T.C. Memo. 2000-205
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
PHILIP E. PARSONS AND KAREN PARSONS, Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 9303-97. Filed July 5, 2000.
J. Timothy Bender and J. Scott Broome, for petitioners.
Christopher A. Fisher, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
GALE, Judge: Respondent determined deficiencies in
petitioners’ Federal income taxes and additions to tax as
follows:
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Additions to Tax
Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec.
Year Deficiency 6653(b)(1) 6653(b)(1)(A) 6653(b)(1)(B) 6661(a)
1
1987 $18,652 N/A $13,989 $4,663
1988 10,100 $7,575 N/A N/A 2,525
1
50 percent of the interest due on $18,652.00 for tax year 1987.
Unless otherwise noted, all section references are to the
Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years in issue, and all
Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and
Procedure.
After concessions,1 we must decide the following issues:
(1) Whether petitioners are liable for additions to tax for
fraud under section 6653(b) for 1987 and 1988.2 We hold they
are.
(2) Whether petitioners are liable for additions to tax for
substantial understatement of tax for 1987 and 1988. We hold
they are.
1
Petitioners have conceded the deficiencies in each year
at issue.
2
Petitioners have also averred that the sec. 6501(a) 3-
year period of limitations on assessment has expired with respect
to the years in issue. Because we conclude that petitioners
filed fraudulent returns for each of these years, the period for
assessment remains open. See sec. 6501(c)(1); Murphy v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-76; Sisson v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1994-545 (“The definition of fraud for purposes of section
6653 is the same as the definition of fraud for the purpose of
extending the period of limitations under section 6501(c).”),
affd. without published opinion 108 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 1996).
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FINDINGS OF FACT
At the time they filed their petition, petitioners resided
in Pepper Pike, Ohio. Petitioners were married and filed joint
returns for the years in issue.
During the years in issue, petitioner Philip E. Parsons was
a licensed pharmacist and the president and sole shareholder of
Cedar Hill Drug Company, Inc. (Cedar Hill), which operated a
pharmacy in Cleveland Heights, Ohio, and, beginning in November
1988, a second pharmacy in Solon, Ohio. Mr. Parsons formed Cedar
Hill in 1975 and incorporated it in the State of Ohio in 1981.
In addition to filling prescriptions, Cedar Hill sold milk,
tobacco, beer, wine, and other merchandise. Mr. Parsons was an
employee of Cedar Hill and was issued Forms W-2, Wage and Tax
Statement, for the years in issue. Mr. Parsons, as the
pharmacist, did not ring up sales on the register, which was
operated by other employees. Mrs. Parsons, also a licensed
pharmacist, worked at an unrelated pharmacy, and although not an
employee of Cedar Hill, she occasionally filled in for Mr.
Parsons at Cedar Hill.
During the years at issue, petitioners retained the
accounting firm Skoda, Minotti, Reeves & Co. (SMR) to perform
bookkeeping and tax consultation services for Cedar Hill, as well
as to prepare Cedar Hill’s corporate income tax returns and
petitioners’ personal income tax returns. Joseph F. Skoda was
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the SMR partner responsible for petitioners’ and Cedar Hill’s
accounts.
SMR supplied petitioners with forms for the purpose of
recording cash transactions in Cedar Hill’s operations. These
forms were titled “Daily Sales and Cash Report” and were referred
to as “pink sheets”. The pink sheets provided a means of
recording different categories of cash receipts and disbursements
so that petitioners and SMR could account for Cedar Hill’s cash.
The cash disbursement categories included a line denoted
“Personal Drawing” for recording cash withdrawn by Mr. Parsons
for personal use. The pink sheets also had a line for recording
the amount of cash deposited into Cedar Hill’s bank account. Mr.
Parsons understood the “Personal Drawing” line to be a place for
recording money taken out of the register during the course of
the day for personal use.
