T.C. Memo. 2001-276
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
FLINT INDUSTRIES, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 10645-97. Filed October 10, 2001.
Mark H. Allen, Kevin L. Kenworthy, and Frances F. Hillsman,
for petitioner.
David G. Hendricks, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
MARVEL, Judge: Respondent determined the following
deficiencies in the Federal income tax of Flint Industries, Inc.,
and subsidiaries:
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FYE May 31 Deficiency
1989 $66,096
1990 663,532
1991 1,014,268
1992 752,581
Flint Industries, Inc., and subsidiaries, hereinafter
collectively referred to as petitioner, filed a petition to
redetermine the deficiencies.1 Following concessions, the issue
presented for decision is whether the following worthless stock
and bad debt deductions claimed by petitioner on its consolidated
Federal income tax returns for fiscal years ending (FYE) May 31,
1992, 1993, and 1994, are allowable under sections 165 and 166:2
FYE May 31 Worthless stock Bad debt
1992 $7,374,438 $6,564,124
1993 2,435,876 815,105
1994 –- 6,085,248
Respondent contends that petitioner’s worthless stock and
bad debt deductions must be disallowed because (1) the amounts
claimed as bad debts were capital in nature, and (2) petitioner
has failed to prove that the alleged bad debts and worthless
1
Petitioner reported net operating losses (NOLs) for fiscal
years ended 1992, 1993, and 1994 which it carried back to prior
years. Respondent’s adjustments reduced the NOLs available to be
carried back to prior years, resulting in the deficiencies
determined by respondent in the notice of deficiency.
2
All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in
effect for the years at issue, and all Rule references are to the
Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. Monetary amounts have
been rounded to the nearest dollar or deutsche mark as
appropriate.
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stock were worthless in the taxable years the disputed deductions
were claimed.3 Respondent concedes, however, that all of the
disallowed worthless stock and bad debt deductions constitute a
long-term capital loss for FYE May 31, 1994.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts, and pertinent German law, have been
stipulated for purposes of these proceedings and are so found or
stated. The stipulations are incorporated herein by this
reference.
I. In General
At the time the petition was filed, Flint Industries, Inc.
(Flint), was a corporation with its principal place of business
in Tulsa, Oklahoma. For all relevant years, Flint was the common
parent of a group of affiliated corporations that filed a
consolidated corporate income tax return for each of the taxable
years at issue.4 For all relevant years, Flint used the accrual
method of accounting and a fiscal year ended May 31.
3
As a result of respondent’s determination that petitioner
was not entitled to the claimed bad debt deductions, respondent
made a corollary adjustment to petitioner’s interest income.
Respondent agrees that this adjustment will be resolved
consistent with our resolution of the bad debt issue. Petitioner
also alleges error in the computation of the deficiencies. The
parties agree that the computational matters will be addressed in
the Rule 155 computation.
4
In its reply brief, petitioner states that only Flint and
its domestic subsidiaries filed consolidated returns for the
years at issue; Günther, a foreign subsidiary, was not eligible
to be included, and was not included, in the consolidated group.
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During the years at issue, Flint was engaged primarily in
the business of large-scale construction and oil and gas
servicing. Flint’s ability to conduct its business successfully
depended heavily upon Flint’s maintaining good banking and surety
relationships.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Flint, directly or
through its subsidiaries, purchased three electronics companies,
one of which was W. Günther GmbH (Günther). Günther was an
electronic component manufacturing firm located in Nürnberg,
Germany. It was organized as a German Gesellschaft mit
beshrankter Haftung (GmbH) and was classified as a corporation
for U.S. tax purposes. Günther used the accrual method of
accounting and a fiscal year ending on April 30.
II. Petitioner’s Basis in Günther’s Stock
Flint’s majority-owned subsidiary, Flint Electronics Co.
(Flint Electronics), purchased 100 percent of Günther’s stock for
$4,890,388 during FYE May 31, 1981. During FYE May 31, 1985,
Flint Electronics contributed $484,050 to Günther’s capital. As
set forth more fully, infra, during FYE May 31, 1992, Flint
Electronics contributed an additional $2 million to Günther’s
capital.5 As of May 31, 1992, Flint Electronics’ adjusted basis
5
Although the parties stipulated to these facts, several
exhibits in the case appear to contradict the facts regarding
ownership. For example, Günther’s commercial report for its FYE
April 30, 1991, the audited financial statement required by
(continued...)
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in its Günther stock, before taking into account the amounts at
issue in this case, was $7,374,438.
III. Günther's Management and Operations
Günther’s geschäftsführer, Albert Günther (Albert), and its
procurist, Hans Kampfrad (Kampfrad), controlled Günther’s day-to-
day management and operations.6 Albert reported directly to
Flint’s president.
Most of Günther’s products were switches, relays, and sensor
devices such as those used for air bags and braking systems. The
market for these products was highly cost-sensitive because
Günther had several competitors that made similar products.
At some point before 1992, Günther was an industry leader in
air bag sensor technology. Subsequently, however, new products
superseded Günther's technology and eroded its competitive
advantage. Although Günther owned patents for some of its
manufacturing processes, by May 31, 1992, Günther's patents had
5
(...continued)
German law, states that Günther is a wholly owned subsidiary of
Gordos International Corp., and Günther’s commercial report for
its FYE April 30, 1992, states that Günther’s share capital was
transferred from Gordos International Corp. to Flint Electronics
Co. We accept the parties’ stipulation, however, because the
relevant facts regarding Günther’s ownership by a member of the
affiliated group and petitioner’s adjusted basis in Günther’s
stock are not in dispute.
6
The positions of geschäftsführer and procurist in a German
GmbH are similar to those of general manager and controller in a
U.S. company. However, because the geschäftsführer and procurist
were the only members of Günther’s senior management, they had
considerably more power and authority.
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little or no value because the underlying technology was widely
available in other forms.
IV. Günther's Subsidiaries
Günther was the majority owner of several subsidiaries that
manufactured or sold products in India, France, Switzerland, and
Germany (Berlin). The French and Swiss subsidiaries were
distribution outlets that sold Günther's products. The Berlin
subsidiary was essentially a manufacturing subcontractor for
Günther. The Indian subsidiary began as a joint venture in 1991.
It operated a manufacturing facility that was supposed to produce
Günther’s products at a lower cost. Günther’s subsidiaries were
valued at historical cost (book value) on Günther’s balance
sheet. As of May 31, 1992, the subsidiaries’ book values
exceeded their fair market values.
V. Flint’s Guaranties of Günther’s Bank Loans and Lease
In the 1980s, Flint also provided some working capital to
Günther and guaranteed certain of Günther’s bank loans. With one
exception discussed below, all of these guaranties were given
between 1983 and 1989. During this period, Günther did not have
much equity, it had a poor relationship with German banks, and
its earnings were erratic.
At some point before January 1992, without the knowledge or
approval of Flint’s management,7 Günther obtained a loan of
7
Although Flint had imposed restrictions on the authority of
(continued...)
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roughly 2,500,000 deutsche marks (DM)8 from Bankhaus Reuschel
(Reuschel).9 In February 1992, when Reuschel indicated it would
demand immediate payment of the loan without Flint’s guaranty,
Flint guaranteed the loan. Because Günther was operating at a
loss by then, Flint’s management knew that guaranteeing the
Reuschel loan was risky. Still, Flint extended the guaranty, as
it saw no economically reasonable alternative short of advancing
Günther the cash to repay the note.
Günther’s long-term liabilities also included a lease for
Günther’s building in Nürnberg. This building was owned by
Actium Leasobjekt GmbH & Co. KG (Actium), a limited partnership.
Günther owned a 99-percent limited partnership interest in
Actium. In the early 1980s, shortly after acquiring Günther,
Flint guaranteed the lease for Günther’s building in Nürnberg.
Günther’s bank loans were listed on its balance sheets as
notes payable. As of April 30, 1992, the principal balances of
Günther’s notes payable to banks totaled $10,976,220, and accrued
7
(...continued)
Günther’s management to enter into loans, those restrictions on
management's actual authority were unenforceable with regard to
third parties because managers of a German GmbH have statutory
authority to represent and bind the company in transactions with
third parties.
8
On average, 1 deutsche mark was worth approximately 60
cents during the years at issue.
9
Flint decided to terminate Albert at least partly because
of this transaction. The terms of his severance were being
negotiated when Flint discovered the Omega transaction (discussed
infra), at which point Albert was abruptly fired.
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interest thereon totaled $1,382,965. Günther also owed Actium
$4,942,343 under the terms of its lease.10
VI. Petitioner’s Efforts To Sell Günther During 1987-1990
In 1987, petitioner decided to focus on its core businesses
and began efforts to sell Günther and its other electronics
subsidiaries. Petitioner engaged investment bankers in the
United States and in Germany to find potential buyers, and the
bankers endeavored to do so during 1988, 1989, and 1990. As part
of the sales effort, petitioner and its agents contacted hundreds
of potential purchasers, and serious discussions were held with
more than 10 companies.
