113 T.C. No. 5
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
WALTER R. STROHMAIER, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 13353-97. Filed August 3, 1999.
P was an independent agent for an insurance
brokerage firm and a part-time minister. P was not
provided an office by the insurance brokerage firm; he
was not required to report to or visit the brokerage
firm office, nor did he conduct any business there. P,
as a minister, was not affiliated with any church. He
served as chaplain for a mobile home community, where
he performed religious services. Occasionally, P
delivered sermons or taught at various churches. In
neither activity did P receive or interview insurance
customers or religious patrons at his residence, nor
did he perform ministerial services there. P's
insurance activity was conducted by visiting clients at
their homes or other locations. P performed all the
preparatory work for both activities at his residence,
a rented apartment.
1. Held, although a portion of P's residence was
used exclusively and regularly in his two activities,
the residence was not his principal place of business.
Accordingly, the home office expenses are not
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deductible. See sec. 280A(c)(1)(A), I.R.C.;
Commissioner v. Soliman, 506 U.S. 168, 175-177 (1993).
2. Held, further, the car and truck expenses
incurred by P between his residence and the places
where he conducted religious services and the car and
truck expenses between his residence and the first and
last place of insurance customer contact each day are
not deductible as transportation expenses but are
nondeductible commuting expenses. See secs. 262,
162(a), I.R.C.; Wisconsin Psychiatric Servs. v.
Commissioner, 76 T.C. 839, 849 (1981); Curphey v.
Commissioner, 73 T.C. 766, 777-778 (1980); Heuer v.
Commissioner, 32 T.C. 947, 953 (1959), affd. per curiam
283 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1960); Walker v. Commissioner,
101 T.C. 537 (1993), distinguished.
3. Held, further, expenses incurred for meals, in
the absence of overnight lodging, are not deductible as
travel expenses away from home under sec. 162(a)(2),
I.R.C., where the meal expenses incurred are occasioned
by the taxpayer's rests to accommodate a medical
condition. See United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299
(1967); Barry v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1210 (1970),
affd. per curiam 435 F.2d 1290 (1st Cir. 1970).
Walter R. Strohmaier, pro se.
Robert W. Dillard, for respondent.
OPINION
PARR, Judge: This case was assigned to Special Trial Judge
D. Irvin Couvillion pursuant to section 7443A(b)(3)1 and Rules
180, 181, and 182. The Court agrees with and adopts the Opinion
of the Special Trial Judge, which is set forth below.
1
Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the
Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years at issue. All Rule
references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
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OPINION OF THE SPECIAL TRIAL JUDGE
COUVILLION, Special Trial Judge: Respondent determined
deficiencies of $766 and $1,954 in petitioner's Federal income
taxes for the years 1993 and 1994, respectively.
The issues for decision are: (1) Whether petitioner is
entitled to a home office deduction under section 280A(c) for the
year 1994 in connection with his trade or business activities;
(2) whether petitioner is entitled, under section 162(a), for the
years 1993 and 1994, to deductions for car and truck expenses in
excess of amounts allowed by respondent; and (3) whether
petitioner is entitled, under section 162(a)(2), for the years
1993 and 1994, to deductions for travel expenses in excess of
amounts allowed by respondent.2
Some of the facts were stipulated. Those facts, with the
exhibits annexed thereto, are so found and are incorporated
herein by reference. At the time the petition was filed,
petitioner's legal residence was Lake Wales, Florida.
2
At trial, petitioner conceded respondent's disallowance of
Schedule C meal expenses of $212 and $113, respectively, for 1993
and 1994. Other adjustments in the notice of deficiency are
computational and will be resolved by the Court's holdings on the
contested issues. These adjustments are increases in
petitioner's self-employment taxes, the deduction allowable for
one-half of self-employment taxes, and the amounts of
petitioner's earned income credit.
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Petitioner was engaged as an independent contractor in two
trade or business activities during the years at issue: a
ministerial activity and an insurance sales activity.