At the end of each business day, Mr. Parsons brought home
the register tapes, cash, and receipts from the cash registers at
Cedar Hill and gave them to Mrs. Parsons, who then completed the
pink sheet record for that day. By comparing the cash and the
register tapes from each cash register and shift, it could be
determined whether each cashier was properly accounting for his
or her cash receipts. Each morning, Mr. Parsons would take the
cash that Mrs. Parsons had counted in preparing the pink sheets
the previous evening, so he could deposit it in Cedar Hill’s bank
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account. At some point during the business day, he would deposit
cash into Cedar Hill’s bank account.
Mr. Parsons did not receive regularly scheduled, pro rata
installments of his salary from Cedar Hill. Instead, either Mr.
or Mrs. Parsons would take cash from Cedar Hill’s proceeds as
needed for living expenses. On occasion, Mr. Parsons would
remove cash from the Cedar Hill registers during the business
day, and either he or Mrs. Parsons would record the withdrawal on
the pink sheets on the personal drawing line. In the evening,
Mrs. Parsons would sometimes remove cash that had been brought
home from Cedar Hill and use it for the Parsonses' personal use.
Mrs. Parsons recorded these withdrawals on the pink sheets as
personal draws. The withdrawals of cash that were recorded as
personal draws on the pink sheets and the value of any business
checks written for personal expenditures were tallied at yearend
by SMR and offset against the salary due Mr. Parsons. Cedar Hill
would then issue a check to Mr. Parsons for any remaining salary
due him.
However, not all cash taken by Mr. Parsons from Cedar Hill’s
proceeds was recorded on the pink sheets. On many occasions, Mr.
Parsons would remove cash from the previous day’s proceeds that
had been counted by Mrs. Parsons the previous evening, had been
recorded on the pink sheets as deposited, and was awaiting
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deposit into Cedar Hill’s bank account.3 These withdrawals of
cash by Mr. Parsons were not noted as personal draws or otherwise
recorded on the pink sheets. As a result, the pink sheets
reflected the cash on hand at the end of each business day but
often did not reflect the subsequent cash withdrawals made by Mr.
Parsons before making deposits into Cedar Hill’s bank account.
The total cash withdrawn by Mr. Parsons but not recorded on the
pink sheets equaled $57,106 in 1987 and $35,957 in 1988. Some,
but not all, of this money was deposited into Mrs. Parsons’
personal bank account.
After the close of each month, Mr. Parsons forwarded that
month’s pink sheets to SMR. He also provided handwritten
summaries of that month’s sales and accounts receivable (the
white sheets). Using the pink sheets, the white sheets, and
other records of check transactions, SMR prepared monthly balance
sheets, income statements, and general ledger sheets for Cedar
Hill.
Mr. Skoda noticed that the amounts recorded for Cedar Hill’s
accounts receivable could not be reconciled with the cash in
Cedar Hill’s bank account, nor did the “Cash Deposited” amounts
Mrs. Parsons had recorded on the pink sheets match the actual
3
Often, Mr. Parsons would make such withdrawals at the
request of Mrs. Parsons, who would call him at Cedar Hill and
request that he deposit additional funds in her personal checking
account to cover checks she was writing.
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amounts deposited. Mr. Skoda attributed these discrepancies to
the large volume of workmen’s compensation prescriptions filled
by Cedar Hill, wherein the nominal amounts billed for such
prescriptions were greater than the actual amounts reimbursed to
Cedar Hill for such prescriptions. Mr. and Mrs. Parsons did not
mention to Mr. Skoda that they had withdrawn for personal use
some of the amounts listed as deposits on the pink sheets, and
Mr. Skoda did not review the Parsonses’ personal bank accounts
during the years at issue.
At various times, Mr. Parsons advanced funds to Cedar Hill,
and as of January 31, 1987, Cedar Hill’s books recorded debt owed
to Mr. Parsons of $54,891.68. In February 1987, in an effort to
avoid Mr. Parsons’ having imputed interest income from Cedar
Hill, SMR recharacterized on Cedar Hill’s books $52,000 of the
indebtedness to Mr. Parsons as Mr. Parsons’ paid-in capital. As
a result of SMR’s action, by February 28, 1987, Cedar Hill’s
indebtedness to Mr. Parsons was recorded as only $3,066.68, and
by April 30, 1987, the indebtedness had been eliminated from
Cedar Hill’s books.
