T.C. Memo. 2002-135
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
GENE AND CIAO NEWMAN, Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 5695-01L. Filed May 30, 2002.
Gene and Ciao Newman, pro sese.
Wendy S. Harris and Karen Lynne Baker, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
ARMEN, Special Trial Judge: This matter is before the Court
on respondent’s Motion For Summary Judgment And To Impose A
Penalty Under I.R.C. Section 6673, as supplemented.1 Respondent
1
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and all Rule references
are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
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contends that there is no dispute as to any material fact with
respect to this lien and levy action and that respondent’s
determination to proceed with collection of petitioners’
outstanding tax liabilities for the taxable years 1993 through
1997 should be sustained as a matter of law.
Summary judgment is intended to expedite litigation and
avoid unnecessary and expensive trials. Fla. Peach Corp. v.
Commissioner, 90 T.C. 678, 681 (1988). Summary judgment may be
granted with respect to all or any part of the legal issues in
controversy "if the pleadings, answers to interrogatories,
depositions, admissions, and any other acceptable materials,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that a decision may be
rendered as a matter of law." Rule 121(a) and (b); Sundstrand
Corp. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), affd. 17 F.3d 965
(7th Cir. 1994); Zaentz v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 753, 754 (1988);
Naftel v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 527, 529 (1985). The moving
party bears the burden of proving that there is no genuine issue
of material fact, and factual inferences will be read in a manner
most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Dahlstrom
v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 812, 821 (1985); Jacklin v.
Commissioner, 79 T.C. 340, 344 (1982).
As explained in detail below, there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact, and a decision may be rendered as a matter
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of law. Accordingly, we shall grant respondent’s motion for
summary judgment.
Background
A. Petitioners’ Tax Returns
1. Taxable Years 1993 and 1994
Petitioner Gene Newman (petitioner) failed to file Federal
income tax returns for the taxable years 1993 and 1994. The
record shows that respondent prepared substitutes for returns for
petitioner for the taxable years 1993 and 1994. See sec.
6020(b).
2. Taxable Years 1995, 1996, and 1997
On or about April 15, 1996, April 15, 1997, and April 15,
1998, petitioners Gene and Ciao Newman (petitioners) submitted to
respondent a joint Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return,
for each of the taxable years 1995, 1996, and 1997, respectively.
On petitioners’ Form 1040 for 1996, which form is representative
of petitioners’ Forms 1040 for all 3 taxable years, petitioners
entered zeros on applicable lines of the income portion of the
Form 1040, specifically including line 7 for wages, line 9 for
dividends, line 22 for total income, and lines 31 and 32 for
adjusted gross income. Petitioners also entered a zero on line
38 for tax and a zero on line 51 for total tax. Petitioners then
claimed a refund equal to the amount of Federal income tax that
had been withheld from their wages.
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Petitioners attached to their Forms 1040 for 1995, 1996, and
1997 various Forms W-2, Wage and Tax Statements, disclosing the
payment of wages to petitioners during the taxable years in
issue. By way of example, petitioners attached three Forms W-2
to their Form 1040 for 1996. The first Form W-2 for 1996 was
from Leonard’s Machine Shop in Sparks, Nevada; it disclosed the
payment of wages to petitioner in the amount of $10,788.69 and
the withholding of Federal income tax in the amount of $174.29.
The second Form W-2 for 1996 was from Northern Nevada Tool & Die,
Inc. in Reno, Nevada; it disclosed the payment of wages to
petitioner in the amount of $23,953.47 and the withholding of
Federal income tax in the amount of $692.04. The third Form W-2
for 1996 was from Chemex Labs, Inc., in Sparks, Nevada; it
disclosed the payment of wages to petitioner Ciao Newman in the
amount of $23,152.75 and the withholding of Federal income tax in
the amount of $516.15.
Petitioners also attached to their Forms 1040 for 1995,
1996, and 1997 a typewritten statement. The typewritten
statement that petitioners attached to their Form 1040 for 1996,
which statement is essentially identical to the statements that
petitioners attached to their other Forms 1040, stated, in part,
as follows:
We are submitting this statement as part of our
1996 income tax return.
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Even though we know that no section of the Internal
Revenue Code:
1) established an income tax “liability” * * * ;
2) provides that income taxes “have to be paid on the
basis of a return” * * * .
* * * * * * *
In addition to the above, we are filing even though:
3. The “Privacy Act Notice” that the face of this
return directs us to, states that we need only file a
return for “any tax” we may be “liable” for, and since
no Code section makes us “liable” for income taxes,
this Notice notifies us that we do not have to file an
income tax return.