In 1990, petitioner negotiated a letter of intent with a
potential purchaser, AMETEK, to sell Günther for DM 11 million.
The consideration included Flint's release from its guaranties of
Günther's bank loans. In late 1990, however, AMETEK withdrew its
letter of intent for undisclosed reasons while conducting its due
diligence investigation. This withdrawal coincided with rising
oil prices during the Gulf War and a general downturn in the
European auto industry, during which the electronics and
automotive industries suffered setbacks.
10
Günther’s liabilities were stated in deutsche marks. The
amounts in this paragraph have been converted to U.S. dollars
using an exchange rate of .6025.
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VII. Günther's Financial Demise
As of FYE May 31, 1990, the income statement of Günther and
its subsidiaries showed a net profit of $387,962. During FYE May
31, 1991, petitioner began advancing cash to Günther so that
Günther could service its bank loans and meet its short-term
financial obligations. As of FYE May 31, 1991, the income
statement of Günther and its subsidiaries showed a net loss of
$414,443.
Early in FYE May 31, 1992, Günther management's interim
reports to petitioner showed a fiscal-year-to-date loss of
roughly DM 5 million ($3,012,500 approximately). From
petitioner’s perspective, this result was a disaster. Günther
was unable to pay its bank loans and trade payables currently out
of cashflow generated from its operations, and, consequently,
petitioner had to advance the necessary funds to prevent a
default by Günther on the guaranteed bank loans. Sometime later
in FYE May 31, 1992, Günther’s management reported that a capital
contribution in the amount of $2 million was required to avert
statutory bankruptcy under German law. Petitioner made the
requested contribution to capital after Günther’s management
projected significant improvement in operating results for the
latter half of Günther’s FYE April 30, 1992.
Petitioner’s management first became aware of the true
severity of Günther’s financial problems during July 1992, when
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it discovered a transaction that would become known as the Omega
transaction.
A. The Omega Transaction and Petitioner's Discovery of
Misleading Financial Reporting by Günther’s Management
In the Omega transaction, Günther transferred machinery to
Omega-Reed GmbH (Omega), a no-asset corporation owned by one of
Günther’s former employees, in exchange for Omega’s promise to
produce switches for Günther at a reduced cost and for a promise
to pay in the future. Despite Omega’s tenuous financial
condition, no security agreement was executed in connection with
the transfer. In an apparent effort to hide Günther’s true
financial condition, Günther’s management originally reported a
profit of DM 2,900,000 on the Omega transaction and booked the
amount due as a receivable from Omega in Günther’s books and
records for FYE April 30, 1992.11 Any profit, however, was
contingent upon the receipt and sale of Omega products to
Günther's customers over a multiyear period, and thus was
extremely speculative.
After petitioner discovered the Omega transaction in July
1992, Flint's president, Paul K. Lackey, Jr., dispatched senior
management to Germany immediately, and Mr. Lackey soon followed.
11
The alleged profit was backed out and recharacterized in
Günther’s commercial report for FYE April 30, 1992, and
litigation was filed to recover the machinery. Although Günther
eventually recovered at least some of its machinery, the
machinery had been stripped of its operating controls and
essentially was worthless by the time the machinery was
recovered.
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Petitioner began to investigate Günther’s financial condition and
discovered that Günther’s management had concealed the magnitude
of Günther’s operating losses by capitalizing expenses into phony
inventory, incorrectly accounting for inventory, and overstating
receivables with Günther's subsidiaries.
On August 20, 1992, Mr. Lackey fired Albert because, among
other reasons, petitioner had discovered that Albert had
orchestrated the coverup. For a short time after Albert was
fired, Kampfrad acted as geschäftsführer, but, as Mr. Lackey
suspected that Kampfrad had been involved in the coverup, Mr.
Lackey eventually dismissed him as well.
B. Günther’s True Financial Condition as of FYE April 30,
1992
In addition to the investigation by petitioner’s management
discussed above, Günther’s German auditors conducted an audit in
connection with the preparation of Günther’s commercial report
for its FYE 1992. Petitioner’s investigation revealed that
Günther’s liabilities substantially exceeded the book value of
its assets as of April 30, 1992, and that Günther was currently
unable to pay its bank loans and other liabilities. The audit
revealed that, for its FYE 1992, Günther had incurred a net loss
from operations of DM 15,903,268 and that it had a “deficit not
covered by equity” of DM 4,068,076, determined under German
accounting standards.
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C. Bankruptcy Under German Law
Under German bankruptcy law, the geschäftsführer of a GmbH
must file a bankruptcy proceeding, at the latest, within 3 weeks
of the GmbH’s becoming overindebted or insolvent.12 For purposes
of German bankruptcy law, a GmbH is overindebted when its
liabilities exceed its assets, and it is insolvent when it cannot
pay its immediately due debts on a permanent basis for the
foreseeable future.
A GmbH’s bankruptcy allows its creditors to accelerate the
debts owed to each creditor and to pursue collection of
guaranteed debt from the guarantors. In addition, a creditor of
an overindebted or insolvent GmbH is authorized to file for the
GmbH’s bankruptcy.
If a shareholder of a bankrupt GmbH has made loans to, or
assumed other liabilities of, a bankrupt GmbH, including payments
of guaranteed debt, and the German bankruptcy court determines
that such loans, assumptions, or payments were made at a time
when the GmbH was overindebted or insolvent, the bankruptcy court
can deny the shareholder repayment of such amounts. Within 1
year after bankruptcy proceedings are opened, the administrator
may challenge (1) any transaction by the bankrupt GmbH
prejudicing creditors that occurred within 6 months of the
beginning of the bankruptcy proceeding, if such transaction
12
Failure to do so is a criminal offense under German law.
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occurred while the GmbH was overindebted or insolvent, or within
10 days prior to the GmbH’s becoming overindebted or insolvent,
and the other party to the transaction knew of such
overindebtedness or insolvency, and (2) any transaction by the
GmbH, regardless of when such transaction occurred, the purpose
or intent of which was to prejudice creditors, if such
transaction occurred at a time reasonably connected to a
subsequent bankruptcy.
In order to avoid bankruptcy under German law, the owners of
a GmbH are required to endorse a plan aimed at improving the
GmbH’s financial stability as determined under applicable German
accounting principles.
D. Petitioner’s Evaluation of Günther’s Financial
Condition
Faced with Günther’s catastrophic net loss for FYE April 30,
1992, petitioner’s management considered its options with respect
to Günther. It ascertained the fair market value of Günther’s
assets, looking for any asset whose fair market value so exceeded
its book value that the asset might be converted into cash to pay
down bank loans Flint had guaranteed. It attempted to identify
any liabilities not reflected on Günther’s books that could arise
if Günther were sold or liquidated or if Günther were forced into
bankruptcy. Most importantly, petitioner analyzed available
options in order to ascertain which option would result in the
smallest financial loss to petitioner from Günther’s financial
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collapse. As a result of this analysis, petitioner’s management
concluded that the option most likely to minimize petitioner’s
losses with respect to Günther was to prevent Günther’s
bankruptcy and any default on Günther’s bank loans while
petitioner paid down the guaranteed bank loans and attempted to
find a purchaser for Günther.
Once petitioner’s management concluded that Günther was no
longer a viable going concern, that Günther must be sold or
otherwise disposed of, and that its disposal would generate a
loss, it presented its plan to petitioner’s board of directors.
On September 3, 1992, petitioner’s board of directors approved
the plan to dispose of Günther, and petitioner adopted
discontinued operations treatment with respect to Günther’s
operations in preparing petitioner’s consolidated financial
statements as of May 31, 1992.
E. Discontinued Operations Treatment
Petitioner has prepared its consolidated financial statement
in accordance with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(U.S. GAAP) since 1981. U.S. GAAP requires a company to treat a
business segment or unit as a discontinued operation when the
company makes a decision to dispose of the business segment or
unit and management expects to incur a loss on the disposal.
When a company adopts discontinued operations treatment with
respect to a business unit, U.S. GAAP requires management to
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assess the period of time operations will continue until disposal
and the expected results of operations over that time period.
U.S. GAAP also requires management to evaluate the expected
outcome from the disposal of the business unit. In order to do
so, management is required to adjust the value of the unit’s
assets from book value to net realizable value.13
After conducting a review of Günther’s assets and obtaining
appraisals where necessary, petitioner’s management concluded:
(1) The values of most of Günther’s book assets must be adjusted
downward to reflect that their net realizable values were lower
than their book values; (2) the value of Günther's ownership
interest in Actium must be adjusted upward to reflect its net
realizable value in excess of book value; and (3) Günther’s
liabilities substantially exceeded the fair market value of
Günther’s assets as of May 31, 1992.