In April or May of 1989, Donald Paskert, a revenue agent for
respondent, began a Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program audit
of Cedar Hill. At that time, Mr. Paskert asked for and received
all of Cedar Hill’s books and records. During his audit of Cedar
Hill, Mr. Paskert was unable to reconcile the deposit amounts
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listed on the pink sheets with the bank deposits recorded on the
bank statements for Cedar Hill’s account. He was also unable to
match the figures from Cedar Hill’s white sheets with those from
the pink sheets. To resolve these discrepancies, Mr. Paskert
expanded his investigation to the personal tax returns of
petitioners. He requested and received petitioners’ personal
bank records in the fall of 1989, which indicated that
petitioners had made deposits that far exceeded the income
reported on their returns. In a subsequent telephone interview
with Mr. Paskert, when asked about these excess deposits, Mr.
Parsons admitted that all the funds in petitioners’ bank account
consisted of either Mrs. Parsons’ wages or money removed from
Cedar Hill. At a second meeting in December 1989, Mr. Parsons
admitted to Mr. Paskert that the pink sheets did not reflect all
of the cash withdrawn from Cedar Hill by petitioners.
Mr. and Mrs. Parsons were subsequently indicted and, after a
jury trial, convicted of two violations of section 7206(1) with
respect to their 1987 and 1988 returns, for subscribing to false
income tax returns. Specifically, the indictments charged
petitioners with reporting on each return total income which they
knew to be false.
Petitioners reported gross income of $49,660 and $54,379 in
1987 and 1988, respectively, which included salary income of Mr.
Parsons from Cedar Hill of $25,000 and $30,000, respectively.
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For the same respective years, respondent determined, using the
bank deposits and cash expenditures method, that petitioners had
unreported income of $57,106 and $35,957. Petitioners now
concede they had unreported income in these amounts, the source
of which was cash proceeds from Cedar Hill’s operations not
deposited into Cedar Hill’s bank accounts but instead retained by
petitioners. Thus, petitioners received from Cedar Hill a total
of $82,106 and $65,957 during 1987 and 1988, respectively, while
reporting as income only $25,000 and $30,000, respectively, from
that source.
Respondent determined in addition that the underpayments
resulting from the unreported income in each year at issue were
due to fraud and that there was a substantial understatement of
tax in each year within the meaning of section 6661(a).
Petitioners dispute these determinations.
OPINION
1. Fraud
The existence of fraud is a question of fact. See Hagaman
v. Commissioner, 958 F.2d 684, 696 (6th Cir. 1992), affg. and
remanding on other grounds T.C. Memo. 1987-549. Respondent has
the burden of proving fraud by clear and convincing evidence.
See sec. 7454(a); Rule 142(b). If respondent establishes that
any portion of an underpayment is attributable to fraud, the
entire underpayment shall be treated as attributable to fraud,
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except to the extent petitioners establish otherwise. See sec.
6653(b)(2). To establish fraud, respondent must show that
petitioners "engaged in conduct with the intent to evade taxes
that * * * [they] knew or believed to be owing." United States
v. Walton, 909 F.2d 915, 926 (6th Cir. 1990). Direct evidence of
fraud is seldom available. See Petzoldt v. Commissioner, 92 T.C.
661, 699 (1989); Rowlee v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1111, 1123
(1983). Consequently, we may rely on circumstantial evidence to
establish fraud. See United States v. Walton, supra; see also
Hagaman v. Commissioner, supra at 696. Fraud may be inferred
from "any conduct, the likely effect of which would be to mislead
or to conceal." Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 499
(1943). The taxpayer’s background, including his sophistication,
experience and education, and the context of the events in
question may be considered circumstantial evidence of fraud. See
Solomon v. Commissioner, 732 F.2d 1459, 1461-1462 (6th Cir.
1984), affg. per curiam T.C. Memo. 1982-603; Plunkett v.
