T.C. Memo. 2001-186
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
PAUL E. AND JANE ANNE GLADDEN EMERSON, Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 10221-99. Filed July 23, 2001.
Paul E. and Jane Anne Gladden Emerson, pro se.
Joanne B. Minsky, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PAJAK, Special Trial Judge: Respondent determined a
deficiency in petitioners' Federal income tax in the amount of
$6,046 and a section 6662(a) penalty in the amount of $1,209.20
for the taxable year 1995. Unless otherwise indicated, section
references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the
year in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules
of Practice and Procedure.
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This Court must decide: (1) Whether petitioners
substantiated Schedule A medical expenses of $6,393, Schedule A
interest expenses of $3,165, a net operating loss carryover of
$16,505, Schedule C expenses of $6,260 related to an
attorney/sales consultant activity, Schedule C expenses,
including cost of goods sold, of $3,433 related to an antiques
and jewelry activity, and Schedule C expenses of $26,927 related
to an oil and gas activity; (2) whether petitioners are liable
for self-employment tax on the income from their Schedule C
activities and are entitled to the corresponding deduction; and
(3) whether petitioners are liable for the accuracy-related
penalty. If petitioners' itemized deductions are less than the
standard deduction, petitioners will be entitled to the standard
deduction under section 63(b).
Some of the facts in this case have been stipulated and are
so found. Petitioners resided in Bradenton, Florida, at the time
they filed their petition.
In 1995, Paul Emerson (petitioner), an attorney, was engaged
in the business of an "Attorney/Sales Consultant" and in the
business of "Sales-Antiques & Jewelry". As an attorney/sales
consultant, petitioner worked with others and anticipated
becoming the general counsel of an Ohio corporation. Petitioner
worked from home. During 1995, Jane Emerson (Mrs. Emerson) was
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not employed outside the home. Petitioners also had an oil/gas
operating interest.
Respondent contends that petitioners did not provide
adequate substantiation for the disallowed items. Petitioner
presented numerous receipts into evidence. Petitioner also tried
to submit evidence at trial, which we excluded as it was not
presented to respondent within 15 days of trial as required by
our Standing Pre-Trial Order. Schaefer v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1998-163, affd. in unpublished opinion 188 F.3d 514 (9th
Cir. 1999).
Deductions are strictly a matter of legislative grace.
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); New
Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934).
Taxpayers must substantiate claimed deductions. Hradesky v.
Commissioner, 65 T.C. 87, 89 (1975), affd. per curiam 540 F.2d
821 (5th Cir. 1976). Moreover, taxpayers must keep sufficient
records to establish the amounts of the deductions. Meneguzzo v.
Commissioner, 43 T.C. 824, 831 (1965); sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income
Tax Regs. Generally, except as otherwise provided by section
274(d), when evidence shows that a taxpayer incurred a deductible
expense, but the exact amount cannot be determined, the Court may
approximate the amount bearing heavily if it chooses against the
taxpayer whose inexactitude is of his own making. Cohan v.
Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543-544 (2d Cir. 1930). The Court,
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however, must have some basis upon which an estimate can be made.
Vanicek v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 731, 742-743 (1985).
Respondent disallowed $6,393 of petitioners' claimed medical
expenses. Section 213(a) provides that a deduction is allowed
for expenses paid during the taxable year, not compensated for by
insurance or otherwise, for medical care of the taxpayer, his or
her spouse, or a dependent to the extent that such expenses
exceed 7.5 percent of adjusted gross income. The term "medical
care" means amounts paid for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation,
treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of
affecting any structure or function of the body or for insurance
covering the aforementioned items. Sec. 213(d)(1)(A), (C).
"Medical care" also includes expenses for medicine and drugs.
Sec. 1.213-1(a)(1), Income Tax Regs. A deduction is allowable
only to individuals and only with respect to medical expenses
actually paid during the taxable year. Sec. 1.213-1(a)(1),
Income Tax Regs.
Petitioner testified that he had high blood pressure for
which he took medicine. He spent $81.35 for his prescription
every 90 days. Mrs. Emerson was on five different medications.
The medicines were for blood pressure, fibromyalgia, and
hormones. At the time of trial, Mrs. Emerson was undergoing
radiation treatments for cancer.
Petitioner presented canceled checks and credit card
statements for purchases from Phar-Mor, Walgreens, and Park West
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Pharmacy in the amount of $1,255.13. Petitioner testified that
these expenses were for prescriptions. He admitted that it was
possible that some of these amounts were for items other than
prescriptions.
Petitioner presented canceled checks made out to Golden Rule
Insurance in the amount of $5,473.37 and Liberty Fund Inc. in the
amount of $40.50 The checks made out to Golden Rule Insurance
were paid quarterly. Petitioner testified that they were for
health insurance. Petitioner was not sure whether Liberty Fund
Inc. was for health insurance. Petitioner also presented checks
in the amount of $343 made out to doctors and medical
laboratories.
It is clear that petitioners incurred medical expenses.
Under the Cohan doctrine, we estimate the allowable amounts of
expenses as follows. We allow $880 for prescription expenses,
all of the insurance payments to Golden Rule Insurance of
$5,473.37, and all of the doctor and medical laboratory expenses
of $343, for a total of $6,696.37, which is more than the $6,393
petitioners claimed on their return. This deduction is subject
to a floor of 7.5 percent of adjusted gross income.
