T.C. Memo. 2002-19
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
WILLIAM G. AND DEBRA C. KELLEN, Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 5429-00. Filed January 22, 2002.
Robert S. Schriebman and Patrick E. McGinnis, for
petitioners.
Timothy S. Sinnott, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
ARMEN, Special Trial Judge: In a so-called affected items
notice of deficiency, respondent determined additions to tax to
petitioners’ Federal income tax for the year and in the amounts
as shown below:
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Additions to tax
Sec.1 Sec. Sec.
3
Year 6653(a)(1) 6653(a)(2) 6661
2
1983 $685.50 $29,095.94 $3,427.50
1
Throughout this opinion and unless otherwise
indicated, all section references are to the Internal
Revenue Code in effect for the taxable year in issue.
2
The first page of the notice of deficiency
mistakenly shows this amount as the sum of the additions
to tax under sec. 6653(a)(1) and (2), i.e., $29,781.
3
The first page of the notice of deficiency
mistakenly references sec. 6662(d), which section is the
successor to sec. 6661 and is applicable for returns the
due date for which (determined without regard to
extensions) is after December 31, 1989. See Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. 101-239, sec.
7721(a), (c)(2), (d), 103 Stat. 2395-2400.
After concessions by the parties,1 the issues for decision
are as follows:
(1) Whether petitioner William G. Kellen (petitioner) is
liable for additions to tax under section 6653(a)(1) and (2) for
negligence or intentional disregard of rules or regulations. We
hold that petitioner is liable for such additions.
(2) Whether petitioner is liable for the addition to tax
under section 6661 for substantial understatement of tax
1
Petitioners concede that the notice of deficiency is
valid. Cf. Scar v. Commissioner, 814 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1987),
revg. 81 T.C. 855 (1983).
Respondent concedes, and petitioner William G. Kellen does
not dispute, that pursuant to sec. 6015, petitioner Debra C.
Kellen is entitled to relief from joint and several liability for
the additions to tax.
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liability. We hold that petitioner is liable for such addition.
The foregoing two issues relate to the participation of
petitioner as a limited partner in a jojoba partnership known as
San Nicholas Research, Ltd.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated, and they are so
found. The stipulated facts and attached exhibits are
incorporated herein by this reference.
Petitioner resided in Cora, Wyoming, at the time that his
petition was filed with the Court.
A. Petitioner’s Education and Experience
Petitioner is a highly educated individual. In 1964, he
graduated from Loyola University of Los Angeles with a bachelor
of science degree in civil engineering, specializing in water
systems. Ten years later, in 1974, he received a law degree from
Western State College of Law in Fullerton, California.
Since 1964, petitioner has practiced engineering in both the
public and private sectors. Since 1974, he has practiced law in
the private sector.
Petitioner also has experience related to farming. In 1974,
he formed a company known as the Great American Hay Company that
grew hay in Desert Center, California. In 1975, he and certain
friends and investors purchased property known as Brown’s Farm
that grew citrus, alfalfa, and row crops.
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In 1983, the taxable year in issue, petitioner was actively
engaged in the practice of law, although he also served as a
consulting engineer and was involved in farming.2 Petitioner
maintained a law office in Riverside, California, and he
specialized in the formation of financial institutions, such as
banks, savings and loan associations, and thrift and loan
associations. Petitioner formed more than 23 financial
institutions in southern California.
Neither in 1983 nor at any other time relevant to this case
did petitioner have any expertise in accounting or tax matters,
nor did he ever attempt to render advice on those subjects.
In 1983, petitioner was financially well-off and
sophisticated. For that year, he earned a net profit of $122,464
from his law practice, and he derived capital gains from stock
transactions in the net amount of $115,5083 and interest in the
amount of $21,747. In addition, petitioner had equity interests
in: (1) An equipment rental proprietorship, (2) a partnership
known as Fontana Bancorp Development, (3) five jojoba
partnerships, see pp. 5-6, and (4) an S corporation known as
2
Any income that petitioner may have earned in 1983 from
consulting as an engineer or from farming was minimal.
3
In one instance, petitioner parlayed a $5,000 investment
in Corona Bancorp in June 1982 into a $98,508 sale in Dec. 1983.
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Vancouver Coors, Inc.4
B. Petitioner’s Initial Involvement in Jojoba Partnerships
In late 1982, petitioner became the general partner and tax
matters partner of four limited partnerships: Utah Jojoba
Research, Ltd. (Utah Jojoba); Blythe Jojoba I Research, Ltd.
(Blythe Jojoba I); Blythe Jojoba II Research, Ltd. (Blythe Jojoba
II); and Desert Center Jojoba Research, Ltd. (Desert Center
Jojoba).5 Each of these partnerships was similar, if not
identical, to San Nicholas Research, Ltd., described infra pp.
5-11.