On its consolidated statement of operations and retained
earnings for FYE May 31, 1992, petitioner reported a loss from
13
For Federal estate, gift, and income tax purposes, fair
market value means “the price at which the property would change
hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being
under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable
knowledge of relevant facts.” United States v. Cartwright, 411
U.S. 546, 551 (1973); Martin Ice Cream Co. v. Commissioner, 110
T.C. 189, 220 (1998). Although net realizable value is an
accounting concept which apparently refers to the net value
realizable from the sale or disposition of a business unit and/or
its assets and is not necessarily the same as fair market value,
we are satisfied that petitioner’s management calculated the fair
market value of Günther’s assets and that those values were
considered in determining the net realizable value of Günther’s
assets for financial statement purposes.
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discontinued operations, attributable to Günther, of $13,496,553
before income taxes. After reducing the loss for an income tax
benefit of $4,229,613, petitioner reported a net loss
attributable to Günther of $9,266,940. On its consolidated
balance sheet for FYE May 31, 1992, petitioner reported a net
liability from discontinued operations attributable to Günther of
$10,502,000, consisting of a projected loss during the phaseout
period of $3,883,000 and a projected loss on the final sale of
Günther’s assets of $6,619,000.
F. The Intercompany Account
Flint and its subsidiaries used an intercompany account to
record various charges and credits among the different companies.
Intercompany account balances were recorded in the books and
records of the companies as accounts receivable/payable and
accrued interest at a market rate.
Günther’s intercompany account balance during the years at
issue consisted of the following components: (a) Corporate
charges; (b) interest charges; (c) allocations of expenses
incurred on a group basis for Flint and its subsidiaries; e.g.,
insurance; (d) intercompany purchases; and (e) cash advances;
i.e., cash paid directly to banks or advanced to Günther for that
purpose and cash advanced to Günther for the purpose of meeting
other short-term financial obligations, such as payroll. The
following table shows Günther’s intercompany account balances for
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the FYE May 31, 1981-94,14 the composition of Günther’s
intercompany account balances for the FYE May 31, 1991-94, the
amount of Günther’s bank loans assumed by petitioner during FYE
May 31, 1994, and certain waivers of intercompany account
balances discussed, infra.
Balance Balance
owed owed by
by (to) Waivers (to)
Group Günther of Günther Bank
Fiscal Corporate Interest expense Interco. Cash before Interco. after debt
year charge charge allocation purchases advances waivers balance waivers assumption
1981 --- --- --- --- --- $836,430 --- --- ---
1982 --- --- --- --- --- 1,476,550 --- --- ---
1983 --- --- --- --- --- 1,129,649 --- --- ---
1984 --- --- --- --- --- 747,695 --- --- ---
1985 --- --- --- --- --- 31,830 --- --- ---
1986 --- --- --- --- --- (9,787) --- --- ---
1987 --- --- --- --- --- (431,874) --- --- ---
1988 --- --- --- --- --- (104,906) --- --- ---
1989 --- --- --- --- --- 434,349 --- --- ---
1990 --- --- --- --- --- (91,019) --- --- ---
1991 $180,000 $36,992 $130,327 $341,436 $650,000 1,247,736 --- --- ---
1992 180,000 275,006 26,178 564,736 4,270,468 6,564,124 --- --- ---
1993 180,000 184,366 51,792 --- 2,834,823 9,815,105 ($9,000,000) $815,105 ---
1994 50,000 58,635 23,570 --- 2,243,583 3,190,893 (2,429,665) 761,228 $3,709,460
Günther made no payments on its intercompany account balance
during FYE May 31, 1992, 1993, or 1994. Petitioner did not
expect advances it made to Günther or on Günther’s behalf during
FYE May 31, 1992, 1993, and 1994 to be repaid.
14
The record does not reflect the specific charges before
FYE May 31, 1991.
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G. Petitioner’s Plan To Dispose of Günther
Günther’s financial condition as of May 31, 1992, was so bad
that petitioner could have forced Günther to file for bankruptcy
simply by withholding additional financial support. Petitioner
discussed bankruptcy but decided to pursue an orderly disposition
of Günther to minimize petitioner’s losses from Günther’s
financial collapse and to avoid triggering contingent and/or
potential liabilities, which did not appear on Günther’s balance
sheet. The plan included making payments on the guaranteed bank
loans to prevent Günther’s default until a purchaser could be
found, shoring up Günther’s German balance sheet by waiving
petitioner’s right to collect a portion of Günther’s intercompany
account balance, and minimizing petitioner’s exposure on the
lease guaranty by purchasing Günther's interest in Actium.
1. The First Waiver Subject to Reinstatement
Under German GmbH law, a formal contribution to the capital
of a GmbH by its owner requires an amendment to the GmbH’s
charter, which must be effected in accordance with German GmbH
law. An informal contribution to a German GmbH, however, does
not require a charter amendment. One type of informal
shareholder financing available to a German GmbH is a waiver of a
shareholder’s loan to the GmbH.
A waiver of a shareholder's loan subject to reinstatement is
a form of contingent debt that can return a subsidiary GmbH to
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technical solvency for German law purposes. A waiver of a
shareholder’s loan to a GmbH can be made subject to the condition
that the loan will be reinstated as soon as the financial
condition of the subsidiary GmbH has improved to permit repayment
out of surplus capital. When a waiver subject to reinstatement
is given, interest for the period of time during which the loan
had been waived can be imposed upon the subsidiary GmbH.
As part of its plan to dispose of Günther and in order to
forestall the filing of a bankruptcy proceeding with respect to
Günther, petitioner waived portions of Günther’s intercompany
account balance.
The first waiver, executed on October 1, 1992, involved
several steps. First, Flint assigned $9 million of Günther’s
intercompany account balance to Flint Electronics. Next, Flint
Electronics formally waived the receivable “In order to create a
sound financial basis for future operations * * * and to
recapitalize Günther”. The waiver was subject to the condition
that “at such time that the net equity of Günther exceeds its
registered capital * * * the waived amount will * * * [at Flint
Electronic’s option] be owed by Günther again”. Flint
Electronics recorded the waived intercompany receivable as
contributed capital. This first waiver effectively reclassified
$9 million of the intercompany account payable on Günther’s books
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as equity, thereby enabling Günther to issue its FYE April 30,
1992, commercial report and avoid statutory bankruptcy.15
2. The Actium Transaction
The next part of petitioner’s plan to minimize its exposure
involved the purchase of Günther's interest in Actium. Unlike
virtually every other asset on Günther’s German balance sheet,
the fair market value of Günther’s partnership interest in Actium
exceeded its book value. Petitioner concluded that if Günther
were to sell its interest in Actium to an affiliated company, the
resulting net cashflow could be used to pay down Günther’s
liabilities, while minimizing petitioner’s potential exposure in
the event of Günther’s bankruptcy.
Petitioner organized a subsidiary, Investors Capital Company
(ICC), which purchased Günther’s ownership interest in Actium in
December 1992 for its fair market value of approximately
$3,477,000. The fair market value of Günther’s interest in
Actium was determined by an independent third-party appraisal
because petitioner was concerned that the transaction could be
reversed in bankruptcy. The purchase yielded a positive cashflow
to Günther of DM 8,000,000.16
15
Günther’s auditors would not issue financial statements
for FYE Apr. 30, 1992, that showed liabilities in excess of
assets, one of the conditions resulting in statutory bankruptcy.
16
The return of a related sinking fund and an amount
attributable to tenant improvements increased the funds available
to pay down Günther’s liabilities from approximately DM 5,400,000
(continued...)
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To ensure that all of Günther’s creditors benefited from the
Actium sale, Flint directed Günther to use 80 percent of the cash
generated by the Actium sale to pay down Günther’s guaranteed
bank loans in proportion to their balances. The remaining cash
was used to pay employee salaries, trade creditors, and tenant
improvements. None of the sale proceeds were used to repay any
part of the intercompany account balance owed by Günther to
petitioner.
H. Petitioner’s Efforts To Dispose of Günther
Throughout the period following discovery of the Omega
transaction and dismissal of Günther's management, petitioner
continued Günther’s operations while seeking potential purchasers
for Günther and its product lines. Petitioner retained
investment banks and brokers, but there was very little interest
in Günther. Before the purchase of Günther by Günther America,
Inc. (GAI), during FYE May 31, 1994, discussed infra, only one
offer to purchase Günther was received. In March 1993, Celduc,
one of Günther's principal competitors, offered to purchase
Günther, if petitioner contributed cash of DM 20 million
(approximately $12,050,000) and made guaranties and concessions
worth several million dollars more. After unsuccessful efforts
to negotiate a more favorable deal, petitioner ultimately
16
(...continued)
to approximately DM 8 million.
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rejected Celduc's offer and continued to seek other potential
purchasers.
