T.C. Memo. 2000-248
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
LORETTA JEAN RANDOLPH, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 10540-97. Filed August 9, 2000.
Loretta Jean Randolph, pro se.
J. Anthony Hoefer, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
MARVEL, Judge: Respondent determined a deficiency in
petitioner’s 1994 Federal income tax of $11,148 and additions to
tax under sections 6651(a)(1)1 and 6654 of $2,787 and $575,
1
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the year in issue, and
all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and
Procedure.
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respectively. The issues for decision2 are (1) whether
petitioner realized income of $50,000 under section 61(a)(12)
from the discharge of indebtedness; (2) whether she is liable
under section 6651(a)(1) for the addition to tax for late filing;
and (3) whether she is liable under section 6654 for the addition
to tax for failure to pay estimated tax. We hold that petitioner
realized income of $50,000 from the discharge of indebtedness and
that she is liable for the additions to tax.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
The stipulation of facts is incorporated herein by this
reference. Petitioner resided in Kearney, Nebraska, when she
filed her petition in this case.
On or before December 31, 1977, petitioner’s mother and
stepfather (the Pattersons) formed Murl Patterson, Inc., a
corporation organized under the laws of the State of Nebraska
(corporation). Thereafter, commencing on or about December 30,
1977, and continuing at least through January 1, 1983, the
Pattersons made a series of gifts of the corporation’s common
stock to their three daughters and their spouses. By January 1,
2
Additional issues determined by respondent in the notice of
deficiency and not included by petitioner in the petition are
deemed conceded. See Rule 34(b)(4).
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1983, petitioner and her now former spouse owned 604 shares of
the corporation’s stock out of a total of 4,000 shares
outstanding.
On April 10, 1989, petitioner received a check made payable
to her in the amount of $50,000 and written on an account
maintained in the name of the corporation. The check memo line
contained the following notation: “10,000 gift 40,000 loan”.
Also on April 10, 1989, petitioner signed a promissory note
(note) in which she promised to pay the corporation $50,000. The
note was payable on demand and did not provide for the payment of
interest. Beneath petitioner’s signature was the typed
instruction to “SEE BACK”. The reverse side of the note
contained the following typed statement: “Unless sooner
terminated, as herein provided, upon the deaths of both Murl E.
Patterson and Dorothy E. Patterson, this note shall be
cancelled.” The Pattersons signed and dated that statement as of
November 21, 1991.
Petitioner made no payments on the note. On a Schedule L,
Balance Sheet, filed with its 1993 corporate income tax return3
3
At trial, petitioner objected to the admission of the
corporation’s 1993 return and 1994 return on hearsay grounds. We
admitted the 1994 return under the so-called business records
exception to the hearsay rule. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). We
deferred ruling on her objection to the 1993 return. After
consideration, we admit the 1993 return also under the business
record exception to the hearsay rule.
(continued...)
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the corporation listed the note among its assets as of yearend
1993 under the category “trade notes and accounts receivable”.
In addition to petitioner’s $50,000 note, the assets included in
the trade notes and accounts receivable category included notes
given to the corporation by petitioner’s two sisters relating to
certain amounts they also had received from the corporation. On
a Schedule L filed with its 1994 corporate income tax return the
corporation listed the note among its assets as of the beginning
of 1994 under the category “trade notes and accounts receivable”.
During 1993 and 1994, the Pattersons caused a reorganization
of the corporation (reorganization) under which its assets were
divided among it and three newly formed corporations; i.e.,
Charity Field Farms, Inc. (Charity), MDA Farms, Inc. (MDA), and M
& D Hay & Cattle Co., Inc. (M & D). Pursuant to the plan of
reorganization, during 1994 petitioner and her former spouse
surrendered their shares of common stock of the corporation in
exchange for shares of common stock of Charity and M & D.4
Neither the corporation nor Charity, MDA, or M & D included the
note as an asset as of yearend 1994 on the Schedules L they filed
3
(...continued)
At trial, we also reserved ruling on objections to the
following exhibits: 10-R, 16-P, 19-P, 32-P, 35-P, 36-P, 37-P,
38-P, 39-P, 44-P, and 58-P. The party offering each exhibit
failed to overcome the objections to that exhibit at trial or in
the briefs. Consequently, we do not admit these exhibits.
4
Richard Randolph also received shares of Charity’s class A
voting preferred stock.
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with their corporate income tax returns for that year. The
record does not reveal whether at any time petitioner had assets
sufficient to repay the $50,000.
During 1995, petitioner completed, executed, and submitted
to the Internal Revenue Service (the Service) a Form 1040, U.S.
