T.C. Memo. 2001-11
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
DAVID AND CARYN PETERSON, Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 1440-00. Filed January 22, 2001.
Sheldon A. Smith, for petitioners.
Melissa J. Hedtke, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PARR, Judge: This case is before the Court on respondent's
Motion To Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (respondent's motion).
Respondent seeks dismissal on the ground that the petition was
filed untimely. Petitioners, in their objection to respondent's
motion, allege that the petition was deposited in the mail before
expiration of the 90-day period for filing and therefore was
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filed timely. As discussed in detail below, we shall grant
respondent's motion.
Background
In a notice of deficiency dated October 26, 1999, and sent
by certified mail on that day, respondent determined a deficiency
of $1,403 in petitioners' Federal income tax for the taxable year
1997. There is no dispute that respondent mailed the notice to
petitioners' last known address. Petitioners resided in
Columbus, North Dakota, at the time they filed their petition in
this case. The petition, signed by petitioners' attorney,
Sheldon A. Smith (Mr. Smith), is dated January 24, 2000.
The envelope in which the petition was mailed bears a
private-meter stamp date that reads "Bismark N. Dak. Jan 24 '00".
Affixed to the envelope are a certified mail receipt sticker (No.
Z 354 628 323) and the anchors for the so-called certified mail
green card used to confirm receipt. Neither the envelope nor the
certified mail receipt sticker bears any U.S. Postal Service
postmark. An employee of the Tax Court signed the green card on
February 8, 2000, and it was returned to petitioners in due
course by the U.S. Postal Service.
Petitioners attached the affidavits of two of Mr. Smith's
employees to their objection to respondent's motion. In the
first affidavit, Michelle Leary stated that she did not alter the
date on the private meter to falsify the date stamp, that the
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envelope containing petitioners' petition was put through the
private meter, and that she instructed Laura Pfeifer (Ms.
Pfeifer), a file clerk, to put the envelope in the mail. In the
second affidavit, Ms. Pfeifer stated that she delivered the
envelope to a U.S. Postal Service drop box in Bismark, North
Dakota (Bismark), sometime after the post office was closed and
before the time of the last mail pickup on the evening of January
24, 2000.
Discussion
Respondent contends that this case should be dismissed as
the petition was not filed within the time prescribed by section
6213(a) and section 7502 and the regulations thereunder.1
The Court's jurisdiction to redetermine a deficiency depends
upon the issuance of a valid notice of deficiency and a timely
filed petition. See Rule 13(a), (c); Monge v. Commissioner, 93
T.C. 22, 27 (1989); Abeles v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 1019, 1025
(1988); Normac, Inc. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 142, 147 (1988).
The petition for redetermination of a deficiency must be
filed with this Court within 90 days (or 150 days if the notice
is addressed to a person outside the United States) after the
notice of deficiency is mailed to the taxpayer. See sec.
6213(a). The time provided for filing a petition is
1
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and all Rule references
are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
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jurisdictional and cannot be extended. Failure to file within
the prescribed period requires that the case be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction. See Estate of Cerrito v. Commissioner, 73
T.C. 896, 898 (1980); Stone v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 617, 618
(1980).
In this case, the 90-day period for filing a timely petition
with this Court pursuant to section 6213(a) expired on Monday,
January 24, 2000.2 The petition was not filed until Tuesday,
February 8, 2000, which was 105 days after the mailing of the
notice of deficiency.
Although the petition was not timely filed, petitioners
maintain that the petition was timely mailed to the Court on
January 24, 2000, the last day of the 90-day period, and 15 days
before the petition was delivered to the Court. Section 7502 and
the regulations thereunder provide that, in certain
circumstances, a timely mailed petition will be treated as though
it were timely filed.
Section 301.7502-1(c)(2), Proced. & Admin. Regs., provides:
If the document is sent by United States certified mail
and the sender's receipt is postmarked by the postal
employee to whom such document is presented, the date
of the United States postmark on such receipt shall be
treated as the postmark date of the document.
Accordingly, the risk that the document will not be
postmarked on the day that it is deposited in the mail
may be overcome by the use of * * * certified mail.
2
Jan. 24, 2000, was not a legal holiday in the District of
Columbia.