* * * * * * *
It should also be noted that we had “zero” income
according to the Supreme Court’s definition of income
* * * .
The word “income” is not defined in the Internal
Revenue Code * * * but, as stated above, it can only be
a derivative of corporate activity.
B. Respondent’s Deficiency Notices and Petitioners’
Responses
On May 4, 1998, respondent issued two notices of deficiency
to petitioner Gene Newman (petitioner). In the first notice,
respondent determined a deficiency in the amount of $2,036 in
petitioner’s Federal income tax for 1993 and an addition to tax
under section 6651(a)(1) in the amount of $475. In the second
notice, respondent determined a deficiency in the amount of
$1,781 in petitioner’s Federal income tax for 1994 and an
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addition to tax under section 6651(a)(1) in the amount of $440.
The deficiencies in income tax were based on respondent’s
determination that petitioner failed to report wage income,
unemployment compensation, and tip income.
On July 6, 1998, respondent received a letter (postmarked
June 26, 1998) from petitioner acknowledging receipt of the
notices of deficiency dated May 4, 1998, and challenging their
validity. Petitioner did not file a petition for redetermination
with the Court challenging the notices of deficiency dated May 4,
1998.
On September 11, 1998, respondent issued two joint notices
of deficiency to petitioners. In the first notice, respondent
determined a deficiency in the amount of $4,984 in petitioners’
Federal income tax for 1995 and an accuracy-related penalty under
section 6662(a) in the amount of $871. In the second notice,
respondent determined a deficiency in the amount of $8,030 in
petitioners’ Federal income tax for 1996 and an accuracy-related
penalty under section 6662(a) in the amount of $1,346. The
deficiencies in income tax were based on respondent’s
determination that petitioners failed to report wage income (1995
and 1996), unemployment compensation (1995), and a distribution
from an IRA (1996).
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On November 13, 1998, respondent received a letter (dated
November 8, 1998) from petitioners acknowledging receipt of the
notices of deficiency dated September 11, 1998, and challenging
their validity. Petitioners did not file a petition for
redetermination with the Court challenging the notices of
deficiency dated September 11, 1998.
On March 12, 1999, respondent issued a joint notice of
deficiency to petitioners. In the notice, respondent determined
a deficiency in the amount of $12,049 in petitioners’ Federal
income tax for 1997 and an accuracy-related penalty under section
6662(a) in the amount of $1,899.31. The deficiency in income tax
was based on respondent’s determination that petitioners failed
to report wage income, interest and dividends, capital gain, and
an IRA distribution.
On April 9, 1999, respondent received a letter (dated March
25, 1999) from petitioners acknowledging receipt of the notice of
deficiency dated March 12, 1999, and challenging its validity.
Petitioners did not file a petition for redetermination with the
Court challenging the notice of deficiency dated March 12, 1999.
Respondent subsequently made assessments against petitioners
for the deficiencies, additions to tax, and accuracy-related
penalties determined in the above-described notices of
deficiency. Respondent also made assessments against petitioners
for statutory interest. On the same day that the assessments
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were made, respondent issued to petitioners notices of balance
due informing petitioners that they owed taxes for the years in
question and requesting that they pay such amounts. Petitioners
failed to pay the amounts owing.
C. Respondent’s Collection Notices and Petitioners’
Response
On August 14, 2000, respondent mailed to petitioner a Final
Notice--Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a
Hearing in respect of his outstanding tax liabilities for 1993
and 1994. Also on August 14, 2000, respondent mailed to
petitioners a Final Notice--Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice
of Your Right to a Hearing in respect of petitioners’ joint tax
liabilities for 1995, 1996, and 1997.
On August 22, 2000, respondent mailed to petitioner a Notice
of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Notice of Your Right to a Hearing
Under IRC 6320 in respect of his tax liabilities for 1993 and
1994. Also on August 22, 2000, respondent mailed to petitioners
a Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Notice of Your Right to a
Hearing Under IRC 6320 in respect of petitioners’ joint tax
liabilities for 1995, 1996, and 1997. These two notices were
sent to petitioners in respect of notices of Federal tax lien
that respondent filed on August 17, 2000, with the County
Recorder for Washoe County, Nevada.
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On September 11, 2000, petitioners filed with respondent
Form 12153, Request for a Collection Due Process Hearing. The
request included, inter alia, a challenge to the existence of
petitioners’ underlying tax liabilities for 1993 through 1997 on
the ground that petitioners were never provided with a valid
notice of deficiency or notice and demand for payment.
