Haywood v. Comm'r

T.C. Memo. 2002-258

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

LaTANYA HAYWOOD, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 5223-01. Filed October 8, 2002.

LaTanya Haywood, pro se.

Vicki L. Miller, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

COUVILLION, Special Trial Judge: Respondent determined a

deficiency of $4,157 in petitioner's Federal income tax for 1999.

Some of the facts were stipulated, and those facts, with the

annexed exhibits, are so found and are incorporated herein by

reference. Petitioner's legal residence at the time the petition

was filed was Kansas City, Missouri.
 - 2 -

The issues for decision are: (1) Whether petitioner is

entitled to a dependency exemption deduction under section

151(c)1 for her son, Brandon R. Haywood, and (2) whether

petitioner's son, Brandon R. Haywood, is a qualifying child under

section 32(c)(3)(A) so as to increase the amount of the earned

income credit under section 32(a) allowable to petitioner.

In the stipulation, respondent conceded the following

adjustments in the notice of deficiency:

(1) That petitioner was entitled to a dependency exemption

deduction for another son, Brent R. Covington;

(2) That petitioner's son, Brent R. Covington, was a

qualifying child under section 32(c)(3)(A) entitling

petitioner to an earned income credit under section 32(a);

and

(3) That petitioner was entitled to head-of-household filing

status under section 2(b) instead of single as determined in

the notice of deficiency.

With respect to the first issue regarding the dependency

exemption deduction claimed for Brandon R. Haywood, section

151(c) allows taxpayers to deduct an annual exemption amount for

each dependent as defined in section 152. Under section 152(a),

1
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are
to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the year at issue.
All Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and
Procedure.
 - 3 -

the term "dependent" means certain individuals over half of whose

support was received from the taxpayer during the taxable year in

which such individuals are claimed as dependents. Eligible

individuals who may be claimed as dependents include, among

others, a son or daughter of the taxpayer. See sec. 152(a)(1).

Section 1.152-1(a)(2)(i), Income Tax Regs., provides that,

in determining whether an individual received over half of his

support from the taxpayer, "there shall be taken into account the

amount of support received from the taxpayer as compared to the

entire amount of support which the individual received from all

sources, including support which the individual himself

supplied." In Blanco v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 512, 514-515

(1971), this Court held that, in establishing that more than one-

half of a dependent's support has been provided, a prerequisite

to such a showing is the demonstration by competent evidence of

the total amount of the dependent's support from all sources for

that year. If the amount of total support is not established and

cannot be reasonably inferred from competent evidence available

to the Court, it is not possible to conclude that the taxpayer

claiming the exemption provided more than one-half of the support

of the claimed dependent.

Petitioner's son, Brandon R. Haywood (Brandon), was born on

August 12, 1978, and, thus, attained the age of 21 during 1999.

On April 15, 1995, Brandon was convicted in the State of Missouri
 - 4 -

of involuntary manslaughter and was sentenced to a 15-year prison

term. He was incarcerated at or shortly after the sentencing

date, and, throughout 1999, Brandon was an inmate at the Missouri

Eastern Correction Center at either Pacific, Missouri, or the

prison facility at Cameron, Missouri. Brandon, therefore, did

not live with petitioner at any time during 1999. Petitioner

claimed Brandon as a dependent on her 1999 Federal income tax

return, which was disallowed by respondent on the ground that

petitioner did not provide more than one-half of petitioner's

support during the year in question.

Petitioner was not required by the State of Missouri to

provide or pay for any support for Brandon. Petitioner, however,

voluntarily paid on a biweekly basis amounts to the prison, which

were placed in an account for Brandon for his use in purchasing

allowable incidentals not furnished or provided by the prison.

Although petitioner did not substantiate the amounts she

contributed for Brandon during 1999, she claims that, after he

was incarcerated, she initially contributed $160 every 2 weeks

but later reduced the contributions to $50 every 2 weeks. The

Court assumes that, during 1999, petitioner's claimed

contributions would have approximated $50 every 2 weeks, or

$1,300.

The Court concludes from the record that petitioner failed

to establish that she provided more than half of Brandon's
 - 5 -

support during 1999, even if she contributed $1,300 for his

support that year to pay for Brandon's incidental needs. The

Court rejects petitioner's contention that, because Brandon

qualified for and received special education at the prison,

petitioner was entitled to claim the dependency exemption

deduction for him. Section 152 and applicable regulations have

no provision that would qualify the beneficiaries of such

assistance as dependents under section 152. It is quite evident

from the record that Brandon's total support for 1999 was not

established, and that factor alone is sufficient to disallow

petitioner's entitlement to the dependency exemption deduction.

It is also evident that the support provided to Brandon by the

State prison system where he was incarcerated far exceeded the

monetary amounts provided by petitioner. Respondent, therefore,

is sustained on this issue.

The second issue is whether Brandon, during 1999, was a

qualifying child with regard to petitioner for purposes of the

earned income credit under section 32(a).

Section 32(a) provides for an earned income credit in the

case of an eligible individual. Section 32(c)(1)(A), in

pertinent part, defines an "eligible individual" as an individual

who has a qualifying child for the taxable year. Sec.

32(c)(1)(A)(i). A qualifying child is one who satisfies a

relationship test, a residency test, an age test, and an
 - 6 -

identification requirement. See sec. 32(c)(3). To satisfy the

residency test, the qualifying child must have the same principal

place of abode as the taxpayer for more than one-half of the

taxable year in which the credit is claimed. Sec.

32(c)(3)(A)(ii).

As discussed above, petitioner's son, Brandon, did not have

his principal place of abode with petitioner during 1999. Her

son, Brandon, was not a qualifying child under section 32(a) so

as to increase the amount of petitioner's earned income credit

for 1999. Respondent, therefore, is sustained on this issue.

Decision will be entered

under Rule 155.