T.C. Memo. 1999-366
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
TRACY LEE MILIAN, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 3535-98. Filed November 4, 1999.
Lynn Ross, Jr., for petitioner.
Shelley T. Van Doran and Audrey M. Morris, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
PAJAK, Special Trial Judge: Respondent determined a
deficiency in petitioner's Federal income tax in the amount of
$2,464 for the taxable year 1995. Unless otherwise indicated,
section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for
the year in issue.
Petitioner conceded that he failed to report as income
$2,198 that he received from the Fort Worth Independent School
District. The only issue the Court must decide is whether
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petitioner is liable for self-employment tax under section 1401
on income received for the performance of off-duty security
services.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts in this case have been stipulated and are
so found. Petitioner resided in Fort Worth, Texas, at the time
he filed his petition.
Since 1992, petitioner has been employed as a police officer
by the Fort Worth Police Department (Department). In 1995,
petitioner was working full-time as a patrol officer in a patrol
car. As a Fort Worth police officer, petitioner is required to
abide by the rules set forth in the Department's General Orders
Manual (manual) at all times, regardless of whether he is on or
off duty. An officer who at any time violates any of the rules
in the manual is subject to discipline.
The manual also contains detailed provisions that an officer
must follow to obtain off-duty employment outside of the
Department. Under these provisions, the Department allows its
officers to work both law enforcement or security jobs (off-duty
employment) and non-security related jobs after they receive
approval from the Department and pay a one-time $100
administrative fee for a permit.
The approval or denial of a request for off-duty work is
dependent upon the officer's work requirements and the type of
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entities requiring police services. Among other things, the
officer's personnel records are verified to see whether the
officer is on probation, whether he or she is off work because of
injuries, whether there are any violations, or whether the
officer is already working a substantial amount of overtime. The
entity requesting the services of an officer is also investigated
to see whether there is a conflict of interest or whether it is
in violation of any law.
The request for approval is reviewed by the officer's
supervisor, the division captain, the bureau deputy chief, and
the Chief of Police. The names of officers who have been
approved for off-duty work are placed on a list that operates on
a rotation system. A list of approved work locations is also
maintained.
All requests by the public for an off-duty officer must be
referred to the Department's Executive Services Bureau. As a
request is made, the next officer on the list may accept or
reject the specific off-duty job. Participation in off-duty
employment is strictly voluntary.
During 1995, petitioner provided security services for two
different entities (entities), the Fort Worth Independent School
District (school district) and the Fort Worth Housing Authority
(housing authority). Petitioner worked at the William James
Middle School (school) and the Lincoln Terrace Apartments
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(apartments), a property owned by the housing authority. The
parties stipulated that the school district is not a City of Fort
Worth agency. The housing authority is not a Fort Worth agency.
Petitioner voluntarily decided to accept employment at the
school and the apartments. The Department did not assign
petitioner to work at these sites. The Department was not
obligated to send any off-duty officers to work at the school or
the apartments. Each entity decided on its own to hire off-duty
police officers instead of private security. The entities had
the complete authority to hire any approved officer, and if
dissatisfied with an officer's performance, they could fire him
or her. When petitioner went to the school or the apartments, he
was required by the manual to wear his official uniform and carry
his police equipment.
Petitioner's off-duty work schedule was based upon the needs
of the school district and the housing authority, and took into
account petitioner's on-duty hours. When petitioner reported for
duty at the school and the apartments, he knew he was there to
perform security duties. Petitioner did not report to any
representative of the school district or the housing authority.
At the school, there was a liaison officer who was on duty
and was paid by the Department to be on duty there. If the
liaison officer had a problem with petitioner, he would tell the
school district representative and then the school district, if
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it so decided, would fire the petitioner. Petitioner could carry
out his duties as he saw fit in any given situation, as long as
he did not violate any of the rules in the manual.
