T.C. Memo. 1999-323
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
JAMES W. TAYLOR, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 15308-97. Filed September 27, 1999.
James W. Taylor, pro se.
Anne S. Daugharty, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
WOLFE, Special Trial Judge: Respondent determined a
deficiency in petitioner's Federal income tax for 1993 in the
amount of $4,008 and an accuracy-related penalty under section
6662(a) in the amount of $797. Unless otherwise indicated,
section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for
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the year in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court
Rules of Practice and Procedure.
The issues for decision are: (1) Whether a settlement
payment that petitioner received from Central Washington
University (CWU) is excludable from his gross income under
section 104(a)(2); (2) whether petitioner has substantiated the
nature and amount of various deductions he claimed on the
Schedule C attached to his 1993 Federal income tax return;
(3) whether petitioner is entitled to a casualty loss deduction;
(4) whether petitioner is entitled to a deduction for charitable
contributions in an amount greater than the amount determined by
respondent; (5) whether petitioner is entitled to a deduction for
unreimbursed employee business expenses; (6) whether petitioner
is entitled to an individual retirement account (IRA) deduction;
and (7) whether petitioner is liable for the accuracy-related
penalty under section 6662(a).
For purposes of convenience and clarity, we have combined
the findings of fact and discussion of pertinent legal issues.
Some of the facts were stipulated, and those facts are so found
and are incorporated herein by reference. Petitioner resided in
Yakima, Washington, at the time the petition was filed in this
case.
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1. Payment From Central Washington University
Before December 8, 1992, petitioner was employed as a
maintenance mechanic by CWU. During his employment with CWU,
petitioner underwent an operation on his right shoulder for an
injury unrelated to his employment. After the shoulder surgery,
petitioner received medical advice that he should avoid lifting
amounts greater than 50 pounds. On October 20, 1992, petitioner
reinjured his right shoulder while at work. Petitioner contends
that the reinjury resulted when CWU required him to use a 60-
pound jackhammer. Petitioner did not return to work at CWU after
reinjuring his shoulder.
During his employment with CWU, through the union,
petitioner filed against CWU at least five separate grievances,
including a grievance relating to his shoulder injury.
Petitioner testified that the other four grievances relate to
CWU's "unfair labor practices, like taking * * * [his] radio and
making it unsafe for * * *[him] to work, or taking * * * [his]
driving privileges so * * * [he] had to use a wheelbarrow."
Petitioner further testified that CWU authorities "were harassing
* * *[him] and * * *[that his] union representative asked * * *
[him] to file grievances to remedy * * * [CWU's] unprofessional
conduct."
On December 8, 1992, petitioner and CWU entered into a
settlement agreement that petitioner "will through his Union
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representative, withdraw all appeals and grievances."
Petitioner also agreed to the following:
all claims, demands, rights, causes of action, the
administrative remedies that [petitioner] has or may
have against [CWU], its successors and assigns, and
each and every one of the past or present employees,
students, agents, attorneys, or representatives of
[CWU], in their individual and official capacities
arising from or related to his employment are
satisfied, discharged and settled.
CWU agreed to pay petitioner $25,000, reduced by any
compensation benefits (other than medical benefits) received as a
result of his shoulder injury. On account of his shoulder
injury, petitioner received a benefit from the Washington State
Department of Labor and Industries in the amount of $3,604.80, of
which $2,926.80 represented a benefit for lost compensation and
$678 represented medical benefits. Accordingly, in March 1993,
CWU paid petitioner $22,073.20. Petitioner contends that the
payment from CWU is excludable from gross income under section
104(a)(2).
Section 104(a)(2) excludes from gross income "the amount of
any damages * * * received (whether by suit or agreement and
whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of
personal injuries or sickness." The term “damages * * * received
(whether by suit or agreement * * *)” means an amount received
(other than workmen's compensation) through prosecution of a
legal suit or action based upon tort type rights, or through a
settlement agreement entered into in lieu of such prosecution.