Commissioner, 465 F.2d 299, 303 (7th Cir. 1972), affg. T.C. Memo.
1970-274; Niedringhaus v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 202, 211 (1992).
The courts have established several indicia or "badges" of
fraud which include: (1) Understating income; (2) maintaining
inadequate records; (3) giving implausible or inconsistent
explanations of behavior, (4) concealment of income or assets,
(5) failing to cooperate with tax authorities, (6) engaging in
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illegal activities, (7) an intent to mislead which may be
inferred from a pattern of conduct, (8) lack of credibility of
the taxpayer’s testimony, (9) filing false documents, (10)
failing to file tax returns, and (11) dealing in cash. Spies v.
United States, supra at 499; Conti v. Commissioner, 39 F.3d 658,
662 (6th Cir. 1994), affg. and remanding on other grounds T.C.
Memo. 1992-616; Douge v. Commissioner, 899 F.2d 164, 168 (2d Cir.
1990); Bradford v. Commissioner, 796 F.2d 303, 307-308 (9th Cir.
1986), affg. T.C. Memo. 1984-601; Recklitis v. Commissioner, 91
T.C. 874, 910 (1988). Although no single factor is necessarily
sufficient to establish fraud, the existence of several indicia
constitutes persuasive circumstantial evidence of fraud. See
Bradford v. Commissioner, supra at 307; Petzoldt v. Commissioner,
supra at 700. Finally, although not dispositive, a conviction
for filing false Federal income tax returns under section 7206(1)
is evidence of fraudulent intent. See Wright v. Commissioner, 84
T.C. 636, 643-644 (1985); Miller v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1989-461.
Petitioners concede they had unreported income resulting in
the deficiencies as determined by respondent for 1987 and 1988,
which establishes an underpayment for each year. However, they
contend that the underpayments were not due to fraud.
Petitioners mount a number of arguments to show that they lacked
the requisite fraudulent intent.
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First, to rebut the adverse inferences that might be drawn
from the fact that Mr. Parsons often took cash from Cedar Hill’s
proceeds without recording it on the pink sheets as a personal
draw, petitioners contend that they understood the pink sheets to
function merely as a “snapshot” of the day’s business activity,
so that cash removed after the business day need not be reflected
on the pink sheets. Thus, the argument goes, Mr. Parsons
recorded cash he withdrew for personal use from the registers
during business hours but did not believe it was necessary to
record cash taken on the following day before Cedar Hill’s
proceeds were deposited into its bank account. Besides finding
it implausible that a college-educated, successful businessman
could believe this, we note that petitioners’ own actions are
inconsistent with this explanation. Mrs. Parsons testified that
she would on occasion remove cash for petitioners’ personal use
in the evenings at home when she was performing her bookkeeping
tasks for Cedar Hill, and that these withdrawals were recorded as
personal draws on the pink sheets. If petitioners believed the
pink sheets were to function only as a “snapshot” of the business
day, Mrs. Parsons’ after-hours withdrawals would not need to be
recorded.4
4
Petitioners’ “snapshot” theory is also different from the
explanation initially provided by petitioners’ accountant to
respondent’s revenue agent in the course of the audit. As
(continued...)
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Apparently recognizing that if, as they professed to
believe, it was not necessary to record on the pink sheets all
withdrawn cash, then there would have to be some means by which
SMR could trace withdrawn cash not so recorded, petitioners claim
they believed SMR would compile the unrecorded cash by examining
the records of Mrs. Parsons’ personal checking account, into
which petitioners claim all such cash was deposited. Petitioners
concede that the records of Mrs. Parsons’ account were never
given to SMR but claim this failure resulted from a
miscommunication between them. Mr. Parsons testified that he
instructed his wife to provide her checking account records to
their accountant; Mrs. Parsons testified that she misunderstood
this instruction. Thus, Mr. Parsons claims, he believed his
accountant was taking account of all the cash Mr. Parsons removed
from Cedar Hill’s proceeds because he could track it through the
cash deposits made into Mrs. Parsons’ checking account.
