T.C. Memo. 1999-422
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
WILLIAM J. TULLY, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 16008-98. Filed December 27, 1999.
William J. Tully, pro se.
Edwin A. Herrera, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
WELLS, Judge: This case is before the Court on respondent's
motion for partial summary judgment and second motion for partial
summary judgment pursuant to Rule 121.1 Respondent determined a
1
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code as in effect for the year in issue, and
all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and
(continued...)
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deficiency in petitioner's 1993 Federal income tax in the amount
of $57,327, and an addition to tax pursuant to section
6651(a)(1), for failure to file, and a penalty pursuant to
section 6663, for fraud, in the amounts of $14,332 and $42,995,
respectively. Petitioner resided in Ontario, California, at the
time he filed the petition in the instant case.
On September 29, 1998, petitioner filed a petition with this
Court seeking a redetermination of his income tax liability. In
the petition, petitioner listed as his address 634 East Yale
Street, Ontario, California 91764 (the Yale Street address). On
November 25, 1998, respondent filed an answer in the instant case
asserting the above deficiency and facts to support a fraud
penalty. Petitioner failed to deny any of the allegations
contained in respondent's answer.
On March 30, 1999, respondent moved, pursuant to Rule 37(c),
for entry of an order that the allegations in the answer be
deemed admitted. The Court issued a notice of filing of
respondent's Rule 37(c) motion and ordered that petitioner file a
reply by April 19, 1999. The order instructed petitioner that
"If petitioner files a reply as required by Rule 37(a) and (b) of
this Court's Rules * * *, respondent's motion will be denied."
The Court's notice also advised petitioner that "If petitioner
1
(...continued)
Procedure.
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does not file a reply as directed herein, the Court will grant
respondent's motion and deem admitted for purposes of this case
the affirmative allegations in the answer." Upon petitioner's
failure to file a reply, the Court granted respondent's motion
and deemed admitted the affirmative allegations of fact set forth
in respondent's answer.
On April 27, 1999, the Court issued the notice of trial for
the instant case for the trial session in Los Angeles,
California, on September 27, 1999.
On June 21, 1999, respondent filed a motion for partial
summary judgment based upon the allegations in respondent's
answer, which allegations were deemed admitted pursuant to Rule
37(c). On June 22, 1999, the Court ordered petitioner to file a
response to the motion for partial summary judgment on or before
July 22, 1999. Petitioner failed to file a response. On June
21, 1999, respondent filed a request for admissions pertaining to
the addition to tax for delinquency under section 6651(a)(1).
Petitioner failed to file a response to respondent's June 21,
1999, request. On August 24, 1999, respondent filed a second
motion for partial summary judgment based upon the admissions as
to the addition to tax under section 6651(a)(1).2 On August 27,
1999, the Court ordered petitioner to file a response to
2
Taken together, respondent's motions for partial summary
judgment, if granted, dispose of all of the issues in the instant
case.
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respondent's second motion for partial summary judgment on or
before September 10, 1999. Petitioner failed to file a response.
All papers filed by respondent contained a certificate of
service indicating that petitioner was served by mail at the Yale
Street address. All of the Court's orders were served upon
petitioner at the Yale Street address and, except the order
granting respondent's Rule 37(c) motion, were sent by certified
mail. None of the Court's mail serving the orders on petitioner
at the Yale Street address was returned as undeliverable.
On September 27, 1999, the instant case was called from the
Court's trial calendar at Los Angeles, California. Petitioner
appeared and orally moved to vacate the deemed admissions on the
ground that he had not received any of the mailings because he
had moved from his Yale Street address. Respondent objected.
Upon inquiry, respondent's counsel advised the Court that none of
the mailings to petitioner at the Yale Street address were
returned to respondent as undeliverable. The instant case was
continued for the purpose of conducting a hearing and resolving
petitioner's oral motion.
On October 25, 1999, a hearing was held before Special Trial
Judge Nameroff, and the parties appeared and were heard on
petitioner's oral motion and respondent's objection. The Court
denied petitioner's oral motion to vacate the deemed admissions,
stating:
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The evidence indicates that October 19, 1998,
petitioner had filed with the U.S. Post Office a notice
of change of address from the Yale St. address to P.O.
Box 2030, Upland, CA 91785 and that said notification
of change of address was valid for 1 year. Indeed, a
communication from respondent to petitioner on October
7, 1999, to the Yale St. address was delivered to
petitioner and signed for by him on October 14, 1999.
While it is possible that petitioner may have had some
difficulty with his mail, there is no evidence that the
Court's notifications to petitioner were not delivered,
petitioner's self-serving denials notwithstanding.
Consequently, the facts deemed admitted as a result of
respondent's Rule 37(c) motion and as a result of respondent's
request for admissions, pursuant to Rule 90(c), may be considered
for the purpose of respondent's motions for partial summary
judgment. See Marshall v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 267, 273 (1985);
Doncaster v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 334 (1981).
