T.C. Memo. 1997-484
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
ESTATE OF THOMAS A. FLEMING, DECEASED, CATHY J. HIRT, INDEPENDENT
SUCCESSOR EXECUTRIX, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 22462-95. Filed October 27, 1997.
William R. Cousins III, James R. Dobbs, Jr., Robert D.
Collier, and Robert M. Bolton, for petitioner.
John R. Hunter, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
CHIECHI, Judge: Respondent determined a deficiency of
$512,881 in petitioner's Federal estate tax. The sole issue
remaining for decision is the fair market value of the stock
interest in a closely held corporation that was owned by Thomas
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A. Fleming (decedent) at the date of his death.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
Decedent died testate on November 22, 1991 (the valuation
date). Cathy J. Hirt (Ms. Hirt), the independent successor
executrix of decedent's estate (the estate), resided in Tyler,
Texas, at the time the petition was filed.
At the time of his death, decedent owned, inter alia, a 50-
percent community property interest (decedent's 50-percent stock
interest) in the 100,000 shares of the common stock of B&W
Financial Corporation of Longview, Inc. (B&W Longview), that were
outstanding at that time, and his spouse, Jeanette T. Fleming,
owned the remaining 50-percent community property interest in
that stock. Decedent's spouse died in December 1992.
On the valuation date, B&W Longview, which had three offices
in Tyler, Longview, and San Antonio, Texas, was engaged, inter
alia, in the business of making small loans that were regulated
by the Office of Consumer Credit in Texas. (The parties refer to
those loans as trade notes receivable, and we shall do the same.)
Pursuant to Texas law and/or regulations, on the valuation date,
the amount of a loan reflected by a trade note receivable could
not exceed $380.1 Although B&W Longview's trade notes receivable
did not bear interest, under Texas law and/or regulations, B&W
1
All dollar amounts are rounded.
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Longview was permitted to charge for each such note a $10 acqui-
sition fee (acquisition fee) and a handling charge (handling
charge), the amount of which varied according to the amount and
duration of the trade note receivable. If a debtor of B&W
Longview prepaid that debtor's trade note receivable, B&W
Longview was required under Texas law and/or regulations to
refund a portion of the acquisition fee and/or the handling
charge. The amount of any such refund, which was regulated by
the Office of Consumer Credit in Texas, depended upon the amount
and duration of the trade note receivable.
In addition to the trade notes receivable, on the valuation
date, B&W Longview had in its portfolio of loans 11 demand loans
(demand loans), each of which bore monthly interest of one
percent of the unpaid balance of the loan. Five of those loans
were in amounts exceeding $100,000, one loan to decedent was in
the amount of $6,200, and one loan was for less than $1,000. As
of the date of the trial of this case, two of the demand loans
remained outstanding.
On the valuation date, the assets of B&W Longview consisted
of cash totaling $760,953, the gross amount of the trade notes
receivable totaling $1,012,177,2 nondepreciable assets totaling
$75,323, the demand loans totaling $652,139, and other assets
2
B&W Longview showed on its balance sheet as of the valuation
date a "Discount for Bad Debts" of $101,217 with respect to the
gross amount of trade notes receivable.
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totaling $22,630. On that date, B&W Longview had total liabili-
ties of $253,166 and equity of $2,168,839 consisting of $100,000
of capital stock, $9,412 of paid-in capital, and $2,059,427 of
retained earnings. The book value of B&W Longview on the valua-
tion date was $2,168,839.
Prior to the valuation date, decedent participated in the
following transactions involving corporations in which he had an
interest and which had portfolios of business loans that were
similar to B&W Longview's trade notes receivable:3 (1) The
purchase during 1987 (Young transaction) by decedent from Tommy
Young (Mr. Young) of Mr. Young's 50-percent stock interest in
TA&T Finance Corporation (TA&T Finance); (2) the purchase during
1989 (B&W El Paso transaction) by an unidentified individual from
decedent of decedent's 100-percent stock interest in B&W El Paso
(B&W El Paso); and (3) the purchases during 1991 (FNFS transac-
tion) by FNFS, Inc. (FNFS), from decedent of decedent's respec-
tive 100-percent stock interests in five corporations. (We shall
sometimes refer collectively to the foregoing transactions as the
precedent transactions.)
