T.C. Memo. 2002-11
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
KEVIN P. OSBORNE, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 5964-00. Filed January 10, 2002.
Kevin P. Osborne, pro se.
Peter C. Rock, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
DINAN, Special Trial Judge: Respondent determined
deficiencies in petitioner’s Federal income taxes of $10,267 and
$11,057, and penalties under section 6662(a) of $498.40 and
$259.40, for the taxable years 1996 and 1997. Unless otherwise
indicated, section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in
effect for the years in issue.
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The issues for decision are: (1) Whether petitioner is
entitled to deductions for “business promotion” expenses in
excess of the amounts allowed by respondent; (2) whether
petitioner is entitled to deduct amounts representing the
repayment of loan principal; and (3) whether petitioner is liable
for the penalties under section 6662(a).1
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
The stipulations of fact and the attached exhibits are
incorporated herein by this reference. Petitioner resided in
Burlingame, California, on the date the petition was filed in
this case.
Petitioner is an insurance broker and operates a business
named Osborne Insurance Agency. The business is operated as a
sole proprietorship; there is no legal entity separate from
petitioner himself, such as a corporation, limited liability
company, or partnership. Petitioner filed a Schedule C, Profit
or Loss from Business, in each of the years in issue for the
business.
The first issue for decision is whether petitioner is
entitled to deductions for “business promotion” expenses in
excess of the amounts allowed by respondent.
1
Petitioner concedes respondent’s adjustments to his
deductions for taxes and licenses. Respondent’s adjustments to
the amounts of self employment income tax, and the deductions
therefor, are computational and will be resolved by the Court’s
holding on the issues in this case.
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Petitioner claimed meal and entertainment expenses of $1,720
in 1996 and $1,274 in 1997. Subtracting 50 percent of these
expenses pursuant to the section 274(n) limitation, he claimed
deductions of $860 and $637, respectively. Separately from these
deductions, petitioner also claimed deductions for “business
promotion” in the amounts of $2,544 and $2,120. In the statutory
notice of deficiency, respondent disallowed half of each of the
business promotion deductions.
Generally, expenses which are ordinary and necessary in
carrying on a trade or business are deductible. Sec. 162(a).
However, subject to exceptions not applicable here, a deduction
for any expense related to food, beverages, entertainment,
amusement, or recreation is limited to 50 percent of the amount
of the expense. Sec. 274(n). “Entertainment” includes
entertainment, amusement, or recreational activities at golf and
country clubs. Sec. 1.274-2(b)(1)(i), Income Tax Regs.
Respondent argues that the business promotion deductions are
subject to the 50-percent limitation because they are for meal
and entertainment expenses; namely, restaurant and golf-related
expenses. A summary prepared by petitioner’s representative
during the audit of petitioner’s return lists the amounts
constituting the total deduction claimed in 1996. The majority
of the expenses were in fact from restaurants and a country club.
The remaining expenses are of an unknown nature; petitioner did
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not identify these as other than meal or entertainment expenses,
or otherwise argue that the expenses should be allowed in full.
We find petitioner’s summary to be support for respondent’s
determination that the business promotion expenses are subject to
the 50-percent limitation under section 274(n). Based on this
record, we sustain that determination.2
The second issue for decision is whether petitioner is
entitled to deduct amounts representing the repayment of loan
principal.
Petitioner testified that he lent his business $31,712 in
1990 and $55,293 in 1992, and that his business partially repaid
these loans in the years in issue in the amount of $30,000 in
each year. Petitioner claimed a Schedule C deduction of $30,000
for each payment; respondent disallowed the deductions in full.
Petitioner is not entitled to the deductions for the alleged
loan payments for two primary reasons. First, and most
fundamentally, there was no loan for Federal income tax purposes.
Petitioner’s business was a sole proprietorship--not an entity
separate from petitioner--and as such petitioner and his business
share an identity for tax purposes. Fairchild v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2001-237. Thus, any loan effectively would have been
2
There is no credible evidence in the record to rebut
the presumption of correctness which would attach to respondent’s
determination. Therefore, the provisions of sec. 7491(a),
placing the burden of proof on respondent, do not apply.
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made by petitioner to himself. Furthermore, even if there had
been a separate entity to which a loan could have been made,
petitioner has not provided any reliable evidence of a loan. The
alleged loan document provided by petitioner (which relates only
to the alleged 1990 loan) is not reliable because it consists of
one paragraph, does not require interest payments, does not
require the repayment of principal at any time certain, and
although it refers to a secured party does not provide security
for the loan. Furthermore, petitioner’s testimony concerning
David Killian, who signed the document as a witness, suggests
that the document may have been signed at a later time and
backdated to 1990. Petitioner also produced as evidence copies
of two amended returns allegedly filed in 1993 for the taxable
years 1990 and 1992. Attached to each return was a sheet of
paper on which the amount of reported Schedule C income was
divided into two categories: “1099 Farmers” and “Loan Kevin”.
