T.C. Memo. 1998-409
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
BONNIE A. BROUGHTON, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 22996-97. Filed November 13, 1998.
Bonnie A. Broughton, pro se.
Mary T. Klaasen, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
POWELL, Special Trial Judge: This case was assigned
pursuant to section 7443A(b)(3) and Rules 180, 181, and 182.1
Respondent determined deficiencies in petitioner's Federal
income taxes for the taxable years 1994 and 1995 in the
respective amounts of $735 and $752.
1
Section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in
effect during the years at issue, and Rule references are to the
Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
- 2 -
The sole issue is whether petitioner is entitled to claim
two dependency exemptions for her children. Petitioner resided
in Boise, Idaho, at the time she filed her petition with this
Court.
Background
The facts may be summarized as follows. Prior to 1984,
petitioner was married to Gary Broughton (Gary), and two
children, Cacy and Matthew, were born of the marriage. In 1984,
petitioner and Gary were divorced. Pursuant to the divorce
agreement, which was incorporated into the final decree
dissolving the marriage, Gary would pay $250 per month for each
child as child support. Petitioner was given physical custody of
the children. The agreement further provided in paragraph 18
that Gary "shall be allowed the exemption for both State and
Federal tax returns for the minor children for the year 1984, and
each tax year thereafter." In 1987, Cacy was injured in an
automobile accident. On June 9, 1987, the Decree of Divorce was
modified to provide that Gary would maintain major medical and
dental insurance policies for the children and that
all medical and dental expenses incurred by the minor
children but not covered by insurance shall be split equally
between the parties and each party shall be 50% obligated on
said debit. In addition, the Defendant [Gary] agrees to be
responsible for ½ of any medical expenses incurred by the
minor child, Cacy as a result of her accident in January
1987, that are not covered by insurance.
Paragraph 18, relating to the tax exemptions, was not modified.
- 3 -
It is stipulated that Gary continually has made all payments
for child support. Petitioner alleges, however, that he has not
satisfied the provisions of the amended decree relating to the
payment of medical expenses for the children. For this reason,
on her 1994 and 1995 Federal income tax returns, petitioner
claimed an exemption for both children. Respondent disallowed
the exemptions, the issue now before the Court.
Discussion
Section 152(a) defines a dependent, inter alia, as a son or
daughter "over half of whose support, for the calendar year * * *
was received from the taxpayer (or is treated under subsection
(c) or (e) as received from the taxpayer)". Under section
152(e)(1) generally the person who has custody for the greater
portion of the calendar year (the custodial parent) is treated as
having supplied over half of the support. In the case, however,
of a divorce decree executed prior to January 1, 1985, the
noncustodial parent shall be treated as having supplied over half
the support if the noncustodial parent provides at least $600 for
the support of the child during the calendar year and the divorce
decree "provides that the noncustodial parent shall be entitled
to" the exemption for such child. Sec. 152(e)(4)(A). In the
case before us, Gary provided at least $600 for the support of
each child during 1995, the divorce decree was entered prior to
- 4 -
January 1, 1985,2 and the divorce decree provides that Gary
"shall be allowed the exemption[s] * * * for the minor children".
Petitioner argues that it is inequitable to deny her the
exemptions because, when the medical expenses that Gary has not
paid are considered, she paid more than half of the support of
the children. We answered the same question in McClendon v.
Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1, 3-4 (1980):
However sympathetic we may be towards petitioner, the
statute is clear on its face and leaves no room for implied
exceptions. * * * [Section 152(e)(4)] was intended to
provide a means whereby the parties to a divorce could take
dependency exemptions directly into consideration when
planning financial arrangements attendant to the divorce.
The overriding purpose of the section is to provide
certainty to the parties. We would subvert the intent and
the spirit of the statute if we held that there was an
implied exception when the party entitled to the exemption
is not in compliance with the divorce decree. The statute
is absolute, and its plain language must control. [Emphasis
in original; citations and fn. ref. omitted.]
The divorce decree is a matter of State law, and, if it is to be
further amended, it is a matter for the State court and not this
Court.
Decision will be entered
for respondent.
2
While the divorce decree was amended or modified after
that date, the pre-1985 provision in paragraph 18, relating to
the exemptions, was not modified and remains fully in effect.