Petitioners’ efforts to account for the failure to provide
Mrs. Parsons’ personal checking account records to their
accountant-–which records, in their version of events, were
crucial to the accountant’s correctly compiling their income-–are
4
(...continued)
petitioners’ authorized representative, the accountant advised
the agent that Mr. Parsons’ explanation was that the pink sheets
had already been completed and were at home when, on the
following morning, he would remove some of the cash awaiting
deposit to Cedar Hill’s bank account.
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based entirely on their self-serving testimony and are
unconvincing. Moreover, this failure purportedly caused by
miscommunication occurred 2 years in a row. The amounts reported
on petitioners’ returns as Mr. Parsons’ salary or “draw” from
Cedar Hill were $25,000 and $30,000 in 1987 and 1988,
respectively. Petitioners have conceded that the actual amounts
they received from Cedar Hill in those years were $82,106 and
$65,957, respectively. We do not believe that petitioners could
continue to believe that their accountant was successfully
tracking all the cash they were taking from Cedar Hill, via Mrs.
Parsons’ checking account records, which were never furnished to
the accountant, or otherwise, in light of the size of the
discrepancies in the figures reported on the return and the
amounts actually taken in each year. Finally, respondent has
reconstructed personal expenditures in each year (which
petitioners have conceded) that substantially exceed the net
balance plus deposits into Mrs. Parsons’ checking account,
creating the clear inference that significant amounts of cash
taken from Cedar Hill by Mr. Parsons were not deposited into the
account, as petitioners contend, but spent directly on personal
expenditures. Accordingly, even if SMR had been provided with
Mrs. Parsons’ checking account records, it would not have been
able to reconstruct all of Mr. Parsons’ diversions from Cedar
Hill.
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Petitioners further contend that they lacked fraudulent
intent because they believed any cash they received from Cedar
Hill in excess of Mr. Parsons’ reported salary constituted
repayment of loans owed to Mr. Parsons by the corporation.
Although on January 31, 1987, Cedar Hill owed Mr. Parsons
$54,892, by February 28, 1987, the value of the loans had been
reduced to $3,067. This reduction resulted from SMR’s decision
to recharacterize amounts recorded as debt as paid-in capital in
order to preclude petitioners’ having imputed interest income in
respect of these amounts. Petitioners assert that they were
never informed of the elimination of this indebtedness.
We do not find petitioners’ “loan repayment” rationale
convincing. Regardless of whether petitioners had been advised
of their accountant’s recharacterization of the loan amounts as
paid-in capital, their rationale that the cash Mr. Parsons took
constituted loan repayments fails because there was no way for
their accountant to keep track of the purported “repayments” by
Cedar Hill. Only if one accepts that Mrs. Parsons’ checking
account was intended to provide a means for SMR to compile Mr.
Parsons’ removals of cash-–which, for the reasons previously
stated, we do not-–could SMR have any conceivable way of keeping
track of Cedar Hill’s outstanding indebtedness to Mr. Parsons as
he “paid himself back” with diverted cash.
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A final argument by petitioners deserves brief
consideration. Petitioners contend that if they were attempting
to evade taxes, they would not have left such a clear “paper
trail”. Specifically, petitioners argue that a lack of
fraudulent intent should be inferred from the fact that all of
the diverted cash was deposited into Mrs. Parsons’ checking
account, creating a clear record of the diversions which they
would have avoided if their intent were to evade. As discussed
previously, the record in this case refutes petitioners’ claim
that all their cash withdrawals from Cedar Hill were deposited
into Mrs. Parsons’ checking account. A second “paper trail” that
petitioners contend they created, which rebuts fraudulent intent,
concerns the accurate recording of all of Cedar Hill’s cash sales
on the pink sheets. According to this argument, it would have
been “very simple” for Mr. Parsons to avoid ringing up cash sales
on the register or to record a lower figure for cash sales on the
pink sheets if he intended to evade taxes. We find this argument
unpersuasive. First, the record in this case does not establish
that the pink sheets accurately recorded Cedar Hill’s
transactions in cash. Respondent reconstructed unreported income
using the bank deposit and cash expenditures method, not by
reference to data on the pink sheets. As to the suggestion that
Mr. Parsons could have simply avoided ringing up sales on the
register if he wished to divert cash surreptitiously, we note
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that Mr. Parsons testified that, as pharmacist, he did not
operate the cash register at Cedar Hill; this task was performed
by other employees. Thus, Mr. Parsons could not have readily
avoided ringing up cash sales without involving his employees in
this scheme.