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See sec. 1.104-1(c), Income Tax Regs. To exclude damages from
gross income pursuant to section 104(a)(2), the taxpayer must
prove: (1) The underlying cause of action is based upon tort or
tort type rights, and (2) the damages were received on account of
personal injuries. See Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323,
336 (1995).
Where amounts are received pursuant to a settlement
agreement, the nature of the claim that was the actual basis for
settlement controls whether such amounts are excludable from
gross income under section 104(a)(2). See United States v.
Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 237 (1992). The crucial question is "in
lieu of what was the settlement amount paid?" Bagley v.
Commissioner, 105 T.C. 396, 406 (1995), affd. 121 F.3d 393 (8th
Cir. 1997). Where a settlement agreement lacks express language
stating what the settlement amount was paid to settle, the most
important factor is the intent of the payor. See Knuckles v.
Commissioner, 349 F.2d 610, 612-613 (10th Cir. 1965), affg. T.C.
Memo. 1964-33. Determining the nature of the claim is a factual
inquiry. See Robinson v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 116, 127 (1994),
affd. in part, revd. in part, and remanded on another issue 70
F.3d 34 (5th Cir. 1995).
Petitioner has failed to establish what part, if any, of the
settlement amount here was based upon tort or tort type rights
and was received on account of personal injuries. During his
employment with CWU, petitioner filed at least four other
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grievances against CWU in addition to the grievance that
pertained to his shoulder injury. Petitioner's own testimony
shows that these four grievances were not filed on account of
physical injury but instead were filed because petitioner claimed
that he was being subjected to unfair labor practices. We find
that he has failed to prove that any of these four grievances
were tort type claims for personal injuries.
From this record, we cannot determine the amount, if any, of
the settlement payment allocable to tort type claims for personal
injuries. The agreement contains broad language relieving CWU
from liability, and the settlement agreement does not
specifically allocate any portion of the amount paid to
petitioner's shoulder injury. Under these circumstances, we hold
that the payment from CWU is not excludable from petitioner's
1993 gross income. See Taggi v. United States, 35 F.3d 93, 96
(2d Cir. 1994).
2. Schedule C Deductions
After leaving CWU, petitioner engaged in an activity known
as "Total Video". The purpose of this activity was to produce
videos. On the Schedule C attached to his 1993 Federal income
tax return, petitioner claimed the following deductions with
respect to the video activity:
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Advertising $600
Car and truck 1,210
Depreciation 3,686
Insurance 243
Legal 100
Office 100
Repairs 1,500
Supplies 200
Meals and entertainment 600
Utilities 610
Petitioner did not report any revenue from the video
activity on his 1993 Federal income tax return. Respondent has
determined that petitioner failed to substantiate entitlement to
deductions for meals, repairs, depreciation, and car expenses.
Taxpayers are required to keep sufficient records to enable
respondent to determine their correct tax liability. See sec.
6001; Hradesky v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 87, 90 (1975), affd. per
curiam 540 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1976). Moreover, deductions are
strictly a matter of legislative grace, and a taxpayer has the
burden of establishing that he or she is entitled to any
deduction claimed on a return. See Rule 142(a); INDOPCO, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992).
Under certain circumstances, where a taxpayer establishes
entitlement to a deduction but does not establish the amount of
the deduction, the Court is permitted to estimate the amount
allowable. See Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir.
1930). However, there must be sufficient evidence in the record
to permit the Court to conclude that a deductible expense was
incurred in at least the amount allowed. See Williams v. United
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States, 245 F.2d 559, 560 (5th Cir. 1957). In estimating the
amount allowable, the Court bears heavily against the taxpayer
whose inexactitude is of his or her own making. See Cohan v.
Commissioner, supra at 544.
Section 274(d) overrides the Cohan doctrine in the case of
travel expenses, meals and lodging while away from home,
entertainment, and "listed property". See Sanford v.
