T.C. Memo. 1998-254
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
ALVIN VICTOR BRACEY, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 11485-94. Filed July 13, 1998.
Alvin Victor Bracey, pro se.
Susan M. Pinner, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GALE, Judge: Respondent determined the following
deficiencies in, addition to, and fraud penalties on petitioner's
Federal income taxes:1
1
All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in
effect for the years in issue, and all Rule references are to the
Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, unless otherwise
(continued...)
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Addition to Tax Fraud Penalty
Year Deficiency Sec. 6651(a)(1) Sec. 6663
1990 $66,299 $3,315 $49,724
1991 52,593 - 0 - 39,445
Respondent also determined as an alternative to fraud that the
underpayments for 1990 and 1991 are subject to accuracy-related
penalties under section 6662(b)(1) and (2).
Respondent has conceded the addition to tax under section
6651(a)(1) for 1990 and the fraud penalties, and the parties have
reached agreement with respect to each adjustment determined in
the notice of deficiency. However, with certain exceptions2 the
parties dispute the applicability of the accuracy-related
penalties to the agreed adjustments. Thus the remaining issue
for decision is whether petitioner is liable for accuracy-related
penalties under section 6662(b)(1) and (2) with respect to the
underpayment arising from certain of the agreed-upon adjustments.
1
(...continued)
indicated.
2
On brief respondent concedes that the sec. 6662(b)(1)
penalty does not apply to the portion of the 1990 underpayment
attributable to an adjustment involving petitioner's
contributions to an individual retirement account and the portion
of the 1991 underpayment attributable to adjustments involving
Schedule C mortgage interest expenses. Respondent's position
regarding the sec. 6662(b)(2) penalty with respect to the
foregoing adjustments is not entirely clear. To the extent
respondent has not conceded these adjustments for purposes of
sec. 6662(b)(2), we find on the basis of the record in this case
that petitioner had reasonable cause under sec. 6664(c) with
respect thereto.
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Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
The stipulation of facts and the attached exhibits are
incorporated herein by this reference.
At the time the petition was filed, petitioner resided in
Houston, Texas.
Prior to and during the years in issue, petitioner operated
a "wear lining" business as a sole proprietorship, in which he
developed and sold linings used in pneumatic handling systems
that pulverize and transfer coal into coal-burning industrial
boilers, primarily in power plants. Petitioner visited customers
in the north central and northeastern United States to solicit
orders for such wear linings, arranged for their manufacture by a
third party, and subsequently supervised installation of the
linings at a customer's plant. The conduct of petitioner's
business required extensive travel, which petitioner estimated at
60,000 to 80,000 miles per year.
For recordkeeping in his wear lining business, petitioner
kept a copy of the invoices issued to a customer when an order
was placed and then attached a copy of the check when payment was
received on the invoice. Petitioner kept separate files for
invoices awaiting payment and for paid invoices. It was from
these invoices that petitioner calculated the gross receipts from
the wear lining business reported on Schedule C of his 1990 and
1991 returns. He did not maintain any ledger or journal with
respect to gross receipts.
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With respect to travel expenses incurred in his wear lining
business, petitioner's recordkeeping consisted of a mileage log
and a diary of appointments containing information regarding
where he went, with whom he spoke, and the subject matter. With
respect to lodging, petitioner did not have receipts to document
his expenses. Instead, he claimed lodging expenses as a
deduction for travel on his Schedule C by using a per diem
estimate that he found in an Internal Revenue Service
publication.
In addition to the expenses incurred in his wear lining
business, petitioner claimed Schedule C deductions for expenses
incurred in connection with certain real property acquisitions in
Florida. Sometime in 1990, petitioner acquired three properties
in Florida and had a house built on one of them with the
intention of leaving the wear lining business and beginning a
homebuilding business. The remaining two lots were undeveloped
when purchased by petitioner. During the years in issue,
petitioner had the lots cleared and filled to meet elevations
required by applicable flood laws and arranged for water service
to one of them. At some point in 1991, petitioner returned to
the wear lining business and tried to rent the house in Florida.
He obtained insurance coverage for the house based on its
intended use as a rental property. Petitioner was not successful
in finding a tenant in 1991 and eventually moved into the house
himself. On Schedule C of his 1990 return, petitioner deducted
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legal fees that he paid in connection with the purchase of the
Florida house. On Schedule C of his 1991 return petitioner
deducted depreciation expense with respect to the house.
