T.C. Memo. 2001-16
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
MICHAEL G. HARVEY AND PENNY B. HARVEY, Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 9527-99. Filed January 25, 2001.
Joel N. Crouch and Sarah Q. Qureshi, for petitioners.
Rodney J. Bartlett, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
DINAN, Special Trial Judge: Respondent determined that
petitioner was liable for the following additions to tax for
taxable year 1982: $452.25 under section 6653(a)(1), 50 percent
of the interest due on a $9,045 deficiency under section
6653(a)(2), and $2,261.25 under section 6661. Unless otherwise
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indicated, section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in
effect for the year in issue.
The issues for decision are: (1) Whether petitioners are
liable for additions to tax for negligence under section 6653(a),
and (2) whether petitioners are liable for the addition to tax
for a substantial understatement under section 6661. The issues
in this case concern the participation of petitioner husband (Mr.
Harvey or petitioner) as a limited partner in Yuma Mesa Jojoba,
Ltd. (“Yuma Mesa” or “the partnership”).1
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
The stipulations of fact and the attached exhibits are
incorporated herein by this reference. Petitioners resided in
Norman, Oklahoma, on the date the petition was filed in this
case.
1
The underlying deficiency in this case is based upon a
computational adjustment made by respondent in accordance with
partnership level adjustments. Those adjustments were upheld by
this Court in Cactus Wren Jojoba, Ltd. v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1997-504. In that case, this Court reviewed respondent’s
determinations with respect to Yuma Mesa and a related
partnership. We held that the partnerships did not directly or
indirectly engage in research or experimentation and that the
partnerships lacked a realistic prospect of entering into a trade
or business. In upholding respondent’s disallowance of
$1,298,031 in research and experimental expenditures claimed by
Yuma Mesa, we described the research and development agreement
entered into by the partnership as “mere window dressing,
designed and entered into solely to decrease the cost of
participation in the jojoba farming venture for the limited
partners through the mechanism of a large upfront deduction for
expenditures that in actuality were capital contributions.” Id.
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Mr. Harvey currently teaches international business and
conducts research at the University of Oklahoma. He has received
a bachelor’s degree in business administration (marketing), a
master’s degree in business administration, a second master’s
degree in marketing research, and a doctorate in marketing and
international sociology. However, he has no tax background, and
his accounting background is limited to two accounting classes.
His teaching and writing encompass neither accounting nor tax.
Petitioner wife (Ms. Harvey) has received a bachelor’s degree in
secondary education.
Beginning in 1967, Mr. Harvey was involved in the formation
and operation of a business that reconditioned and then sold
trucks. He ran the business for a period of 2-1/2 years, after
which time he became a minority shareholder until the business
was terminated in 1982.
During 1982, the year in issue, Mr. Harvey was a professor
of international marketing at Southern Methodist University, he
was the sole proprietor of a consulting business which generated
$86,766 in gross receipts and a $71,091 profit, and he was the
sole proprietor of a trucking business (separate from the
business discussed above) which generated $83,157 in gross
receipts and a $19,610 loss.
Mr. Harvey’s introduction to jojoba occurred about 1970
through 1972 through discussions he had with two neighbors.
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These neighbors happened to be doctoral students of archaeology
and anthropology who were conducting research related to the
history of jojoba. Mr. Harvey was reacquainted with jojoba in
1982 by Marlin Peterson. Mr. Peterson, a certified public
accountant, is petitioners’ accountant and has prepared their tax
returns since around 1974. When Mr. Harvey and Mr. Peterson
first discussed jojoba in November 1982, Mr. Peterson was in the
planning stages of the jojoba investment. Mr. Harvey discussed
the investment with Mr. Peterson when Mr. Harvey met with him and
another of his clients at a lunch which was both social and for
the purpose of discussing tax matters. After meeting with Mr.
Peterson, Mr. Harvey met with Rick Avery, president of Anderson-
Clayton Food Company. Mr. Avery had access to research which had
been conducted relating to potential uses of jojoba in the food
industry. Mr. Harvey learned from this meeting that the
insufficient supply of jojoba was at least in part prohibiting
its use in food products. Mr. Harvey then discussed jojoba with
a health food store owner, who provided him with materials
relating to jojoba’s properties and uses.