Prior to 1982, petitioner did not have any experience in
growing jojoba, nor did he have any experience in either the
research or development of jojoba. Prior to that time,
petitioner’s knowledge concerning jojoba was limited to articles
that he had read in various magazines and a general familiarity
with the existence of an experimental jojoba plantation located
at the University of California at Riverside.
4
At trial, petitioner testified that he became a general
partner in Coordinated Financial Services (CFS) of Salt Lake
City, Utah “in the latter part of 1982.” The record is not clear
whether petitioner continued to be a partner in CFS in 1983. CFS
is described in Utah Jojoba I Research v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1998-6; see infra pp. 12-14.
5
Petitioner also became a limited partner in Desert Center
Jojoba.
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C. Petitioner’s Investment in San Nicholas Research, Ltd.
In late 1983, petitioner signed a subscription agreement and
purchased 15 limited partnership units (an 11.719-percentage
interest) in San Nicholas Research, Ltd. (San Nicholas or the
partnership).6 Petitioner purchased the partnership units
pursuant to a private placement memorandum dated October 10,
1983. See infra pp. 6-8, 8-11.
Petitioner paid $2,790 per limited partnership unit, or a
total of $41,850, for his 15 units in San Nicholas. Of this
amount, $1,140 per unit, or $17,100 for 15 units, was paid in
cash. The balance, $1,650 per unit or $24,750 for 15 units, was
payable pursuant to a 10-year promissory note.7
At the time that he signed the subscription agreement,
petitioner believed that his investment in San Nicholas offered
tax benefits, and his decision to invest was influenced by that
belief.
D. Putative Nature of San Nicholas’ Business
According to the private placement memorandum dated October
10, 1983 (the offering memorandum), San Nicholas was formed in
6
The general partner and tax matters partner of San
Nicholas was Alfred M. Clancy, an individual whom petitioner did
not know at the time that he invested in San Nicholas.
7
The note, which was recourse in form, contemplated
payments of interest only for the first 5 years. As matters
actually transpired, in the late 1980s, the limited partners were
given the option of paying a discounted percentage of the
principal in cash. Petitioner elected this option.
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order “to undertake a comprehensive research and development
program on the plant Simmondsia Chinesis (Jojoba).” The offering
memorandum described how this program was to be carried out:
The Partnership will enter into a research and
development contract * * * with U.S. Agri Research and
Development Corp. (the “R & D Contractor”), who will
conduct the experiments in various test sites * * * as
well as its laboratory or greenhouse facilities that it
in its sole discretion deems advisable. In addition,
the R & D Contract sets forth that a site in the
vicinity of Desert Center and Blythe, California of
from 30-50 acres will be delineated as the applied
research site upon which all technology and improved
cultivars developed on behalf of the Partnership during
the term of the contract will be placed “in field.”
The Partnership will also have the right but not be
obligated to enter into a License Agreement * * * to
license to U.S. Agri Research and Development Corp. all
technology developed on behalf of the Partnership for a
period of forty (40) years and receive therefrom an
amount equal to 85% of the products produced from the
developed technology.[8]
Copies of the research and development (R&D) contract and
the license agreement referred to in the preceding paragraph were
attached as exhibits to the offering memorandum. The R&D
contract identified U.S. Agri Research and Development Corp.
(U.S. Agri) as a party to the contract and the R&D contractor
thereunder. The license agreement identified U.S. Agri as a
8
Although San Nicholas may not have been obligated to
enter into a license agreement with U.S. Agri Research and
Development Corp., it was a foregone conclusion that it would do
so. Indeed, the research and development (R&D) contract and the
license agreement were executed concurrently. Notably, execution
of the license agreement by San Nicholas served to automatically
terminate the R&D contract pursuant to the terms of the latter
contract. See infra pp. 19-20.
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party to the contract and the licensee thereunder.
E. U.S. Agri and Eugene Pace
As previously indicated, the offering memorandum identified
U.S. Agri as the R&D contractor under the R&D contract and as the
licensee under the license agreement. U.S. Agri was also the R&D
contractor and the licensee for Utah Jojoba, Blythe Jojoba I,
Blythe Jojoba II, and Desert Center Jojoba.
The president of U.S. Agri was Eugene Pace (Mr. Pace), who
was also a member of its board of directors. Petitioner also
served as a member of U.S. Agri’s board until he became general
partner of Utah Jojoba, Blythe Jojoba I, Blythe Jojoba II, and
Desert Center Jojoba in late 1982.
At the time that petitioner invested in San Nicholas, he and
Mr. Pace had been personal friends and business associates for a
number of years.
F. Cautionary Language in the San Nicholas Offering Memorandum
The face of the offering memorandum warned, in block
letters, that “THIS OFFERING INVOLVES A HIGH DEGREE OF RISK”.