Generally, from July 1992 forward, one of petitioner's board
members or corporate officers was onsite in Germany to supervise
Günther’s management and keep petitioner informed of
developments. Despite petitioner’s supervision, Günther
continued to report operating losses in FYE April 30, 1993 and
1994.
In March 1993, petitioner hired Elson Nowell as
geschäftsführer. Upon becoming geschäftsführer, Mr. Nowell
discovered that Günther had inflated the value of its inventory
by cycling old inventory through its subsidiaries.17 This
discovery necessitated additional substantial writeoffs in
connection with the preparation of Günther’s commercial report
for its FYE April 30, 1993.
On January 21, 1994, in order to make Günther more appealing
to potential purchasers, petitioner arranged an additional waiver
of Günther’s intercompany receivable. Flint assigned $2,429,665
of its intercompany receivable to Flint Electronics, which then
waived the receivable, subject to reinstatement. This second
waiver was identical in all practical aspects to the first
17
Under accounting principles applicable to an electronics
firm such as Günther, older inventory is written down to
progressively lower values to account for its obsolescence and
reduced market value. Günther avoided this writedown by
transferring assets among the subsidiaries.
- 23 -
waiver, and was made "to create a sound financial basis for
future operations * * * and to recapitalize Günther."
Sometime between January and April 1994, petitioner finally
found a purchaser for Günther. Robert P. Romano, an individual
who had worked for one of Flint's other electronics subsidiaries
and had started an electronics company of his own, agreed to
purchase Günther through GAI, a corporation formed to acquire
Günther.
Under the terms of a sale agreement dated April 13, 1994,
GAI gave Flint Electronics a promissory note for DM 5,000,000,
Flint assumed all of Günther's remaining bank debt ($3,709,460)
and forgave the remaining intercompany receivable balance
($761,228), and Flint Electronics relinquished its right to
reinstate the waived intercompany receivable ($11,429,665).
GAI’s promissory note provided for minimum principal and interest
payments beginning in FYE May 31, 1996, and specified that the
payment schedule would accelerate if GAI sold assets other than
in the ordinary course of business or became profitable.
Petitioner bargained for the note to discourage GAI from
liquidating Günther.
GAI retained Mr. Nowell as geschäftsführer. In the years
following the sale of Günther, the company reported a small
operating loss followed by marginal profits. In 1996, the first
year payment under the promissory note became due, GAI/Günther
- 24 -
paid approximately DM 125,000 to one of Flint’s subsidiaries
pursuant to the promissory note.
VIII. Günther’s Value as of May 31, 1992
As of May 31, 1992, Günther's liabilities (excluding the
intercompany account payable of $6,564,124 owed to Flint and the
reserve for Günther’s projected FYE April 30, 1993, operating
loss of $3.2 million) exceeded the fair market value of its
assets by at least $7 million. As of May 31, 1992, and for the
foreseeable future, Günther was unable to pay its guaranteed bank
loans and other obligations when due.
IX. Deductions Claimed
For FYE May 31, 1992, petitioner claimed a worthless stock
deduction of $7,374,438 (petitioner’s adjusted basis in Günther’s
stock without regard to our discussion herein) under section 165
and a bad debt deduction of $6,564,124 (the intercompany account
balance as of May 31, 1992) under section 166.
For FYE May 31, 1993, petitioner claimed an additional
worthless stock deduction of $2,435,876 and a bad debt deduction
of $815,105. The worthless stock deduction equaled the amount of
the first waiver subject to reinstatement, less the amount
claimed as a bad debt deduction on petitioner’s FYE 1992 return.
The bad debt deduction equaled the intercompany account balance
as of May 31, 1993.
- 25 -
For FYE May 31, 1994, petitioner reduced its income by
$6,085,248.18 This amount consisted of the ending balance of
Günther’s intercompany account as of May 31, 1994, that had not
yet been written off for Federal income tax purposes ($2,375,788)
and the amount of Günther’s guaranteed bank loans petitioner
assumed ($3,709,460).
X. Notice of Deficiency
In the notice of deficiency, respondent disallowed
petitioner’s deductions for bad debts and worthless stock
attributable to Günther that were claimed for FYE May 31, 1992
and 1993, increased petitioner’s income for FYE May 31, 1994, and
reduced petitioner’s net operating losses for FYE 1992, 1993, and
1994, accordingly. Respondent recharacterized the disallowed
deductions as long-term capital losses and recomputed the net
operating loss carrybacks allowable for FYE 1989, 1990, 1991, and
1992. Respondent also determined that other adjustments were
required, which have since been resolved by agreement or are
computational.
18
In the notice of deficiency, respondent proposed an
adjustment increasing petitioner’s income by $6,085,248. For
briefing and argument purposes, however, the parties have treated
the disputed adjustment as the disallowance of a bad debt
deduction.
- 26 -
OPINION
I. Bad Debt Deductions
Section 166 authorizes a taxpayer to deduct any debt that
becomes worthless within the taxable year. Nonbusiness bad debts
are treated as losses resulting from the sale or exchange of a
short-term capital asset. Secs. 166(d)(1), 1211(b), 1212(b).
Business bad debts are deductible as ordinary losses to the
extent of the taxpayer’s adjusted basis in the debt. Sec.
166(b).
In order for petitioner to prevail on the bad debt issue,
petitioner must first establish that: (1) A bona fide debt
existed between petitioner and Günther which obligated Günther,
the alleged debtor, to pay petitioner a fixed or determinable sum
of money; (2) the debt was created or acquired in, or in
connection with, petitioner’s trade or business; and (3) the debt
became worthless in the year the bad debt deduction was claimed.
Sec. 166; United States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93 (1972); Calumet
Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 257, 284-285 (1990); Beaver
v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 85, 91 (1970); Black v. Commissioner, 52
T.C. 147, 151 (1969). A gift or contribution to capital is not
debt within the meaning of section 166. Calumet Indus., Inc. v.
Commissioner, supra at 284; Kean v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 575,
594 (1988). Petitioner bears the burden of proving that it is
- 27 -
entitled to a business bad debt deduction under section 166.
Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).19
Petitioner contends it properly deducted the intercompany
account balances owed to it by Günther as business bad debts
under section 166. Respondent disagrees, contending that the
amounts constituting the intercompany account balances
(hereinafter collectively referred to as advances) were
contributions to the capital of Günther and that, even if the
advances qualify as bona fide debt, the debts were not worthless
in the years the deductions were claimed.
A. Were the Advances Made to Günther and Charged to the
Intercompany Account Bona Fide Debt?
1. In General
In order for us to find that a bona fide debt was created
for purposes of section 166, petitioner must prove that there was
“a genuine intention to create a debt, with a reasonable
expectation of repayment” and that the intention was consistent
with the “economic reality of creating a debtor-creditor
relationship”. Litton Bus. Sys., Inc. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C.
367, 377 (1973). Whether the requisite intention to create a
true debtor-creditor relationship existed is a question of fact
to be determined from a review of all the evidence. Id. Factors
19
The burden of proof provisions of sec. 7491 do not apply
here because the examination in this case began before July 22,
1998. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring & Reform Act of
1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001, 112 Stat. 726.
- 28 -
we ordinarily consider in our analysis include, but are not
limited to: (1) The name given to the certificate evidencing the
indebtedness, (2) the presence or absence of a fixed maturity
date, (3) the source of payments, (4) the right to enforce
repayment, (5) any increase in management participation as a
result of the advances, (6) the status of the advances in
relation to debts owed to regular corporate creditors, (7) the
intent of the parties, (8) thin or adequate capitalization, (9)
the identity of interest between creditor and stockholder, (10)
payment of interest only out of profits, (11) the ability to
obtain loans from outside lending institutions, (12) the extent
to which the advance was used to acquire capital assets, and (13)
the failure of the corporation to repay on the due date. Am.
Offshore, Inc. v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 579, 602-606 (1991); see
also Calumet Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at 285; Anchor
Natl. Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 382, 400 (1989) (11
factors); Dixie Dairies Corp. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 476, 493
(1980) (13 factors). No single factor is determinative, and not
all factors are applicable in each case. Dixie Dairies Corp. v.
Commissioner, supra at 493-494. “The various factors * * * are
only aids in answering the ultimate question whether the
investment, analyzed in terms of its economic reality,
constitutes risk capital entirely subject to the fortunes of the
corporate venture or represents a strict debtor-creditor
- 29 -
relationship.” Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d
694, 697 (3d Cir. 1968).
Before we apply the factors, however, we must first identify
the relevant date that governs our analysis. Ordinarily we must
examine an advance as of the date it is made to decide whether it
qualifies as bona fide debt. When an advance takes the form of a
payment required by a guaranty, however, we must examine the
circumstances existing on the date the guaranty is given. Sec.