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Although petitioners may have sent their petition by
certified mail, this regulation does not apply here because
petitioners never presented the sender's receipt to any postal
employee and it was never postmarked. Cf. Brown v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1982-165. In this circumstance, mailing their
petition by certified mail provided petitioners no protection.
Where the postmark in question is made by a private postage
meter, the provisions implementing the “timely mailing/timely
filing” rule are contained in section 301.7502-1(c)(1)(iii)(b),
Proced. & Admin. Regs., which provides as follows:
(b) If the postmark on the envelope or wrapper is
made other than by the United States Post Office, (1)
the postmark so made must bear a date on or before the
last date, or the last day of the period, prescribed
for filing the document, and (2) the document must be
received by the agency, officer, or office with which
it is required to be filed not later than the time when
a document contained in an envelope or other
appropriate wrapper which is properly addressed and
mailed and sent by the same class of mail would
ordinarily be received if it were postmarked at the
same point of origin by the United States Post Office
on the last date, or the last day of the period,
prescribed for filing the document. However, in case
the document is received after the time when a document
so mailed and so postmarked by the United States Post
Office would ordinarily be received, such document will
be treated as having been received at the time when a
document so mailed and so postmarked would ordinarily
be received, if the person who is required to file the
document establishes (i) that it was actually deposited
in the mail before the last collection of the mail from
the place of deposit which was postmarked (except for
the metered mail) by the United States Post Office on
or before the last date, or the last day of the period,
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prescribed for filing the document, (ii) that the delay
in receiving the document was due to a delay in the
transmission of the mail, and (iii) the cause of such
delay.
The validity of this regulation has been upheld. See
Lindemood v. Commissioner, 566 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1977),
affg. T.C. Memo. 1975-195; Fishman v. Commissioner, 420 F.2d 491,
492 (2d Cir. 1970), affg. 51 T.C. 869 (1969).
On the basis of the record presented, we conclude that
petitioners cannot avail themselves of the timely mailing/timely
filing rule set forth in section 301.7502-1(c)(1)(iii)(b),
Proced. & Admin. Regs.
In general, the regulation requires that the petition be
delivered to the Court within the ordinary mailing time for that
class of mail. Petitioners concede that the ordinary delivery
time for an item mailed from Bismark to Washington, D.C., is 3 to
5 days. The petition in this case was delivered to the Court 15
days after it was allegedly mailed. It follows that the petition
was not delivered to the Court within the ordinary mailing time.
Where a petition is mailed to the Court in an envelope
bearing a private postage meter postmark, but the petition is not
delivered to the Court within the ordinary mailing time for that
class of mail, a taxpayer seeking to rely on the timely
mailing/timely filing rule must establish that the petition was
actually deposited in the mail before the expiration of the 90-
day period, that the delay in receiving the petition was due to a
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delay in the transmission of the mail, and the cause of the
delay. See Selter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-316.
Petitioners have provided no evidence demonstrating that the
delay in the delivery of the petition to the Court was due to a
delay in the transmission of the mail or the cause of such a
delay. To the contrary, petitioners admit in their objection to
respondent's motion that they have not established either of
these requirements: "Petitioner [sic] and their attorney do not
understand why the mail was not received by the Tax Court within
three days. It appears the weather should not have complicated
the mailing process, however this factor has not been thoroughly
explored."
The petition was received by the Court after expiration of
the statutory filing period, and petitioners have failed to prove
the facts necessary under the regulations to establish timely
filing by mail. Therefore this case must be dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction.3 This result could easily have been avoided if
3
We note, finally, that petitioners need not be denied their
day in court as they may pay the deficiency, file a claim for
refund, and, if the claim is denied, commence an action in U.S.
District Court or the U.S. Court of Federal Claims to recover the
tax paid. See Drake v. Commissioner, 554 F.2d 736, 739 (5th Cir.
1977).
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the envelope or the certified mail sender's receipt had been
postmarked by the U.S. Postal Service on or before January 24,
2000. See sec. 7502(a), (c); sec. 301.7502-1(c)(2), Proced. &
Admin. Regs.
To reflect the foregoing,
An order of dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction will be
entered.