The offering memorandum also included the following cautionary
language in block letters:
PROSPECTIVE INVESTORS ARE CAUTIONED NOT TO CONSTRUE
THIS MEMORANDUM OR ANY PRIOR OR SUBSEQUENT
COMMUNICATIONS AS CONSTITUTING LEGAL OR TAX ADVICE.
* * * INVESTORS ARE URGED TO CONSULT THEIR OWN COUNSEL
AS TO ALL MATTERS CONCERNING THIS INVESTMENT.
* * * * * * *
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THERE IS NO PUBLIC OR OTHER MARKET FOR THE UNITS, NOR
WILL SUCH MARKET DEVELOP.
* * * * * * *
THE PURCHASE OF SUCH UNITS DESCRIBED IN THIS MEMORANDUM
INVOLVES A HIGH DEGREE OF RISK (SEE “RISK FACTORS”) AND
SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ONLY BY PERSONS WHO CAN AFFORD THE
TOTAL LOSS OF THEIR INVESTMENT.
* * * * * * *
EACH PURCHASER OF THE UNITS HEREIN SHOULD AND IS
EXPECTED TO CONSULT WITH HIS OWN TAX ADVISOR AS TO THE
TAX ASPECTS.
In addition, the offering memorandum limited the sale of
partnership units to investors with a net worth (exclusive of
home, furnishings, and automobiles) of at least $150,000, or
investors whose net worth was at least $50,000 (exclusive of
home, furnishings, and automobiles) and who anticipated that, for
the taxable year of the investment, they would have gross income
of at least $65,000 or taxable income, a portion of which, but
for tax-advantaged investments, would be subject to Federal
income tax at a marginal rate of 50 percent.
The offering memorandum included a section entitled “Risk
Factors”, which was the single longest section. It began with a
general warning:
The purchase of the interests offered hereby involves
various risk factors. Investment in the Partnership
* * * involves an extremely high degree of risk.
Investors should consider carefully the various risk
factors set forth in this and other portions of this
Memorandum. Investment in the Partnership is suitable
only for persons of substantial financial means who
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will not require liquidity in the investment.
Investors must be prepared for the possible loss of
their entire investment.
The offering memorandum then proceeded to discuss a number
of specific, and significant, risk factors associated with an
investment in San Nicholas. Among those risks, the offering
memorandum warned: (1) Research and development risks were so
great that an investment in San Nicholas should be considered
“highly speculative”; (2) the general partner had no previous
experience in dealing in jojoba; (3) there was no structured
market or distribution system for jojoba; (4) there were no
facilities dedicated to the processing of jojoba; (5) commercial
applications of jojoba are not extensive; (6) the general partner
had not conducted any market analysis or similar studies; (7)
there was no assurance of any increase in marketing or production
facilities or in the demand for jojoba; (8) in the absence of any
such increase, the production of jojoba might be unprofitable,
regardless of any technology that might be developed by the R&D
contractor; and (9) there was the likelihood of audit by the
Internal Revenue Service. Indeed, the discussion concerning the
tax risks associated with an investment in San Nicholas
constituted half of the section on “Risk Factors”.
The offering memorandum also included projections of
revenue, cashflow, and taxable income or loss. Investors were
warned, however, that those projections, which had been prepared
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for the general partner, had not been audited and that they
should not be relied on to indicate the actual results that might
be attained.
G. Petitioner’s Friend and Associate E.T. Jacobs
E.T. Jacobs (Mr. Jacobs), a former IRS agent and examination
manager, was a certified public accountant in private practice.
He was also one of petitioner’s friends and business associates.
In or about 1982, Mr. Jacobs became involved in the farming
of jojoba in Desert Center, California. Mr. Jacobs sold limited
partnership interests in a number of jojoba partnerships.
H. Petitioner’s 1983 Schedule K-1 and Income Tax Return
Petitioner received a Schedule K-1, Partner’s Share of
Income, Credits, Deductions, Etc., from San Nicholas for 1983.
The Schedule K-1 reported that petitioner’s distributive share of
partnership loss from San Nicholas was $37,064 for that year.
Petitioner timely filed a Federal income tax return (Form
1040) for 1983.9 Petitioner attached to his return page 2 of
Schedule E (Supplemental Income Schedule) and claimed thereon a
loss from San Nicholas in the amount of $37,064. Petitioner then
offset this loss against his other income. See supra p. 4.
I. Jojoba Partnership Litigation
San Nicholas was examined by the Internal Revenue Service,
9
The return was prepared by David Macher, a certified
public accountant in Riverside, California.
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and a notice of final partnership administrative adjustment
(FPAA) was ultimately issued to the partnership. In December
1991, Alfred M. Clancy (Mr. Clancy), the general partner and tax
matters partner of San Nicholas, commenced a TEFRA partnership
proceeding in this Court.10 Subsequently, in November 1993, Mr.
Clancy and the Commissioner agreed to be bound by the decision to
be entered in Utah Jojoba I Research v. Commissioner, docket No.