1.166-9(c), Income Tax Regs. Petitioner contends that we must
divide the amounts recorded in the intercompany account into two
categories–-amounts reducing Günther’s guaranteed bank loan
balances and amounts paid on other obligations. Petitioner
asserts that all amounts paid towards the bank loans were
payments required by Flint’s guaranties and must be analyzed as
of the dates of the guaranties. Respondent contends that none of
the payments applied to Günther’s bank loans were payments that
Flint was required to make under its guaranties, and that all of
the advances, including those applied to the guaranteed bank
loans, must therefore be analyzed as of the dates the payments
were made.
Petitioner did not prove that any of the banks declared a
default on any of Günther’s guaranteed bank loans or demanded
that petitioner pay under the guaranties, or that petitioner
actually made guaranty payments and, if so, in what amount. We
- 30 -
conclude, therefore, that because petitioner has failed to prove
that any of the payments charged to the intercompany account were
guaranty payments, for purposes of our analysis under section 166
we must evaluate all of the advances constituting Günther’s
intercompany account balance as of the years the advances were
paid and recorded in the intercompany account.
2. Applying the Factors
We proceed to examine the advances under the traditional
multifactor approach. Cf. Hayutin v. Commissioner, 508 F.2d 462,
472-474 (10th Cir. 1974), affg. T.C. Memo. 1972-127.
Respondent’s determination as to whether a shareholder’s advance
is debt or equity is presumed to be correct. Gooding Amusement
Co. v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 408, 421 (1954), affd. 236 F.2d 159
(6th Cir. 1956).
a. Name Given to Certificate
The advances in question were not memorialized by any
promissory note or other documentation characterizing the
advances as debt. Consequently, both parties agree that this
factor is not relevant to our analysis.
b. Presence or Absence of Fixed Maturity Date
“The presence of a fixed maturity date indicates a fixed
obligation to repay, a characteristic of a debt obligation. The
absence of the same on the other hand would indicate that
repayment was in some way tied to the fortunes of the business,
- 31 -
indicative of an equity advance.” Estate of Mixon v. United
States, 464 F.2d 394, 404 (5th Cir. 1972); see also sec.
385(b)(1); Am. Offshore, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at 602.
Evidence that a creditor did not intend to enforce payment or was
indifferent as to the exact time the advance was to be repaid
belies an arm’s-length debtor-creditor relationship. See
generally Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, supra at 418-
421.
Petitioner acknowledges that there was no fixed date for
Günther’s repayment of petitioner’s advances but argues that the
history of repayment before FYE May 31, 1991, demonstrates that a
fixed repayment schedule was unnecessary. Petitioner also
contends, but did not prove, that all members of the consolidated
group used the intercompany account in the same manner, and,
thus, this factor should not favor equity.
The record in this case establishes that the intercompany
account was an open account with a running balance and no fixed
date for repayment. While Flint and its subsidiaries may have
used the account in a similar fashion, any similarity in usage
does not change the fact that petitioner did not prove there was
any deadline for repayment of balances owed among the companies.
This factor favors respondent’s position.
- 32 -
c. Source of the Payments
If the source of the debtor’s repayment is contingent upon
earnings or is from a restricted source, such as a judgment
recovery, dividends, or profits, an equity investment is
indicated. Estate of Mixon v. United States, supra at 405;
Calumet Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. at 287-288; Dixie
Dairies Corp. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. at 495. In such a case,
the lender acts “‘as a classic capital investor hoping to make a
profit, not as a creditor expecting to be repaid regardless of
the company’s success or failure.’” Calumet Indus., Inc. v.
Commissioner, supra at 287-288 (quoting In re Larson, 862 F.2d
112, 117 (7th Cir. 1988)). When circumstances make it impossible
to estimate when an advance will be repaid because repayment is
contingent upon future profits or repayment is subject to a
condition precedent, or where a condition may terminate or
suspend the obligation to repay, an equity investment is
indicated. Affiliated Research, Inc. v. United States, 173 Ct.
Cl. 338, 351 F.2d 646, 648 (1965).
Petitioner acknowledges that repayment of the advances was
dependent upon Günther’s earnings. Therefore, the only question
is the weight to be given this factor. We conclude that this
factor favors respondent’s position and that it is entitled to
considerable weight because Günther had no available source of
repayment other than its earnings and, during the years the
- 33 -
advances were made, petitioner knew there was very little, if
any, possibility that the advances would ever be repaid.20
d. The Right To Enforce Repayment
A right to enforce the repayment of amounts advanced to
another, which is conferred on the entity making the advances, is
indicative of bona fide debt. Estate of Mixon v. United States,
supra at 405; Am. Offshore, Inc. v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. at 603.
Petitioner failed to introduce any evidence regarding the
operation of the intercompany account in FYE May 31, 1991,21 and
thereafter or the terms applicable to any account balance, other
than with respect to interest. Because petitioner bears the
burden of proof, petitioner’s failure to introduce evidence
regarding this factor weighs against petitioner’s position.
e. Increase in Management Participation
If a creditor receives a right to participate in the
management of a business in consideration for an advance to the
business, such participation tends to demonstrate that the
advance was not a bona fide debt but rather was an equity
investment. Am. Offshore, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at 603.
20
Even the advances made during FYE May 31, 1991, were made
at a time when Günther had suffered a downturn in its business,
and repayment was dependent on earnings.
21
The intercompany account balance owed by Günther as of May
31, 1992, consisted, in part, of amounts advanced during FYE May
31, 1991. Unless otherwise noted, our analysis covers advances
in FYE May 31, 1991, as well as those in later years.
- 34 -
Before petitioner learned of Günther’s dire financial
condition, Günther’s local management ran its day-to-day
operations with oversight from petitioner. After petitioner
learned of Günther’s financial problems, petitioner’s management
became more actively involved in Günther’s operations, eventually
assuming direct control. Although respondent argues that this
factor favors equity, we reject the argument. Petitioner did not
receive an increased role in Günther’s management during FYE
1992, 1993, and 1994 in exchange for petitioner’s advances;
rather, petitioner’s increased participation in management was a
necessary part of its effort to prevent Günther’s financial
collapse from becoming public. This factor is neutral.
f. Status Equal or Inferior to Other Creditors
Whether an advance is subordinated to regular creditors
bears on whether the taxpayer was acting as a creditor or an
investor. Estate of Mixon v. United States, supra at 406. In
addition, “Failure to demand timely repayment effectively
subordinates the intercompany debt to the rights of other
creditors who receive payment in the interim.” Am. Offshore,
Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at 603 (citing Inductotherm Indus.,
Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1984-281, affd. without
published opinion 770 F.2d 1071 (3d Cir. 1985)).
Petitioner effectively subordinated its intercompany
advances to Günther for the benefit of third-party creditors in
- 35 -
two ways. First, petitioner caused Günther to distribute the net
proceeds from the Actium transaction as part payment to the banks
and trade creditors to whom Günther was liable, but no part of
the proceeds was used to repay the intercompany account balance.
Second, when petitioner waived portions of Günther’s intercompany
account balance, it effectively subordinated the intercompany
account balance to other creditors.
Subordination of the advances strongly indicates equity.
This factor favors respondent’s position.
g. Intent of the Parties
“[T]he inquiry of a court in resolving the debt-equity issue
is primarily directed at ascertaining the intent of the parties”.
A.R. Lantz Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 1330, 1333 (9th Cir.
1970) (citing Taft v. Commissioner, 314 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1963),
affg. in part and revg. in part T.C. Memo. 1961-230). Before the
waivers of portions of the intercompany account balance owed to
petitioner by Günther, both companies treated the intercompany
account balance as debt in that the outstanding account balance
accrued interest. The intercompany account balance was recorded
as an account payable by Günther and an account receivable by
petitioner on their respective financial statements.
Although petitioner treated the intercompany account balance
as debt on its books and records and referred to the account
balance as a debt owed to it by Günther, it is obvious that
- 36 -
neither petitioner nor Günther intended, or reasonably could have
intended, the advances22 to be bona fide debt. Petitioner made
the advances to keep Günther from defaulting on its bank loans
and other obligations. During FYE May 31, 1991 and 1992,
petitioner knew the advances were risky but made them anyway.
During FYE May 31, 1993 and 1994, petitioner realized that it
would not recover any of the amounts it had advanced to Günther
or for Günther’s benefit, and it continued to inject funds into
Günther for the sole purpose of minimizing the losses it would
incur before Günther’s disposal. We conclude, therefore, that
neither petitioner nor Günther genuinely intended the advances to
be bona fide debt or reasonably expected the advances to be
repaid. See Sigmon v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-377.
This factor favors respondent’s position.
h. Thin or Adequate Capitalization
Inadequate or “thin” capitalization is strong evidence of a
capital contribution where: (1) The debt-to-equity ratio was
initially high; (2) the parties realized that it would likely go
higher; and (3) substantial portions of these funds were used for
the purchase of capital assets and for meeting expenses needed to
commence operations. Am. Offshore, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra
22
Even the advances charged to the intercompany account
during FYE May 31, 1991, were made to prevent a default on
Günther’s bank loans and to provide working capital.