Mr. Harvey also obtained, and carefully reviewed, a copy of
the private placement memorandum distributed by the promoters of
Yuma Mesa. According to this document, the partnership was
organized “to engage in research and development and, thereafter,
participate in the marketing of the products of the jojoba
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plant.” Interests in the partnership were offered for $12,245
each, payable by cash of $3,571 and a 4-year promissory note of
$8,674 bearing 10 percent annual interest.
Yuma Mesa was organized as a limited partnership, with two
co-general partners. The general partners, G. Dennis Sullivan
and William Woodburn, were lawyers; the private placement
memorandum listed no experience of either outside the legal
field. Yuma Mesa was to enter into a “Research and Development
Agreement” with Hilltop Plantations, Inc. (Hilltop), which would
in turn enter into a farming subcontract with its wholly owned
subsidiary, Mesa Plantations, Inc. (Mesa). Hilltop was then to
enter into an “Experimental Agricultural Lease” with Hilltop
Ventures, a general partnership with identical ownership as
Hilltop. This lease was to be assigned to Mesa upon completion
of the research and development. Finally, Hilltop was to enter
into a “Research and Development Management Agreement” with
Agricultural Investments, Inc., which was to be the “manager” of
the project.
Hilltop (as well as Mesa and Hilltop Ventures) was
controlled by four individuals. These individuals were Raymond
H. Meinke (president, director, and shareholder), Keith A. Damer
(vice president, secretary, director, and shareholder), Mr.
Peterson (vice president, treasurer, director, and shareholder),
and Cecil R. Almand (shareholder). The three officer/directors
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of Hilltop were all listed as certified public accountants with
expertise in the tax field. The private placement memorandum
listed no experience of any of the officer/directors or
shareholders which is relevant to the farming of jojoba.
The private placement memorandum contained language
specifically alerting investors to the planned deduction of the
“research and development” costs, as well as other tax risks
involved in making an investment in the partnership. The
document also contained an opinion letter stating that the
research and development agreement contained therein met the
requirements of section 174. Potential investors were required
to provide information concerning any previous experience in tax
shelter investments, and the subscription agreement required
investors to initial a statement that the investor had been
advised to consult with an attorney concerning the tax
consequences of the investment.
Several weeks after meeting with Mr. Peterson, Mr. Harvey
decided to invest in the partnership. Mr. Harvey made his
investment because he felt he had insider knowledge concerning
jojoba and because he thought demand for the product was
sufficient to meet a larger supply. Petitioner did not research
the possible yield per acre of a jojoba plantation, did not
analyze production costs, did not independently investigate the
available markets or means of transporting the jojoba to
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purchasers, and did not make any financial projections regarding
the product.
Petitioner purchased two interests in Yuma Mesa. On
December 30, 1982, he executed a subscription agreement, a
promissory note in the amount of $17,348, and a partnership
agreement. Petitioner subsequently was issued a Schedule K-1 by
the partnership which reflected a $23,174 ordinary loss for
taxable year 1982.
On their joint Federal income tax return for 1982,
petitioners reported the following amounts of income and losses:
Wages (University) $43,978
Interest 984
Business (Consulting) 71,091
Business (Trucking) (19,610)
Royalties 2,878
Yuma Mesa partnership (23,174)
S corporation (79)
Total income 76,068
In the years following his investment in 1982, petitioner
received and reviewed financial statements and progress reports.
The reports were semiannual or quarterly, and discussed the
progress or problems at the sites. At one point, petitioner
traveled to the plantation in Yuma, where he spent approximately
1½ days. While there, he spoke with individuals involved in the
project to ascertain the progress being made and the outlook for
the jojoba development. The partnership failed in 1987.
The private placement memorandum provided projections of
estimated cash expenditures and tax savings associated with
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investments in the partnership. These projections, adjusted to
two interests, together with petitioner’s actual cash
expenditures, are as follow:
Cash Expenditures Tax Savings
Year Projected Actual Projected
1982 $9,782 $8,439 $11,998
1983 5,280 5,186 764
1984 5,280 5,186 572
1985 5,280 5,186 360
1986 2,640 3,888 152
28,262 27,885 13,846
Petitioners’ claimed loss from Yuma Mesa for taxable year
1982 was disallowed in the computational adjustment which was
made pursuant to the partnership level proceedings, resulting in
a $9,045 deficiency. Respondent issued petitioners a statutory
notice of deficiency determining additions to tax under sections
6653(a)(1), 6653(a)(2), and 6661, in the respective amounts of
$452.25, 50 percent of the interest due on a $9,045 deficiency,
and $2,261.25.