7619-90, a TEFRA partnership proceeding involving Utah Jojoba
that had previously been commenced by petitioner in his capacity
as tax matters partner of that partnership.
In Utah Jojoba I Research v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-
6, the Court made detailed findings of fact related to the jojoba
limited partnerships,11 petitioner, U.S. Agri, and Mr. Pace. The
Court described the R&D contract between the partnerships and
U.S. Agri as “mere window dressing” and held that the
partnerships did not, directly or indirectly, engage in research
or experimentation and that the partnerships lacked a realistic
prospect of entering into a trade or business. In upholding the
10
The TEFRA partnership proceeding was assigned docket No.
29994-91. TEFRA stands for the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-248, 96 Stat. 648. See
secs. 6221-6232; N.C.F. Energy Partners v. Commissioner, 89 T.C.
741, 744 (1987); Maxwell v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 783, 789
(1986).
11
At least 18 docketed cases were bound by stipulation to
the outcome of Utah Jojoba I Research v. Commissioner, docket No.
7619-90.
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Commissioner’s disallowance of research and experimental
expenditures, the Court concluded that the agreements between the
partnerships and the R&D contractor (U.S. Agri) had been designed
and entered into solely to provide a mechanism to disguise the
capital contributions of limited partners as currently deductible
expenditures.12 The Court stated that the activities of the
partnerships were “another example of efforts by promoters and
investors in the early 1980s to reduce the cost of commencing and
engaging in the farming of jojoba by claiming, inaccurately, that
capital expenditures in jojoba plantations might be treated as
research or experimental expenditures for purposes of claiming
deductions under section 174.” Id.
In November 1998, Mr. Clancy, acting in his capacity as tax
matters partner of San Nicholas, consented to entry of decision
against the partnership. Subsequently, in December 1998, the
Court entered decision against San Nicholas pursuant to the
Commissioner’s Motion for Entry of Decision under Rule 248(a).13
Thereafter, the Commissioner assessed a deficiency in
petitioner’s income tax for 1983 in the amount of $13,710 and
mailed a so-called affected items notice of deficiency to
12
In other words, in order to decrease the limited
partners’ cost of investing in the jojoba partnerships, large up-
front deductions were manufactured from expenditures that were
actually capital contributions.
13
All Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of
Practice and Procedure.
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petitioner determining additions to tax for negligence and
substantial understatement of tax liability. See sec. 6230(a);
N.C.F. Energy Partners v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 741, 744 (1987);
Maxwell v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 783, 792 n.9 (1986). It is
those additions to tax that are in issue in the present case.
J. Epilogue: Demise of the Jojoba Partnerships
The jojoba partnerships proved to be financial failures. In
October 1991, some 30 to 40 jojoba partnerships under contract
with U.S. Agri were consolidated into one large limited
partnership, Jojoba Plantation Ltd. Sometime thereafter, Jojoba
Plantation Ltd. filed a petition in bankruptcy under chapter 7 of
the Bankruptcy Act. See Utah Jojoba I Research v. Commissioner,
supra.
At trial, petitioner testified that the jojoba partnerships
failed because of the Internal Revenue Service.14 At a previous
trial, petitioner testified that “the collapse, basically, of the
tax incentive for doing jojoba” contributed to the partnerships’
failure. See id.
14
Petitioner’s sole third-party witness suggested a
different reason: That no commercially viable method of
harvesting jojoba was ever developed.
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OPINION
We have decided many jojoba cases involving additions to tax
for negligence and substantial understatement of tax liability.15
We have found the taxpayers liable for additions to tax for
negligence in all of those cases; likewise, we have found the
taxpayers liable for the addition to tax for substantial
understatement of tax liability in all of those cases that have
presented that issue.
I. Section 6653(a)(1) and (2) Negligence
The first issue for decision is whether petitioner is liable
for additions to tax under section 6653(a)(1) and (2) with
respect to the underpayment of tax attributable to petitioner’s
investment in San Nicholas. Petitioner has the burden of proof
to show that he is not liable for these additions to tax. See
Addington v. Commissioner, 205 F.3d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 2000), affg.
Sann v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-259; Bixby v. Commissioner,
58 T.C. 757, 791-792 (1972); Anderson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
15
See, e.g., Lopez v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-278;
Christensen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-185; Serfustini v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-183; Carmena v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2001-177; Nilsen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-163;
Ruggiero v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-162; Robnett v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-17; Harvey v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2001-16; Hunt v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-15; Fawson
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-195; Downs v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2000-155; Glassley v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-206;
Stankevich v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-458.
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1993-607, affd. 62 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1995). See generally Rule
142(a); INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992);
Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).16
Section 6653(a)(1) imposes an addition to tax in an amount
equal to 5 percent of the underpayment of tax if any part of the
underpayment is due to negligence or intentional disregard of
rules or regulations. Section 6653(a)(2) imposes another
addition to tax in an amount equal to 50 percent of the interest
due on the portion of the underpayment attributable to negligence
or intentional disregard of rules or regulations.