- 37 -
at 604 (citing United States v. Henderson, 375 F.2d 36, 40 (5th
Cir. 1967)).
In its reply brief, petitioner maintains that Günther had a
debt-to-equity ratio of 3.4:1 as of May 31, 1991.23 Petitioner
did not explain precisely how it calculated the debt-to-equity
ratio, nor did petitioner present any argument regarding the
proper method for calculating the ratio.24 Petitioner also
failed to explain why the debt-to-equity ratio it calculated as
of May 31, 1991, supported its position that Günther was
adequately capitalized during each of the taxable years at issue
here.
The failures identified above, combined with our review of
evidence in the record, lead us to conclude petitioner has failed
to prove that the capitalization of Günther was adequate to meet
its reasonably foreseeable business needs. There is certainly
ample evidence in the record from which an inference can be drawn
that Günther’s capitalization was inadequate. Petitioner’s large
23
Petitioner apparently calculated the ratio by dividing
Günther’s total long-term liabilities of $4,782,637 as of May 31,
1991, by total stockholder’s investment of $1,405,422.
Petitioner’s method of calculating the debt-to-equity ratio
ignores approximately 80 percent of the total liabilities
outstanding as of May 31, 1991, and determines Günther’s equity
based upon the book value of Günther’s assets.
24
For example, in some cases, courts, including this Court,
have used the fair market values of assets rather than their book
values to calculate debt-to-equity ratios. E.g., Kraft Foods Co.
v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1956), revg. 21 T.C. 513
(1954); Mason-Dixon Sand & Gravel Co. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1961-259.
- 38 -
cash infusions and Günther’s poor relationship with German banks
suggest inadequate capitalization. Although petitioner’s capital
contributions to Günther in FYE May 31, 1985 and 1992, were
substantial, they were insufficient to staunch the flow of red
ink caused by Günther’s negative cashflow.
For all relevant time periods, therefore, we conclude that
this factor favors respondent’s position.
i. The Identity of Interest Between Creditor
and Shareholder
At all relevant times, a member of the consolidated group
was Günther’s sole shareholder. Advances made by a sole
shareholder are more likely to be committed to the risk of the
business (and hence indicative of an equity investment) than are
advances made by creditors who are not shareholders of the
corporation. Ga. Pac. Corp. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 790, 797
(1975). The sole shareholder is also less likely to be concerned
than a third party would be with the safeguards normally used to
protect such advances. Id. Petitioner’s status as sole
shareholder obviously leads to an identity of interest which,
respondent argues, strongly indicates an equity investment.
Petitioner argues that its greater involvement in Günther’s day-
to-day management after Günther’s financial difficulties became
apparent shows that it was more interested in protecting its
interests as a creditor; i.e., its focus was on minimizing its
- 39 -
liability under the guaranties and not on protecting its equity
investment in Günther.
The record in this case establishes that there was an
identity of interest between petitioner’s role as creditor and as
shareholder. This factor favors respondent’s position.
j. Payment of Interest Only Out of Profits
This factor is essentially the same as the third factor, the
source of the payments. Hardman v. United States, 827 F.2d 1409,
1414 (9th Cir. 1987). It focuses, however, on how the parties to
the advances treated interest. As we have stated, “A true lender
is concerned with interest.” Id. at 605 (citing Estate of Mixon
v. United States, 464 F.2d at 409). The failure to insist on
interest payments indicates that the payors expect to be paid out
of future earnings or through the increased market value of their
equity interest. Am. Offshore, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at
605 (citing Curry v. United States, 396 F.2d 630, 634 (5th Cir.
1968)).
Although the intercompany account balance accrued interest,
which was added to the yearend account balance reflected in the
books and records of both petitioner and Günther, Günther did
not, and financially could not, make any interest payments during
FYE May 31, 1992, 1993, or 1994. Payment of the accrued interest
was entirely dependent on profits that Günther did not have and
- 40 -
was not likely to have in the future. On balance, this factor
favors respondent’s position.
k. Ability of Günther To Obtain Funds From
Outside Lending Institutions
“[T]he touchstone of economic reality is whether an outside
lender would have made the payments in the same form and on the
same terms.” Segel v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 816, 828 (1987)
(citing Scriptomatic, Inc. v. United States, 555 F.2d 364, 367
(3d Cir. 1977)); see also Calumet Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner,
95 T.C. at 287.
The record contains only vague and limited information on
Günther’s financial status before FYE May 31, 1992, and no
evidence tending to prove that Günther could have obtained
comparable loans from unrelated financial institutions. The
limited evidence regarding Günther’s financial condition before
FYE May 31, 1992, tends to show that Günther was not in a
position to obtain substantial funding from any financial
institution without meaningful security, guaranties from a third
party, and fixed payment terms. Petitioner’s financial support
of Günther through the mechanism of the intercompany account had
none of these characteristics and was far more speculative. See
Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d at 697; Dixie
Dairies Corp. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. at 497.
This factor favors respondent’s position.
- 41 -
l. The Extent To Which the Advances Were Used
To Acquire Capital Assets
Respondent concedes that the advances to Günther were used
primarily to service existing bank loans and that, therefore,
this factor is not relevant.
m. Failure To Repay on the Due Date
Petitioner’s advances to Günther were made pursuant to an
open account arrangement with no fixed date for repayment.
Consequently, this factor is not relevant to our analysis.
3. Conclusion
Upon consideration of the above factors, we hold that
Günther’s intercompany account balance during and after FYE May
31, 1992, was not a bona fide debt within the meaning of section
16625 and that petitioner is not entitled to the bad debt
deductions it claimed under section 166. We treat the advances
recorded in the intercompany account, instead, as capital
contributions, which created basis in Günther’s stock.
Datamation Servs., Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1976-252.
B. Guaranteed Bank Loan Assumed by Petitioner in 1994
For FYE May 31, 1994, petitioner claimed the equivalent of a
bad debt deduction for the guaranteed bank debt assumed as part
of GAI’s acquisition of Günther. Petitioner argues that, because
it was an accrual basis taxpayer entitled to a deduction when all
25
Our holding eliminates the need to discuss the remaining
requirements of sec. 166.
- 42 -
events that fix the liability have occurred and the amount of the
liability can be determined with reasonable accuracy, its
assumption of liability for Günther’s bank loans it had
guaranteed should give rise to an immediate deduction. We
disagree. A taxpayer’s assumption of liability for guaranteed
bank debt does not give rise to an immediate deduction, even when
the taxpayer utilizes the accrual method of accounting and even
when there is no right of subrogation or the right of subrogation
is worthless.26 Black Gold Energy Corp. v. Commissioner, 99 T.C.
482 (1992), affd. without published opinion 33 F.3d 62 (10th Cir.
1994). Rather, the event giving rise to a deduction is the
taxpayer’s payment of the liability. Id. at 488.
The record in this case establishes only that Flint assumed
liability for Günther’s guaranteed bank loans during FYE May 31,
1994. Petitioner introduced no evidence establishing how much,
if any, of the bank loans Flint actually paid during FYE May 31,
1994, after it assumed liability for them. Consequently, we hold
that petitioner has failed to prove it is entitled to a bad debt
deduction equal to the amount of the guaranteed bank loans
assumed during FYE May 31, 1994.
26
The assumption of liability also does not create any basis
until the obligation is paid. Sec. 1.166-9(c), Income Tax Regs.
- 43 -
II. Worthless Stock Deductions
A. Deduction Claimed on FYE May 31, 1992, Return
We now consider whether petitioner’s shares of Günther’s
stock were worthless as of May 31, 1992. Petitioner claimed a
worthless stock deduction for FYE May 31, 1992, in an amount
equal to its basis27 in its Günther shares as of May 31, 1992.
Petitioner asserts that it is entitled to the deduction under
section 165 because the shares became worthless during FYE May
31, 1992. Respondent asserts that petitioner has failed to prove
its shares of Günther’s stock became worthless.
27
In both its opening and reply briefs, petitioner asserted
it was entitled to claim an increased worthless stock deduction
in the event we held that items constituting the intercompany
account balance were capital contributions. Respondent did not
dispute that such capital contributions increased petitioner’s
basis; respondent contended only that Günther was not worthless.
Petitioner’s adjusted basis in its Günther stock as of May
31, 1992, was $7,374,438 before any adjustment attributable to
the bad debt issue. Our conclusion that amounts constituting the
intercompany account balance as of FYE May 31, 1992, 1993, and
1994 were contributions to Günther’s capital when made means that
petitioner’s adjusted basis in Günther’s stock as of May 31,
1992, must be increased by the intercompany account balance as of
that date. Petitioner’s adjusted basis in Günther’s stock as of
May 31, 1992, recomputed in accordance with this opinion, was
$13,938,562. Our analysis of whether Günther’s stock was
worthless must take into account the increased equity and
decreased liability resulting from our decision on the bad debt
issue. See Datamation Servs., Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1976-252.