In the manual, there are also rules regarding income from
off-duty employment. The manual clearly states that financial
arrangements are between the officer and the employer and that
all officers must be paid on an individual basis by the employer.
Petitioner did not negotiate the amount of pay with either the
school district or the housing authority. However, when
petitioner accepted employment, he knew what the pay rate was.
Petitioner received his pay from both entities in the form of
checks made out to him personally. The checks from the school
district were mailed to petitioner at his house.
Neither the school district nor the housing authority
reported to the Department the amounts earned by petitioner. The
housing authority and the school district considered petitioner
an independent contractor, and each issued petitioner a Form 1099
which reflected that no income taxes were withheld from
petitioner's earnings.
Petitioner's on-duty salary, paid by the City of Fort Worth,
was reported on a Form W-2, had Federal income taxes and Medicare
tax withheld, and was used in the computation of retirement
benefits. The off-duty payments were not included in
petitioner's pay from the Department for any purpose.
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In 1995, Petitioner earned $32,834.85 from the City of Fort
Worth, $12,860 from the housing authority, and $2,198 from the
school district. Petitioner included the $12,860 from the
housing authority as part of what he reported as wages on his
1995 return. He failed to report on his return the $2,198
received from the school district. At trial, petitioner conceded
that the $2,198 received from the school district should have
been included in his reportable income. Petitioner did not
report any amount of self-employment tax on his off-duty income.
Petitioner contends that he was an employee of the City of
Fort Worth when he worked off-duty jobs because he was under the
control of the Department at all times. Petitioner argues that
because he was employed by the City of Fort Worth in its Police
Department for the off-duty jobs, and not self-employed, he does
not have to pay self-employment taxes on the off-duty income.
Respondent asserts that petitioner was not under the control of
the Department at the time petitioner worked off-duty jobs.
Therefore, respondent's position is that petitioner was not an
employee, and as such, his compensation from off-duty employment
is subject to self-employment tax under section 1401.
OPINION
Section 1401 imposes a tax upon a taxpayer's self-employment
income. Self-employment income includes the net earnings from
self-employment derived by an individual during the taxable year.
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Sec. 1402(b). Net earnings from self-employment consist of gross
income derived by an individual from any trade or business
carried on by such individual, less the allowable deductions that
are attributable to such trade or business, plus certain items
not relevant here. Sec. 1402(a). However, the self-employment
tax generally does not apply to compensation paid to an employee
by an employer. Sec. 1402(c)(2) and (3).
Whether an individual is an employee or an independent
contractor in a particular situation is a question of fact that
must be determined through the application of common-law
principles to the circumstances of the situation at hand. Weber
v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 378, 386-387 (1994), affd. 60 F.3d 1104
(4th Cir. 1995); sec. 31.3401(c)-1(d), Employment Tax Regs.
Section 31.3401(c)-1(b), Employment Tax Regs., defines the
employer/employee relationship as follows:
Generally the relationship of employer and employee
exists when the person for whom services are performed
has the right to control and direct the individual who
performs the services, not only as to the result to be
accomplished by the work but also as to the details and
means by which that result is accomplished. That is,
an employee is subject to the will and control of the
employer not only as to what shall be done but how it
shall be done. In this connection, it is not necessary
that the employer actually direct or control the manner
in which the services are performed; it is sufficient
if he [or she] has the right to do so. The right to
discharge is also an important factor indicating that
the person possessing that right is an employer. Other
factors characteristic of an employer, but not
necessarily present in every case, are the furnishing
of tools and the furnishing of a place to work to the
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individual who performs the services. In general, if
an individual is subject to the control or direction of
another merely as to the result to be accomplished by
the work and not as to the means and methods for
accomplishing the result, he [or she] is not an
employee.
The Court may consider various factors in determining the
relationship between the parties. These factors include:
(1) The degree of control exercised by the principal over the
details of the work; (2) which party invests in the facilities
used in the work; (3) the opportunity of the individual for
profit or loss; (4) whether or not the principal has the right to
discharge the individual; (5) whether the work is part of the
principal's regular business; (6) the permanency of the
relationship; and (7) the relationship the parties believe they
are creating. However, no one factor dictates the outcome.