Negligence is defined as the failure to exercise the due
care that a reasonable and ordinarily prudent person would
exercise under like circumstances. See Anderson v. Commissioner,
62 F.3d 1266, 1271 (10th Cir. 1995), affg. T.C. Memo. 1993-607;
Neely v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 934, 947 (1985). The focus of
inquiry is the reasonableness of the taxpayer’s actions in light
of the taxpayer’s experience and the nature of the investment.
See Henry Schwartz Corp. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 728, 740
(1973); see also Sacks v. Commissioner, 82 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir.
1996) (whether a taxpayer is negligent in claiming a tax
deduction “depends upon both the legitimacy of the underlying
16
Cf. sec. 7491(c), effective for court proceedings
arising in connection with examinations commencing after July 22,
1998. In the present case, the examination of petitioner’s
income tax return for 1983 commenced well before July 22, 1998.
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investment, and the due care in the claiming of the deduction.”),
affg. T.C. Memo. 1994-217; Turner v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1995-363. In this regard, the determination of negligence is
highly factual.
Under some circumstances, a taxpayer may avoid liability for
negligence if reasonable reliance on a competent professional
adviser is shown. See United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 250-
251 (1985); Freytag v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 849, 888 (1987),
affd. 904 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1990), affd. on another issue 501
U.S. 868 (1991). However, reliance on professional advice,
standing alone, is not an absolute defense to negligence, but
rather a factor to be considered. See Freytag v. Commissioner,
supra. For reliance on professional advice to excuse a taxpayer
from negligence, the taxpayer must show that the professional had
the requisite expertise, as well as knowledge of the pertinent
facts, to provide informed advice on the subject matter. See
David v. Commissioner, 43 F.3d 788, 789-790 (2d Cir. 1995), affg.
T.C. Memo. 1993-621; Goldman v. Commissioner, 39 F.3d 402, 407
(2d Cir. 1994), affg. T.C. Memo. 1993-480; Freytag v.
Commissioner, supra.
The facts pertinent to the present case relating to the
structure, formation, and operation of San Nicholas are as found
above and as discussed in Utah Jojoba I Research v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1998-6. The offering memorandum identified U.S. Agri
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as the contractor under the R&D contract. In addition, a license
agreement between San Nicholas and U.S. Agri granted U.S. Agri
the exclusive right to use all technology developed for the
partnership for 40 years in exchange for a royalty of 85 percent
of the products produced from such technology. The R&D contract
and the license agreement were executed concurrently.
According to its terms, the R&D contract expired upon the
partnership’s execution of the license agreement. Because the
two contracts were executed concurrently, amounts paid by the
partnership to U.S. Agri were not paid pursuant to a valid R&D
contract but rather were passive investments in a farming venture
under which the investors’ return, if any, was to be in the form
of royalties pursuant to the license agreement. Thus, as the
Court held in Utah Jojoba I Research v. Commissioner, supra, the
partnership was never engaged in research or experimentation,
either directly or indirectly. Moreover, the Court found that
U.S. Agri’s attempt to farm jojoba commercially did not
constitute R&D, thereby concluding that the R&D contract was
designed and entered into solely to decrease the limited
partners’ cost of investing in an jojoba partnership through
large, upfront deductions for expenditures that were actually
capital contributions. The Court further concluded that the
partnership was not involved in a trade or business and had no
realistic prospect of entering into a trade or business with
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respect to any technology that was to be developed by U.S. Agri.
Id.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, petitioner contends that his
investment in San Nicholas was motivated solely by the potential
to earn a profit. Petitioner also contends that, taking into
account his experiences as a farmer and engineer and the nature
of his investment, he exercised the due care that a reasonable
and ordinarily prudent person would have exercised under like
circumstances. Finally, petitioner contends that reliance on Mr.
Pace, Mr. Jacobs, and a professor at the University of California
should absolve him of liability for negligence in this case. For
the following reasons, we disagree with petitioner’s contentions.
First, the principal flaw in the structure of San Nicholas
was evident from an examination of the R&D contract and the
license agreement. Both of these documents were a part of the
offering memorandum. A reading of the R&D contract and the
license agreement demonstrates that the license agreement
canceled, or rendered ineffective, the R&D contract because of
the concurrent execution of the two documents. Accordingly, San
Nicholas was never engaged in, either directly or indirectly, any
research or experimentation. Rather, San Nicholas was merely a
passive investor seeking royalty returns pursuant to the license
agreement. See Lopez v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-278;
Christensen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-185; Serfustini v.
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Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-183; Carmena v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2001-177; Nilsen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-163;
Fawson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-195. Petitioner, an
experienced attorney, should have understood the legal
ramifications of the license agreement canceling the R&D
contract.