- 44 -
Section 165(g)28 authorizes a domestic corporation owning
28
Sec. 165(g) provides in pertinent part:
SEC. 165(g). Worthless Securities.--
(1) General rule.–-If any security which is a
capital asset becomes worthless during the taxable
year, the loss resulting therefrom shall, for purposes
of this subtitle, be treated as a loss from the sale or
exchange, on the last day of the taxable year, of a
capital asset.
(2) Security defined.--For purposes of this
subsection, the term "security" means--
(A) a share of stock in a corporation;
(B) a right to subscribe for, or to
receive, a share of stock in a corporation;
or
(C) a bond, debenture, note, or
certificate, or other evidence of
indebtedness, issued by a corporation * * *,
with interest coupons or in registered form.
(3) Securities in affiliated corporation.--For
purposes of paragraph (1), any security in a
corporation affiliated with a taxpayer which is a
domestic corporation shall not be treated as a capital
asset. * * * a corporation shall be treated as
affiliated with the taxpayer only if--
(A) stock possessing at least 80 percent
of the voting power of all classes of its
stock and at least 80 percent of each class
of its nonvoting stock is owned directly by
the taxpayer, and
(B) more than 90 percent of the
aggregate of its gross receipts for all
taxable years has been from sources other
than royalties, rents (except rents derived
from rental of properties to employees of the
corporation in the ordinary course of its
operating business), dividends, interest
(continued...)
- 45 -
stock of an affiliated domestic or foreign corporation29 to claim
an ordinary loss with respect to the affiliated corporation’s
stock that becomes wholly worthless during the taxable year.
Sec. 165(g)(3); sec. 1.165-5(d)(1), Income Tax Regs. A
corporation claiming a worthless stock loss under section
165(g)(3) must prove that the stock in question had value at some
point during the taxable year in which worthlessness is claimed
but ceased to have both "liquidating value" and "potential value"
by the end of that year. Sec. 165(g)(1); Austin Co. v.
Commissioner, 71 T.C. 955, 970 (1979); Steadman v. Commissioner,
50 T.C. 369, 376 (1968), affd. 424 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1970); Morton
v. Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 1270, 1278 (1938), affd. 112 F.2d 320
(7th Cir. 1940). The standard we apply is whether a prudent
businessperson would have considered the stock of the affiliated
corporation to be worthless by the end of the taxable year for
which a worthless stock loss under section 165 is claimed.
Steadman v. Commissioner, supra.
28
(...continued)
(except interest received on deferred
purchase price of operating assets sold),
annuities, and gains from sales or exchanges
of stocks and securities.
29
For purposes of sec. 165, an affiliated corporation is one
in which the taxpayer owns directly stock possessing at least 80
percent of the voting power of all classes of such corporation’s
stock and at least 80 percent of each class of such corporation’s
nonvoting stock. Sec. 1.165-5(d)(2)(i)(a), Income Tax Regs.
- 46 -
1. Did Günther Have Value During FYE 1991?
As shown in the consolidated report column of Günther’s
balance sheet as of May 31, 1991, Günther had a positive net
worth of $1,405,422. Respondent does not dispute that Günther
had value during FYE May 31, 1992; it argues only that petitioner
has failed to prove Günther was worthless on May 31, 1992.
2. Did Günther Lack Liquidation Value As of May 31,
1992?
A corporation lacks liquidation value when its liabilities
exceed the value of its assets. Steadman v. Commissioner, supra
at 376-377. Following an investigation, petitioner concluded
that Günther’s liabilities substantially exceeded the aggregate
fair market value of Günther’s assets and that petitioner would
receive nothing upon Günther’s liquidation.30 In fact,
petitioner has demonstrated to our satisfaction that its
conclusion was accurate and that its management searched
diligently for any of Günther’s assets that had a fair market
value in excess of book value which could be liquidated to pay
down the guaranteed bank loans and mitigate petitioner’s losses
from its investment in Günther.
30
Günther’s consolidated balance sheet as of May 31, 1992,
shows a deficit in shareholder’s equity of $17,010,232. Our
conclusion that the intercompany advances were contributions to
capital and not debt requires an adjustment in that figure, but,
even after adjustment, Günther still had a substantial net
deficit as of May 31, 1992.
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Although respondent asserts that some value should be
attributed to goodwill, patents, and other intangibles not shown
on Günther's balance sheet, in our view the evidence showed that
Günther had destroyed its goodwill with ongoing quality problems
and that its patents had little or no value. We find nothing in
the record to indicate that these assets had significant value,
and much to indicate that they did not.
Respondent also argues that petitioner aggressively wrote
down the values of Günther’s assets to support its claims of
worthlessness and that use of discontinued operations treatment
was improper. Respondent urges us to rely instead on Günther’s
German commercial report for its FYE April 30, 1992, which was
prepared on a going concern basis.
Petitioner responds that the writedowns jeopardized its own
banking and surety relationships and thus threatened the
existence of the parent company. Consequently, petitioner
contends that it had a strong disincentive to overstate any
writedowns. Petitioner further contends that its treatment of
Günther as a discontinued operation was appropriate and that the
resulting adjustment in the value of Günther’s assets confirmed
management’s evaluation of the fair market value of those assets.
Petitioner also argues that it was required to use U.S. GAAP by
section 446(a) which states that a taxpayer shall compute taxable
income “under the method of accounting on the basis of which the
taxpayer regularly computes his income in keeping his books.”
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We find no support in the record for respondent’s
allegations of unduly pessimistic valuation in connection with
the discontinued operations writedowns. Petitioner presented the
expert testimony of Justin A. Gannon, an audit partner in the San
Antonio office of Arthur Andersen LLP, on the propriety of
adopting discontinued operations treatment with respect to
Günther for FYE May 31, 1992. Respondent stipulated that Mr.
Gannon was an expert in the field of accounting. Mr. Gannon’s
report sets forth the underlying facts in support of his
conclusion that discontinued operations treatment was
appropriate. Respondent did not offer any expert testimony to
rebut Mr. Gannon’s testimony. Our consideration of all the
evidence in this case, including but not limited to Mr. Gannon’s
testimony, convinces us that petitioner’s decision to adopt
discontinued operations treatment was consistent with U.S. GAAP
and appropriate under the circumstances herein.31 Moreover,
petitioner has convinced us that its efforts with respect to
Günther were directed to minimizing the substantial economic
losses it reasonably anticipated from Günther’s catastrophic
financial implosion and were not structured to distort its tax
position.
31
We note that the value of Günther’s interest in Actium was
increased as a result of discontinued operations treatment. This
writeup belies respondent's claim that discontinued operations
treatment was undertaken solely to buttress petitioner's claim
that Günther had become worthless.
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Respondent’s reliance on Günther’s German commercial report
for its FYE April 30, 1992, is likewise unsupported. Petitioner
has amply demonstrated that Günther’s FYE April 30, 1992,
commercial report used the book values of Günther’s assets
instead of fair market values and that it did not realistically
present Günther’s true financial condition or adequately state
the value of petitioner’s investment in Günther.
We hold that, because Günther’s liabilities substantially
exceeded the fair market value of its assets as of May 31, 1992,
Günther lacked liquidation value as of May 31, 1992.
3. Did Günther Lack Potential Value as of
May 31, 1992?
A corporation lacks potential value when there is no
reasonable expectation that assets will exceed liabilities in the
future. Steadman v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. at 376. Generally, a
lack of potential value is established by showing that an
identifiable event, such as bankruptcy, liquidation, the
appointment of a receiver, or the cessation of normal business
operations, effectively has destroyed the corporation’s potential
value. Id. at 376-377; Morton v. Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. at
1279. Where, however, a corporation’s liabilities so greatly
exceed the value of the corporation’s assets and the
corporation’s assets and business are such that no reasonable
expectation of profit to the shareholders exists, the inability
of a taxpayer to point to an identifiable event as proof of a
- 50 -
lack of potential value is of no consequence. Morton v.
Commissioner, supra at 1279; see also Steadman v. Commissioner,
supra at 377.
The record in this case leads us overwhelmingly to the
conclusion that Günther had no potential value as of May 31,
1992. After a thorough investigation prompted by the discovery
of the Omega transaction, petitioner understandably concluded
that Günther’s financial condition was so dire that petitioner
had no option but to minimize its losses and dispose of Günther
as soon as possible. Petitioner considered several alternatives
in making its decision, ultimately opting for a course of action
that was designed to avoid Günther’s bankruptcy under German law
and any default by Günther on its bank loans. Petitioner
concluded that a bankruptcy proceeding and/or a default on
Günther’s bank loans could result in the assertion of a variety
of contingent and potential liabilities and generate an even
greater financial loss attributable to its investment in Günther
than that projected from Günther’s orderly disposal.