Individual Income Tax Return, for the 1994 taxable year (1994
Form 1040). Before submitting the Form 1040, petitioner struck
the words “penalties” and “perjury” from the verification portion
of that form (jurat) which appeared immediately above her
signature. Before that action, the jurat read: “Under penalties
of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return and
accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my
knowledge and belief, they are true, correct, and complete.” The
1994 Form 1040 reflected no tax payments made for that year by
petitioner, either through withholding or estimated payments.
Respondent determined that petitioner’s 1994 Form 1040 did
not constitute a valid Federal income tax return because she did
not sign it under penalty of perjury. In the notice of
deficiency, respondent included $50,000 in petitioner’s income on
the ground that the corporation had relieved her indebtedness to
it by that amount in connection with the reorganization. In
addition, respondent determined that petitioner was liable for an
addition to tax under section 6651(a)(1) because she had not
filed a valid 1994 Federal income return by its due date and for
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an addition to tax under section 6654(a) because she did not pay
sufficient estimated tax for 1994.
OPINION
Section 61(a) provides that gross income means all income
from whatever source derived. That section has been interpreted
broadly to encompass all gains except those specifically exempted
by Congress. See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S.
426, 430 (1955). Gross income, however, generally does not
include the value of property acquired by gift or advancements in
the nature of loans. See sec. 102(a); Beaver v. Commissioner, 55
T.C. 85, 91 (1970); Gatlin v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 50 (1936).
On the other hand, it generally does include income from the
discharge of indebtedness. See sec. 61(a)(12); United States v.
Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931); see also, e.g., Babin v.
Commissioner, 23 F.3d 1032, 1034 (6th Cir. 1994), affg. T.C.
Memo. 1992-673; Cozzi v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 435, 445 (1987).
The gain to the debtor from the forgiveness of debt results from
the freeing up of assets that otherwise would have been required
to pay off the debt. See United States v. Kirby Lumber Co.,
supra; Milenbach v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. 184, 202 (1996).
Whether a debt has been discharged depends on the substance of
the transaction. See Cozzi v. Commissioner, supra. When a debt
has been canceled is determined on the facts and circumstances of
each case. See id.; Miller Trust v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 191,
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195 (1981); Estate of Bankhead v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 535, 539
(1973). Petitioner bears the burden of proving that a discharge
of indebtedness does not result in taxable income. See Rule
142(a); Miller Trust v. Commissioner, supra.5
Respondent contends that the corporation lent petitioner
$50,000 in 1989 and that the debt remained unpaid and an asset of
the corporation until April 11, 1994, when enforcement on the
debt expired by operation of law.6 Respondent further contends
that the corporation canceled petitioner’s obligation on the note
during 1994. Thus, respondent asserts, petitioner realized
income during 1994 in the amount of $50,000 from the discharge of
indebtedness.
Petitioner, on the other hand, contends that she realized no
taxable income during 1994 relating to the forgiveness of debt.
She maintains that when she received the $50,000 from the
corporation the Pattersons had agreed to treat the payment as a
5
The burden of proof provisions of sec. 7491 do not apply
here because the examination in this case began prior to July 22,
1998. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring & Reform Act of
1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001, 112 Stat. 726.
6
In support of this contention, respondent relies on Neb.
Rev. Stat. sec. 25-205 (1995 Reissue), which reads in pertinent
part as follows:
Actions on written contracts, on foreign
judgments, or to recover collateral. (1) Except as
provided in subsection (2) of this section, an action
upon a specialty, or any agreement, contract, or
promise in writing, or foreign judgment, can only be
brought within five years; * * *.
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gift. According to petitioner, the Pattersons gifted $10,000 of
the $50,000 during 1989, and agreed to gift the remaining $40,000
over a 4-year period commencing in 1990 by canceling $10,000 of
her indebtedness to the corporation each year until the loan was
paid in full. Petitioner claims that by yearend 1993 the
Pattersons had gifted the total $50,000 to her by forgiving all
of her indebtedness to the corporation.
A payment constitutes a gift if it is given in a spirit of
“‘detached and disinterested generosity,’ * * * ‘out of
affection, respect, admiration, charity or like impulses.’”
Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960). The intent
of the transferor determines whether a payment constitutes a gift
or something else; e.g., a loan or compensation for services.
See id. at 285-286; see also Goodwin v. United States, 67 F.3d
149, 151-152 (8th Cir. 1995); Estate of Cronheim v. Commissioner,
323 F.2d 706, 707 (8th Cir. 1963), affg. T.C. Memo. 1961-232.
For tax purposes, a valid debt requires the existence of an
unconditional obligation to repay. See Milenbach v.