In the Young transaction, decedent, who owned 50 percent of
the stock of TA&T Finance, purchased during 1987 Mr. Young's 50-
percent stock interest in that corporation, thereby resulting in
3
Hereinafter, we shall also refer to the respective portfolios
of loans held by the corporations involved in the transactions in
question as trade notes receivable.
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decedent's owning 100 percent of the stock of TA&T Finance.4
Although Mr. Young and decedent were not related, Mr. Young had
previously worked for decedent. In calculating the price for Mr.
Young's 50-percent stock interest in TA&T Finance, the parties to
the Young transaction added to the book value of that company a
premium of 23 percent of the trade notes receivable that were
held by TA&T Finance at the time of that transaction.
In the B&W El Paso transaction, an unidentified individual
who was not related to decedent purchased during 1989 decedent's
100-percent stock interest in B&W El Paso. In calculating the
price for decedent's 100-percent stock interest in B&W El Paso,
the parties to the B&W El Paso transaction added to the book
value of that company a premium of 15 percent of the trade notes
receivable that were held by B&W El Paso at the time of that
transaction.
In the FNFS transaction, FNFS purchased during 1991 dece-
dent's respective 100-percent stock interests in B&W Brownsville,
B&W Harlingen, B&W Mission, B&W Austin, and B&W Finance. At the
time of that transaction, FNFS was a holding company owned
equally by David Harwood (Mr. Harwood) and Wayne McKinney, who
were not related. Mr. Harwood, who was not related to decedent,
negotiated on behalf of FNFS in the FNFS transaction. In calcu-
4
Sometime after decedent's death, B&W Longview merged into TA&T
Finance, and, around May 1992, Ms. Hirt became president of that
corporation.
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lating the price for each of decedent's respective stock inter-
ests in B&W Brownsville, B&W Harlingen, B&W Mission, B&W Austin,
and B&W Finance, the parties to the FNFS transaction added to the
book value of each of those companies a premium of 23 percent of
the trade notes receivable that were held by each such company at
the time of that transaction.
On or about August 7, 1992, the estate filed Form 706,
United States Estate (and Generation-Skipping Transfer) Tax
Return (estate tax return). In that return, the estate listed
the value of 100 percent of the stock of B&W Longview as $2
million and claimed a value of $1 million for decedent's 50-
percent stock interest in that corporation.
On or about November 17, 1993, the estate filed an amended
estate tax return (amended estate tax return) in which the estate
listed the value of 100 percent of the stock of B&W Longview as
$1,452,000 and claimed a value of $726,000 for decedent's 50-
percent stock interest in that corporation. Respondent treated
the amended estate tax return as a claim for refund and denied
it.
OPINION
Respondent determined in the notice of deficiency, inter
alia, that on the valuation date the fair market value of dece-
dent's 50-percent stock interest in B&W Longview was $1,251,460.
Respondent modified that determination and claims on brief that
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the value of that stock interest was $1,110,000. The estate also
modified on brief its prior positions as to the value on the
valuation date of the stock interest in question. The estate now
claims that that value was $604,777.
As is customary in valuation cases, the parties rely exten-
sively on the opinions of their respective experts to support
their differing views about the fair market value on the valua-
tion date of decedent's 50-percent stock interest in B&W
Longview. The estate relies on Richard P. Bernstein (Mr.
Bernstein), a member of the American Society of Appraisers, who
is the founder and president of the business valuation firm of
Bernstein, Phalon & Conklin. Respondent relies on Monty L.
Harrell (Mr. Harrell), who is employed by the Internal Revenue
Service as an economist. Although Mr. Harrell is not a member of
the American Society of Appraisers, he has taken business valua-
tion courses offered by that organization.
