T.C. Memo. 2000-105
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
JAMES E. BRIGGSDANIELS, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 13657-98. Filed March 28, 2000.
James E. Briggsdaniels, pro se.
Laura B. Belote, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
DEAN, Special Trial Judge: Respondent determined
deficiencies in petitioner’s Federal income taxes of $2,159 for
1995 and $3,614 for 1996.
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The issues for decision are: (1) Whether petitioner is
entitled to head of household filing status;1 (2) whether
petitioner is entitled to deductions for dependency exemptions;
and (3) whether petitioner is entitled to an earned income
credit.
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
The stipulation of facts and the attached exhibits are
incorporated herein by reference. Unless otherwise indicated,
all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect
for the years at issue.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Petitioner resided in San Jose, California, at the time the
petition in this case was filed.
Petitioner, James E. Briggsdaniels, is also known as James
E. Briggs and James E. Daniels. Petitioner has never been
married. He has three sons by Charlene Riley: (1) James E.
Daniels, Jr., born May 17, 1979; (2) Jamar E. Daniels, born
December 30, 1980; and (3) Jeremy E. Daniels, born May 15, 1982.
James E. Daniels, Jr., was in juvenile custody in Santa
Clara County (County), California, from February 25 to May 21,
1995, from June 21 through September 24, 1995, and from March 23
through July 3, 1996. Jeremy E. Daniels was in juvenile custody
1
Our resolution of the issue of petitioner's filing status
will determine the correct computation of his standard deduction
for the years at issue.
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from August 29 to September 1, 1996, and from October 19, 1996,
to March 18, 1997.
On July 16, 1996, a complaint was filed in the Superior
Court of California in the case of County of Santa Clara v.
Daniels, No. DA051877, to establish petitioner’s parental
relationship to James, Jamar, and Jeremy Daniels and to collect
reimbursement of child support payments made by the County. As
part of the litigation, Mary Schriver, eligibility examiner for
the Social Services Agency (SSA) of the County, filed an
affidavit stating that SSA had paid various sums of money in
support of petitioner’s children. The affidavit filed by the
examiner states that SSA has paid, in the form of AFDC “Family
Grant” payments for one child, $3,588 in 1995, and for one child
for 10 months and two children for 2 months, $4,140 in 1996. In
addition, SSA was stated to have made foster care payments for
James Daniels, Jr. of $20,625.86 from July through December of
1996, and for Jamar Daniels $5,445 in 1995 and $700.98 in 1996.
In an attachment to the affidavit, Katherine Swayzer, maternal
aunt, is listed as the “payee/caretaker”.
Judgment was entered in favor of the County on May 18, 1999,
finding that petitioner’s paternity was established and that he
was liable for child support payments for the period July 1993
through March 1999.2
2
Respondent objects to the judgment as irrelevant. We find
the judgment to be evidence relevant to the amount of support
provided to the children in 1995 and 1996. We overrule the
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OPINION
Head of Household
Section 1(b) imposes a special tax rate on individuals
filing as “heads of households”. “Head of household” is defined
in section 2(b) as an unmarried individual whose household is
maintained as the principal place of abode for specific family
members. If a taxpayer provides over half the cost of
maintaining as his home a household that for more than one-half
the year was his sons’ principal place of abode, he meets the
head of household definition in section 2(b)(1).
Evidence in the record shows that James Daniels for several
months in 1995 and 1996 and Jeremy Daniels for several months in
1996 were wards of the County. They were in custody, according
to petitioner, “for running away.” There is also evidence that
James and Jamar Daniels spent time in foster care in 1995 and
1996. Social Service payments for his sons were not paid to him,
petitioner testified; they were paid to “Katherine Swayzer, or
either Prince Swayzer and Veronica Swayzer”, the boys’ aunts and
uncle. Katherine Swayzer is listed in Social Service documents
as “caretaker”.
Referring to James and Jeremy Daniels’ periods of custody,
petitioner testified: “But out of all that time, although they
did not live personally with me, I was still responsible for
objection and admit it into evidence.
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providing their support” whether they were in custody, or at a
foster or group home. Jamar, according to petitioner, stayed
with his aunt, Katherine Swayzer, and with petitioner. He stayed
with his aunt so that “he could go to a particular school”.
Petitioner submitted copies of miscellaneous receipts and
invoices for a variety of items including drycleaning bills,
invoices for storage payments, motel receipts, grocery receipts,
Lotto receipts, and receipts for pet supplies and other items.