Commissioner, 50 T.C. 823, 827 (1968), affd. per curiam 412 F.2d
201 (2d Cir. 1969); sec. 1.274-5T(a), Temporary Income Tax Regs.,
50 Fed. Reg. 46014 (Nov. 6, 1985). Section 274(d) imposes
stringent substantiation requirements. Under section 274(a), a
taxpayer must substantiate the amount, time, place, and business
purpose of the expenditures using adequate records or sufficient
evidence corroborating his own statement. See sec. 1.274-
5T(c)(1), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46016 (Nov. 6,
1985). Adequate records are defined as an account book, diary,
log, statement of expense, trip sheets, or similar records. See
sec. 1.274-5T(c)(2), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg.
46017 (Nov. 6, 1985).
Petitioner contends that the repair expense claimed on his
Federal income tax return relates to repairs he made on a pickup
truck that was used exclusively for business. Passenger
automobiles are listed property under section 280F(d)(4)(A)(i).
With certain exceptions, any other property used as a means of
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transportation is also listed property under section
280F(d)(4)(A)(ii).
Petitioner also testified that the depreciation deduction
claimed on his 1993 Federal income tax return was by mistake
misclassified and that the expenditure actually was in the nature
of a rental expense.
We are not persuaded by petitioner's testimony or by the
evidence he presented regarding his claim for a rental expense
deduction. Petitioner asserts that during 1993 he paid $3,500 to
rent a raft, with boat gear and oarsmen, for use in his video
business. To substantiate his claimed rental expense, petitioner
introduced a handwritten receipt. Petitioner failed to provide
any further testimony regarding these items. The receipt
presented by petitioner is not persuasive. The person who
allegedly wrote the receipt was not available at trial. Under
these circumstances, and in view of petitioner's failure to
provide substantiating detail, we are not convinced that
petitioner paid $3,500 to rent a raft, with boat gear and
oarsmen. Based upon the foregoing, we hold that petitioner has
failed to substantiate his claimed entitlement to a depreciation
or rental deduction.
After considering the other receipts petitioner presented,
we find that, with one exception, petitioner has failed to
demonstrate that he is entitled to the Schedule C deductions
claimed on his 1993 Federal income tax return in excess of
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amounts allowed by respondent. Most of the expenses claimed by
petitioner are subject to the strict substantiation requirements
of section 274(d). We do find that petitioner has substantiated,
in a manner that satisfies section 274(d), $172.31 of the claimed
meal expenses. Accordingly, we hold that petitioner is entitled
to a deduction for meals in the amount of $172.31 and is not
entitled to a deduction for repairs or car expenses.
3. Casualty Loss
Petitioner contends that on March 15, 1993, he purchased a
boat and trailer for $10,000 cash. Petitioner further claims
that the boat and trailer were stolen the next day, on March 16,
1993. Petitioner never reported this supposed theft to the
police, nor did he file an insurance claim. On his 1993 Federal
income tax return, petitioner claimed that his adjusted cost
basis in the stolen property was $9,500. Petitioner has not
provided any explanation concerning the discrepancy between his
claimed adjusted cost basis and the alleged purchase price.
Section 165 provides that individual taxpayers may deduct
certain losses, including losses resulting from theft, sustained
during the taxable year and not compensated by insurance or
otherwise. See sec. 165(a), (c)(3). The amount of a theft loss
is equal to the lesser of (1) the fair market value at the time
of the theft, or (2) the adjusted cost basis of the property in
question. See sec. 1.165-8(c), Income Tax Regs.
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Petitioner has failed to substantiate entitlement to a theft
loss deduction. In support of his position, petitioner
introduced a handwritten receipt from the purported seller of the
boat and an affidavit from an alleged friend. Neither of these
persons was available at the trial, and petitioner's
documentation is not persuasive. Simply put, we find it
difficult to believe that petitioner purchased a boat, had it
stolen, and then failed to report the theft to the police.