Both of petitioner’s experts opined that Günther was
finished as a going concern and that its stock was worthless as
of May 31, 1992. Respondent offered no expert testimony to
refute their conclusions. Moreover, although respondent argues
that certain assets were not listed in Günther’s FYE April 30,
1992, commercial report, he offered no evidence to rebut the
testimony of petitioner’s witnesses that the assets in question
- 51 -
had no value. Given the overwhelming evidence of financial
catastrophe introduced by petitioner, respondent would have been
wise to offer some affirmative evidence to demonstrate Günther’s
potential value. Respondent failed to do so. The record
presented to us supports a conclusion that a prudent
businessperson would have considered Günther's stock to lack
potential value because the company's liabilities substantially
exceeded the fair market value of its assets, calculated on a
conservative basis, and Günther’s business was in such a state
that Günther’s assets could not reasonably be expected to exceed
its liabilities in the future.
Our conclusion is consistent with that of the marketplace,
which confirmed that Günther's stock was worthless. After hiring
consultants and spending months seeking a purchaser, petitioner
could not find a company willing to acquire Günther on acceptable
terms, even though it essentially was willing to give Günther
away. Before the offer from GAI, the only offer that petitioner
received as a result of its efforts to dispose of Günther after
May 31, 1992, would have required petitioner to pay the acquiring
company the equivalent of over $12 million and to provide
guaranties and concessions worth millions.
When petitioner finally convinced GAI to acquire Günther,
petitioner had to assume $3,709,460 in bank debt, release the
right to reinstate the intercompany account receivable of
$11,429,665 it previously had waived to shore up Günther’s German
- 52 -
commercial report, and forgive the remaining intercompany
receivable of $761,228. Respondent argues, nevertheless, that
Günther’s stock had value because petitioner received a
promissory note of DM 5 million under which GAI promised to make
installment payments for Günther’s stock. We do not think that
the receipt of a promissory note in April 1994 demonstrates that
Günther’s stock had value as of May 31, 1992. The amount of the
bank loans petitioner assumed, combined with petitioner’s
additional advances to Günther during FYE 1993 and 1994,
substantially exceeded the face value of the promissory note.
The promissory note obligated GAI to pay petitioner DM 5,000,000
only after petitioner had reconfigured Günther’s balance sheet by
eliminating a substantial part of Günther’s fixed and contingent
liabilities as of the date of sale. If anything, the terms of
the sale support our conclusion that Günther’s stock was
worthless as of May 31, 1992. Günther’s continuing financial
problems effectively forced petitioner to provide economic
benefits worth millions to GAI to facilitate the sale.
In a nutshell, respondent’s argument is that Günther was
merely undergoing a downturn and that, with sufficient
recapitalization, it would make a full recovery. In support of
his argument, respondent notes that Günther has become marginally
profitable in the hands of GAI in the years following
petitioner’s sale of the company. While this point appears to
weigh against our conclusion that Günther lacked potential value,
- 53 -
it must be remembered that GAI acquired a very different company;
on the date of its acquisition by GAI, Günther had been relieved
of all liability for its outstanding bank loans and petitioner’s
advances. While GAI was willing to acquire Günther, with the
hope of restoring it to profitability, a loss is not any less
definite and ascertained because, in a later year, someone is
willing to take a chance on the losing venture at a nominal
price. Steadman v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. at 378; Pearsall v.
Commissioner, 10 B.T.A. 467, 469 (1928).
Respondent argues that this is not a case like those cited
by petitioner32 in which we found a lack of potential value
despite continued operation or the absence of bankruptcy or
liquidation proceedings because, in those cases, “the companies
were defunct as a result of various fundamental factors
precluding all prospect of future worth.” According to
respondent, no fundamental factor precluded Günther’s prospects
of future worth; Günther was simply the victim of gross
mismanagement, and the financial consequences of that
mismanagement could be reversed, and were reversed, with time.
Respondent contends that the facts of this case are more
analogous to those in Wally Findlay Galleries Intl., Inc. v.
32
De Loss v. Commissioner, 28 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1928), affg.
6 B.T.A. 784 (1927); Preston v. Commissioner, 7 B.T.A. 414
(1927); Remington Typewriter Co. v. Commissioner, 4 B.T.A. 880
(1926); Emhart Corp. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-162.
- 54 -
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-293, and Datamation Servs., Inc. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1976-252. We disagree.
In Wally Findlay Galleries Intl., Inc. v. Commissioner,
supra, we concluded that the taxpayer’s French subsidiary was
insolvent by only $26,228 and that the taxpayer had failed to
sustain its burden of proving that the subsidiary lacked
potential value. In this case, Günther’s insolvency,
conservatively calculated, totaled several million dollars and
was coupled with severe operational problems exacerbated by inept
and perhaps dishonest management. In Datamation Servs., Inc. v.
Commissioner, supra, we concluded that the Datamation subsidiary
was barely insolvent and needed only minor capital financing in
order to continue as a going concern.
The severity of Günther’s financial problems was evident,
not just to petitioner but to third parties who considered
acquiring Günther after May 31, 1992. Günther’s situation more
closely resembled the dire financial situations described in
cases cited by petitioner. E.g., Ainsley Corp. v. Commissioner,
332 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1964), revg. T.C. Memo. 1963-183; De Loss
v. Commissioner, 28 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1928), affg. 6 B.T.A. 784
(1927); Steadman v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 369 (1968); Preston v.
Commissioner, 7 B.T.A. 414 (1927); Emhart Corp. v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1998-162; Harrington v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1972-
181; Richards v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1959-64.
- 55 -
In connection with his argument that Günther had potential
value as of May 31, 1992, respondent also raises a policy
argument, arguing petitioner’s position creates the possibility
for abuse under section 165(g)(3). According to respondent, a
parent corporation that owns a subsidiary in need of
recapitalization could delay providing funding, declare the stock
worthless, and then recapitalize the company. We reject
respondent’s argument because we do not see any abuse present in
this case. Petitioner faced a very real financial crisis in
1992, which threatened to undermine its own financial stability.
It was not playing games designed to obtain an improper tax
advantage.
4. Conclusion
Under the well-established standards applicable to a
worthless stock loss, it is clear that a taxpayer need not be an
“incorrigible optimist” with respect to his investment. Steadman
v. Commissioner, supra at 378 (quoting United States v. White
Dental Manufacturing Co., 274 U.S. 398 (1927)). We believe that
a prudent businessperson would have concluded that Günther lacked
both liquidation value and potential value in FYE May 31, 1992.
Petitioner has proven it incurred a worthless stock loss for FYE
1992 in an amount equal to the adjusted basis of its Günther
stock as of May 31, 1992. We hold that petitioner may deduct
that loss on its consolidated tax return for FYE 1992, the year
the stock became worthless. See sec. 165(g)(1).
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B. Deduction Claimed on FYE May 31, 1993, Return
Petitioner also claimed a worthless stock deduction in the
amount of $2,435,876 in FYE 1993. This amount represents the
basis created by the first waiver subject to reinstatement less
the amount of the intercompany receivable that was deducted as a
bad debt in FYE May 31, 1992.
In order to claim a worthless stock loss, the stock must
become worthless during the taxable year. See sec. 165(g)(1).
Thus, a taxpayer claiming a worthless stock loss must prove that
the security had value anytime during the year, and that it
became completely worthless during the year the deduction is
claimed. Steadman v. Commissioner, supra at 376.
On brief, petitioner conceded that the worthless stock loss
it claimed on its FYE 1993 tax return is not deductible under
section 165 but argued instead that the amount is deductible
under section 166 as a bad debt. We reject this argument. As
discussed previously, the amounts in question were capital
contributions which cannot be deducted as bad debts under section
166. Lidgerwood Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 1152
(1954), affd. 229 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1956); Plante v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-386, affd. 168 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir.
1999); W.A. Krueger Co. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1967-192.
Because the amounts in question do not qualify as bona fide debt
and because petitioner conceded on brief that it is not entitled
to deduct a worthless stock loss with respect to advances made on
- 57 -
Günther’s behalf after May 31, 1992, we sustain respondent's
determination regarding petitioner’s FYE May 31, 1993, worthless
stock deduction.
III. Conclusion
Because petitioner’s shares of Günther’s stock became
worthless during FYE May 31, 1992, petitioner is entitled to
deduct a worthless stock loss of $13,938,562 for that year but is
not entitled to any of the bad debt deductions claimed.
Consistent with respondent’s concession and this opinion,
additional amounts charged to the intercompany account after May
31, 1992, excluding only the bank debt assumed during FYE 1994,
shall be taken into account in computing petitioner’s capital
loss from the sale of Günther in FYE May 31, 1994.
We have considered all arguments for a result contrary to
that expressed herein, and, to the extent not discussed above, we
conclude that those arguments are irrelevant, moot, or meritless.
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered
under Rule 155.