T.C. Memo. 1998-392
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
JAMES J. AND LINDA J. HARFORD, Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 8436-97. Filed November 6, 1998.
James J. Harford, pro se.
Linda A. Neal, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
COUVILLION, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard
1
pursuant to section 7443A(b)(3) and Rules 180, 181, and 182.
Respondent determined a deficiency of $5,457 in petitioners'
Federal income tax for 1994.
1
Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the
Internal Revenue Code in effect for the year at issue. All Rule
references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
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The sole issue for decision is whether $24,060.44 received
by James J. Harford (petitioner husband) as a result of the
termination of his employment is excludable from petitioners'
1994 gross income, pursuant to section 104(a)(2), as damages
received on account of personal injury or sickness.
Some of the facts were stipulated, and those facts, with the
annexed exhibits, are so found and are incorporated herein by
reference. At the time the petition was filed, petitioners'
legal residence was Durham, North Carolina.
Petitioner husband received a bachelor of science degree in
electrical engineering from Georgia Tech University in 1984.
That same year petitioner husband became employed by
International Business Machines Corp. (IBM) in the company's
Kingston, New York, facility. In 1987, petitioner husband moved
to the Raleigh-Durham area of North Carolina and remained
employed with IBM. Following his move to North Carolina, and
concurrent with his continued employment with IBM, petitioner
husband pursued and received a master's degree in computer
science from the University of North Carolina.
During May 1994, the manager of petitioner husband's
division at IBM (manager) became concerned about the delay in
completing a development project that petitioner husband's
division was working on. Consequently, the manager advised
petitioner husband and the other members of his division that all
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vacation would be canceled through the end of June 1994 in order
for the project to be completed. Petitioner husband informed his
manager that he would be unable to comply with the cancellation
of vacation, as he was committed to attend a reunion of his
extended family that had been planned and paid for several months
prior thereto and had been previously approved by IBM management.
Petitioner husband's manager warned him that, if he followed
through with his vacation plans and failed to report for work as
required, he would be dismissed due to insubordination.
Petitioner husband defied the cancellation of leave and attended
his family reunion, failing to report for work for a week during
late May and early June.
When petitioner husband returned to work following his
vacation, he was informed by his manager that he would not be
dismissed; however, he was given two options regarding his
employment with IBM. Petitioner husband was given the choice to
either (1) submit a voluntary resignation from IBM and obtain the
benefits provided in a severance package created by IBM for
employees who resigned or retired as a result of corporate
downsizing, or (2) remain employed with IBM but sustain a
demotion in performance evaluation ranking, undergo a
probationary period of 6 months, and engage in a significant
amount of overtime work. Petitioner husband chose to voluntarily
resign from IBM and accept the severance package.
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Pursuant to the termination of his employment, petitioner
husband received benefits under the "Networking Hardware Division
and Networking Software Division Resource Transition Program"
(NRTP) established by IBM to induce employees to resign or retire
early under a plan of corporate downsizing. Under the NRTP, a
participating employee was entitled to a lump-sum payment,
temporary medical and dental insurance (which the employee could
continue later at his or her own cost), and career transition
services. The lump-sum payment was payable at the time of a
participating employee's departure and was reduced by any
advances or loans owed to IBM at the time of departure. If a
participating employee resumed his employment with IBM within a
specified period, a prorated amount of the lump-sum payment was
required to be repaid.
In connection with his participation in NRTP, petitioner
husband executed, on July 15, 1994, a document entitled "General
Release and Covenant Not to Sue" (the Release) setting out the
terms of his severance package. The Release stated:
In exchange for the sums and benefits which you will
receive pursuant to the terms of the * * * [NRTP] * * *
[petitioner husband] agrees to release International
Business Machines Corporation, its subsidiaries and
affiliates, and its benefits plans, (hereinafter "IBM")
from all claims, demands, actions or liabilities you
may have against IBM of whatever kind, including but
not limited to those that are related to your
employment with IBM, the termination of that
employment, or other severance payments or your
eligibility or participation in the Retirement Bridge
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Leave of Absence, or any claims for attorneys' fees.