Rather, we must look at all the facts and circumstances of each
case. Weber v. Commissioner, supra.
The facts of this case are strikingly similar to the facts
in Kaiser v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-526, affd. without
published opinion 132 F.3d 1457 (5th Cir. 1997), and March v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1981-339. In accord with those
opinions, we find for the following reasons that petitioner was
not an employee of the City of Fort Worth when he worked off-duty
for the school district and the housing authority.
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As in the March and Kaiser cases, the Department in this
case exercises control over off-duty jobs in that it has a
detailed approval process and the officer is always to abide by
the manual and code of ethics. However, the Court previously
found, and we so find again, that the incidental control held by
the police department relates solely to the on-duty employment
relationship, rather than to the details of the off-duty
relationship. Kaiser v. Commissioner, supra; March v.
Commissioner, supra. We find that the Department is looking
after its own interests in making sure that off-duty work does
not interfere with on-duty work, that the Department's image is
not tarnished, and that the Department knows where its officers
are located in case of an emergency.
Petitioner puts forth another argument for departmental
control stating that he has to report to other officers on his
off-duty jobs. However, we find that the coordination of the
off-duty jobs by other officers is not comparable to departmental
control. Rather, the use of a coordinating officer is merely an
administrative aid to all parties involved. It is easier for the
school district and the housing authority to converse with one
individual officer rather than a group of officers. The amount
of control held by the Department is not sufficient for us to
find that petitioner was engaged in off-duty employment as an
employee of the Department. In fact, the Department does not
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recognize off-duty employment as employment by the Department.
This is evidenced by the Form W-2 issued to petitioner and by the
fact that income from such sources is not taken into account for
pension purposes.
The conclusions in March v. Commissioner, supra and Kaiser
v. Commissioner, supra regarding other indicia of an
employee/employer relationship will be briefly reiterated and
followed by this Court. One indicator is that an employee
performs work that directly benefits the employer. March v.
Commissioner, supra. Although petitioner testified that the
Department benefited from his off-duty employment because the
amount of police calls out to the school and apartments
decreased, such a benefit was indirect and could have resulted
from the use of private security guards. March v. Commissioner,
supra. The school district and the housing authority asked for
and received the main benefit of added security provided by
petitioner's presence on their premises.
Another factor of an employee/employer relationship is the
ability to select and discharge at will. March v. Commissioner,
supra. In this case, the school district and the housing
authority retained this power. This factor militates against
petitioner's position. The mere approval from the Department to
work off-duty does not amount to the ability to hire and fire
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with regard to the off-duty positions. Kaiser v. Commissioner,
supra.
The source and method of payment may also help establish
whether an employee/employer relationship existed. March v.
Commissioner, supra. In this case, both entities, the school
district and the housing authority, operate separately from the
City of Fort Worth/the Department. Petitioner was paid
separately by each entity and his earnings were never reported to
the Department. The entities treated petitioner as an
independent contractor and issued Form 1099's. The City of Fort
Worth did not include the off-duty pay in his W-2 Form.
Although there may be some factors that point to an
employee/employer relationship, such as the use of the uniform
and equipment, these factors are not as significant as the
factors which show that the Department was not petitioner's
employer for his off-duty services. In fact, the factors in
their totality show that petitioner was self-employed.
To the extent that any of petitioner's other arguments were
not addressed by this Court, we have considered them and find
them to be without merit.
We find that petitioner was not an employee of the City of
Fort Worth when he provided security for the school district and
the housing authority. For the reasons above, and those
expressed in March v. Commissioner, supra and Kaiser v.
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Commissioner, supra, we hold that the earnings in dispute are
earnings from self-employment under section 1402, subject to the
tax imposed by section 1401.
Decision will be entered for
respondent.