We evaluate the opinions of experts in light of the demon-
strated qualifications of each expert and all other evidence in
the record. Anderson v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 242, 249 (5th
Cir. 1957), affg. in part and remanding in part T.C. Memo. 1956-
178; Parker v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 547, 561 (1986). We have
broad discretion to evaluate "'the overall cogency of each
expert's analysis.'" Sammons v. Commissioner, 838 F.2d 330, 334
(9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Ebben v. Commissioner, 783 F.2d 906, 909
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(9th Cir. 1986), affg. in part and reversing in part T.C. Memo.
1983-200). We are not bound by the formulae and opinions prof-
fered by expert witnesses, especially when they are contrary to
our judgment. Silverman v. Commissioner, 538 F.2d 927, 933 (2d
Cir. 1976), affg. T.C. Memo. 1974-285; IT&S of Iowa, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 97 T.C. 496, 508 (1991). Instead, we may reach a
determination of value based on our own examination of the
evidence in the record. Lukens v. Commissioner, 945 F.2d 92, 96
(5th Cir. 1991), affg. Ames v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-87
(citing Silverman v. Commissioner, supra). The persuasiveness of
an expert's opinion depends largely upon the disclosed facts on
which it is based. See Tripp v. Commissioner, 337 F.2d 432, 434
(7th Cir. 1964), affg. T.C. Memo. 1963-244. Where experts offer
divergent estimates of fair market value, we shall decide what
weight to give those estimates by examining the factors used by
those experts to arrive at their conclusions. Casey v. Commis-
sioner, 38 T.C. 357, 381 (1962). While we may accept the opinion
of an expert in its entirety, Buffalo Tool & Die Manufacturing
Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 441, 452 (1980), we may be selective
in the use of any part of such an opinion, Parker v. Commis-
sioner, supra at 562. We also may reject the opinion of an
expert witness in its entirety. Palmer v. Commissioner, 523 F.2d
1308, 1310 (8th Cir. 1975), affg. 62 T.C. 684 (1974); Parker v.
Commissioner, supra at 562-565.
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In their respective original reports (expert reports), both
experts relied on the market approach in determining the fair
market value on the valuation date of decedent's 50-percent stock
interest in B&W Longview. In applying that approach, each of
those experts used a combination of the transaction method and
the market multiple or guideline company method (market multiple
method) in order to arrive at his opinion of that value. At
trial, Mr. Bernstein and Mr. Harrell modified and/or abandoned
portions of their respective expert reports, as follows: In
applying the market approach to valuing the stock interest in
question, petitioner's expert modified his application of the
market multiple method (modified market multiple method), and
respondent's expert modified his application of the transaction
method (modified transaction method) and abandoned his determina-
tion of value under the market multiple method. Consequently,
both experts modified their respective opinions of the fair
market value on the valuation date of decedent's 50-percent stock
interest in B&W Longview. We have problems with the opinions of
both experts.
Mr. Bernstein relied on the market approach and applied an
equally weighted combination of the transaction method and his
modified market multiple method under that approach because he
did not believe that either method alone produced what he consid-
ered to be an accurate estimate of the fair market value on the
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valuation date of the stock interest in question.
In applying the transaction method, Mr. Bernstein examined
the precedent transactions that occurred in 1987, 1989, and 1991,
respectively. He concluded that under that method the value of
decedent's 50-percent stock interest in B&W Longview should be
derived by (1) adding to the book value of B&W Longview on the
valuation date a premium equal to 23 percent of the gross amount
of the trade notes receivable held by that corporation on that
date and (2) multiplying the resulting sum by 50 percent to
reflect the fact that decedent owned only a 50-percent stock
interest in B&W Longview. Mr. Bernstein determined that, under
the transaction method and before considering any discounts that
he believed are warranted because of the lack of control and the
lack of marketability inherent in that stock interest on the
valuation date, its value was $1,200,801.
In applying his modified market multiple method, Mr.
Bernstein selected three publicly traded companies (guideline
companies) engaged to varying degrees in consumer lending that he
determined were comparable or similar to B&W Longview. Mr.
