T.C. Summary Opinion 2001-130
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
ROSILAND J. SMITH, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 3576-00S. Filed August 22, 2001.
James Wesly Smith, for petitioner.
Lorraine Y. Wu, for respondent.
PAJAK, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant to
the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in
effect at the time the petition was filed. The decision to be
entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion
should not be cited as authority. Unless otherwise indicated,
subsequent section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in
effect for the year in issue.
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Respondent determined a deficiency of $2,561 in petitioner’s
1995 Federal income tax, a section 6651(a)(1) addition to tax of
$639.25, and a section 6662(a) penalty of $512.20. This Court
must decide: (1) Whether the notice of deficiency was mailed
within the statute of limitations period; and if it was, (2)
whether petitioner is entitled to deduct expenses on Schedule C,
Profit or Loss From Business, of $36,167; (3) whether petitioner
is liable for the section 6651(a)(1) addition to tax; and (4)
whether petitioner is liable for the section 6662(a) penalty.
Some of the facts in this case have been stipulated and are
so found. Petitioner resided in Pacoima, California, at the time
she filed her petition.
Respondent disallowed $36,167 of petitioner's 1995 Schedule
C expense deductions because they were not substantiated. Of
this amount, $26,666 is for depreciation of motion picture
synchronization rights from recordings. The remaining amount
represents deductions for advertising, car and truck expenses,
insurance, office expense, repairs and maintenance, supplies,
utilities, record storage, and auto club. As reported on her
Schedule C, petitioner had no gross income from her "Film Video &
Record Production" business.
We first observe that petitioner did not appear at trial.
Instead her attorney, who was her husband at least during 1995,
appeared on her behalf. Petitioner's sole argument before this
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Court was that the statute of limitations barred the assessment
of tax. Due to a strong belief in the foregoing argument,
petitioner and her attorney decided it was not necessary to
provide the Court with any substantiation of the disallowed
expenses.
Petitioner and her husband filed their returns under the
filing status "married filing separate". They "never" mailed
their returns at the same time.
Petitioner's argument regarding the statute of limitations
is based on her position that she mailed her return on April 15,
1996. The date petitioner allegedly signed her 1995 tax return
is April 5, 1996. (The date typed on the return was “Aprilk596"
[sic]). The envelope in which the return was mailed is
postmarked April 18, 1997, by the U.S. Postal Service. The date
stamped on the front of the 1995 return as the date the return
was received by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is April 8,
1997, 10 days prior to the date of the postmark.
On an IRS Form 895 pertaining to petitioner, there is a
notation that the postmark date on the envelope, in which the
return was mailed, is April 18, 1997, and that the received date
(April 8, 1997) is wrong. This document lists the expiration
date of the period of limitations as April 18, 2000. The notice
of deficiency was mailed on December 28, 1999.
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Petitioner pointed out the difference between the dates
April 8, 1997, and April 18, 1997, and the reference to the
received date as wrong to show respondent was not accurate.
Petitioner argues that the dates used by respondent should be
ignored. Petitioner's contention is that the period of
limitations expired on April 15, 1999, prior to the mailing of
the notice of deficiency on December 28, 1999.
A witness for petitioner testified that he saw petitioner
mail on April 15, 1996, an envelope bearing a typed address to
the IRS, Fresno, California 93888. In response to a question
from respondent, the witness confirmed that the address was
typed. However, the address on the envelope containing
petitioner’s return was not typed, but was written in a scrawl.
The fact is that petitioner is the person who knew when she filed
her Federal income tax return for the year 1995. She failed to
appear at trial. The rule is well established that the failure
of a party to introduce evidence within her possession which, if
true, would be favorable to her, gives rise to the presumption
that if produced it would be unfavorable. Wichita Terminal
Elevator Co. v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 1158 (1946), affd. 162 F.2d
513 (10th Cir. 1947).
Ms. Susan J. Hernandez, a disclosure officer for the Los
Angeles IRS office, testified regarding the procedures used at
the IRS to keep track of documents. She stated that if a return
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is received by the Service Center between January and April the
15th of the year the return is due, then there is no date stamped
received on the document. Late returns are date stamped received
at the time they come in. The envelopes in which the returns are
mailed are attached to the taxpayer's return only if the return
is received after April 15.
All returns, documents, and correspondence are stamped with
a document locator number when they are processed by the Service
Center. The date the return is processed is not necessarily the
date the return is received. The delay in processing does not
affect the filing date and is not usually more than a week after
the item is received. The document locator number provides a
Julian date, which is a number that corresponds with the day of
the calendar year that the document was processed, e.g., 1
through 365.
The document locator number on petitioner's 1995 tax return
is 116. This number corresponds to April 26. The last digit of
the document locator number is a 7, which means that the return
was processed in 1997.
Under the general rule of section 6501(a), a deficiency must
be assessed within 3 years from the date on which the return is
filed. The notice of deficiency was issued on December 28, 1999.
Respondent determined that petitioner filed her 1995 return on
April 18, 1997. Petitioner claims that she filed her 1995 return
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on April 15, 1996. Thus, the statute of limitations issue turns
on when the return was filed.
Generally, a return is filed when it is delivered to and
received by the IRS. Walden v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 947, 951
(1988). This general presumption is modified by section 7502.