Commissioner, supra at 197; Midkiff v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 724,
734-735 (1991), affd. sub nom. Noguchi v. Commissioner, 992 F.2d
226 (9th Cir. 1993); Howlett v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 951, 960
(1971). Thus, an essential element for a payment to constitute a
loan is the existence of a debtor-creditor relationship; i.e.,
there must be an intent on the part of the recipient of the funds
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to make repayment and an intent on the part of the person
advancing the funds to require repayment. See Fisher v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C. 905, 909-910 (1970); Mercil v.
Commissioner, 24 T.C. 1150 (1955). We look to both testimony and
objective facts to ascertain intent. See Busch v. Commissioner,
728 F.2d 945, 948 (7th Cir. 1984), affg. T.C. Memo. 1983-98;
Commissioner v. Makransky, 321 F.2d 598, 600 (3d Cir. 1963),
affg. 36 T.C. 446 (1961). Testimony is not determinative,
particularly where it is contradicted by the objective evidence.
See Busch v. Commissioner, supra; Glimco v. Commissioner, 397
F.2d 537, 540-541 (7th Cir. 1968), affg. T.C. Memo. 1967-119.
In the family context, a transfer of money may be a gift or
a loan. See Hughes v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-438.
Furthermore, in the case of a bona fide loan, a gift may
subsequently result should the loan be forgiven. See id.
In the instant case, the $50,000 payment to petitioner came
from the corporation and not directly from the Pattersons.
Generally, a distribution by a corporation to a shareholder out
of accumulated earnings and profits may constitute a dividend
taxable to the shareholder as ordinary income. See secs. 301,
316; Commissioner v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83, 88-89 (1968); Hardin v.
United States, 461 F.2d 865, 872 (5th Cir. 1972). A formal
dividend declaration is not required for a corporate distribution
to constitute a dividend. See Sachs v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d
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879, 882 (8th Cir. 1960), affg. 32 T.C. 815 (1959); Paramount-
Richards Theatres, Inc. v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 602, 604 (5th
Cir. 1946), affg. a Memorandum Opinion of this Court; Yelencsics
v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1513, 1529 (1980). All of the facts
surrounding a transaction must be considered to determine whether
a payment by a corporation to a taxpayer constitutes a dividend
or something else; e.g., a loan, a gift, or compensation for
services. See John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521, 526
(1946); Hardin v. United States, supra; see also Milenbach v.
Commissioner, 106 T.C. at 195. A corporation’s cancellation of a
shareholder’s indebtedness may constitute a constructive dividend
or compensation for services. See Shephard v. Commissioner, 340
F.2d 27, 29-30 (6th Cir. 1965), affg. per curiam T.C. Memo. 1963-
294; see also Estate of Shapiro v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-
126.
Petitioner introduced no evidence directed toward
establishing the corporation’s intent in paying her $50,000
during 1989.7 The Pattersons controlled the corporation, and
they played an integral part in the decision for the corporation
7
This Court does not consider statements in a brief as
proof. See Rule 143(b); Niedringhaus v. Commissioner, 99 T.C.
202, 214 n.7 (1992); Viehweg v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 1248, 1255
(1988). Although petitioner indicated that she wished to testify
at trial, she declined to swear under oath or affirm or otherwise
verify that her testimony would be true and made under penalty of
perjury. Accordingly, we could not permit her to testify. See
Fed. R. Evid. 603; DiCarlo v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-280;
cf. United States v. Ward, 989 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1992).
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to make the payment to petitioner. They would have been
qualified to testify as to the corporation’s intent in making the
payment. Petitioner, however, did not call them as witnesses.
The preponderance of the evidence in the record supports
respondent’s position that the corporation lent petitioner
$50,000 during 1989. The memo line on the corporation’s check to
petitioner indicates that $40,000 of the $50,000 paid constituted
a loan. Although the memo line further denotes that $10,000
represented a gift, other evidence contradicts that notation and
nothing in the record explains the contradiction.8 On the same
day the corporation gave her the $50,000, petitioner executed a
note promising to pay it $50,000 on demand. In addition, the
corporation included the note as an asset valued at $50,000 on
its books and on the Schedule L it filed with its tax returns.
Furthermore, the notation on the reverse of the note implies that
the Pattersons considered petitioner to be indebted to the
corporation and that she would be required to adhere to the terms
specified on its face unless the Pattersons died before she paid
off the note. Other evidence in the record, including the
testimony of one of petitioner’s sisters and of Raymond A.
