WILLIAMS v. COMMISSIONER

T.C. Memo. 2002-111

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

TED L. WILLIAMS, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 12404-00L. Filed May 3, 2002.

Ted L. Williams, pro se.

Joanne B. Minsky, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHIECHI, Judge: This case is before the Court on respon-

dent’s motion for summary judgment (respondent’s motion). We

shall grant respondent’s motion.

Background

The record establishes and/or the parties do not dispute the

following.
 - 2 -

Petitioner resided in Jacksonville, Florida, at the time he

filed the petition in this case.

Petitioner filed a Federal income tax (tax) return (return)

for his taxable year 1995, which showed $8,125.87 as the tax due

for that year. When petitioner filed his 1995 return, he did not

pay the amount of tax due shown in that return.

On April 28, 2000, respondent issued to petitioner a final

notice of intent to levy with respect to petitioner’s taxable

years 1995, 1996, and 1997 (final notice of intent to levy).

Thereafter, petitioner requested a hearing with the Internal

Revenue Service Appeals Office (Appeals Office) with respect to

that notice.

On October 18, 2000, the Appeals Office held a hearing with

petitioner with respect to the final notice of intent to levy.1

Prior to having been assigned to conduct the Appeals Office

hearing with respect to the final notice of intent to levy, the

Appeals officer who conducted that hearing had had no relation-

ship with petitioner and had not had any involvement with peti-

tioner’s taxable year 1995.

Prior to the Appeals Office hearing, the Appeals officer

1
Although the Appeals Office hearing was held with respect
to the final notice of intent to levy, which pertained to peti-
tioner’s taxable years 1995, 1996, and 1997, petitioner peti-
tioned this Court only with respect to his taxable year 1995.
Our discussion hereinafter relates only to petitioner’s taxable
year 1995.
 - 3 -

obtained coded and noncoded (so-called “plain English”) versions

of computer-generated transcripts (transcripts) of respondent’s

records with respect to petitioner. Those transcripts identified

petitioner, the type of tax assessed, the taxable period, the

date of the assessment, and the amount assessed. At the Appeals

Office hearing, the Appeals officer relied on the transcripts for

the purpose of verifying that respondent made a valid assessment

with respect to petitioner’s taxable year 1995. The Appeals

officer provided to petitioner a copy of the plain English

version of those transcripts at the Appeals Office hearing.

On October 30, 2000, the Appeals Office issued to petitioner

a “NOTICE OF DETERMINATION CONCERNING COLLECTION ACTION(S) UNDER

SECTION 6320 and/or 6330" (notice of determination). That notice

stated in pertinent part:

(1) The only legal requirements before taking general
enforcement action are the notice & demand and the
notice of intent to levy and the notice of right to a
collection due process hearing. The assessments were
made, and notice & demand for payment, under
IRC6303(a), were sent to your last known address, along
with Publication 1, your rights as a taxpayer. You
neglected or refused to pay the taxes and penalties
due. Subsequently, you were sent the LT11 dated
4/28/2000. The Automated Collection System followed
all legal & procedural requirements and the action
proposed is appropriate under the circumstances, with
regard to the income tax due for 1995 only.

(2) The issues raised by you on your request are that,
for the income tax due for 1995, you did not earn the
alleged taxable income. For the Civil Penalties for
1996 & 1997, that the penalty is not based on agency
records. With regard to the income tax due for 1995,
the tax was assessed via a tax return filed by you on
 - 4 -

4/15/1996, showing total tax due of $8,125.87. The
information that you have provided regarding your
position, including the information presented by you at
your hearing on 10/18/2000, did not change our position
that we have a valid assessment for 1995. However,
with regard to the civil penalties assessed for 1996
(4@$500), and 1997(1@$500,they cannot be considered
under the collection due process procedure, because
they have a separate appeal procedure under Penalty
Appeals. Therefore, they will be considered under that
procedure, and you will be notified of the result. Any
other issues raised by you were determined to be not
applicable to our consideration of this case.

(3) The proposed collection action for 1995 balances
the need for the efficient collection of the tax with
your legitimate concern that any collection action be
no more intrusive than necessary. [Reproduced liter-
ally.]