Bernstein did not explain in his report or adequately explain at
trial why the three guideline companies that he chose were
comparable to B&W Longview on the valuation date and why he
selected only three publicly traded companies as guideline
companies. For these reasons, we are not persuaded that the
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results that Mr. Bernstein reached under his modified market
multiple method are reliable, and we shall not give any weight to
those results in determining the fair market value on the valua-
tion date of the stock interest in question.5 Consequently, we
shall ignore Mr. Bernstein's opinion that, under his modified
market multiple method and before considering any discounts that
he believed are warranted because of the lack of control and the
lack of marketability inherent in decedent's 50-percent stock
interest in B&W Longview on the valuation date, its value was
$660,050.
Although we shall not rely on Mr. Bernstein's modified
market multiple method, for the sake of completeness we shall
describe what Mr. Bernstein did with the results that he derived
under that method. After having arrived at the respective values
of the stock interest in question under his modified market
multiple approach and the transaction method and after having
determined that each such value should be accorded equal weight
in ascertaining the fair market value of that interest, Mr.
Bernstein calculated the mean of those two values to be $930,425
(mean value). He applied a 35-percent combined minority and
5
There are additional reasons why we are not convinced that the
results under Mr. Bernstein's modified market multiple method are
reliable. For example, Mr. Bernstein did not adequately explain,
and has not convinced us, that his determinations of the market
multiples for the guideline companies that he selected are
proper.
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lack-of-marketability discount6 (35-percent combined discount) to
that mean value and arrived at an amount, viz., $604,777, that he
determined was the fair market value on the valuation date of
decedent's 50-percent stock interest in B&W Longview. We are not
persuaded on the record presented to us that the 35-percent
combined discount which Mr. Bernstein applied is appropriate.
When he prepared his expert report, Mr. Harrell, like Mr.
Bernstein, believed that applying a weighted combination of the
market multiple method and the transaction method generally would
produce an accurate estimate under the market approach of the
fair market value on the valuation date of the stock interest in
question.7 However, after he prepared his report and before
trial, Mr. Harrell discovered deficiencies in the data which were
provided to him and on which he relied in applying the market
multiple method. Those deficiencies caused Mr. Harrell to
conclude that the results that he reached under that method are
not reliable. We agree, and we shall not give any weight to
6
Mr. Bernstein described the 35-percent discount that he ap-
plied as a lack-of-marketability discount. However, his explana-
tion in his expert report of what that discount was intended to
cover makes it clear, and petitioner agrees on brief, that that
discount was applied by Mr. Bernstein not only because he be-
lieved that there was a lack of marketability inherent in the
stock interest in question, but also because he concluded that
that stock interest was a noncontrolling interest.
7
Unlike Mr. Bernstein who gave equal weight to those two meth-
ods, Mr. Harrell believed when he prepared his expert report that
one-third weight should be given to the market multiple method
and two-thirds weight should be given to the transaction method.
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those results in determining the fair market value of the stock
interest in question.
In applying his modified transaction method, Mr. Harrell,
like Mr. Bernstein, examined the precedent transactions that
occurred in 1987, 1989, and 1991, respectively. Mr. Harrell
testified that under that method the value of that interest was
between approximately $1,110,000 and approximately $1,124,000,
derived as follows: Mr. Harrell, like Mr. Bernstein, added to
the book value of B&W Longview on the valuation date a premium
equal to 23 percent of the gross amount of the trade notes
receivable held by that corporation on that date. Mr. Harrell,
unlike Mr. Bernstein, also added to that book value a premium on
the demand loans that Mr. Harrell believed should be between 10
percent and 15 percent of those loans. Mr. Harrell reduced the
resulting sum by 50 percent to reflect the fact that decedent
held only a 50-percent stock interest in B&W Longview on the
valuation date. Finally, Mr. Harrell applied a 10-percent
minority discount, but, unlike Mr. Bernstein, he applied no
discount for lack of marketability.
On the record before us, we are not persuaded that Mr.