Petitioner prepared and filed Federal income tax returns for
the years in issue without consulting an accountant or other tax
professional.
We turn first to the applicability of the section 6662(b)(1)
penalty. We consider each agreed adjustment (except as indicated
supra note 2) to determine whether the resulting portion of the
underpayment is attributable to "Negligence or disregard of rules
or regulations" as provided in that section. "Negligence" for
this purpose includes "any failure to make a reasonable attempt
to comply with the provisions of * * * [the Internal Revenue
Code]", and "disregard" includes "any careless, reckless, or
intentional disregard". Sec. 6662(c). Respondent's
determination of an accuracy-related penalty is presumptively
correct, and petitioner bears the burden of proving the
determination wrong. Rule 142(a); Monahan v. Commissioner, 109
T.C. 235 (1997); Hitchins v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 711, 719
(1994); Neely v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 934, 947 (1985); Bixby v.
Commissioner, 58 T.C. 757, 791-792 (1972). In deciding whether
the accuracy-related penalty for negligence applies, the test is
whether there was a lack of due care or a failure to act
prudently under the circumstances. Hitchins v. Commissioner,
supra. Thus, the taxpayer must show that he acted reasonably and
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prudently and exercised due care in choosing the treatment of the
items in issue. Allen v. Commissioner, 925 F.2d 348, 353 (9th
Cir. 1991), affg. 92 T.C. 1 (1989); Neely v. Commissioner, supra
at 947-948. The section 6662(b)(1) penalty shall not in any
event be imposed with respect to any portion of an understatement
as to which the taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and in good
faith. Sec. 6664(c)(1).
Unreported Gross Receipts
In the notice of deficiency, respondent determined that
petitioner had unreported Schedule C gross receipts of $132,330
in 1990 and $58,107 in 1991. Respondent now concedes that
petitioner did not have any unreported gross receipts in 1991,
and the parties have stipulated that the unreported gross
receipts in 1990 were $12,911 rather than $132,330. Citing
Sindik v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-47, respondent contends
that the underpayment arising from the unreported receipts is
attributable to negligence because petitioner failed to keep
adequate books and records. In particular, respondent argues
that petitioner was negligent in keeping only invoices and in
failing to maintain a ledger or journal in which he separately
recorded information regarding his gross receipts.
Taxpayers are required to keep such records "as are
sufficient to establish the amount of gross income * * * required
to be shown" on the return. Sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs.
The regulations further provide that negligence for purposes of
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section 6662(b)(1) and (c) includes "any failure by the taxpayer
to keep adequate books and records". Sec. 1.6662-3(b)(1), Income
Tax Regs. There is no requirement that a taxpayer maintain any
specific type of ledger or journal, so long as his overall
recordkeeping is sufficient to establish the amount of his
income. Petitioner's business required travel to such an extent
that he essentially worked out of his automobile. In the
circumstances, we are not persuaded that respondent's insistence
on ledgers is realistic or appropriate. Petitioner's method of
retaining his invoices in paid and unpaid categories was
apparently "adequate" for 1991, as the parties have now
stipulated that there was no underreporting of gross receipts in
that year. As for 1990, petitioner failed to report $12,911 of a
total of $242,788 in gross receipts. While the unreported amount
is not inconsequential, we are not persuaded that it constitutes
either "negligence", which includes "any failure to make a
reasonable attempt to comply with the provisions" of the Internal
Revenue Code, or "disregard of rules or regulations", which
includes "any careless, reckless, or intentional disregard".
Sec. 6662(c). We believe that petitioner was making a
reasonable, though flawed, attempt to keep track of his gross
receipts in the circumstances. Respondent's reliance on Sindik
v. Commissioner, supra, is misplaced. The taxpayer in that case
kept no records at all, which we found was a failure to make any
reasonable attempt to comply and therefore negligent. Here, we
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find that the underpayment arising from the unreported gross
receipts in 1990 is not subject to the accuracy-related penalty
provided in section 6662(b)(1).