Second, we are unable to accept uncritically petitioner’s
contention that he invested in San Nicholas solely to earn a
profit.17 Rather, at the time that he signed the subscription
agreement, petitioner believed that his investment in San
Nicholas offered tax benefits, and his decision to invest was
influenced by that belief.
Third, we do not think that petitioner, a well-educated and
successful attorney and a sophisticated investor, exercised due
care at the time that he signed the subscription agreement. In
this regard we are again unable to accept uncritically
petitioner’s contention that he reasonably relied on the offering
memorandum. The short answer to this contention is that
17
It is the duty of the Court to listen to testimony,
observe the demeanor of witnesses, weigh the evidence, and
determine what to believe. The Court is not required to accept
testimony at face value, and the Court may discount a party’s
self-interested testimony and place reliance on other evidence
that is believed to be more reliable. See Christensen v.
Commissioner, 786 F.2d 1382, 1383-1384 (9th Cir. 1986), affg. in
part and remanding in part T.C. Memo. 1984-197; Niedringhaus v.
Commissioner, 99 T.C. 202, 212 (1992); Duralia v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1994-269; see also Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C.
74, 77 (1986).
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petitioner either did not read the offering memorandum in its
entirety or chose to ignore portions thereof. See Goldman v.
Commissioner, 39 F.3d 402, 407-408 (2d Cir. 1994), affg. T.C.
Memo. 1993-480, holding that the taxpayer’s reliance on offering
materials was not reasonable; see also Pasternak v. Commissioner,
990 F.2d 893, 903 (6th Cir. 1993), affg. Donahue v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1991-181, holding that claims that are probably “too
good to be true” should be investigated by a reasonably prudent
person.18
The offering memorandum was replete with caveats and
warnings regarding the business and tax risks associated with an
investment in San Nicholas. The cover page cautioned that “THIS
OFFERING INVOLVES A HIGH DEGREE OF RISK” and warned prospective
investors “NOT TO CONSTRUE THIS MEMORANDUM OR ANY PRIOR OR
SUBSEQUENT COMMUNICATIONS AS CONSTITUTING LEGAL OR TAX ADVICE.”
Potential inventors were urged “TO CONSULT THEIR OWN COUNSEL AS
TO ALL MATTERS CONCERNING THIS INVESTMENT” and were advised “TO
CONSULT WITH [THEIR] OWN TAX ADVISOR AS TO THE TAX ASPECTS.” The
single longest section of the offering memorandum was devoted to
“risk factors” and warned of numerous risks, specifically
including tax risks, the lack of a structured market and
18
In the present case, the parties stipulated to a
promotional videotape produced by U.S. Agri that described jojoba
as “liquid gold” and “the industrial crop of the future”, which
would be cultivated in “some of the most hostile land anywhere”.
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distribution system for jojoba, and the highly speculative nature
of the investment. Petitioner ignored these warnings.
On brief, petitioner painstakingly dissects portions of the
offering memorandum in an attempt to show that he carefully
perused what he calls a “business plan”. Petitioner’s piecemeal
approach to the offering memorandum ignores the existence of the
strong cautionary language. A careful review of the offering
memorandum, especially the portion discussing the tax risks,
would have caused a prudent investor to question the propriety of
the tax benefits. We would certainly expect no less from a well-
educated and sophisticated individual such as petitioner.
Petitioner contends that he also conducted his own analysis
of San Nicholas prior to investing. However, there is no
persuasive evidence that petitioner’s “analysis” was based on
anything other than the projections set forth in the offering
memorandum. See Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74, 77 (1986).
Investors were warned, however, that those projections had been
prepared for the general partner, had not been audited, and
should not be relied on. There is nothing in the record to
persuade us that petitioner’s “projections” were ever audited or
examined by any disinterested third party. Any reliance on those
projections was unreasonable.
Petitioner contends that his experience with farming and his
reading about jojoba gave him confidence in the viability of his
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investment in San Nicholas. Yet, petitioner’s experience and his
knowledge should have led him to inquire into both the
operational aspects of the partnership and the nature of the
research that U.S. Agri was to conduct under the terms of the R&D
contract.19 See Fawson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-195.
Although petitioner claims to have visited the jojoba sites
about once a month, the primary purpose of these visits was to
“see how the plants were growing” and that proper watering and
weeding methods were being utilized. However, there is no
persuasive evidence in the record to demonstrate that petitioner,
either as a limited partner in San Nicholas or as the general
partner and tax matters partner of four other jojoba
partnerships, visited the jojoba sites in order to determine
whether research or development was being conducted. If
petitioner had visited the jojoba sites for that purpose, he
would have quickly discovered that U.S. Agri was engaged in
19
We find it curious that petitioner would choose to
emphasize his experience when the record clearly demonstrates
that prior to 1982, he did not have any experience in growing
jojoba, nor did he have any experience in either the research or
development of jojoba. Petitioner’s experience first came in
late 1982, when he became the general partner and tax matters
partner of Utah Jojoba, Blythe Jojoba I, Blythe Jojoba II, and
Desert Center Jojoba.