Discussion

The Court may grant summary judgment where there is no

genuine issue of material fact and a decision may be rendered as

a matter of law. Rule 121(b);2 Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner,

98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), affd. 17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994). We

conclude that there is no genuine issue of material fact regard-

ing the questions raised in respondent’s motion.

The validity of the underlying tax liability for 1995 is not

at issue in this case.3 Consequently, we shall consider the

2
Unless otherwise indicated, all Rule references are to the
Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. Unless otherwise
indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue
Code in effect at all relevant times.
3
Although not altogether clear, petitioner may have chal-
lenged the underlying tax liability for 1995 at the Appeals
Office hearing. However, petitioner did not raise any challenge
(continued...)
 - 5 -

matters addressed in respondent’s motion using an abuse-of-

discretion standard. Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 610

(2000); Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 182 (2000).

In the petition, petitioner alleged that (1) “the IRS failed

to make an assessment in accordance with the requirements of the

IR Code and underlying regulations” and that (2) “the procedural

due process requirements were not met, since the IRS did not

conduct a fair and impartial hearing before an impartial decision

maker.” Petitioner did not allege in the petition (1) any facts

to support petitioner’s allegation that he did not receive “a

fair and impartial hearing before an impartial decision maker” or

(2) any irregularity in respondent’s assessment procedure with

respect to petitioner’s taxable year 1995.

In his response to respondent’s motion (petitioner’s re-

sponse) and in his affidavit in support of that response (peti-

tioner’s affidavit), petitioner abandons the allegations set

forth in the petition. Instead, he advances the types of argu-

ments and contentions that we find to be frivolous and

3
(...continued)
to that liability in the petition. Consequently, petitioner is
deemed to have conceded the underlying tax liability for 1995.
See Rule 331(b)(4); Lunsford v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 183, 186
(2001).
 - 6 -

groundless and that the courts have repeatedly rejected.4

4
By way of illustration, petitioner’s response asserts,
inter alia:

1. The Affiant [petitioner] can not serve two mas-
ters. The Affiant has a divine covenant with the
Affiant’s Creator [Exodus 23:32 and 34:26] pro-
tected by the common law and the Constitution for
the united States of America.

2. The Affiant has made a formal Declaration of Alle-
giance to an American Republic and cancelled the
nationality that is held under the 14th amendment
(U.S. citizenship) * * * the affiant never gave
express consent to be or become a citizen and
national of the United States: and, has declared
allegiance to the republic/ Florida state and
claim sole nationality thereof.

* * * * * * *

WHEREFORE * * * the Respondent’s motion for
summary judgment must be denied and vacated for
lack of authority over Affiant and that no bona
fide contract exists between the Respondent and
Affiant. [Reproduced literally.]

Petitioner’s affidavit asserts, inter alia:

4. The federal United States government has been
operating under the Wars Powers Act since 1861.
The United States Supreme Court is not a judicial
court, but a member of the Executive Branch under
Martial Law (Supreme Court Rules 45.1). * * *

* * * * * * *

12. The [Internal Revenue] Service was never created
by an Act of Congress and is listed as an agency,
sub-agency or sub-department of the Department of
the Treasury in 31 USC § 301 et seq. The Service
is an “alter ego” for “Common Law Trust #62" which
is registered in Puerto Rico, and is therefore
inside the jurisdiction of Washington D.C. The
actual, physical headquarters of the Service is in
(continued...)
 - 7 -

In respondent’s motion, respondent contends that the Appeals

officer’s reliance on the transcripts to verify that respondent

made a valid assessment with respect to petitioner’s taxable year

1995 satisfies the requirements of section 6330(c)(1) that the

Appeals officer obtain verification that the requirements of any

applicable law or administrative procedure have been met. That

is because, according to respondent, (1) those transcripts

contained all of the information required under section 301.6203-

1, Proced. & Admin. Regs.,5 and (2) petitioner failed to show any

4
(...continued)
the Virgin Islands. * * *

* * * * * * *

22. The only regulations promulgated by the Secretary
to implement his collection authority are found at
27 CFR Part 70 and pertains only to matters re-
garding alcohol, tobacco and firearms.

* * * * * * *

26. The Service is not in possession of any record
maintained under the Privacy Act that shows that
the Affiant is a “Taxpayer”.