The insurance activity consisted of the sales of various
types of insurance to senior citizens. The various categories of
insurance petitioner offered included insurance for long-term
care, supplementary Medicare benefits, home health care,
annuities, and life insurance. Petitioner was affiliated with an
insurance brokerage firm from which petitioner was provided a
customer list of insured persons. From this list, petitioner
serviced policy holders having problems or questions regarding
their coverage, and he endeavored to sell them other coverage
they did not have. Any applications for such insurance were
taken by petitioner, who then forwarded the applications to the
insurance brokerage firm for processing and the ultimate issuance
of insurance by an insurance provider. The insurance brokerage
firm was located approximately 50 miles from petitioner's
residence. Petitioner was not provided an office by the
brokerage firm, nor was he required to report or visit the office
of the brokerage firm. None of petitioner's work was conducted
at the brokerage firm's office. Petitioner worked out of his
home, which was an apartment he rented at Lake Wales, Florida.
He worked at hours of his choice. Petitioner's means of getting
business was contacting individuals listed on the customer list
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provided by the brokerage firm or responding to individuals who
had service requests on their existing coverage. Petitioner did
not receive or interview clients at his apartment. Instead,
petitioner went out and met with potential clients. Petitioner
did not employ anyone to assist him in his activity. As
petitioner explained at trial:
The agency [the brokerage firm] had sufficient business
on the books that I could cultivate business from my
home by simply looking at the records * * *. I would
make a phone call or I would show up at the person's
house. But when I went to that individual's house, I
already knew what he had. And I had a proposal in my
attache case saying, this is what I'm going to sell
that individual, which was homework done at my home
office.
* * * * * * *
my position * * * is that the business is a home-based
business, in that the majority of the paperwork, the
grunt work, is done prior to going out to a client's
home. And, because there is no structured territory or
structured requirements, since I am totally
independent, my understanding of the Internal Revenue
Code is that this qualifies as a home business.
Petitioner performed services as a minister for
approximately 6 months each year, essentially during the winter
and spring. Petitioner was not affiliated with a particular
church. His ministerial activity consisted of serving as a
chaplain to a mobile home community located approximately 35
miles from Lake Wales, Florida. That community consisted of
people petitioner referred to as "snowbirds", which he defined as
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people from the northern United States who came to Florida each
year for the winter and spring months. Petitioner conducted
services there twice weekly. Petitioner also taught at First
Baptist Church of Orlando, Florida, weekly and, in addition,
occasionally preached at various churches. All of petitioner's
sermons were prepared at his home office. No services or other
sacerdotal rites were performed at petitioner's apartment, nor
did he ever receive or counsel religious patrons there.
On his Federal income tax returns for 1993 and 1994,
petitioner's income and expenses from his insurance and
ministerial activities were combined and reported on Schedule C,
Profit or Loss From Business. The following income and expenses
were reported:
1993 1994
Gross income $20,144.89 $30,421
Expenses:
Advertising $502 $427
Car & truck expenses 13,990 16,828
Commissions & fees 661 --
Legal & professional 179 304
Office expenses 388 73
Taxes & licenses 86 --
Travel 4,106 4,977
Meals & entertainment:
80% 274 --
50% -- 152
Other expenses -- 2,313
Total 20,186.00 25,074
Tentative profit (loss) (41.11) 5,347
Expenses for business use of home -- 532
Net profit (loss) ($41.11)* $4,815
*Rounded to $42 on return.
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In the notice of deficiency, respondent disallowed the
following expenses:
1993 1994
Car & truck $1,193 $1,239
Travel 4,056 4,927
Meals & entertainment 212 113
Expenses for business
use of home -- 532
As noted earlier, respondent made computational adjustments,
flowing from the above, to petitioner's self-employment taxes,
the deduction for one-half of such taxes, and the earned income
credit claimed by petitioner. As also noted earlier, petitioner
conceded at trial the $212 and $113 disallowed meals and
entertainment expenses claimed respectively for 1993 and 1994.