Almost all the receipts and invoices were in the name of “James
E. Daniels”. There is evidence of the payment of auto insurance
and registration of an automobile in the joint names of James and
Jamar Briggs, but Jamar (Briggs) Daniels was not able to legally
drive until December of 1996. There is nothing in the record,
however, to indicate that petitioner provided over half the cost
of maintaining as his home a household that for more than one-
half the year was any of his sons’ principal place of abode in
1995 or 1996.
Petitioner has not shown that he qualifies for head of
household filing status for either year in suit, and respondent’s
determination on this issue is sustained.
Dependency Exemptions
Section 151(c)(1) allows a taxpayer to claim an exemption
deduction for each qualifying dependent. A child of the taxpayer
is considered a “dependent” so long as the child has not attained
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the age of 19 (24 if the child is a student) at the close of the
taxable year, and more than half the dependent’s support for the
taxable year was received from the taxpayer. Secs. 151(c)(1)(B),
152(a).
In order for petitioner to establish that he provided more
than half of the support of any of his sons, he must first show
by competent evidence the total amount of support furnished for
each of them by all sources for the years at issue. Blanco v.
Commissioner, 56 T.C. 512, 514 (1971). Petitioner has not
provided complete evidence of the total amount of support
provided for James, Jeremy, or Jamar Daniels for any year at
issue.
There is, on the other hand, evidence that supports
respondent’s determination that petitioner did not supply over
half the children’s support. Considering the judgment of the
Superior Court of California in County of Santa Clara v. Daniels,
supra, it appears that petitioner failed to pay child support for
the boys from 1993 through 1999. The evidence indicates that the
children were supported by the County3 and by their maternal
aunts and uncle.
Accordingly, respondent’s determination that petitioner’s
sons are not his dependents for section 151 purposes is
3
See Lutter v. Commissioner, 514 F.2d 1095 (7th Cir. 1975)
(AFDC payments constitute support by the State not by the
parent), affg. 61 T.C. 685 (1974).
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sustained.
Earned Income Credit
Petitioner claimed the earned income credit for 1995 and
1996 for two “qualifying” children, Jeremy Briggs and Jamar
Briggs. Respondent determined that petitioner is not entitled to
the earned income credit for either year.
Section 32(a)(1) allows an eligible individual an earned
income credit against the individual’s income tax liability.
Section 32(a)(2) limits the credit allowed, and section 32(b)
prescribes different percentages and amounts used to calculate
the credit based on whether the eligible individual has no
qualifying children, one qualifying child, or two or more
qualifying children.
To be eligible to claim an earned income credit with respect
to a qualifying child, a taxpayer must establish, inter alia,
that the child bears the relationship to the taxpayer prescribed
by section 32(c)(3)(B), the child meets the age requirements of
section 32(c)(3)(C), and the child shares the same principal
place of abode as the taxpayer for more than one-half of the
taxable year as prescribed by section 32(c)(3)(A)(ii).
James, Jeremy, and Jamar Daniels satisfy the relationship
and age tests, but petitioner has offered no evidence to
establish that any of his three sons shared his residence for
more than one-half of either year at issue.
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Although petitioner is not eligible to claim an earned
income credit under section 32(c)(1)(A)(i) for a qualifying
child, he may be an “eligible individual” under section
32(c)(1)(A)(ii).
An individual without a qualifying child is eligible for an
earned income credit subject to the phaseout limitations of
section 32(a)(2) if his principal place of abode is in the United
States for more than one-half the taxable year, he has attained
the age of 25 but not the age of 65, and he is not the dependent
of another for whom a deduction is allowable under section 151.
See sec. 32(c)(1)(A)(ii).
The phaseout limitations are determined by the greater of
the taxpayer’s earned income or his “modified adjusted gross
income”. See secs. 32(a)(1), (c)(2), (c)(5). Petitioner’s
earned income and modified adjusted gross income was $21,085 for
1995 and $18,136 for 1996. For tax year 1995, the earned income
credit is completely phased out under section 32(a)(2) for an
individual with no qualifying children if the individual’s earned
or modified adjusted gross income is equal to or in excess of
$9,230. See Rev. Proc. 94-72, 1994-2 C.B. 811, 813. For the
year 1996, the phaseout amount is $9,500. See Rev. Proc. 95-53,
1995-2 C.B. 445, 446-447.
Because petitioner did not have a qualifying child for 1995
or 1996 and had earned income and modified adjusted gross income
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exceeding the phaseout amounts for both years, petitioner is not
entitled to the earned income credit for either year.
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered
for respondent.