You agree that this also releases from liability IBM's
agents, directors, officers, employees,
representatives, successors and assigns (hereinafter
"those associated with IBM").
You agree that you have voluntarily executed this
Release on your own behalf, and also on behalf of any
heirs, agents, representatives, successors and assigns
that you may have now or in the future. You also agree
that this Release covers, but is not limited to, claims
arising from the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, as amended, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, as amended, and any other federal, state or
local law dealing with discrimination in employment,
including but not limited to discrimination based on
sex, race, national origin, religion, disability,
veteran status or age. You also agree that this
Release includes claims based on theories of contract
or tort whether based on common law or otherwise.
Petitioner husband was entitled to revoke his signature within 7
days of signing the Release; however, had he done so, he would
have been required to return his lump-sum payment and would have
become ineligible for the other NRTP benefits. Petitioner
husband received a lump-sum payment of $24,060.44 in connection
with his participation in NRTP. Petitioner husband suffered no
injury or sickness at the time of his resignation. Neither prior
nor subsequent to his resignation did petitioner husband file a
complaint or claim with IBM or against IBM regarding any type of
discrimination, personal injury, or wrongful termination.
On their 1994 Federal income tax return, petitioners failed
to report as income the $24,060.44 received by petitioner husband
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2
upon his termination of employment with IBM. Petitioners
attached to their return a Form 8275, Disclosure Statement,
explaining that they had not included the subject $24,060.44 in
their gross income for 1994 because they believed such payment
was:
not taxable under Section 104 of the Internal Revenue
Code because the payment was made as a consideration to
the taxpayer for his release of his employer for any
claim he might have against his employer for age
discrimination and other potential tort claims.
In the notice of deficiency, respondent determined that the
subject $24,060.44 was includable in petitioners' gross income
for 1994. This was the only adjustment in the notice of
deficiency.
The sole issue is whether the $24,060.44 received by
petitioner husband as a result of the termination of his
employment with IBM is excludable from petitioners' 1994 gross
income pursuant to section 104(a)(2) as damages received on
account of personal injury or sickness. Except as otherwise
provided, gross income includes "all income from whatever source
derived". Sec. 61(a); Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348
2
IBM issued to petitioner husband a Form W-2, Wage and Tax
Statement, for 1994 reflecting wages, tips, and other
compensation of $64,432.30, which included the $24,060.44 paid to
petitioner husband upon termination of his employment.
Petitioners attached a copy of this Form W-2 to their 1994
return.
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U.S. 426, 429-430 (1955). Although section 61(a) is to be
broadly construed, statutory exclusions from income must be
narrowly construed. Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 327-
328 (1995).
Section 104(a)(2) excludes from gross income "the amount of
any damages * * * received (whether by suit or agreement and
whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of
personal injuries or sickness". Section 1.104-1(c), Income Tax
Regs., provides that "The term 'damages received (whether by suit
or agreement)' means an amount received * * * through prosecution
of a legal suit or action based upon tort or tort type rights, or
through a settlement agreement entered into in lieu of such
prosecution." Thus, in order to exclude damages from gross
income pursuant to section 104(a)(2), the taxpayer must prove:
(1) The underlying cause of action is "based upon tort or tort
type rights", and (2) the damages were received "on account of
personal injuries or sickness." Commissioner v. Schleier, supra
at 336-337.
Where amounts are received pursuant to a settlement
agreement, the nature of the claim that was the actual basis for
settlement controls whether such amounts are excludable from
gross income under section 104(a)(2). United States v. Burke,
504 U.S. 229, 237 (1992). The crucial question is "in lieu of
what was the settlement amount paid." Bagley v. Commissioner,
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105 T.C. 396, 406 (1995), affd. 121 F.3d 393 (8th Cir. 1997).
Determining the nature of the claim is a factual inquiry.
Robinson v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 116, 127 (1994), affd. in
part, revd. in part, and remanded 70 F.3d 34 (5th Cir. 1995).