The first issue for decision is whether petitioners are
liable for additions to tax for negligence under section
6653(a)(1) and (2). Section 6653(a)(1) imposes an addition to
tax equal to 5 percent of the underpayment of tax if any part of
the underpayment is attributable to negligence or intentional
disregard of rules or regulations. Section 6653(a)(2) provides
for a further addition to tax equal to 50 percent of the interest
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due on the portion of the underpayment attributable to negligence
or intentional disregard of rules or regulations.
Negligence is defined as “lack of due care or failure to do
what a reasonable and prudent person would do under similar
circumstances.” Anderson v. Commissioner, 62 F.3d 1266, 1271
(10th Cir. 1995), affg. T.C. Memo. 1993-607. Petitioners argue
that Mr. Harvey was not negligent because he relied on the advice
of a professional, Mr. Peterson. Reliance on professional advice
may be a defense to the negligence penalties. See id. The
advice must be from competent and independent parties, not from
the promoters of the investment. See LaVerne v. Commissioner, 94
T.C. 637, 652 (1990), affd. without published opinion sub nom.
Cowles v. Commissioner, 949 F.2d 401 (10th Cir. 1991), affd.
without published opinion 956 F.2d 274 (9th Cir. 1992); Rybak v.
Commissioner, 91 T.C. 524, 565 (1988). We hold that petitioner’s
reliance on any advice2 from Mr. Peterson was not reasonable
because it was not from an independent source. As such, this
reliance cannot be a defense to negligence.
2
The advice petitioner received from Mr. Peterson was
apparently only in the context of Mr. Peterson’s preparation of
petitioners’ tax return. Mr. Harvey testified that he never
discussed the tax implications of the investment with Mr.
Peterson.
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Petitioners argue that reliance on an adviser who is a
promoter may be reasonable under precedents from the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, to which appeal lies in this case.
The first case petitioners cite is Anderson v. Commissioner,
supra. In Anderson, the taxpayer relied on both an investment
adviser and an accountant in making his investment. The court
found that reliance on the investment adviser, who received a
commission for selling the investment to the taxpayer, was
reasonable under the circumstances of the case. However, the
court stressed that the investment adviser was not affiliated
with the corporation which had entered into the agreement with
the taxpayers. On the contrary, the adviser was an independent
insurance agent and registered securities dealer who presumably
would have received a commission on any investment he sold to the
taxpayer. See id. at 1271.
The second case petitioners cite is the unpublished opinion
of Gilmore & Wilson Constr. Co. v. Commissioner, 166 F.3d 1221,
83 AFTR 2d 99-457, 99-1 USTC par. 50,186 (10th Cir. 1999), affg.
Estate of Hogard v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-174.3 In that
3
Gilmore & Wilson Constr. Co. is an unpublished opinion of
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Although unpublished
decisions generally are not binding precedent in the Tenth
Circuit and citation thereto is disfavored, that court allows
citation to such a decision where “(1) it has persuasive value
with respect to a material issue that has not been addressed in a
published opinion; and (2) it would assist the court in its
disposition.” 10th Cir. Rule 36.3. Gilmore & Wilson Constr. Co.
(continued...)
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case, the taxpayers relied upon their accountant for investment
advice. Following Anderson, the court noted that the fact that
the accountant was entitled to receive compensation for the
taxpayers’ investment does not make that advice per se
unreasonable: “the mere fact that * * *[the adviser] received
compensation for taxpayers’ reliance on his advice does not turn
him into a promoter whose advice cannot be considered
independent.” Gilmore & Wilson Constr. Co. v. Commissioner,
supra. As in Anderson, the court noted that the accountant was
not in any way affiliated with the partnerships related to the
investment (other than a personal investment in one of them).
In the case at hand, unlike Anderson and Gilmore & Wilson
Constr. Co., Mr. Peterson was involved in Yuma Mesa from the
planning stages through its operation. He was a promoter of the
partnership and was an officer and director of the corporation
which entered into the research and development agreement with
it. Mr. Peterson falls far outside the role of an adviser who
simply received commissions from independent entities upon the
3
(...continued)
was discussed by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in
accordance with its rule 36.3 in Thompson v. United States, 223
F.3d 1206, 1210 n.7 (l0th Cir. 2000), which was decided after the
briefs were filed in this case. The court in Thompson, however,
addressed “the more limited question of whether a reliance
instruction was warranted”; i.e., whether the district court
abused its discretion in instructing the jury that reliance on a
professional was a defense to the negligence penalties. Id. at
1210.