Under section 7502(a), where a return is mailed and bears a U.S.
Postal Service postmark on or before the due date but is received
by the IRS after the due date, the return is deemed timely filed.
Estate of Wood v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 793, 795-796 (1989),
affd. 909 F.2d 1155 (8th Cir. 1990). Petitioner's return was not
timely postmarked.
Petitioner argues that we should apply the common law
“mailbox rule” to determine whether the return was timely mailed
and therefore deemed timely filed under section 7502. The common
law mailbox rule provides that proof of a properly mailed
document creates a presumption that the document was delivered
and actually received by the addressee. Estate of Wood v.
Commissioner, supra at 798-799. In applying section 7502, when a
taxpayer does not have documentary evidence that a document was
mailed, we have in particular circumstances allowed indirect
evidence to prove that the document was mailed. Estate of Wood
v. Commissioner, supra; see also Anderson v. United States, 966
F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1992).
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However, petitioner has failed to recognize that the cases
in which the common law mailbox rule is applied are generally
those where the return was never received by the IRS, not those
where the return was received after its due date bearing a
legible but untimely postmark. See Anderson v. United States,
supra; Estate of Wood v. Commissioner, supra. "When a legible
postmark appears on an envelope no evidence that the petition was
mailed on some other day will be allowed." Shipley v.
Commissioner, 572 F.2d 212, 214 (9th Cir. 1977), affg. T.C. Memo.
1976-383. Petitioner offered no explanation why the envelope was
postmarked and received almost exactly 1 year after it was
allegedly mailed. We find that the return was mailed after the
due date on April 18, 1997, the date the envelope was postmarked.
When a return is mailed after the due date, the return is
considered filed on the date the return is actually received by
the IRS. Emmons v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 342, 346-347 (1989),
affd. 898 F.2d 50 (5th Cir. 1990); Radding v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1988-250.
Petitioner’s return was received by the IRS at some point
between April 18, 1997, and April 26, 1997. Because there was
some question as to the exact date the return was received, the
IRS used the earliest date of April 18, 1997, as the received
date. We shall do the same. Therefore, we find that
petitioner’s return was received on April 18, 1997, and was filed
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as of that date. Therefore, we find that the statute of
limitations period expired on April 18, 2000. We hold that the
statute of limitations does not bar assessment of the deficiency
determined in the statutory notice sent to petitioner on December
28, 1999.
We now address the remaining issues. Respondent disallowed
the deduction of $36,167 of Schedule C expenses. Petitioner
presented no testimony or other evidence regarding these
deductions. Deductions are strictly a matter of legislative
grace. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992);
New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934).
Taxpayers must substantiate claimed deductions. Hradesky v.
Commissioner, 65 T.C. 87, 89 (1975), affd. per curiam 540 F.2d
821 (5th Cir. 1976). Section 7491(a) does not change the burden
of proof where petitioner has failed to substantiate her
deductions. Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438 (2001).
Moreover, taxpayers must keep sufficient records to establish the
amounts of the deductions. Meneguzzo v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.
824, 831 (1965); sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. Because
petitioner presented no substantiation, we sustain respondent's
determination as to the disallowance of the deduction of $36,167
of Schedule C expenses.
Under section 7491(c), respondent has the burden of
production in any court proceeding with respect to the liability
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of any individual for any penalty or addition to tax. Respondent
contends that petitioner is liable for an addition to tax
pursuant to section 6651(a)(1). Section 6651(a)(1) imposes an
addition to tax for failure to file a Federal income tax return
by its due date, determined with regard to any extension of time
for filing previously granted. The addition equals 5 percent for
each month that the return is late, not to exceed 25 percent.
Sec. 6651(a)(1). Additions to tax under section 6651(a)(1) are
imposed unless the taxpayer establishes that the failure was due
to reasonable cause and not willful neglect. Sec. 6651(a)(1).
The taxpayer must prove both reasonable cause and a lack of
willful neglect. Crocker v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 899, 912
(1989). "Reasonable cause" requires the taxpayer to demonstrate
that he exercised ordinary business care and prudence. United
States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 246 (1985). Willful neglect is
defined as a "conscious, intentional failure or reckless
indifference." Id. at 245.
Petitioner's 1995 return was filed late. Petitioner did not
prove she had reasonable cause or a lack of willful neglect.
Accordingly, we sustain respondent's determination as to the
section 6651(a)(1) addition to tax.
Respondent determined that petitioner is liable for the
section 6662(a) penalty. Section 6662(a) provides for an
accuracy-related penalty in the amount of 20 percent of the
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portion of an underpayment of tax attributable to, among other
things, negligence or disregard of rules or regulations. Sec.
6662(a) and (b)(1). Negligence is defined to include any failure
to make a reasonable attempt to comply with the provisions of the
internal revenue laws and any failure by the taxpayer to keep
adequate books and records or to substantiate items properly.
Sec. 6662(c); sec. 1.6662-3(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.
Petitioner failed to substantiate the expenses she deducted
on her Schedule C. Accordingly, we sustain respondent's
determination as to the section 6662(a) penalty.
To the extent that we have not addressed any of petitioner's
arguments, we have considered them and conclude that they are
without merit.
Reviewed and adopted as the report of the Small Tax Case
Division.
Decision will be entered
for respondent.