27. The Service is not in possession of any record
maintained under the Privacy Act that the Affiant
has ever “volunteered” (without treats, duress and
coercion by the Service) to file a federal 1040
tax return.
5
Sec. 301.6203-1, Proced. & Admin. Regs., provides in perti-
nent part:

The assessment shall be made by an assessment officer
signing the summary record of assessment. The summary
record, through supporting records, shall provide
(continued...)
 - 8 -

irregularity in respondent’s assessment procedure with respect to

petitioner’s taxable year 1995.

Respondent further contends in respondent’s motion that

petitioner received a fair hearing before an impartial decision

maker as required by section 6330(b).6 That is because, accord-

ing to respondent, the Appeals officer “had no involvement with

petitioner’s case prior to receiving the file because a request

for a CDP hearing was filed. * * * [The Appeals officer] also had

no prior relationship with petitioner.”

We agree with respondent. Section 6330(c)(1) does not

5
(...continued)
identification of the taxpayer, the character of the
liability assessed, the taxable period, if applicable,
and the amount of the assessment. * * * If the taxpayer
requests a copy of the record of assessment, he shall
be furnished a copy of the pertinent parts of the
assessment which set forth the name of the taxpayer,
the date of assessment, the character of the liability
assessed, the taxable period, if applicable, and the
amounts assessed.
6
Sec. 6330(b) provides in pertinent part:

SEC. 6330. NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING BEFORE
LEVY.

(b) Right to Fair Hearing.--

* * * * * * *

(3) Impartial officer.--The hearing under this
subsection shall be conducted by an officer or employee
who has had no prior involvement with respect to the
unpaid tax specified in subsection (a)(3)(A) before the
first hearing under this section or section 6320. A
taxpayer may waive the requirement of this paragraph.
 - 9 -

require the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to rely on a partic-

ular document to satisfy the verification requirement imposed by

that section.7 We have held that, absent a showing by the tax-

payer of an irregularity in respondent’s assessment procedure, it

was not an abuse of discretion for the Appeals officer to have

relied on certain computer-generated transcripts for purposes of

complying with section 6330(c)(1).8 On the record before us, we

find that the Appeals officer’s reliance on the transcripts to

verify that respondent made a valid assessment with respect to

petitioner’s taxable year 1995 did not constitute an abuse of

discretion. On that record, we further find that the facts that

are undisputed for purposes of respondent’s motion establish that

petitioner received a fair hearing before an impartial decision

maker.

Based on our examination of the entire record before us, we

find that respondent did not abuse respondent’s discretion in

determining in the notice of determination to proceed with

collection with respect to petitioner’s taxable year 1995. On

that record, we shall grant respondent’s motion.

Although respondent has not requested a penalty under

section 6673(a)(1), this Court is authorized to impose such a

7
E.g., Lindsey v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-87; Kuglin
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-51.
8
E.g., Howard v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-81; Kuglin v.
Commissioner, supra; Mann v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-48.
 - 10 -

penalty in an amount not to exceed $25,000 in cases where it

appears to the Court that, inter alia, a proceeding before it was

instituted or maintained primarily for delay, sec. 6673(a)(1)(A),

or the taxpayer's position in such a proceeding is frivolous or

groundless, sec. 6673(a)(1)(B). In Pierson v. Commissioner, 115

T.C. 576, 581 (2000), we issued an unequivocal warning to taxpay-

ers concerning the imposition of a penalty under section 6673(a)

on those taxpayers who abuse the protections afforded by sections

6320 and 6330 by instituting or maintaining actions under those

sections primarily for delay or by taking frivolous or groundless

positions in such actions.

In the instant case, petitioner advances, we believe primar-

ily for delay, frivolous and groundless arguments and conten-

tions, thereby causing the Court to waste its limited resources.

We shall impose a penalty on petitioner pursuant to section

6673(a)(1) in the amount of $1,000.

We have considered all of petitioner’s arguments and conten-

tions which are not discussed herein, and we find them to be

without merit and/or irrelevant.

To reflect the foregoing,

An order granting respondent’s

motion and decision

sustaining respondent’s

determinations and imposing a
- 11 -

penalty under section 6673(a)(1)

will be entered.