Hervert, the corporation’s attorney, is either neutral on this
issue or tends to support respondent’s position that the
8
Neither party offered any evidence as to when the memo line
was completed or identifying the author of the memo entry.
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corporation lent petitioner $50,000 during 1989. Accordingly, we
find that petitioner has failed to prove that the $50,000 was not
a loan.
Respondent determined that petitioner realized income during
1994 from the cancellation of indebtedness. In support of that
position, respondent relies on the running of the period of
limitations for enforcement of the note and the elimination of
the note from the Schedules L of the corporation and the three
spinoff corporations. Petitioner did not submit any proof in
support of her position that the Pattersons forgave $10,000 of
the note each year for 5 years, resulting in the note’s being
paid in full by the end of 1993.
Although not controlling, the running of the period of
limitations on the time within which the corporation could have
commenced an action against petitioner to recover the debt
supports respondent’s position. See Miller Trust v.
Commissioner, 76 T.C. at 195. Additional support for
respondent’s determination is found in the manner in which the
corporation handled the note on its 1994 return. The corporation
included the $50,000 note as an asset at the beginning of 1994 on
Schedule L. However, neither the corporation nor any of the
three spinoff corporations included the note on its tax return as
an asset at yearend 1994.
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Petitioner introduced no evidence showing that the
corporation forgave the note before the end of 1993. Other
evidence in the record is either neutral on this issue or tends
to support respondent’s position that the corporation had not
forgiven petitioner’s debt to it before the end of 1993. The
failure of the corporation or any of the spinoff corporations to
include the note on its tax return as an asset at yearend 1994
supports respondent’s position that the corporation canceled
petitioner’s indebtedness to it during 1994. Petitioner has
submitted no evidence which shows otherwise. Consequently, we
find that petitioner has failed to carry her burden of proving
respondent’s determination incorrect, and we sustain respondent’s
determination that petitioner realized income during 1994 from
the cancellation of indebtedness in the amount of $50,000.9
Addition to Tax Under Section 6651(a)
Respondent also determined that petitioner is liable for the
addition to tax under section 6651(a)(1). Respondent contends
that petitioner is liable for that addition to tax because she
did not file a timely and valid tax return. According to
9
Petitioner does not claim, nor does the record establish,
that the discharge occurred while she was insolvent; accordingly,
we do not address the question of whether the so-called
insolvency exception would be applicable here. See sec.
108(a)(1); Dallas Transfer & Terminal Warehouse Co. v.
Commissioner, 70 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1934), revg. 27 B.T.A. 651
(1933); Gershkowitz v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 984, 1005 (1987).
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respondent, the 1994 Form 1040 was not a valid Federal income tax
return because petitioner failed to sign the form under penalty
of perjury.
Section 6651(a)(1) imposes an addition for failure to timely
file a return unless it is shown that the failure was due to
reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect. Petitioner
bears the burden of proof. See Rule 142(a); Baldwin v.
Commissioner, 84 T.C. 859, 870 (1985).
We agree with respondent that the 1994 Form 1040 petitioner
submitted to the Service does not constitute a valid return
because she did not sign the return under penalty of perjury.
See sec. 6065; see also, e.g., Cupp v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 68,
78-79 (1975), affd. without published opinion 559 F.2d 1207 (3d
Cir. 1977). Accordingly, we sustain respondent’s determination
that petitioner is liable for the addition to tax under section
6651(a)(1).
Addition to Tax Under Section 6654(a)
Respondent further determined that petitioner is liable for
an addition to tax under section 6654(a) for 1994. Respondent
contends that petitioner is liable for the addition to tax under
section 6654 because she did not make any payments of estimated
tax during 1994.
Section 6654(a) provides for an addition to tax "in the case
of any underpayment of estimated tax by an individual". Unless
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petitioner shows that a statutory exception applies, imposition
of the addition to tax under section 6654(a) is automatic where
payments of tax, either through withholding or by making
estimated quarterly tax payments during the course of the year,
do not equal the percentage of total liability required under the
statute. See Niedringhaus v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 202, 222
(1992); Recklitis v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 874, 913 (1988);
Grosshandler v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 1, 20-21 (1980).
Petitioner has offered no evidence to show that any of the
statutory exceptions apply. Accordingly, we sustain respondent's
determination that petitioner is liable for the addition to tax
under section 6654(a) for the year in issue.
We have carefully considered all remaining arguments made by
petitioner for a result contrary to that expressed herein, and,
to the extent not discussed above, find them to be irrelevant,
moot, or without merit.
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered
for respondent.