T.C. Memo. 2003-47
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
GLORIA M. STARK, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 9570-02L. Filed February 25, 2003.
Gloria M. Stark, pro se.
Charles J. Graves, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
THORNTON, Judge: Respondent has moved for summary judgment
on the question of whether respondent may proceed with collection
of petitioner’s outstanding tax liabilities for tax years 1994
through 1997.
Summary judgment is intended to expedite litigation and
avoid unnecessary and expensive trials. Fla. Peach Corp. v.
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Commissioner, 90 T.C. 678, 681 (1988). Summary judgment may be
granted where there is no genuine issue of any material fact and
a decision may be rendered as a matter of law. Rule 121(a) and
(b); see Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520
(1992), affd. 17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994); Zaentz v.
Commissioner, 90 T.C. 753, 754 (1988).1 The moving party bears
the burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of material
fact; factual inferences will be read in a manner most favorable
to the party opposing summary judgment. Dahlstrom v.
Commissioner, 85 T.C. 812, 821 (1985); Jacklin v. Commissioner,
79 T.C. 340, 344 (1982). When a motion for summary judgment is
made and properly supported, the adverse party may not rest upon
mere allegations or denials of the pleadings but must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Rule 121(d).
As discussed in detail below, we conclude that there is no
dispute as to any material fact and that respondent is entitled
to summary judgment as a matter of law.
Background
On September 8, 1987, the Circuit Court for the County of
Midland, Michigan, entered a judgment of divorce between
petitioner and her former husband, Forrest Stark (the divorce
1
Unless otherwise indicated, all Rule references are to
the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, and all section
references are to the Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
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judgment). The divorce judgment ordered, inter alia, that
permanent alimony be awarded to petitioner in the amount of
$1,000 per month.
Petitioner made several unsuccessful appeals to the Michigan
Supreme Court regarding her divorce. See Stark v. George, 489
N.W.2d 784 (Mich. 1992) (denying petitioner’s application for
leave to appeal an action against the attorneys who represented
Forrest Stark in the divorce proceedings); Stark v. Midland
Circuit Judge, 435 Mich. 877 (1990) (denying petitioner’s
application for leave to appeal and denying a motion “to
disqualify a party”); Stark v. Stark, 432 Mich. 898 (1989)
(denying petitioner’s application for leave to appeal an action
against Forrest Stark), motion for reconsideration denied, Stark
v. Stark, Nos. 85431, 85, 85432, 83, 1989 Mich. LEXIS 1217; Stark
v. Stark, 431 Mich. 877 (1988) (denying petitioner’s application
for leave to appeal an action against Forrest Stark).2
Petitioner filed a Federal income tax return for 1994
showing tax liability, but she did not remit payment for the
reported liability. Petitioner filed a Federal income tax return
for 1996, but not for 1995 or 1997.
2
On petitioner’s Form 12153, Request for a Collection Due
Process Hearing, dated July 12, 2000, petitioner contended that
her divorce was invalid and stated that her “case is now in
Federal Court.” We take judicial notice that on July 12, 2000,
the United States Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
entered an order granting the State of Michigan’s motion to
dismiss the action filed by petitioner in Stark v. Michigan, No.
00-CV-10066 (E.D. Mich., filed Feb. 23, 2000).
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On June 21, 1999, respondent sent petitioner a notice of
deficiency for 1995, 1996, and 1997, determining income tax
deficiencies of $7,054, $6,305, and $6,711, respectively, plus
additions to tax under sections 6651(a)(1) and 6654 for 1995 and
1997. Petitioner did not petition this Court for
redetermination.
On March 29, 1999, respondent assessed the unpaid tax
liability reported on petitioner’s 1994 tax return, plus
penalties and interest. On February 7, 2000, respondent assessed
the income tax deficiencies and additions to tax, plus interest,
as determined in the notice of deficiency for 1995, 1996, and
1997.
On June 15, 2000, respondent sent petitioner a Final Notice
-- Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a
Hearing, regarding petitioner’s 1994 through 1997 income tax
liabilities. On July 12, 2000, petitioner submitted to
respondent a Form 12153, Request for a Collection Due Process
Hearing. On the Form 12153, the only issue that petitioner
raised was whether payments received from her former husband were
taxable to her as alimony.
On April 10, 2001, an administrative hearing was held
between petitioner and respondent’s Appeals officer (the
administrative hearing). On April 30, 2002, respondent issued
petitioner a Notice of Determination Concerning Collection
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Action(s) Under Section 6320 and/or 6330 (notice of
determination) regarding petitioner’s 1994 through 1997 tax
liabilities. In the notice of determination, respondent
determined that all applicable legal and administrative
procedures had been met and that collection actions could proceed
against petitioner. The notice of determination states: “The
underlying tax liability is correct. You were divorced and the
alimony payments received from your former husband are properly
included into income.”