We find it equally curious that petitioner would choose to
emphasize his knowledge when the record demonstrates that prior
to 1982, his knowledge was limited to articles that he had read
in various magazines and a general familiarity with the existence
of an experimental jojoba plantation located at the University of
California at Riverside.
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nothing more than a farming activity. See Fawson v.
Commissioner, supra. Petitioner should have realized that in the
absence of any research and development, there could be no
deduction for research and experimental expenditures under
section 174.
Fourth, petitioner contends that in deciding to invest in
San Nicholas, he reasonably relied on advice from Mr. Pace, Mr.
Jacobs, and a professor at the University of California. For
reasons that we shall discuss, we disagree that any such reliance
was reasonable.
Petitioner contends that he reasonably relied on advice from
Mr. Pace. At the time of trial, Mr. Pace was deceased;
accordingly, we do not know first hand what knowledge he may have
had or what advice he may have given.20 The record does establish
that Mr. Pace was the president of U.S. Agri and a member of its
board of directors. Petitioner, who for a period of time was
also a member of U.S. Agri’s board, obviously knew that Mr. Pace
was an interested party and that Mr. Pace had a conflict of
interest. Thus, whatever advice petitioner may have received
from Mr. Pace fails as a defense to negligence because of Mr.
Pace’s lack of competence to give such advice and the clear
presence of a conflict of interest. See Rybak v. Commissioner,
20
In Utah Jojoba I Research v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1998-6, the Court found that before 1983, Mr. Pace had only
limited knowledge of, and minimal background in, jojoba.
- 25 -
91 T.C. 524, 565 (1988).
Petitioner also contends that he reasonably relied on advice
from Mr. Jacobs. At the time of trial, Mr. Jacobs was deceased;
accordingly, we do not know first hand what knowledge he may have
had or what advice he may have given. The record does establish
that Mr. Jacobs only became involved in the farming of jojoba in
or about 1982, so his experience was limited, and there is
nothing to suggest that he was knowledgeable about research and
development of jojoba. See Freytag v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. at
888. The record also establishes that Mr. Jacobs was involved in
the sale of limited partnership interests in a number of jojoba
partnerships. Accordingly, any advice that he may have given can
be analogized to that of a promoter, which advice is inherently
suspect. E.g., Addington v. Commissioner, 205 F.3d at 59;
Pasternak v. Commissioner, 990 F.2d at 903.
In Glassley v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-206, we found
that the taxpayers:
acted on their fascination with the idea of
participating in a jojoba farming venture and their
satisfaction with tax benefits of expensing their
investments, which were clear to them from the
promoter’s presentation. They passed the offering
circular by their accountants for a “glance” * * *.
The record in the present case suggests that whatever advice may
have been given by Mr. Jacobs was nothing more than a generalized
affirmation to invest in jojoba. Indeed, at trial, petitioner
testified that Mr. Jacobs was “very high on the investments in
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jojoba, and I–-and that was the primary reason I invested in it.”
Petitioner also contends that he reasonably relied on advice
from a professor at the University of California at Riverside, a
Dr. Yermanos. This individual did not testify at trial, so we do
not know first hand what advice he may have given or on what
basis such advice may have been rendered.21 However, the record
suggests that petitioner never compensated Dr. Yermanos for his
time and that Dr. Yermanos may have merely opined on whether the
jojoba industry as a whole could become profitable.22 There is
nothing in the record to suggest that petitioner ever discussed
the details of San Nicholas with Dr. Yermanos or that Dr.
Yermanos even knew about the existence of that partnership. In
short, petitioner’s testimony concerning Dr. Yermanos is too
amorphous for us to conclude that whatever advice Dr. Yermanos
may have provided was sufficiently informed to absolve petitioner
from liability for the additions to tax for negligence.
Finally, petitioner relies heavily on Krause v.
Commissioner, 99 T.C. 132 (1992), affd. sub nom. Hildebrand v.
Commissioner, 28 F.3d 1024 (10th Cir. 1994). That case, however,
is distinguishable on its facts.
21
We note that no mention is made of a Dr. Yermanos in Utah
Jojoba I Research v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-6.
22
Remarkably, Dr. Yermanos apparently admitted to
petitioner that he, i.e., Dr. Yermanos, had not been successful
in convincing anyone to enter the field of jojoba.