Lodging Expenses
In the notice of deficiency, respondent completely
disallowed petitioner's claimed travel expenses for his wear
lining business in the amounts of $34,398 and $37,422 for 1990
and 1991, respectively. Respondent now concedes that the claimed
amounts are allowable except to the extent of lodging expenses of
$10,374 in 1990 and $11,286 in 1991. Respondent argues for the
negligence penalty because petitioner failed to substantiate the
lodging expenses as required by section 274(d). The parties'
dispute centers on petitioner's failure to produce receipts for
his claimed lodging expenses. Petitioner testified credibly that
he maintained a diary of his business travel in which he recorded
his appointments, including time, place, substance of the
discussion, and follow-up. Petitioner concedes, however, that he
did not use actual receipts to calculate the lodging expenses
claimed, but instead used a per diem amount that he obtained from
an IRS publication. We take judicial notice of IRS Publication
17, "Your Federal Income Tax" (1990), which the agency published
for use in preparing 1990 returns. In a section specifically
devoted to the records required to support deductions for
business travel, the publication states:
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Documentary evidence. Documentary evidence is required to
support all lodging expenses (however, see Per diem
allowance or reimbursement, earlier) while traveling away
from home. [IRS Pub. 17, ch. 28, at 149 (1990).]
The parenthetical refers the reader to that portion of the
publication where a procedure for accounting for expenses,
including lodging expenses, on the basis of a per diem amount
rather than actual expenditures is explained. While it is true
that as a self-employed individual petitioner was not eligible to
use the per diem method, the Publication is not exceedingly clear
on this point, and we accept that petitioner could have
misunderstood this based on the language quoted above. We note
in this regard that in the most recent version of Publication 17,
"Your Federal Income Tax" (1997), of which we also take judicial
notice, the section on "Documentary evidence" has been
substantially revised to make clearer the limited circumstances
in which the per diem method may be used for lodging expenses.
Documentary evidence. You generally must have documentary
evidence, such as receipts, canceled checks, or bills, to
support your expenses. However, this evidence is not needed
if any of the following apply:
1) You have meals or lodging expenses
while traveling away from home for
which you account to your employer
under an accountable plan and you
use a per diem allowance method that
includes meals and/or lodging.
[IRS Pub. 17, ch. 28, at 186 (1997).]
Section 1.6664-4(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. (as effective for
the years in issue), provides that reasonable cause for purposes
of the accuracy-related penalties includes "an honest
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misunderstanding of fact or law that is reasonable in light of
the experience, knowledge and education of the taxpayer." In
these circumstances, we believe that petitioner's use of a per
diem method to calculate his lodging expenses was an "honest
misunderstanding" constituting reasonable cause under section
6664(c)(1). Thus, the underpayments arising from the disallowed
travel expenses are not subject to accuracy-related penalties
under section 6662(b)(1) or (2).
Employee Benefit Program
Petitioner has conceded that he is not entitled to a $1,086
deduction claimed on Schedule C of his 1990 return for employee
benefit programs. Respondent contends that the amount represents
petitioner's medical expenses that were not deductible on
Schedule A because they did not exceed 7.5 percent of adjusted
gross income, see sec. 213(a), and asserts that a section
6662(b)(1) penalty is appropriate because the deduction had no
basis in law or fact. Petitioner offered no explanation or
argument with respect to the deduction or the penalty. On this
record, we find that the underpayment arising from this
disallowed deduction is subject to the accuracy-related penalty
under section 6662(b)(1).
1990 Interest Expense
On Schedule C of his 1990 return, petitioner claimed
interest expenses of $10,603 for "Mortgage" and $10,210 for
"Other". With respect to the first amount, petitioner now
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concedes that it is not allowable as a deduction in 1990.
Petitioner admitted that this interest was paid by him in 1989
and offered by way of explanation that he did not have his bank
statement available in time to claim the amount on his 1989
return, and so he claimed it on his 1990 return. We find this
constitutes "disregard of rules or regulations" within the
meaning of section 6662(b)(1).
With respect to "Other" interest of $10,210, the parties
have stipulated that petitioner is not entitled to any deduction
on Schedule C for "Other" interest but instead is entitled to a
mortgage interest deduction of $7,730 on Schedule A of his 1990
return. Petitioner has offered no explanation for the $2,480 in
claimed interest to which he now concedes he is not entitled. In
the absence of any substantiation for this amount, we find that
the underpayment arising from its disallowance is attributable to
negligence. Sec. 1.6662-3(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.
1990 Legal Expenses
Petitioner claimed $10,556 in legal expenses in Schedule C
of his 1990 return to which the parties now stipulate he was not
entitled. The amount represents legal fees petitioner paid in
connection with the purchase of a house in Florida as part of his
efforts to commence a homebuilding business. Petitioner now
concedes that the amounts should have been capitalized and added
to the basis of the house. Petitioner did not seek any
professional advice with respect to taking the deduction. We
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believe in any event that the rules with respect to the treatment
of legal fees incurred in connection with the purchase of real
estate are relatively simple and clear. Thus, we do not find
reasonable cause for the error under section 6664(c)(1). On this
record, we sustain respondent's determination that the
underpayment arising from this disallowed deduction is subject to
an accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(b)(1).