As shown above, petitioner claimed car and truck expenses of
$13,990 and $16,828, respectively, for 1993 and 1994. On
Schedule C of the return for 1993, petitioner based the $13,990
claimed on 49,302 business miles. Petitioner stated on the
return that he had no commuting mileage that year and 2,594
additional miles for other purposes. In the notice of
deficiency, respondent determined that petitioner had 45,702
business miles for 1993 instead of 49,302 miles claimed on the
return. Respondent allowed a deduction of $12,797 at the rate of
28 cents per mile and disallowed $1,193, the balance of the
amount claimed for 1993. On the 1994 return, petitioner based
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the $16,828 claimed on 57,355 business miles. That same return
also stated that petitioner had no commuting mileage during 1994
and an additional 3,019 miles for other purposes. In the notice
of deficiency, respondent determined that petitioner had 53,755
business miles during 1994 instead of 57,355 miles claimed on the
return. Respondent allowed a deduction of $15,589 at the rate of
29 cents per mile and disallowed $1,239, the balance of the
amount claimed for 1994. For both years, the allowable business
mileage determined by respondent represented a disallowance of
3,600 miles for each year from the amounts claimed by petitioner
on his tax returns. At trial, counsel for respondent stated that
the disallowed mileage represented mileage that respondent
determined to be commuting mileage by petitioner with respect to
his ministerial and insurance activities. As to the insurance
activity, respondent determined that petitioner incurred
commuting mileage from his residence to his first destination and
from his last destination to his residence. The disallowed
commuter mileage also included the mileage from petitioner's
residence to and from the areas where petitioner was involved in
his ministerial activity.
Petitioner has not challenged the formula or the method by
which respondent determined the 3,600 disallowed business miles
for each year at issue. Petitioner contends that his principal
place of business for both the insurance and ministerial
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activities was his home; consequently, the disallowed mileage
constituted business mileage.3
The first issue is whether petitioner is entitled to a home
office deduction of $532 for 1994. Petitioner contends his
apartment was his principal place of business. Respondent
disputed this assertion.
Under section 162(a), a taxpayer is permitted to deduct all
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred in carrying on a
trade or business. Under section 280A(c)(1)(A), however,
deductions associated with a home office are generally disallowed
unless the home office was used exclusively and regularly as the
principal place of business of the taxpayer. Respondent does not
dispute that petitioner used a portion of his apartment
exclusively and regularly in his business activities but denies
3
The Court notes that the standard mileage rates used by
respondent in allowing petitioner's business mileage were 28
cents and 29 cents per mile, respectively, for 1993 and 1994.
Petitioner did not challenge the mileage rate used by respondent.
The 49,302 business miles claimed by petitioner on his 1993
return, at 28 cents per mile, would amount to $13,804.56; yet,
the amount petitioner claimed on his return was $13,990. For
1994, the 57,355 business miles claimed by petitioner on that
return, at 29 cents per mile, would amount to $16,632.95; yet,
the amount claimed by petitioner on his return was $16,828. It
appears to the Court that, since petitioner has not questioned
the allowable mileage rate for each year, either he miscalculated
the amount on his returns or included in his car and truck
expenses other items that were not disclosed or addressed at
trial. These discrepancies were not raised as an issue by
petitioner.
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that petitioner's residence constituted the principal place of
business for his two activities.
Where a taxpayer's business is conducted in part in the
taxpayer's residence and in part at another location, the
following two primary factors are considered in determining
whether the home office qualifies under section 280A(c)(1)(A) as
the taxpayer's principal place of business: (1) The relative
importance of the functions or activities performed at each
business location, and (2) the amount of time spent at each
location. See Commissioner v. Soliman, 506 U.S. 168, 175-177
(1993).
