T.C. Memo. 2000-224
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
JOSEPH P. MCGIVNEY, JR., Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 10329-99. Filed July 28, 2000.
Thomas J. Handler, for petitioner.
Patricia Pierce Davis, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
LARO, Judge: Respondent moves the Court to enter a decision
in accordance with the parties' stipulation of settled issues
(stipulation) filed on March 20, 2000. Petitioner objects
thereto, asserting that he has recently learned of possible
evidence of documents which will disprove certain terms of the
stipulation. We must decide whether, as requested, we shall
defer entry of decision until after petitioner obtains the
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documents and shares them with respondent. We hold that we shall
not. Section references are to the Internal Revenue Code for the
year in issue.
Background
Respondent determined a $59,114 deficiency in petitioner's
1995 Federal income tax and additions thereto of $2,662.95 and
$3,205.33 under sections 6651(a)(1) and 6654, respectively.
While residing in Illinois petitioner petitioned the Court to
redetermine these amounts. The Court set this case for trial in
Chicago, Illinois, on March 20, 2000. On the date set for trial
the parties filed the stipulation, and the Court ordered that the
stipulated decision document be submitted to the Court by April
19, 2000. Petitioner now refuses to sign the decision document,
asserting that he has recently become aware that documents may
exist which support the allegations set out in his petition.
Petitioner asserts:
petitioner believes that the financial records and
information [alleged to be newly discovered but not in
petitioner’s possession] will indicate that the taxable
income amounts, related tax liability, and interest and
penalty previously conceded in the stipulation of
settled issues, are inaccurate and petitioner is harmed
by conceding to such amounts.
Petitioner does not move the Court to vacate the stipulation1 but
1
Even assuming arguendo, that petitioner is making such a
motion through his response to respondent's motion for entry of
decision, we would deny the motion under the rationale of Stamm
Intl. Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 315, 321 (1988)
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requests that we deny respondent's motion and that in view of the
aforementioned information, which is not supported by affidavit,
petitioner be granted additional "time to present such new
information to District Counsel."
Discussion
The compromise and settlement of tax cases is governed by
general principles of contract law. See Dorchester Indus., Inc.
v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. 320, 330 (1997), affd. without
published opinion 208 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2000). A settlement
stipulation is in essence a contract. Each party agrees to
concede some rights which he or she may assert against his or her
adversary as consideration for those secured in the settlement
agreement. See Saigh v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 171, 177 (1956).
Like contracts, stipulations of settlement bind the parties
thereto to the terms thereof. See Stamos v. Commissioner, 87
T.C. 1451, 1455 (1986). In determining the proper meaning of the
terms, we look to the language of the stipulation and the
circumstances surrounding its execution. See Robbins Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 420, 435-436 (1969); see also
Brink v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 602, 606 (1962), affd. 328 F.2d
662 (6th Cir. 1964). We will enforce a stipulation of
settlement, whether filed or orally stipulated into the record,
unless justice requires that we do otherwise. See Dorchester
Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at 335; Saigh v.
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Commissioner, supra at 177 (1956); cf. Adams v. Commissioner, 85
T.C. 359, 375 (1985) (less stringent standard to modify or set
aside settlement stipulation when a trial is not canceled as a
result of the stipulation).
Petitioner makes no allegations that the decision proffered
by respondent is not in accordance with the stipulation. The
stipulation, which is clear on its face, speaks for itself and
shows that the parties agreed to resolve this case in the manner
therein set out. The stipulation, voluntarily entered into, must
be given binding effect. The parties struck a bargain in the
stipulation, and petitioner must live with the benefits and
burdens of it. See Summers v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-17.
We hold that on the material before us, there is no reason to
delay entry of a decision, reflecting the stipulation.
To reflect the foregoing,
An appropriate order will be
issued granting respondent's
motion for entry of decision and
decision will be entered in
accordance therewith.