Petitioners have failed to demonstrate any personal injury
or sickness suffered by petitioner husband. Although
petitioners' arguments are not entirely clear from the record,
the Court surmises petitioners' contention to be that, since
petitioner husband signed the Release in exchange for the
$24,060.44 payment, petitioner husband must have had some
potential claim against IBM. Petitioners are mistaken. The
execution of a general release against liability does not, in and
of itself, confirm that the releasing party indeed possesses a
bona fide cause of action against the party released.
The record does not show that petitioner husband had a
potential claim of any kind against IBM, including that for
personal injury, sickness, or wrongful termination. In point of
fact, petitioner husband was not terminated but rather was given
the option to remain with IBM on a probationary status for
several months and be subject to some discipline for his direct
defiance of a company mandate. Instead, petitioner husband chose
to resign voluntarily from IBM and accept a severance package.
Every indication in the record leads the Court to conclude that
the termination of petitioner husband's employment with IBM was
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purely voluntary and resulted directly from his own
insubordination, and, had he complied with the company's
cancellation of leave policy, he would have avoided a
confrontation with his supervisor and ultimately the company.
The lump-sum payment thus appears to be severance pay rather than
a payment for personal injury, and severance pay, like the pay it
replaces, is taxable as income. See Brennan v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1997-317.
Even if the Court were to conclude that IBM paid petitioner
husband the $24,060.44 in settlement of a possible claim for
wrongful termination from IBM, the amount of lost wages received
in such a situation is generally not linked to any personal
injury, and, thus, such an award would not qualify for the
exclusion from gross income provided in section 104(a)(2).
Commissioner v. Schleier, supra at 330.
The Court recognizes that mental distress may suffice as a
personal injury or sickness under the law applicable to the
taxable year in issue, id. at 329 n.4; however, petitioners have
failed to show that any inconvenience or stress experienced by
petitioner husband as a result of his resignation from IBM
constituted a personal injury or sickness. There is no evidence
that petitioner husband's distress, if any, manifested itself as
physical symptoms, required him to seek medical help, or
incapacitated him in any manner.
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Even if petitioner husband sustained personal injury or
sickness, petitioners failed to show what portion, if any, of the
$24,060.44 payment was allocable to tort or tort type claims.
The Release contains broad language relieving IBM from liability
for many potential claims, some of which are not based in tort or
tort type rights, including contract claims, claims under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), Pub. L. 90-202,
81 Stat. 602, as amended 29 U.S.C. secs. 621-634 (1994), and
claims under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L.
88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253, as amended 42 U.S.C. secs. 2000e-1 to
-17 (1994). See, e.g., Commissioner v. Schleier, supra at 336
(holding that settlements for claims made under the ADEA are not
based on tort or tort type rights for purposes of section
104(a)(2)); United States v. Burke, supra at 241 (holding awards
of back wages under title VII do not redress tort type personal
injury within the meaning of section 104(a)(2)). The Release
does not state that any portion of the amount petitioner husband
received was for any specific potential tort or tort type claim
3
against IBM. Thus, on this record, it would be impossible for
3
Where a settlement agreement lacks express language stating
what the settlement amount was paid to settle, then the most
important factor is the intent of the payor. Knuckles v.
Commissioner, 349 F.2d 610, 612-613 (10th Cir. 1965), affg. T.C.
Memo. 1964-33. The Court is satisfied that it was not IBM's
intent for any portion of the subject payment to be paid as a
settlement of a tort or tort type claim on account of a personal
injury or sickness.
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the Court to determine a specific tort or tort type claim or
claims that may have served as a basis for settlement, if any. A
failure to show the specific amount of the payment allocable to
the claims of tort or tort type damages for personal injuries
results in the entire amount being presumed not to be excludable.
See Taggi v. United States, 35 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 1994); Getty
v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 160, 175-176 (1988), affd. on this issue
and revd. on other issues 913 F.2d 1486 (9th Cir. 1990).
The $24,060.44 settlement payment petitioner husband
received from IBM in 1994 does not satisfy the requirements for
exclusion of the payment under section 104(a)(2). Consequently,
on this record, the Court holds that such payment is includable
in petitioners' gross income for that year.
Decision will be entered
for respondent.