Whether the functions or activities performed at the home
office are necessary to the business is relevant but not
controlling, and the location at which goods and services are
delivered to customers generally will be regarded as an important
indicator of the principal place of a taxpayer's business, which
must be given great weight and is a principal consideration in
most cases. See id. at 175, 176. The relative importance of
business activities engaged in at the home office may be
substantially outweighed by business activities engaged in at
another location. The Supreme Court has explained as follows:
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If the nature of the business requires that its
services are rendered or its goods are delivered at a
facility with unique or special characteristics, this
is a further and weighty consideration in finding that
it is the delivery point or facility, not the
taxpayer's residence, where the most important
functions of the business are undertaken.
Id. at 176.
Petitioner contends that virtually all the work he did with
respect to his insurance clients was done at home to determine
what insurance coverage a customer had and the additional
coverage such customer might need. His visit to each customer
was to close the deal. As the Court views the situation,
however, the visit by petitioner to each customer to close a
transaction represented the most important function of
petitioner's activity because, no matter how much preparatory
work was done by petitioner at home, none of this work was of any
value unless the customer agreed to buy the insurance proposed by
petitioner. Petitioner made no sales either at home or by
telephone. The visit to each customer was to consummate a
transaction. The consummation of the transaction constituted the
delivery point or the facility at which the goods or services
were delivered. If a customer declined the offered insurance,
all of the preparatory work by petitioner was for naught. There
would be no delivery. In relative terms, therefore, the most
important function or activity of petitioner was his visit to
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each customer where the transaction with such customer was
consummated. The record does not show how many hours he worked
at home compared to the hours he visited his clients. The
preparatory work at petitioner's home, while necessary and
relevant, was not controlling.
With respect to petitioner's ministerial activity,
petitioner's sermons and other services were not offered at his
apartment. The delivery of those services occurred away from his
apartment. While petitioner prepared and researched his topics
or sermons at home, the most significant function of his activity
was the delivery of his services to the places where his patrons
or followers were located. The preparation for his services at
his apartment, while certainly relevant and necessary, was
secondary to the delivery of the services.
The Court, therefore, sustains respondent on the
disallowance of the home office expense claimed by petitioner for
1994.
The second issue is whether petitioner is entitled, under
section 162(a), to deductions for car and truck expenses in
excess of amounts allowed by respondent. As noted earlier,
respondent determined that petitioner incurred 3,600 commuting
miles for each year at issue and, therefore, disallowed car and
truck expenses of $1,193 and $1,239, respectively, for 1993 and
1994.
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It is well settled that, as a general rule, the expenses of
traveling between one's home and his place of business or
employment constitute commuting expenses which are nondeductible,
personal expenses. See sec. 262; Fausner v. Commissioner, 413
U.S. 838 (1973); Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465 (1946);
Feistman v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 129 (1974); Sullivan v.
Commissioner, 1 B.T.A. 93 (1924).
This Court has previously held that "a taxpayer's cost of
transportation between his residence and local job sites may be
deductible if his residence serves as his 'principal place of
business' and the travel is in the nature of normal and
deductible business travel." Wisconsin Psychiatric Servs. v.
Commissioner, 76 T.C. 839, 849 (1981); see Curphey v.
Commissioner, 73 T.C. 766, 777-778 (1980); Heuer v. Commissioner,
32 T.C. 947, 953 (1959). Petitioner's residence was not his
principal place of business.
The Court notes, however, that, in Walker v. Commissioner,
101 T.C. 537 (1993), the taxpayer was allowed to deduct
transportation expenses incurred between his residence and local,
temporary job sites. In Walker, the taxpayer's residence was
considered his "regular" place of business rather than his
"principal" place of business. However, the conclusion in Walker
was based on a concession of the issue by the Commissioner based
on Rev. Rul. 90-23, 1990-1 C.B. 28. This revenue ruling has
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subsequently been amended to reflect existing case law, as
articulated above. See Rev. Rul. 94-47, 1994-2 C.B. 18. Since
petitioner's residence was not his "principal place of business",
it follows that the expenses relating to the disallowed mileage
for each year constitutes commuting expenses that are not
deductible. Respondent is sustained on this issue.