Petitioners also requested verification from the Secretary that
all applicable laws and administrative procedures were followed
with regard to the assessment and collection of the taxes in
dispute.
D. The Appeals Office Hearing
On January 30, 2001, petitioners attended an administrative
hearing conducted by Appeals Officer Donna Fisher. At the
hearing, the Appeals officer provided petitioners with Forms
4340, Certificates of Assessments, Payments, and Other Specified
Matters for the years 1993 through 1997. During the hearing,
petitioners requested that the Appeals officer identify the
statutory provisions establishing petitioners’ liability for
Federal income taxes and provide verification that all applicable
laws and administrative procedures were followed in the
assessment and collection process. Petitioners were informed
that the Forms 4340 provided to them were sufficient to satisfy
the verification requirement of section 6330(c)(1). The Appeals
officer terminated the hearing after petitioners declined to
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discuss collection alternatives.
E. Respondent’s Notices of Determination
On April 2, 2001, respondent’s Appeals Office issued to
petitioner separate Notices of Determination Concerning
Collection Action(s) Under Section 6320 and/or 6330 with regard
to his tax liabilities for 1993 through 1997. In the notices,
the Appeals Office stated that respondent’s determination to
proceed with collection by way of levy should be sustained and
that the filing of the notices of Federal tax lien was
appropriate.
Also on April 2, 2001, respondent’s Appeals Office issued to
petitioner Ciao Newman a Notice of Determination Concerning
Collection Action(s) Under Section 6320 and/or 6330 with regard
to her tax liabilities for 1995 through 1997. In the notice, the
Appeals Office stated that respondent’s determination to proceed
with collection by way of levy should be sustained and that the
filing of the notice of Federal tax lien was appropriate.
F. Petitioners’ Petition and Motion To Dismiss
On April 30, 2001, petitioners filed with the Court a
Petition for Lien or Levy Action seeking review of respondent’s
notices of determination.2 The petition includes the following
allegations: (1) The Appeals officer failed to obtain
2
At the time that the petition was filed, petitioners
resided in Reno, Nevada.
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verification from the Secretary that the requirements of any
applicable law or administrative procedure were met as required
under section 6330(c)(1); (2) the Appeals officer failed to
identify the statutes making petitioners liable for Federal
income taxes; and (3) petitioners were denied the opportunity to
challenge (a) the appropriateness of the collection action, and
(b) the existence or amount of their underlying tax liabilities.
Concurrently with the filing of their petition, petitioners
filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction in which they
asked the Court to “declare invalid the ‘Determination’ at issue,
since the appeals officer issued the ‘Determination’ without
conducting the CDP hearing as requested by petitioner according
to law.” Petitioners attached to their motion a Memorandum of
Law in which they repeated many of the allegations in the
petition. Petitioners also alleged:
there is no Code Section that authorizes IRS employees
to attribute to petitioners more taxes then [sic] they
reported on their tax returns. Since income taxes are
based on “self-assessment,” petitioners can only owe in
taxes, the amount reported on their tax returns, which,
in this case, were correctly reported as “zero.”
By Order dated August 27, 2001, the Court denied
petitioners’ motion to dismiss.
G. Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment
As stated, respondent filed a Motion For Summary Judgment
And To Impose A Penalty Under I.R.C. Section 6673. Respondent
contends that petitioners are barred under section 6330(c)(2)(B)
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from challenging the existence or amount of their underlying tax
liabilities in this proceeding because petitioners received
notices of deficiency for the taxes in question. Respondent also
contends that the Appeals officer’s review of the Forms 4340,
which forms were provided to petitioners during the Appeals
Office hearing, satisfied the verification requirement of section
6330(c)(1). Finally, respondent contends that petitioners’
behavior warrants the imposition of a penalty under section 6673.
Petitioners filed an Objection to respondent’s motion.
Thereafter, pursuant to notice, respondent’s motion was called
for hearing at the Court's motions session in Washington, D.C.
Following the hearing, respondent filed a supplement to his
motion, and petitioners filed a Supplemental Objection and a
Response to respondent’s motion, as supplemented.
Discussion
Section 6321 imposes a lien in favor of the United States on
all property and rights to property of a person when a demand for
the payment of the person’s liability for taxes has been made and
the person fails to pay those taxes. Such a lien arises when an
assessment is made. Sec. 6322. Section 6323(a) requires the
Secretary to file notice of Federal tax lien if such lien is to
be valid against any purchaser, holder of a security interest,
mechanic’s lienor, or judgment lien creditor. Lindsay v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-285.