Harrell should have added any premium to the demand loans in
determining the fair market value of the stock interest in
question. We found Mr. Harrell's testimony about the propriety
of such a premium to be tentative and unconvincing. Accordingly,
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we shall not accept Mr. Harrell's opinion that a premium should
be applied to the demand loans.
We also are not convinced on the present record that Mr.
Harrell was correct in not applying any lack-of-marketability
discount in valuing the stock interest in question.
Despite the deficiencies that we found in the respective
expert reports and opinions of the parties' experts, we agree
with both experts that, under the market approach to determining
the fair market value on the valuation date of decedent's 50-
percent stock interest in B&W Longview, the combined use of the
market multiple method and the transaction method would produce a
better indication of that value than the use of only the transac-
tion method. However, as discussed above, we are not persuaded
that the respective results of Mr. Bernstein's modified market
multiple method and Mr. Harrell's market multiple method are
reliable. Consequently, we are left with a deficient record from
which to determine the effect of the proper application of the
market multiple method on the determination of the value of the
stock interest in question. Nonetheless, we shall determine the
fair market value on the valuation date of decedent's 50-percent
stock interest in B&W Longview by applying our best judgment to a
record that we find to be inadequate in that and other respects8
8
We take this opportunity, as we did before and after the trial
of this case, to remind the parties that questions of fair market
(continued...)
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and bearing in mind that the valuation of that stock interest is
a question of fact, Estate of Bonner v. United States, 84 F.3d
196, 197 (5th Cir. 1996); Estate of Andrews v. Commissioner, 79
T.C. 938, 940 (1982), on which petitioner has the burden of
proof, Rule 142(a).9
The determination of the value of closely held stock is a
matter of judgment, rather than of mathematics. Hamm v. Commis-
sioner, 325 F.2d 934, 940 (8th Cir. 1963), affg. T.C. Memo. 1961-
347. Moreover, since valuation is necessarily an approximation,
it is not required that the value that we determine be one as to
which there is specific testimony, provided that it is within the
range of figures that properly may be deduced from the evidence.
Silverman v. Commissioner, 538 F.2d at 933; Anderson v. Commis-
sioner, 250 F.2d at 249.
The regulations define fair market value for purposes of the
Federal estate tax as "the price at which the property would
change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller,
neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both
8
(...continued)
value, like the one that is presented here, are generally more
properly resolved through the give and take of settlement negoti-
ations by the parties, rather than adjudication by the Court.
Buffalo Tool & Die Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.
441, 451 (1980).
9
All Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and
Procedure. All section references are to the Internal Revenue
Code in effect at the date of decedent's death.
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having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts." Sec. 20.2031-
1(b), Estate Tax Regs. In the case of unlisted stock, the price
at which sales of stock are made in arm's-length transactions in
an open market is the best evidence of its value. Champion v.
Commissioner, 303 F.2d 887, 893 (5th Cir. 1962), revg. T.C. Memo.
1960-51; Estate of Andrews v. Commissioner, supra at 940. In the
instant case, the record does not disclose any such sales of the
stock interest in question. The record does disclose, however,
information with respect to the precedent transactions that
involved corporations in which decedent had an interest and
which, like B&W Longview, had portfolios of trade notes receiv-
able.
Where the value of unlisted stock cannot be determined from
actual sale prices, section 2031(b) provides that value is to be
determined by taking into consideration the value of stock of
corporations listed on an exchange that are engaged in the same
or similar business, as well as all other factors bearing on
value. The factors we must consider are those that an informed
buyer and seller would take into account. Hamm v. Commissioner,
supra at 938. Section 20.2031-2(f), Estate Tax Regs., lists some
of those factors, including the company's net worth, prospective
earning power, dividend-earning capacity, goodwill, the economic
outlook for its industry, its position in the industry, its
management, the degree of control represented by the block of
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stock to be valued, and nonoperating assets to the extent not
otherwise considered. Section 5 of Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B.
237, 238-242, sets forth criteria that are virtually identical to
those listed in section 20.2031-2(f), Estate Tax Regs., and "has
been widely accepted as setting forth the appropriate criteria to
consider in determining fair market value". Estate of Newhouse
v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 193, 217 (1990).