Respondent disallowed $3,165 of interest expense. A
deduction for interest paid on indebtedness during the year is
generally allowed under section 163(a). However, section
163(h)(1) provides that no deduction is allowed for personal
interest. "Personal interest" does not include any "qualified
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residence interest". Sec. 163(h)(2)(D). "Qualified residence
interest" means interest which is paid during the year on
acquisition indebtedness or home equity indebtedness with respect
to any qualified residence of the taxpayer. Sec. 163(h)(3)(A).
A "qualified residence" may be the principal residence of the
taxpayer. Sec. 163(h)(5)(A)(i)(I).
In this case, petitioners had a mortgage on the home they
lived in. Petitioners paid "interest payments" on their
mortgage to "Retirement Account Inc., F.O.B. Allen S. Lewis IRA"
(Allen Lewis). During 1995, petitioners wrote 11 checks which
were written out to or referenced Allen Lewis and totaled
$16,425. Petitioners also had a mortgage on their home with West
Coast Bank. During 1995, petitioners wrote 32 checks for the
"interest payments" to West Coast Bank in the total amount of
$21,698.71. Petitioners claimed $3,165 of mortgage interest
expense on their 1995 return, which petitioner prepared himself.
On their 1994 return, petitioners claimed $8,450 of mortgage
interest expense. Petitioners’ 1994 return was prepared by an
accountant. While we believe that petitioners' payments did not
consist solely of interest expense, we find that a portion of
these payments must have been for mortgage interest on their
home. Although the interest portion of the payments probably was
higher than the amount claimed on the 1995 return, petitioners
did not provide sufficient evidence of the amount which was
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interest. We allow petitioners to deduct only the $3,165 of
mortgage interest expense that they claimed on their 1995 return.
On their 1995 return, under "Other income", petitioners
included $16,505 as negative income for a net operating loss
carryover. Under section 172(b), a net operating loss may be
carried back to the 3 preceding taxable years and thereafter
carried forward to the next 15 taxable years. Petitioner did not
provide any evidence, other than the 1994 return, to support the
claimed net operating loss carryforward. The fact that a return
is signed under penalty of perjury is not sufficient to
substantiate deductions claimed on the return. Wilkinson v.
Commissioner, 71 T.C. 633, 639 (1979). We find the evidence
insufficient. Accordingly, we uphold respondent's disallowance
of the net operating loss in full.
In regards to petitioners' Schedule C activities, petitioner
presented canceled checks and credit card statements for amounts
paid for: telephone services; office supplies; an accountant's
services for preparing taxes; professional dues and fees; postal
service; a computer rental; insurance on the home; electric
service in the home; travel expenses such as out-of-town motels,
restaurants, and gas; truck rental; and auto maintenance.
Petitioner testified that he conducted his legal services, the
antiques business, and the oil and gas activities out of 700
square feet of his home. Petitioner testified that the above
expenses were for his businesses, but with the exception of the
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travel expenses, petitioner did not state to which Schedule C
business the receipts for the expenses related.
We believe that some of these expenses were personal
expenses. Moreover, petitioner did not adequately substantiate
his travel, car and truck, and computer expenses under the strict
requirements of section 274(d). Travel, car and truck, and
computer expenses cannot be estimated under Cohan. Sanford v.
Commissioner, 50 T.C. 823, 827-828 (1968), affd. per curiam 412
F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1969). Based on the record, we allow
petitioners to claim $2,000 of expenses on the Attorney/Sales
Consultant Schedule C, $1,000 of cost of goods sold and $100 of
expenses on the Sales-Antiques & Jewelry Schedule C, and $12,000
of expenses on the Oil/Gas Operating Interest Schedule C.
Section 1401 imposes a tax upon a taxpayer's self-employment
income. Self-employment income includes the net earnings from
self-employment derived by an individual during the taxable year.
Sec. 1402(b). Net earnings from self-employment consist of gross
income derived by an individual from any trade or business
carried on by such individual, less the allowable deductions that
are attributable to such trade or business, plus certain items
not relevant here. Sec. 1402(a). A deduction for one half of
the self-employment tax is allowed under section 164(f). We find
that petitioners are liable for self-employment tax on the income
earned from the Schedule C businesses and are entitled to the
corresponding deduction.
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Respondent contends that petitioners are liable for the
accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a). Section 6662(a)
provides for an accuracy-related penalty in the amount of 20
percent of the portion of an underpayment of tax attributable to,
among other things, negligence or disregard of rules or
regulations. Sec. 6662(a) and (b)(1). Negligence is defined to
include any failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply with
the provisions of the Internal Revenue laws. Sec. 6662(c); sec.
1.6662-3(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. Moreover, negligence is the
failure to exercise due care or the failure to do what a
reasonable and prudent person would do under the circumstances.
Neely v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 934, 947 (1985). Disregard is
defined to include any careless, reckless, or intentional
disregard of rules or regulations. Sec. 6662(c); sec. 1.6662-
3(b)(2), Income Tax Regs. Petitioners presented no evidence
regarding the accuracy-related penalty. They failed to keep
adequate records as required by section 6001. We find that
petitioners are liable for the accuracy-related penalty which
must be recalculated under Rule 155.
To the extent that we have not addressed any of the parties'
arguments, we have considered them and find them to be without
merit.
Decision will be entered
under Rule 155.