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Section 6320 provides that the Secretary shall furnish the
person described in section 6321 with written notice of the
filing of a notice of lien under section 6323. The notice
required by section 6320 must be provided not more than 5
business days after the day of the filing of the notice of lien.
Sec. 6320(a)(2). Section 6320 further provides that the person
may request administrative review of the matter (in the form of
an Appeals Office hearing) within 30 days beginning on the day
after the 5-day period. Section 6320(c) provides that the
Appeals Office hearing generally shall be conducted consistent
with the procedures set forth in section 6330(c), (d), and (e).
Section 6331(a) provides that if any person liable to pay
any tax neglects or refuses to pay such tax within 10 days after
notice and demand for payment, the Secretary is authorized to
collect such tax by levy on the person’s property. Section
6331(d) provides that at least 30 days before enforcing
collection by levy on the person's property, the Secretary is
obliged to provide the person with a final notice of intent to
levy, including notice of the administrative appeals available to
the person.
Section 6330 generally provides that the Commissioner cannot
proceed with collection by levy until the person has been given
notice and the opportunity for an administrative review of the
matter (in the form of an Appeals Office hearing) and, if
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dissatisfied, with judicial review of the administrative
determination. See Davis v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 35, 37
(2000); Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 179 (2000).
Section 6330(c) prescribes the matters that a person may
raise at an Appeals Office hearing. In sum, section 6330(c)
provides that a person may raise collection issues such as
spousal defenses, the appropriateness of the Commissioner's
intended collection action, and possible alternative means of
collection. Section 6330(c)(2)(B) provides that the existence
and amount of the underlying tax liability can be contested at an
Appeals Office hearing only if the person did not receive a
notice of deficiency for the taxes in question or did not
otherwise have an earlier opportunity to dispute the tax
liability. See Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 609 (2000);
Goza v. Commissioner, supra. Section 6330(d) provides for
judicial review of the administrative determination in the Tax
Court or a Federal District Court, as may be appropriate.
A. Summary Judgment
Petitioners argue that the assessments made against them are
invalid because respondent failed to demonstrate that petitioners
are subject to the Federal income tax. Petitioners’ argument
fails for two reasons. First, there is no dispute in this case
that petitioners received notices of deficiency with regard to
the years in issue and that they ignored the opportunity to file
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a petition for redetermination with this Court. See sec.
6213(a). Under the circumstances, section 6330(c)(2)(B) bars
petitioners from challenging the existence or the amount of their
underlying tax liabilities for the years 1993 through 1997 in
this collection review proceeding.
In addition to the bar imposed by section 6330(c)(2)(B),
petitioners’ arguments that they are not subject to the Federal
income tax are frivolous and groundless. See Nestor v.
Commissioner, 118 T.C. 162, 165 (2002); Goza v. Commissioner,
supra. As the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
remarked: "We perceive no need to refute these arguments with
somber reasoning and copious citation of precedent; to do so
might suggest that these arguments have some colorable merit."
Crain v. Commissioner, 737 F.2d 1417 (5th Cir. 1984). Suffice it
to say that petitioners are taxpayers who are subject to the
Federal income tax on their wages and other sources of income.
See secs. 1(a), (d); 61(a)(1), (3), (4), (7), (11); 72; 85;
408(d); 7701(a)(1), (14).
Petitioners next argue that the Appeals officer failed to
obtain verification from the Secretary that the requirements of
all applicable laws and administrative procedures were met as
required by section 6330(c)(1). We reject petitioners’ argument
because the record establishes that the Appeals officer obtained
and reviewed transcripts of account (Forms 4340) for petitioners’
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taxable years 1993 through 1997.
Federal tax assessments are formally recorded on a record of
assessment. Sec. 6203. “The summary record, through supporting
records, shall provide identification of the taxpayer, the
character of the liability assessed, the taxable period, if
applicable, and the amount of the assessment.” Sec. 301.6203-1,
Proced. & Admin. Regs.