There is no fixed formula for applying the foregoing fac-
tors. See Estate of Goodall v. Commissioner, 391 F.2d 775, 786
(8th Cir. 1968), vacating T.C. Memo. 1965-154. We have held, and
the regulations provide, that the weight to be given to the
various factors in arriving at fair market value depends upon the
facts of each case. Estate of Andrews v. Commissioner, supra at
940-941; sec. 20.2031-2(f), Estate Tax Regs. As the trier of
fact, we have broad discretion in assigning the weight to accord
to the various factors and in selecting the method of valuation.
Estate of O'Connell v. Commissioner, 640 F.2d 249, 251 (9th Cir.
1981), affg. on this issue T.C. Memo. 1978-191.
Each of the parties' experts agree that, under the transac-
tion method that each applied under the market approach to
valuation, the starting point for determining the fair market
value of the stock interest in question should be the book value
of B&W Longview on the valuation date plus a 23-percent premium
on the gross amount of the trade notes receivable that that
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corporation held on that date. We accept that starting point
under the transaction method as reasonable. According to the
expert reports, market conditions on the valuation date, like
market conditions in 1991 at the time of the FNFS transaction in
which a 23-percent premium was applied to the trade notes receiv-
able there involved, were more favorable than they were in 1989
at the time the B&W El Paso transaction occurred in which a 15-
percent premium was applied to the trade notes receivable in-
volved in that transaction.
A major difference between the parties' experts in valuing
the stock interest in question relates to the discounts that each
applied. Respondent's expert applied only a 10-percent minority
discount, and petitioner's expert applied a 35-percent combined
minority and lack-of-marketability discount. Discounts for a
minority interest and for lack of marketability are conceptually
distinct. Estate of Newhouse v. Commissioner, supra at 249. A
minority discount reflects the minority shareholder's inability
to compel liquidation and thereby realize a pro rata share of the
corporation's net asset value. A discount for lack of market-
ability reflects the fact that there is no ready market for the
stock of a closely held corporation. Id. The appropriate amount
of a minority discount and/or a lack-of-marketability discount is
a question of fact. Id.
We agree with both parties' experts that a minority discount
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should be applied in valuing decedent's 50-percent stock interest
in B&W Longview. Although Mr. Harrell specified that he would
apply a 10-percent discount, Mr. Bernstein did not specify how
much of the 35-percent combined discount that he applied was
attributable to the fact that decedent did not own a controlling
stock interest in B&W Longview on the valuation date. On brief,
petitioner, who has the burden of proof, does not insist that a
minority discount in excess of 10 percent be applied in this
case.
Respondent contends, and petitioner disputes, that, because
the precedent transactions on which both experts, inter alia,
relied involved stock for which there was no ready market, the
respective prices paid for the stock sold in those transactions
reflected some lack-of-marketability discount. While we gener-
ally agree with respondent, it is significant that the stock
interests acquired in the precedent transactions were different
from decedent's 50-percent stock interest in B&W Longview in that
(1) the respective purchasers in the transactions involving
(a) B&W El Paso and (b) B&W Brownsville, B&W Harlingen, B&W
Mission, B&W Austin, and B&W Finance acquired 100 percent of the
stock of each of those corporations; and (2) although decedent
purchased only 50 percent of the stock of TA&T Finance in the
Young transaction, after that purchase, decedent owned 100
percent of the stock of that corporation. On the record before
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us, we find that there was even less of a ready market for
decedent's 50-percent stock interest in B&W Longview than there
was for the stock interests sold in the precedent transactions.
Consequently, we conclude that, in addition to a minority dis-
count, some amount of lack-of-marketability discount should be
applied in determining the fair market value on the valuation
date of decedent's 50-percent stock interest in B&W Longview.
Based on our consideration of the entire record before us,
and using our best judgment, we find that the fair market value
on the valuation date of decedent's 50-percent stock interest in
B&W Longview was $875,000.
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered
under Rule 155.