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sale of an investment. Rather, he was integrally involved in the
partnership, and consequently petitioners’ reliance on any advice
from him was not reasonable.
We are convinced that petitioner intended to make an actual
investment in Yuma Mesa and not merely derive a tax benefit
therefrom. Petitioner, for example, performed some investigation
into the potential of jojoba prior to investment, monitored the
investment after it was made, and made payments to the
partnership in an amount greater than the tax benefits expected
to be derived. We nevertheless find that petitioner was
negligent within the meaning of section 6653(a) with respect to
taxable year 1982. First, despite petitioner’s substantial
business background in both academia and the business world, he
did not make any financial projections for the investment, and he
did little to investigate the investment beyond a limited inquiry
into the uses of and possible demand for jojoba. Second,
petitioner participated in an investment which was organized and
promoted by tax lawyers, and which involved warnings in the
private placement memorandum concerning tax risks and the need to
obtain legal advice. In addition, petitioner claimed a $23,174
ordinary loss for 1982, despite the fact that he had invested
only $9,782 in cash in the partnership via a subscription
agreement dated December 30, 1982; such a disproportionate and
accelerated loss should also have alerted petitioner to the need
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for outside advice regarding the propriety of its deduction.
Despite these warnings, petitioner was not concerned with the tax
risks, and consequently neither personally investigated the tax
implications of the investment nor sought outside legal advice
related to them. Instead, he relied on Mr. Peterson’s treatment
of the loss when it came time to complete petitioners’ tax
return.
Because we hold that petitioner was negligent and that
petitioners’ reliance upon Mr. Peterson was not reasonable, we
uphold respondent’s determination that petitioners are liable for
the section 6653(a)(1) and (2) additions to tax for negligence.
The second issue for decision is whether petitioners are
liable for the addition to tax under section 6661 for a
substantial understatement of tax. Section 6661(a), as amended
by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-509,
sec. 8002, 100 Stat. 1951, provides for an addition to tax of 25
percent of the amount of any underpayment attributable to a
substantial understatement of income tax for the taxable year. A
substantial understatement of income tax exists if the amount of
the understatement exceeds the greater of 10 percent of the tax
required to be shown on the return, or $5,000. See sec.
6661(b)(1)(A). Generally, the amount of an understatement is
reduced by the portion of the understatement which the taxpayer
shows is attributable to either (1) the tax treatment of any item
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for which there was substantial authority, or (2) the tax
treatment of any item with respect to which the relevant facts
were adequately disclosed on the return. See sec. 6661(b)(2)(B).
If an understatement is attributable to a tax shelter item,
however, different standards apply. First, in addition to
showing the existence of substantial authority, a taxpayer must
show that he reasonably believed that the tax treatment claimed
was more likely than not proper. See sec. 6661(b)(2)(C)(i)(II).
Second, disclosure, whether or not adequate, will not reduce the
amount of the understatement. See sec. 6661(b)(2)(C)(i)(I).4
Petitioners do not argue that they had substantial authority
for claiming the loss, nor do they argue that there was adequate
disclosure on the return. We find that the record does not
establish the presence of either. The only argument petitioners
make is that they acted with reasonable cause and in good faith
in claiming the loss.
Section 6661(c) provides the Secretary with the discretion
to waive the section 6661(a) addition to tax if the taxpayer
shows he acted with reasonable cause and in good faith. We
review the Secretary’s failure to waive the addition to tax for
4
Respondent argues in his brief that “petitioners’ claimed
loss for 1982 was clearly a tax shelter item,” despite the fact
that the notice of deficiency stated that the underpayment “is
attributable to non-tax shelter items.” As a result of our
findings we need not decide whether the tax shelter provisions
are applicable in this case.
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abuse of discretion. See McCoy Enterprises, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 58 F.3d 557, 562-563 (10th Cir. 1995) affg. T.C.
Memo. 1992-693. Nothing in the record indicates petitioners
requested a waiver for good faith and reasonable cause under
section 6661(c). In the absence of such a request, we cannot
review respondent’s determination for an abuse of discretion.
See id.
Because petitioners have not established either that they
had substantial authority for their treatment of the partnership
loss or that they adequately disclosed the relevant facts of that
treatment, we uphold respondent’s determination on this issue.
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered
for respondent.