Section 6330(c)(1) does not require the Commissioner to rely
on a particular document to satisfy the verification requirement
imposed therein. Roberts v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. n.10
(2002); Weishan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-88; Lindsey v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-87; Tolotti v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2002-86; Duffield v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-53;
Kuglin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-51. In this regard, we
observe that the transcripts of account on which the Appeals
officer relied, and which she furnished to petitioners during the
hearing, contained all the information prescribed in section
301.6203-1, Proced. & Admin. Regs. See Weishan v. Commissioner,
supra; Lindsey v. Commissioner, supra; Tolotti v. Commissioner,
supra; Duffield v. Commissioner, supra; Kuglin v. Commissioner,
supra.3
3
In their motion to dismiss, see supra p. 11, petitioners
alleged that the Appeals officer did not provide them with a copy
of the verification. We note that sec. 6330(c)(1) does not
(continued...)
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We likewise reject petitioners’ assertion, first raised
during the Appeals Office hearing, that they never received a
notice and demand for payment for the amounts in dispute. In
particular, during the Appeals Office hearing, petitioners argued
that a notice of balance due does not constitute a notice and
demand for payment.
The requirement that the Secretary issue a notice and demand
for payment is set forth in section 6303(a), which provides in
pertinent part:
SEC. 6303(a). General Rule.-–Where it is not
otherwise provided by this title, the Secretary shall,
as soon as practicable, and within 60 days, after the
making of an assessment of a tax pursuant to section
6203, give notice to each person liable for the unpaid
tax, stating the amount and demanding payment thereof.
The transcripts of account that the Appeals officer provided to
petitioners during the Appeals Office hearing show that
respondent issued to petitioners notices of balance due on the
same date that respondent made assessments against petitioners
for the taxes, additions to taxes, and penalties in dispute in
this case. We hold that such notices of balance due constitute
notices and demand for payment within the meaning of section
6303(a). See, e.g., Hughes v. United States, 953 F.2d 531, 536
3
(...continued)
require the Appeals officer to provide the taxpayer with a copy
of the verification at the administrative hearing. Nestor v.
Commissioner, 118 T.C. 162, 166 (2002). In any event, as stated
above, the Appeals officer did, in fact, provide petitioners with
Forms 4340, Certificates of Assessments, Payments, and Other
Specified Matters for the years 1993 through 1997.
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(9th Cir. 1992); Weishan v. Commissioner, supra; see also Hansen
v. United States, 7 F.3d 137, 138 (9th Cir. 1993).
Petitioners have not alleged any irregularity in the
assessment procedure that would raise a question about the
validity of the assessments or the information contained in the
transcripts of account. See Davis v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 35,
40-41 (2000); Mann v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-48.
Accordingly, we hold that the Appeals officer satisfied the
verification requirement of section 6330(c)(1). Cf. Nicklaus v.
Commissioner, 117 T.C. 117, 120-121 (2001).
Petitioners have failed to raise a spousal defense, make a
valid challenge to the appropriateness of respondent’s intended
collection actions, or offer alternative means of collection.
These issues are now deemed conceded. Rule 331(b)(4). In the
absence of a justiciable issue for review, we conclude that
respondent is entitled to judgment as a matter of law sustaining
the notices of determination dated April 2, 2001.
B. Imposition of a Penalty Under Section 6673
We turn now to that part of respondent’s motion that moves
for the imposition of a penalty under section 6673.
As relevant herein, section 6673(a)(1) authorizes the Tax
Court to require a taxpayer to pay to the United States a penalty
not in excess of $25,000 whenever it appears that proceedings
have been instituted or maintained by the taxpayer primarily for
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delay or that the taxpayer's position in such proceeding is
frivolous or groundless. The Court has indicated its willingness
to impose such penalty in lien and levy cases, Pierson v.
Commissioner, 115 T.C. 576, 580-581 (2000), and has in fact
imposed a penalty in several such cases, Roberts v. Commissioner,
118 T.C. (2002) (imposing a penalty in the amount of
$10,000); Yacksyzn v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-99 (imposing
a penalty in the amount of $1,000); Watson v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2001-213 (imposing a penalty in the amount of $1,500).
We are convinced petitioners instituted the present
proceeding primarily for delay. In this regard, it is clear that
petitioners regard this proceeding as nothing other than as a
vehicle to protest the tax laws of this country and to espouse
their own misguided views, which we regard as frivolous and
groundless. In short, having to deal with this matter wasted the
Court's time, as well as respondent's.
Under the circumstances, we shall grant that part of
respondent’s motion that moves for the imposition of a penalty in
that we shall impose a penalty on petitioners pursuant to section
6673(a)(1) in the amount of $1,000.
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In order to give effect to the foregoing,
An order granting respondent's
motion, as supplemented, and
decision for respondent will be
entered.