The following are the facts deemed admitted. During the
taxable year 1993, petitioner engaged in the business of
establishing exempt organizations. Petitioner held himself out
as an attorney authorized to practice law and as a financial
consultant. He conducted seminars encouraging people to
establish exempt organizations and falsely informed them that, by
establishing these organizations, they could avoid income tax by
conducting all of their financial transactions through the exempt
organizations. Petitioner recruited clients at the seminars as
well as through direct mailings to accountants and others.
As part of the services he provided clients, petitioner
submitted required filings to the State of Nevada and tried to
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obtain exempt status for his clients from the Internal Revenue
Service. In some cases, petitioner did not submit the required
filings. For each exempt organization he purportedly established,
petitioner received a fee of approximately $3,000. Records
maintained by the State of Nevada indicate that petitioner
attempted to establish at least 98 exempt organizations during
the taxable year 1993.
Petitioner encouraged clients to name persons as officers
and members of the exempt organizations' board of directors whom
his clients could trust to act in name only. Petitioner
emphasized that these individuals should be willing to resign at
his clients' desire and that a power of attorney from such
persons to his clients to vote on their behalf was encouraged.
On several occasions, petitioner offered to act or acted as an
officer or member of the board of such organizations. Petitioner
also maintained a list of doctors, lawyers, and others who could
be trusted to act as officers and board members in name only.
Petitioner warned his clients not to send up "flags" for the
Internal Revenue Service. On one occasion, petitioner described
the client's exempt organizations as a "license to steal". In
several instances, petitioner did not fulfill the promises he
made to his clients.
On their 1993 Federal income tax return, petitioner and his
wife filed a Schedule C which listed a business named "All
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American Financial Services" (All American). Petitioner alleged
that All American was a sole proprietorship in the business of
consulting. On the Schedule C, petitioner listed his Social
Security number but omitted his employer identification number.
Petitioner understated his Schedule C gross receipts for the 1993
taxable year by $187,745. In addition to understating his gross
receipts on the Schedule C, petitioner also overstated his
exemptions and his standard deduction for married persons and
underreported his self-employment taxes.
A motion for partial summary judgment is appropriate "if the
pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, admissions,
and any other acceptable materials, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that a decision may be rendered as a matter of law."
Rule 121(b). The party opposing the motion cannot rest upon the
allegations or denials in the pleadings but must "set forth
specific facts showing that there is * * * [a] genuine issue for
trial." Rule 121(d). "The moving party, however, bears the
burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of material
fact, and factual inferences will be read in a manner most
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment." Marshall v.
Commissioner, supra at 271.
"Fraud is defined as an intentional wrongdoing designed to
evade tax believed to be owing." Petzoldt v. Commissioner, 92
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T.C. 661, 698 (1989). Whether fraud exists is a question of fact
to be resolved upon review of the entire record. See Gajewski v.
Commissioner, 67 T.C. 181, 199 (1976), affd. without published
opinion 578 F.2d 1383 (8th Cir. 1978). "Fraud is never
presumed." Beaver v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 85, 92 (1970).
"Facts deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 37(c) are considered
conclusively established and may be relied upon by the government
even in relation to issues where the government bears the burden
of proof." Baptiste v. Commissioner, 29 F.3d 1533, 1537 (11th
Cir. 1994), affg. T.C. Memo. 1992-198; see also Doncaster v.
Commissioner, supra at 336-338 (holding that deemed admissions
under Rule 37(c) are sufficient to satisfy the Government's
burden of proof with respect to the issue of fraud).
Based on the facts asserted in respondent's answer, which
facts are deemed admitted, there is no genuine issue of material
fact with respect to respondent's determinations. Petitioner is
deemed to have fraudulently understated by $187,745 his Schedule
C gross receipts for the year in issue. Petitioner knowingly
prepared a false 1993 tax return with the intent to evade tax
when he: (1) Overstated his exemptions, (2) overstated his
standard deduction for married persons, (3) underreported his
self-employment taxes, and (4) understated his income tax
liability. Petitioner's fraudulent actions, as set forth above,
are part of a 2-year pattern of fraud in which petitioner engaged
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with the intent to evade tax. See Tully v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1997-310 (holding petitioner liable for the fraud penalty
for failing to report income from his business of establishing
exempt organizations).
In the instant case, based on the deemed admissions, we
uphold respondent's determination of the $57,327 deficiency in
petitioner's 1993 income tax. Moreover, we conclude that
respondent has satisfied the burden of proving, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the entire underpayment of tax for the
year in issue was due to fraud. Accordingly, respondent is
entitled to partial summary judgment, and petitioner is liable
for the fraud penalty pursuant to section 6663 for the taxable
year 1993.
In the case of a taxpayer who fails to file a timely tax
return, section 6651(a)(1) provides for an addition to tax,
unless the taxpayer can demonstrate that the failure to file was
due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect. See sec.
6651(a)(1). The Internal Revenue Code does not define reasonable
cause, but the regulations state: "If the taxpayer exercised
ordinary business care and prudence and was nevertheless unable
to file the return within the prescribed time, then the delay is
due to reasonable cause." Sec. 301.6651-1(c)(1), Proced. &
Admin. Regs. Willful neglect is "conscious, intentional failure
or reckless indifference." United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241,
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245 (1985).