In summary, we find that in removing cash from Cedar Hill’s
proceeds and failing to record or report such removal to their
accountant, petitioners engaged in “conduct * * * likely * * * to
mislead or to conceal.” Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. at 499.
The amounts petitioners diverted to personal use that were not
reported on their returns for 2 years in a row were substantial
in relation to their reported income, rebutting inferences of
mere mistake or inadvertence. The explanations offered by
petitioners to cast these events in a more innocent light are
implausible and unpersuasive. Moreover, petitioners were both
convicted of violations of section 7206(1) for filing returns for
each year in issue reporting an amount of income which they knew
to be false. While the convictions under section 7206(1) do not
estop petitioners from denying fraud for these years, they are
evidence of fraud. Absent some credible evidence that knowingly
filing a false return should not be considered indicative of
fraud, a section 7206(1) conviction is highly persuasive of
fraud. See Biaggi v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-48; Wilson v.
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Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-454; Avery v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1993-344; Williamson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-246.
On the basis of the foregoing, we hold that respondent has
shown by clear and convincing evidence that the underpayments in
1987 and 1988 are due to fraud on the part of both petitioners.
Under section 6653(b)(3), the fraud of one joint-filing spouse
cannot be attributed to the other; respondent must show that each
spouse engaged in fraud. Although on the basis of petitioners’
testimony it appears that all or most of the cash diversions from
Cedar Hill may have been the result of Mr. Parsons’ taking cash
without recording it as a personal draw, Mrs. Parsons’
involvement in and awareness of the diversions is clear.
According to petitioners’ testimony, the cash withdrawals that
were not recorded on the pink sheets typically occurred when Mrs.
Parsons would call Mr. Parsons at work to request that he make a
deposit into her account to cover checks she was writing. Mrs.
Parsons’ testimony that she had “no idea” where Mr. Parsons got
the money to make these deposits is, in the circumstances, not
credible. Because she performed daily bookkeeping duties for
Cedar Hill, Mrs. Parsons had knowledge of the business’ finances
and the extent of petitioners’ use of Cedar Hill proceeds.
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2. Substantial Understatements
Section 6661 provides for a 25-percent addition to tax on
any substantial understatement. A substantial understatement is
one that exceeds the greater of 10 percent of the tax required to
be shown on the return or $5,000. See sec. 6661(b)(1). The
amount of the understatement, for purposes of section 6661, is to
be reduced by the portion attributable to any item for which
there was substantial authority or any item that was adequately
disclosed. See sec. 6661(b)(2)(B). In addition, the
Commissioner may waive all or part of a section 6661 addition to
tax upon a showing by the taxpayer that there was reasonable
cause for the understatement and that the taxpayer acted in good
faith. See sec. 6661(c).
Petitioners have not claimed substantial authority or
adequate disclosure. Rather, petitioners argue they had
reasonable cause and acted in good faith and that respondent
abused his discretion in denying them relief. To show reasonable
cause and good faith, petitioners rely upon the same arguments
and explanations they employed in an effort to show that they
lacked fraudulent intent. These arguments are no more persuasive
here, nor do we see how petitioners can reconcile their
convictions under section 7206(1) with a showing of reasonable
cause or good faith. For the foregoing reasons we do not find
that respondent acted “arbitrarily, capriciously, or without
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sound basis in fact” in not waiving the additions to tax in this
case. Mailman v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 1079, 1084 (1988); see
also Rao v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-500.
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered
for respondent.