The third issue is petitioner's entitlement to deductions
for travel expenses for 1993 and 1994 in connection with his
insurance and ministerial activities. Petitioner claimed $4,106
and $4,977, respectively, for 1993 and 1994, for travel expenses.
In the notice of deficiency, respondent allowed petitioner a
deduction of $50 for each year based on one out-of-town overnight
trip by petitioner each year. Respondent determined that the
disallowed amounts, $4,056 and $4,927, respectively, for 1993 and
1994, did not represent travel away from home, and, therefore,
such amounts were not deductible. Petitioner agreed that, as to
the amounts at issue, he was not away from home overnight and did
not obtain lodging in connection with those expenses. The
disallowed amounts represented costs of meals petitioner incurred
in connection with his two business activities.
Petitioner contends that he incurred the meal expenses
because he suffered with a medical condition, apnea, which
required that he take rest periods during the day. As a result,
his work day, in each of the instances he sustained such
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expenses, was much longer than normal, and he, therefore,
sustained the cost of these meals on his extended work days.
Petitioner contends that, because he was required to rest during
the course of his work day, he is entitled to a deduction for the
expenses at issue.
Section 162(a)(2) permits the deduction of traveling
expenses, including meals, while away from home in the pursuit of
a trade or business. For a taxpayer to be considered "away from
home" within the meaning of section 162(a)(2), the Supreme Court
has held that the taxpayer must be on a trip requiring sleep or
rest. See United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299 (1967). In
Barry v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1210 (1970), affd. per curiam 435
F.2d 1290 (1st Cir. 1970), this Court applied the Correll rule in
disallowing expenses for meals claimed by a taxpayer on 1-day
business trips that extended from 16 to 19 hours during which the
taxpayer rested briefly once or twice in his automobile but
always returned home without incurring an expense for lodging.
This Court held, in Barry, that the rest period required for the
deductibility of travel expenses requires a rest of sufficient
duration in time that necessitates the securing of lodging, and
that a mere pause in the daily work routine does not satisfy the
requirements of section 162(a)(2). The rationale for allowance
of the deduction in such cases is the taxpayer's significantly
higher expenses incurred by reason of the lodging. See United
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States v. Correll, supra at 304-305. On the other hand, where no
lodging expense is incurred, the meal expenses incurred by the
taxpayer do not add to the taxpayer's business expenses because
such expenses result from the sort of rest that anyone can, at
any time, without special arrangement and without special
expense, take in his own automobile or office. See Barry v.
Commissioner, supra at 1213; see also Siragusa v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1980-68, affd. without published opinion 659 F.2d 1062
(2d Cir. 1981). The fact that petitioner's rests were
necessitated by a medical condition does not render his meal
expenses deductible as travel expenses. In Barry v.
Commissioner, 435 F.2d at 1291, the Court stated:
The Commissioner's rule, known as the overnight rule,
and approved in United States v. Correll, * * *, is
particularly aimed at formulating an objective test
which will obviate individual analysis of countless
factual variations * * *. Nor does [the] taxpayer
qualify as one obliged to sleep or rest simply because
the length of his trip tired him, and he stopped by the
side of the road for a brief nap. * * * The rule
requires a stop of sufficient duration that it would
normally be related to a significant increase in
expenses. * * * [Emphasis added.]
See Chappie v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 823, 830 (1980). Under
Barry v. Commissioner, supra, the factual variation suggested by
petitioner does not entitle him to a deduction of his travel
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expenses for 1993 and 1994 in the absence of lodging. Respondent
is sustained on this issue.
Decision will be entered
for respondent.