Depreciation
Petitioner claimed $6,970 of depreciation on Schedule C of
his 1991 return to which the parties now stipulate he was not
entitled. The amount represents depreciation claimed with
respect to the house petitioner purchased in Florida in 1990.
Petitioner held the house throughout 1991, attempted to rent it,
and obtained insurance designed to provide coverage for a rental.
He was unsuccessful in renting the house and eventually moved
into it himself, although the record does not disclose when.
Respondent asserts that it was negligent for petitioner to
depreciate a house that he never rented and into which he
eventually moved. We think petitioner's negligence depends upon
whether, given the circumstances, he reasonably believed that the
property was depreciable.
Section 167(a) allows a depreciation deduction only if the
property is either used in a trade or business or held for the
production of income. The phrase "held for the production of
income" includes the expectation of gain from the disposition of
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property as well as recurring income such as rent. Mitchell v.
Commissioner, 47 T.C. 120, 128 (1966). In light of petitioner's
other real estate activities in Florida, we believe he originally
acquired and held the house with the expectation of realizing
gain upon its disposition. We conclude that petitioner
reasonably believed that the house was depreciable. Therefore,
he had reasonable cause and acted in good faith, and the
underpayment arising from the disallowed depreciation is not
attributable to negligence. Secs. 6662(b)(1), 6664(c)(1); see
Rezazadeh v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-245, affd. without
published opinion 132 F.3d 36 (7th Cir. 1997).
Miscellaneous Expenses
The following chart lists various additional expenses
claimed by petitioner on Schedule C for 1990 and 1991 that were
challenged by respondent. The second column shows the amount to
which the parties have stipulated that petitioner is entitled,
the third column shows the amounts originally claimed by
petitioner on his returns, and the fourth column shows the
difference; i.e., the amount petitioner claimed to which he now
concedes he is not entitled.
Expense Stipulated Claimed Difference
1990 Taxes $2,719 $3,100 $381
1991 Taxes 4,976 6,139 1,163
1990 Utilities 1,637 1,861 224
1991 Miscellaneous1 7,101 9,942 2,841
1
Aggregate figure for legal fees, utilities, insurance, and
rent.
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With respect to all amounts in the fourth column, respondent
contends on brief that there was no substantiation. Petitioner
has offered no explanation with respect to the amounts he
concedes were claimed improperly. In the absence of any
substantiation for these amounts, we find that the underpayment
arising from their disallowance is attributable to negligence.
Sec. 1.6662-3(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.
Substantial Understatement of Tax
Alternatively, respondent determined that the accuracy-
related penalty applies due to a substantial understatement of
income tax pursuant to section 6662(b)(2). Section 6662(d)(1)(A)
provides that a substantial understatement occurs when the
understatement (of tax) exceeds the greater of $5,000 or 10
percent of the amount of tax required to be shown on the return.
Generally, the understatement is the amount of tax required to be
shown on the return over the amount of tax imposed which is shown
on the return, reduced by that portion of the understatement
attributable to: (i) The tax treatment of an item for which
there was substantial authority; or, (ii) an item with respect to
which the relevant facts affecting its treatment were adequately
disclosed on the return or in a statement attached thereto. Sec.
6662(d)(2)(A) and (B). Petitioner has not provided any authority
for the positions taken on his returns. Petitioner argues for
relief from penalties because he made full disclosure (when
audited) of all the facts and circumstances surrounding the
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various entries on his return. Petitioner misunderstands, and
does not meet, the requirement of section 6662(d)(2)(B), which is
that disclosures be on the return or a statement attached
thereto. Petitioner made no such disclosure. See sec. 1.6661-
4(a), Income Tax Regs. Accordingly, there is no reduction in the
understatement.
The question of whether there is a substantial
understatement of income tax thus depends upon the amount of the
understatement, which will be addressed in the Rule 155
computation. The understatement shall not include any portion of
the underpayment for which we have herein found there was
reasonable cause under section 6664(c)(1).
We have considered all other arguments made by petitioner
and found them to be either irrelevant or without merit.
To reflect the foregoing and concessions,
Decision will be entered
under Rule 155.