On June 3, 2002, this Court received from petitioner, who
then resided in Independence, Missouri, a letter which the Court
treated as a timely imperfect petition for review of respondent’s
notice of determination. On June 26, 2002, petitioner filed an
amended petition. In her amended petition, petitioner states
that she “does not contest the tax owed or any additions to the
tax for penalty or interest. The petitioner merely states that
the IRS is billing the wrong person for the taxes owed for the
years 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1997.” She contends that the Midland
County, Michigan, circuit judge who signed the divorce judgment
had been “previously disqualified from making any further rulings
between the two parties.” Thus, she contends, there was “No
legal divorce” and consequently “no alimony” to be included in
her taxable income.
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Discussion
If any person neglects or refuses to make payment of any
Federal tax liability within 10 days of notice and demand, the
Secretary is authorized to collect the tax by levy on the
person’s property. Sec. 6331(a). At least 30 days before taking
such action, however, the Secretary generally must provide the
person with a final notice of intent to levy that describes,
among other things, the administrative appeals available to the
person. Sec. 6331(d). Upon request, the person is entitled to
an administrative hearing before the Appeals Office of the
Internal Revenue Service. Sec. 6330(b)(1). If dissatisfied with
the Appeals Office determination, the person may seek judicial
review in the U.S. Tax Court or a Federal District Court, as
appropriate. Sec. 6330(d). Generally, the proposed levy actions
are suspended for the pendency of the hearing and any judicial
appeals therein. Sec. 6330(e)(1).
Section 6330(c) prescribes matters that a person may raise
at an Appeals Office hearing, including spousal defenses, the
appropriateness of the Commissioner’s intended collection action,
and possible alternative means of collection. The existence or
amount of the underlying tax liability may be challenged in the
collection proceeding only if the person received no statutory
notice of deficiency or otherwise had no opportunity to dispute
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the tax liability. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B); see Sego v. Commissioner,
114 T.C. 604, 609 (2000). If the underlying tax liability is not
properly at issue, we review respondent’s determination for an
abuse of discretion. Sego v. Commissioner, supra at 610.
Otherwise, we review the matter de novo. Id.
The only issue petitioner has raised is whether payments
received from her former husband pursuant to a disputed divorce
judgment should be included in her taxable income. Respondent
argues that in the circumstances of this case, section
6330(c)(2)(B) bars petitioner from challenging her underlying tax
liability. We need not resolve this issue, however; as discussed
below, even if petitioner were allowed to challenge her
underlying tax liability, she would not prevail on the merits.
Cf. Young v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-6; Horn v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-207.
Under section 71(a), “Gross income includes amounts
received as alimony or separate maintenance payments.” Section
71(b)(1) defines alimony as “any payment in cash if--(A) such
payment is received by (or on behalf of) a spouse under a divorce
or separation instrument”. Petitioner argues that the payments
she received from her former husband were not alimony because
they were made pursuant to an invalid divorce decree. She
contends that the divorce decree was invalid because the Midland
County, Michigan, circuit judge who entered it had previously
disqualified himself from the case.
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In effect, having failed to achieve satisfaction in her
numerous appeals to the Michigan Supreme Court, petitioner seeks
to relitigate her domestic relations dispute here. We decline to
inject ourselves into this Michigan domestic relations dispute.
Marital relationships are peculiarly creatures of State law.
Lee v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 552, 558 (1975), affd. per curiam
550 F.2d 1201 (9th Cir. 1977); see also Overman v. United States,
563 F.2d 1287, 1290 (8th Cir. 1977); Eccles v. Commissioner, 19
T.C. 1049, 1051 (1953), affd. per curiam 208 F.2d 796 (4th Cir.
1953).
Petitioner’s divorce judgment was entered in Midland County,
Michigan, on September 8, 1987. Although petitioner has
contested the validity of the divorce judgment, no State court
has overturned it. To the contrary, between 1988 and 1992, the
Michigan Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s several appeals
relating to her divorce.3 Principles of collateral estoppel and
full faith and credit counsel that we respect the State court
judgments. See Calhoun v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-246
(declining to decide whether a New York divorce judgment was
invalid as violative of due process where no New York appellate
court had overturned, reversed, or otherwise modified the divorce
3
Notably, in Stark v. Midland Circuit Judge, 435 Mich. 877
(1990), the Michigan Supreme Court denied petitioner’s motion to
“disqualify a party.”
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judgment), affd. without published opinion 993 F.2d 1533 (2d Cir.
1993).
The petition does not explicitly raise a request for
equitable relief under section 6015(f). To the extent that the
petition might be construed to raise such a claim inferentially,
we hold that petitioner is not entitled to such relief, having
failed to file a joint Federal income tax return for any year at
issue. See Raymond v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 191, 195 (2002).
Petitioner has failed to make a valid challenge to the
appropriateness of respondent’s intended collection action. She
has raised no issue in this proceeding regarding any offer of an
alternative means of collection.4 These issues are now deemed
conceded. Rule 331(b)(4).
Accordingly, we conclude that respondent is entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law. To reflect the foregoing,
An appropriate order and
decision will be entered
granting respondent’s motion
for summary judgment.
4
After the administrative hearing, petitioner submitted an
offer in compromise to respondent but withdrew it before
respondent issued the notice of determination.