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In Krause v. Commissioner, supra, we held for the taxpayers
on the issue of negligence. We did so in the context of oil
recovery technology based on special or unusual circumstances
related to the energy and oil crisis of the late 1970s and early
1980s:
In evaluating the imposition of the additions to tax
in this case, and in light of the above facts
(encouraging investments in and the development of
tertiary oil recovery methods such as [enhanced oil
recovery] technology), we are somewhat understanding of
the individual investments that were made in * * *
Partnerships. In the context of the hysteria relating
to the energy crisis, the oil price increases of the
late 1970s, the industry and the governmental interest
in [enhanced oil recovery] technology, the heavy and
sophisticated promotion of these investments * * * we
conclude that petitioners are not liable for the
additions to tax and the additional interest element
for negligence under sections 6653(a), 6653(a)(1) and
(2). [Id. at 178.]
None of the circumstances that were determinative in Krause
v. Commissioner, supra, are present in the case at bar.
Petitioner’s reliance on the cited case is misplaced.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that petitioner is liable
for the additions to tax under section 6653(a)(1) and (2) for
negligence. Respondent’s determination is sustained.
II. Section 6661(a) Substantial Understatement of Tax Liability
The second issue for decision is whether petitioner is
liable for an addition to tax under section 6661(a). That
section, as amended by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1986, Pub. L. 99-509, sec. 8002, 100 Stat. 1951, provides for an
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addition to tax of 25 percent of the amount of any underpayment
attributable to a substantial understatement of income tax.
Petitioner bears the burden of proving that he is not liable for
the addition to tax. Monahan v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. 235, 257
(1997); Mueller v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-178.23
A substantial understatement of income tax exists if the
amount of the understatement exceeds the greater of 10 percent of
the tax required to be shown on the return, or $5,000. Sec.
6661(b)(1)(A). Generally, the amount of an understatement is
reduced by the portion of the understatement that the taxpayer
shows is attributable to either (1) the tax treatment of any item
for which there was substantial authority or (2) the tax
treatment of any item with respect to which the relevant facts
were adequately disclosed on the return. See sec. 6661(b)(2)(B).
Substantial authority exists when “the weight of the
authorities supporting the treatment is substantial in relation
to the weight of authorities supporting contrary positions.”
Sec. 1.6661-3(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. Adequate disclosure of the
tax treatment of a particular item may be made either in a
statement attached to the return or on the return itself. Sec.
1.6661-4(b) and (c), Income Tax Regs.
If an understatement is attributable to a tax shelter item,
then different standards apply. First, in addition to showing
23
See supra note 16.
- 29 -
the existence of substantial authority, a taxpayer must show that
he or she reasonably believed that the tax treatment claimed was
more likely than not the proper treatment. Sec.
6661(b)(2)(C)(i)(II). Second, disclosure, whether or not
adequate, will not reduce the amount of the understatement. Sec.
6661(b)(2)(C)(i)(I).
Petitioner appears to concede that there was a substantial
understatement of tax within the meaning of section 6661(a).24
Petitioner does not contend, however, that there was substantial
authority supporting the deduction of the partnership loss that
he claimed on his return, nor does petitioner contend that there
was adequate disclosure of the facts related to that loss.
Rather, petitioner contends that he should be absolved of
liability for the addition to tax by virtue of section 6661(c).
Section 6661(c) vests the Commissioner with discretion to
waive the addition to tax under section 6661(a) if the taxpayer
shows that he or she acted with reasonable cause and in good
faith. The Commissioner’s failure to waive the addition to tax
is reviewed by this Court for abuse of discretion. Martin Ice
Cream Co. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 189, 235 (1998).
24
We note that the understatement of tax on which
respondent determined the addition to tax is $13,710. The amount
required to be shown as tax on petitioner’s return is $41,080.
The understatement is therefore “substantial” because it exceeds
the greater of 10 percent of the amount required to be shown on
the return, or $5,000. Sec. 6661(a).
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There is nothing in the record to suggest that petitioner
ever requested that respondent waive the addition to tax under
section 6661(a). Indeed, petitioner does not even allege that he
requested such a waiver. For that reason alone, petitioner is
not entitled to relief from liability. See McCoy Enters., Inc.
v. Commissioner, 58 F.3d 557, 563-564 (10th Cir. 1995), affg. T.C.
Memo. 1992-693; Klieger v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-734;
sec. 1.6661-6, Income Tax Regs.
Even if petitioner had requested a waiver under section
6661(c), the record demonstrates that he failed to act reasonably
and in good faith in deducting his claimed loss from San
Nicholas. As general partner and tax matters partner of four
other jojoba partnerships, specifically including Utah Jojoba,
petitioner was aware, or should have been aware, that San
Nicholas was not engaged in the research and development of
jojoba. Accordingly, petitioner knew, or should have known, that
in the absence of any research and development, there could be no
deduction for research and experimental expenditures under
section 174.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that petitioner is liable
for the addition to tax under section 6661(a) for substantial
understatement of tax liability. Respondent’s determination is
sustained.
III. Conclusion
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To reflect our disposition of the disputed issues, as well
as the parties’ concessions, see supra note 1,
Decision will be entered
for petitioner Debra C. Kellen
and for respondent as to
petitioner William G. Kellen.