T.C. Memo. 1997-546
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
CHARLES F. URBAUER, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 5323-95. Filed December 11, 1997.
Charles F. Urbauer, pro se.
Mark I. Siegel, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
RAUM, Judge: The instant matter is before us on
petitioner's motion for reasonable administrative and litigation
costs pursuant to section 74301 and Rule 231. Neither party has
requested a hearing on petitioner's motion. Accordingly, we rule
1
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the year in issue, and
all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and
Procedure.
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on petitioner's motion on the basis of the parties' submissions
and the record in the instant case as a whole. We incorporate by
reference herein the portions of our opinion on the merits in
this case, Urbauer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-227, that are
relevant to our disposition of the motion.
On May 13, 1997, we issued our opinion on the substantive
issues in the instant case. Pursuant to their divorce,
petitioner and his ex-wife sold their marital home. They entered
into an agreement under which the ex-wife was responsible for
paying the taxes due from the sale of the marital home. No joint
return was filed by petitioner and his ex-wife for the year in
which the house was sold. We found that, despite their
agreement, since the divorce court did not change the result of
the operation of Michigan law, petitioner owned a one-half
interest in the house and was responsible for half the taxes due.
In the notice of deficiency, the Commissioner determined that
petitioner owed taxes on 50 percent of the gain from the sale.
However, in ill-advised reliance on Friscone v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1996-193, the Government reduced its claim to only 25
percent of the taxes due on the gain. Accordingly, we held that
petitioner was charged with tax on 25 percent of the gain from
the sale of the family residence.
Generally, section 7430(a) provides for the award of
reasonable administrative and litigation costs to a taxpayer who
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is a prevailing party in an administrative or court proceeding
brought against the United States involving the determination of
any tax, interest, or penalty pursuant to the Code. Section
7430(c)(4)(A) requires that to be a "prevailing party", a
taxpayer must establish that: (1) The position of the United
States was not substantially justified; (2) the taxpayer
substantially prevailed with respect to either the amount in
controversy or the most significant issue or set of issues
presented; and (3) the taxpayer meets the net worth requirements
of 28 U.S.C. sec. 2412(d)(2)(B) (1994). Section 7430(b)(1)
provides that an award of litigation costs may be made only where
a taxpayer has exhausted available administrative remedies. No
award of costs may be made with respect to any portion of an
administrative or judicial proceeding that the taxpayer has
unreasonably protracted, sec. 7430(b)(4), and the costs claimed
must be reasonable in amount. Sec. 7430(c). Petitioner bears
the burden of proving each of the above requirements has been
satisfied.2 Rule 232(e).
2
Sec. 7430 was amended by the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2,
Pub. L. 104-168, sec. 701, 110 Stat. 1452, 1463-1464 (1996),
effective with respect to proceedings commenced after July 30,
1996. The amendments to the section place on the Commissioner
the burden of establishing that the position of the Commissioner
was substantially justified. Sec. 7430(c)(4)(B). A judicial
proceeding is commenced in this Court with the filing of a
petition. Rule 20(a). Petitioner filed his petition on April 6,
1995. Accordingly, the amendments to sec. 7430 enacted by the
Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 do not apply here. Maggie Management
(continued...)
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Respondent contends that petitioner has not demonstrated
that the position of the United States was not substantially
justified or that the amounts claimed are reasonable. Respondent
concedes that petitioner has satisfied the other requirements for
the award of reasonable litigation costs. We shall first address
whether respondent's position was substantially justified.
Respondent's position is substantially justified if it has a
reasonable basis in fact and law. Powers v. Commissioner, 100
T.C. 457, 470 (1993). The fact that the Commissioner loses or
concedes the case does not mean that the Government's position
was not substantially justified; however, it is a factor to be
considered. Id. at 471. To show lack of substantial
justification, petitioner must demonstrate "that the legal
precedent does not substantially support respondent's position
given the facts available to respondent." Coastal Petroleum
Refiners, Inc. v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 685, 688 (1990).
Petitioner makes no substantive argument about the
authority, or lack thereof, for respondent's legal position. He
seems to assume that since a decision was entered under Rule 155,
he is entitled to half the litigation and administrative costs.
"The judge in the Trial Hearing (pg. 3 of Petitioner's Brief)
suggested filing for Litigation and Administrative costs, if you
2
(...continued)
Co. v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. 430 (1997).
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win. Both the IRS and Petitioner won 50%, therefore Petitioner
files for ½ of his costs & time."
Even if petitioner had put forth a substantive argument, he
would not be entitled to administrative and litigation costs in
this case. In the notice of deficiency, the Government took the
position that petitioner was liable for 50 percent of the taxes
due upon the sale of his marital home. That position was taken
because petitioner and his wife jointly owned the home, and the
divorce court had not changed the ownership of the property in
the property settlement accompanying the divorce decree. Under
Michigan law, unless the divorce decree provides otherwise, upon
their divorce, married property owners become tenants in common.
Mich. Stat. Ann. sec. 25.132 (Law. Co-op. 1992).
Shortly before the case was submitted to the Court, the
Government conceded half of the deficiency relying, in error, on
Friscone v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-193. In Friscone, the
divorce court, constrained by a buy-sell agreement, divided
ownership of stock between two divorcing spouses beneficially, by
allocating the proceeds and the tax liability, rather than
directly. Id. We subsequently held that the stock should be
treated for tax purposes as though it had been divided outright.
Id. The Government mistakenly believed that the private
agreement petitioner and his ex-wife entered into was entitled to
the same consideration. In Urbauer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
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1997-227, we noted that petitioner should have been liable for
the taxes on 50 percent of the gain. However, since the
Government conceded 25 percent of the taxes due on the gain, we
held the Government to its concession. Id.
This case is unusual in that when the Government was seeking
the larger deficiency amount, its position was legally correct.
Its concession resulted in a windfall for petitioner; he avoided
liability for taxes he otherwise legally would have owed. Given
the benefit to petitioner and given that the Court would have
held for the Government had it maintained its original position,
we hold that there was substantial justification for the
Government's position. Since we find for the Government on that
issue, we need not consider whether the amounts claimed by
petitioner as administration and litigation costs were
reasonable.
To reflect the foregoing,
Petitioner's motion
will be denied and order and
decision will be entered in
accordance with respondent's
Rule 155 computation.