The total Schedule C income was $57,504 in 1990 and $162,650 in
1992. The loan income was listed as $31,712 in 1990, and $55,293
in 1992. It is unclear why these returns were to be filed
because no changes in taxable income or tax liability were shown
on them. In any event, these are mere uncorroborated assertions
by petitioner and are not reliable evidence.
Second, assuming arguendo that a loan had in fact been made,
the repayment of one’s own debt generally is not deductible.
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Brenner v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 878 (1974); Crawford v.
Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 1299 (1928). Petitioner argues that out
of fairness he nonetheless should be entitled to a deduction
because he included the loan amounts in the income of the
business when they were received by the business. We do not
accept petitioner’s evidence that he included the amounts in
income in 1990 and 1992. First, as noted above, the proffered
documents are not reliable evidence. Second, petitioner did not
treat the loan payments consistently. If he believed that the
business was required to report income when the loan was
received, and entitled to a deduction when the loan was repaid,
then it is unclear why petitioner as an individual did not do the
reverse--claim a deduction upon initial disbursement, and report
income upon repayment. These actions, of course, would have
canceled each other out for tax purposes because each would have
been reported on the same tax return. In any event, even if we
assumed arguendo that petitioner overreported income for 1990 or
1992, neither of those years is within our jurisdiction here.
The final issue for decision is whether petitioner is liable
for the penalties under section 6662(a).
Respondent determined that petitioner was liable for the
penalties only with respect to the portions of the underpayments
attributable to petitioner’s deduction of the business promotion
expenses and the tax and license expenses. Petitioner concedes
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the latter underlying adjustment, but he disputes the imposition
of the penalties.
Section 6662(a) imposes a 20-percent penalty on the portion
of an underpayment attributable to any one of various factors,
one of which is negligence or disregard of rules or regulations.
Sec. 6662(b)(1). “Negligence” includes any failure to make a
reasonable attempt to comply with the provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code, including any failure to keep adequate books and
records or to substantiate items properly. Sec. 6662(c); sec.
1.6662-3(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. Section 6664(c)(1) provides
that the penalty under section 6662(a) shall not apply to any
portion of an underpayment if it is shown that there was
reasonable cause for the taxpayer’s position and that the
taxpayer acted in good faith with respect to that portion. The
determination of whether a taxpayer acted with reasonable cause
and in good faith is made on a case-by-case basis, taking into
account all the pertinent facts and circumstances. Sec.
1.6664-4(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. The most important factor is
the extent of the taxpayer’s effort to assess his proper tax
liability for the year. Id. Finally, a taxpayer may avoid the
accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) by showing
reliance on the advice of a professional which was reasonable and
in good faith. Sec. 1.6664-4(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.
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As discussed above, the business promotion expense
deductions were adjusted by respondent to reflect the 50-percent
limitation under section 274(n). The cause for the adjustment to
the tax and license deductions is not as clear because petitioner
concedes this issue and it was not argued at trial. Petitioner
claimed deductions of $7,517 in 1996 and $4,323 in 1997;
respondent allowed only $2,454 and $1,412, respectively. Neither
petitioner’s tax return nor respondent’s notice of deficiency
enumerates the individual expenses constituting the total claimed
and allowed deductions for taxes and licenses. Respondent,
however, argues in his trial memorandum that the totals were
derived from the following with respect to 1996:3
Claimed Allowed
Federal income tax withholding $1,300 $-0-
Employees’ FICA 1,829 -0-
Employer’s FICA 1,829 1,829
FUTA 121 121
State income tax withholding 165 -0-
State unemployment insurance 377 377
State employee training tax 15 15
State disability insurance 191 -0-
Licenses 112 112
Petitioner’s Federal income tax 1,578 -0-
7,517 2,454
Petitioner primarily argues that he is not liable for the
negligence penalty because he relied on his tax return preparer.
Limiting our review to the two items for which respondent found
petitioner to be negligent, we agree with petitioner. Blind
3
Some of the corresponding individual amounts were
stipulated by the parties as having been paid.
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reliance on a return preparer is not a defense to negligence, and
taxpayers retain a duty to file an accurate return and generally
are required to review their return before signing it. E.g.,
Metra Chem Corp. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 654, 662 (1987).
However, in this case and with respect to these two items on
petitioner’s tax returns, petitioner’s reliance was reasonable.
Petitioner provided his return preparer with his business
records, and the preparer computed the amounts of the deductions.
Petitioner was reasonable in not questioning the preparer’s
classification of some meal and entertainment expenses as
“business promotion” expenses; because of the location of these
expenses on the return, the 50 percent limitation was not
obviously applicable. Petitioner was also reasonable in not
questioning the preparer’s classification of the various tax
expenses as deductible: Requiring petitioner to question and
research the deductibility of each individual item would render
his use of a preparer pointless. The record does not support
respondent’s determination of negligence in this case.
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered
for respondent with respect to the
deficiencies and for petitioner
with respect to the penalties.