Whether petitioner acted with "reasonable cause", and not
with "willful neglect", is a question of fact, and petitioner
bears the burden of proof. See Rule 142(a); see also Lee v.
Commissioner, 227 F.2d 181, 184 (5th Cir. 1955), affg. a
Memorandum Opinion of the Court dated Jan. 1, 1953.
Respondent's request for admissions requested that
petitioner admit or deny the following, all of which pertain to
the issue of petitioner's liability for an addition to tax for
failure to file timely pursuant to section 6651(a)(1):
1. Petitioner did not file his joint federal
income tax return for tax year ended December 31, 1993
* * * until August 2, 1995.
2. Petitioner failed to timely file his income
tax return for the taxable year 1993.
3. Petitioner had no excuse for failing to timely
file the aforesaid tax return.
Pursuant to Rule 90(c), each matter is deemed admitted
unless, within 30 days after service of the request or within
such shorter or longer time as the Court may allow, the party to
whom the request is directed serves upon the requesting party a
written answer which admits or denies the assertions made by
respondent. Based on the deemed admissions as a result of
petitioner's failure to file any response to respondent's
requests pursuant to Rule 90(c), we sustain respondent's
determination as to the failure to file timely penalty pursuant
to section 6651(a)(1).
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Pursuant to section 6673(a)(1), this Court is authorized to
impose a penalty against a taxpayer, not in excess of $25,000,
whenever it appears that, inter alia, the proceedings before the
Court have been instituted or maintained by the taxpayer
primarily for delay. See sec. 6673(a)(1)(A). The penalty
provision of section 6673(a)(1) is generally used to sanction
flagrant tax protesters and abusive tax shelters, but it is also
a proper channel for this Court to sanction and deter the use of
false testimony and to protect the integrity of our proceedings
from intentional misconduct. See Bagby v. Commissioner, 102 T.C.
596, 615 (1994); see also Ash v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 459, 472-
473 (1991) (noting this Court's power to impose sanctions when
the underlying facts and circumstances establish an abuse of the
Court's processes). In the instant case, petitioner's conduct
warrants sanction pursuant to section 6673(a)(1)(A).
Petitioner's conduct should be sanctioned because it
resulted in an abuse of the Court's processes and was designed,
primarily, to cause delay. In particular, during the September
27, 1999, trial session in Los Angeles, California, a question
arose as to petitioner's experience with Tax Court litigation.
As the Court attempted to ascertain the extent of petitioner's
Tax Court experience, the following discourse took place:
THE COURT: But you have appeared in this Court
before, is that correct?
MR. TULLY: I don't know about this courtroom,
Your Honor.
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THE COURT: The U.S. Tax Court.
MR. TULLY: I was in U.S. Tax Court one – one day.
Yes, one day in the last six, seven years, and I was
never in Tax Court or in this Court prior to that.
I've been in this Court one day, maybe two days, to
pick up paperwork or something, but only one day for a
hearing that lasted about four hours. That's my only
experience in United States Tax Court or any court.
In fact, however, petitioner has had extensive experience in the
U.S. Tax Court.
Petitioner appeared before the U.S. Tax Court, prior to his
appearance in the instant case, either pro se or as an officer of
certain charitable organizations, on nine different occasions.
See Oliver Family Found. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-234;
Hart Found. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-228; Resource
Management Found. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-224; Share
Network Found. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-216; Tamaki
Found. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-166; Tate Family Found.
v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 1999-165; Bowen Family Found. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-149; Tully v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1997-310; Oliver Family Found. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1997-220. Petitioner, moreover, is prosecuting the appeal of two
of these cases before the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
and he prosecuted one case before a Federal District Court in
Tully v. Kaply, 81 AFTR 2d 98-2125 (C.D. Cal. 1998). See Tate
Family Found. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-165.
Additionally, although petitioner is not licensed to practice
law, he did attend law school.
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Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that petitioner has
had sufficient experience with this and other courts to know that
he would be receiving important mailings pertaining to this case
and that he must contact the Court and respondent to give notice
of his address change. Instead, petitioner waited until this
case was called for trial to allege that he had not received the
Court's or respondent's notices. Petitioner then deliberately
misstated his legal experience in an apparent attempt to persuade
the Court to show leniency by vacating the deemed admissions
based upon his assertion that he had not received the Court's or
respondent's notices.
Had the Court known the extent of petitioner's legal
experience at the time of the call of this case from the
calendar, the Court would have held petitioner to the deemed
admissions when he appeared at that time. A continuance and
hearing would not have been necessary. In short, by deliberately
misstating his experience before this Court, petitioner abused
the Court's processes and caused undue delay. Petitioner's
unacceptable conduct in the instant case resulted in an
unnecessary and considerable waste of the Court's time and
resources. Accordingly, the maximum penalty is appropriate, and
we therefore, on our own motion, require petitioner to pay to the
United States a penalty in the amount of $25,000. See sec.
6673(a)(1).
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To reflect the foregoing,
An appropriate order and
decision will be entered
for respondent.