was based
on information, other than that of presumption,
concerning petitioner's alleged income-producing
activities during the years in issue. Except for the
explanation in the notice of deficiency, there is no
evidence showing the basis for respondent's computation
of petitioner's income and there is no evidence to show
that such income has been derived from an income-
producing or revenue taxable activity. From the sparse
facts presented by the record, it is apparent that
there is no evidence presented by the Commissioner
regarding whether petitioner had taxable income during
the years in issue. Indeed, the only facts before this
Court relate to the events leading up to the notice of
deficiency and respondent's method of computing the
deficiencies. Under these circumstances, the
presumption of correctness that normally attaches to
the notice of deficiency and the proper allocation of
the burden of producing evidence and the burden of
proof become critical. The issue before this Court
that must be decided is whether these determinations
are entitled to the normal presumption of correctness
and if not, who bears the burden of proof.
The remainder of petitioner's reply is simply a long quotation of
the portion of this Court's opinion in Senter v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1995-311, discussing Portillo v. Commissioner, 988
F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1993), revg. T.C. Memo. 1992-99, and Portillo
v. Commissioner, 932 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1991), affg. in part and
revg. in part T.C. Memo. 1990-68 (collectively, the Portillo
cases).
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This matter was called for hearing at the Court's motions
session in Washington, D.C. Counsel for respondent appeared at
the hearing and argued in support of the pending motion. In
particular, respondent cited a case recently decided by the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Parker v. Commissioner, 117
F.3d 785 (5th Cir. 1997), for the proposition that petitioner's
contentions respecting the presumption of correctness and burden
of proof do not state a claim for relief.
Discussion
Rule 34(b)(4) requires that a petition filed in this Court
shall contain clear and concise assignments of each and every
error that the taxpayer alleges to have been committed by the
Commissioner in the determination of the deficiency and the
additions to tax in dispute. Rule 34(b)(5) further requires that
the petition shall contain clear and concise lettered statements
of the facts on which the taxpayer bases the assignments of
error. See Jarvis v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 646, 658 (1982). Any
issue not raised in the pleadings is deemed to be conceded. Rule
34(b)(4); Jarvis v. Commissioner, supra at 658 n.19; Gordon v.
Commissioner, 73 T.C. 736, 739 (1980). Further, the failure of a
party to plead or otherwise proceed as provided in the Court's
Rules may be grounds for the Court to hold such party in default,
either on the motion of another party or on the initiative of the
Court. Rule 123(a).
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It is well settled that determinations made by the
Commissioner in a notice of deficiency normally are presumed to
be correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that
those determinations are erroneous. Rule 142(a); INDOPCO Inc. v.
Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); Welch v. Helvering, 290
U.S. 111, 115 (1933). In addition, this Court ordinarily will
not look behind a notice of deficiency to examine the evidence
used or the propriety of the Commissioner's motives or conduct in
determining the deficiency. Riland v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 185,
201 (1982); Greenberg's Express, Inc. v. Commissioner, 62 T.C.
324, 327 (1974).
A recognized exception to the general rule that the
Commissioner's determination is presumed to be correct arises in
cases involving unreported income where the taxpayer challenges
the notice of deficiency on the grounds that it is arbitrary and
the Commissioner fails to substantiate the determination with
predicate evidence. Sealy Power, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 46 F.3d
382, 386 (5th Cir. 1995), affg. in part, revg. in part and
remanding in part T.C. Memo. 1992-168; Portillo v. Commissioner,
932 F.2d at 1133.
Petitioner contends that, in an unreported income case such
as this case, respondent's reliance on information reported to
respondent by third-party payors on Forms 1099, standing alone,
does not provide the predicate evidence necessary to substantiate
respondent's determinations. In conjunction with this
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contention, petitioner maintains that justiciable issues remain
in this case insofar as the Court is required to decide whether
the normal presumption of correctness is applicable and to make
the proper assignment of the burden of proof.
We agree with respondent that petitioner has failed to state
a claim for relief. Viewing the amended petition in isolation,
the best that can be said is that petitioner disagrees with
respondent's determinations. However, the amended petition lacks
either a clear and concise statement of the errors allegedly
committed by respondent in the determination of the deficiencies
or a statement of the facts on which petitioner bases his
assignments of error. We observe that upon receipt of a notice
of deficiency determining unreported income, a taxpayer can
reasonably be expected to support an allegation that the
Commissioner erred in determining a deficiency in tax by stating
facts tending to show that the taxpayer was unemployed, earned a
lower amount of income, or otherwise did not receive the payments
reported to respondent by third-party payors. The amended
petition lacks any such statement.
Similarly, the arguments set forth in petitioner's reply,
i.e., that the notice of deficiency is not entitled to the normal
presumption of correctness and that respondent should bear the
burden of proof, are inadequate to state a claim for relief. We
agree with respondent that the Court of Appeals' analysis in
Parker v. Commissioner, supra, is controlling in this regard.
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As is the case here, the taxpayers in Parker failed to file
income tax returns for the years in issue, yet relied upon the
Portillo cases for the proposition that the normal presumption of
correctness should not apply to the notices of deficiency because
the Commissioner's determinations of unreported income were based
upon Forms 1099 and W-2. In rejecting this argument and
affirming this Court's dismissal of the taxpayers' case for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the
Court of Appeals distinguished the Portillo cases as follows:
In Portillo, the IRS issued a notice of deficiency when
it discovered that the taxpayer had reported
substantially less income from a particular payor than
that payor had reported in its Form 1099. We found
that the Commissioner "arbitrarily decided to attribute
veracity to [the third-party payor] and assume that
[the taxpayer's] Form 1040 was false." [Portillo v.
Commissioner, 932 F.2d at 1134.] In Portillo, the
Commissioner's determination was arbitrary because the
Commissioner offered no factual basis for accepting one
sworn statement, the Form 1099, while rejecting another
sworn statement, the taxpayer's Form 1040.
Portillo did not hold that the IRS must conduct an
independent investigation in all tax deficiency cases.
In this case, the Commissioner has not arbitrarily
found the third-party forms credible: the Parkers
never filed a Form 1040 or any other document in which
they swore that they did not receive the payments in
question. The Commissioner has no duty to investigate
a third-party payment report that is not disputed by
the taxpayer.
Parker v. Commissioner, 117 F.3d at 786-787. We note that the
Court of Appeals concluded its opinion by imposing a penalty of
$2,000 against the taxpayers for bringing a frivolous appeal.
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Consistent with Parker, we hold that petitioner has failed
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In short,
petitioner's assertion that respondent erred in relying on
reports from third-party payors in determining the deficiencies
in dispute, standing alone, carries no weight. Therefore, we
will grant respondent's motion to dismiss and enter a decision in
this case sustaining respondent's determinations as set forth in
the notice of deficiency issued to petitioner. See Rules
34(a)(1), 123(b); Scherping v. Commissioner, 747 F.2d 478 (8th
Cir. 1984).
Section 6673(a)(1) authorizes the Tax Court to require a
taxpayer to pay to the United States a penalty not in excess of
$25,000 whenever it appears that proceedings have been instituted
or maintained by the taxpayer primarily for delay or that the
taxpayer's position in such proceeding is frivolous or
groundless. The circumstances here suggest that petitioner may
have instituted this proceeding primarily for purposes of delay.
However, we shall not now impose a penalty under section
6673(a)(1). Nonetheless we take this opportunity to admonish
petitioner that the Court shall strongly consider imposing such a
penalty if he returns to the Court and makes similar arguments in
the future.
To reflect the foregoing,
An appropriate order and
decision will be entered.