Petitioner's account of this supposed theft lacks credibility and
in the absence of persuasive and admissible corroborating
evidence, we refuse to rely on petitioner's self-serving
testimony. See Niedringhaus v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 202, 219-
220 (1992); Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74, 77 (1986).
Based upon the record, we hold that petitioner has not
substantiated a theft loss and is not entitled to a theft loss
deduction.
4. Charitable Contribution
On his 1993 Federal income tax return, petitioner claimed
charitable contributions in cash or check in the amount of
$3,767. Respondent has determined that petitioner has not
substantiated entitlement to a charitable contribution deduction
in an amount greater than $267.
Section 170(a) allows a deduction for charitable
contributions subject to certain limitations. Section 170(c)
defines the term "charitable contribution" as a contribution or
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gift to or for the use of listed types of organizations. A
charitable contribution is allowable as a deduction only if
verified under regulations prescribed by the Secretary. See sec.
170(a)(1). For charitable contributions of money, taxpayers must
maintain for each contribution one of the following: (1) A
canceled check; (2) a receipt from the donee organization; or (3)
other reliable written records. See sec. 1.170A-13(a)(1), Income
Tax Regs. For charitable contributions of property other than
money, taxpayers generally must maintain for each contribution a
receipt from the donee showing the following information: (1)
The name of the donee; (2) the date and location of the
contribution; and (3) a description of the property in detail
reasonably sufficient under the circumstances. See sec. 1.170A-
13(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.
During the trial, petitioner presented an unsigned document
entitled, "Quarterly Report of Giving", and a letter from his
church. Both documents are unpersuasive. The document entitled
"Quarterly Report of Giving" was not signed by a church official,
even though it provided space for a signature. The church letter
does not even state a definite contribution amount.
Petitioner also claims that he contributed electrical
equipment to Perry Technical Institute and an organization known
as "N.P.O.".1 Petitioner has failed to introduce any evidence
1
We note that petitioner did not claim a contribution of
(continued...)
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that demonstrates that these alleged donees were qualified
charitable organizations. Moreover, these donees are not listed
in IRS Publication 78, "Cumulative List of Organizations
Described in Section 170(c) of the Internal Revenue Code".
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that petitioner is not
entitled to a deduction for charitable contributions in an amount
greater than the amount determined by respondent.
5. Unreimbursed Employee Expenses and IRA Contribution Deductions
On his 1993 Federal income tax return, petitioner claimed a
deduction for unreimbursed employee expenses in the amount of
$5,700, and an IRA contribution deduction in the amount of
$2,000. Respondent has determined that petitioner failed to
substantiate the claimed IRA deduction and was entitled only to a
deduction for unreimbursed employee expenses in the amount of
$224. Petitioner has failed to present any documentation or
testimony to support his claimed deductions. Accordingly,
petitioner is not entitled to a deduction for unreimbursed
employee expenses in an amount greater than the amount determined
by respondent and is not entitled to a deduction for IRA
contributions.
6. Accuracy-Related Penalty
Section 6662(a) imposes a penalty of 20 percent of the
portion of the underpayment which is attributable to negligence
1
(...continued)
property other than money on his 1993 Federal income tax return.
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or disregard of rules or regulations. See sec. 6662(b)(1).
Negligence is the lack of due care or failure to do what a
reasonable and ordinarily prudent person would do under the
circumstances. See Neely v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 934, 947
(1985). The term "disregard" includes any careless, reckless, or
intentional disregard. Sec. 6662(c). The record in this case
shows that petitioner was negligent and disregarded rules and
regulations. Petitioner has failed to furnish records or
documentation adequate to substantiate his claimed deductions.
Accordingly, we hold that petitioner is liable for the accuracy-
related penalty under section 6662(a).
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be
entered under Rule 155.