T.C. Memo. 2003-181
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
MICHAEL T. HAWKINS AND JANINE M. HANSEN, Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 10747-01. Filed June 20, 2003.
Michael T. Hawkins and Janine M. Hansen, pro sese.
Alan J. Tomsic, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
WOLFE, Special Trial Judge: This matter is before the Court
on petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction,
respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and respondent’s Motion
to Impose a Penalty under Section 6673. Unless otherwise
indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue
Code in effect for the years in issue, and all Rule references
are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
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Background
Petitioners failed to file Federal income tax returns for
1997, 1998, and 1999. On May 25, 2001, respondent issued to each
petitioner a notice of deficiency for those years. Relying on
Forms W-2, Wage and Tax Statement, and Forms 1099 information,
respondent determined deficiencies in petitioners’ Federal income
taxes as follows:
Michael T. Hawkins
Year Deficiency Sec. 6651(a)(1) Sec. 6654(a)
1997 $8,291.00 $1,074.75 $206.27
1998 7,852.00 1,621.75 289.88
1999 8,435.80 1,311.20 236.68
Janine M. Hansen
Year Deficiency Sec. 6651(a)(1) Sec. 6654(a)
1997 $1,255.00 $313.75 --
1998 848.00 212.00 --
1999 848.00 212.00 --
Petitioners resided in Sparks, Nevada, on August 23, 2001, when
they timely filed their petition.
On October 12, 2001, respondent filed an Answer. On March
15, 2002, respondent then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
(summary judgment motion). On April 22, 2002, petitioners filed
a Response to Motion for Summary Judgment (response to summary
judgment motion) and a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction
(jurisdiction motion). The Court heard the motions together, and
at the conclusion of the hearing respondent made an oral Motion
to Impose a Penalty under Section 6673 (penalty motion). The
parties did not enter into a stipulation of facts.
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Discussion
I. Jurisdiction Motion
We consider the jurisdiction motion first because our
jurisdiction is prerequisite to any other action we may take.
The jurisdiction of this Court is governed by statute. Sec.
7442. For a taxpayer to maintain an action in this Court there
must be a valid notice of deficiency and a timely filed petition.
Rule 13(a), (c); Monge v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 22, 27 (1989);
Abeles v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 1019, 1025 (1988).
In the jurisdiction motion, petitioners do not dispute that
respondent issued a notice of deficiency to each of them for each
of the years in issue, and they do not dispute that the petition
they filed was timely. Instead, petitioners contend: (1) That
Rules 24 and 200, governing appearance and practice of counsel
before the Court, violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1993 (RFRA), Pub. L. 103-141, sec. 2, 107 Stat. 1488,
currently codified at 42 U.S.C. secs. 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2000);
(2) that petitioners are not “taxpayers” subject to the
jurisdiction of this Court; and (3) that the issues raised in the
jurisdiction motion, including petitioners’ claim of
constitutional entitlement to a jury trial, can be decided only
by an Article III court.
A. Rules 24 and 200 Do Not Violate RFRA
Section 7453 provides generally that “the proceedings of the
Tax Court * * * shall be conducted in accordance with such rules
of practice and procedure (other than rules of evidence) as the
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Tax Court may prescribe”. Accordingly, this Court has “over many
years developed a comprehensive set of Rules which are designed
and calculated to increase our efficiency in adjudicating genuine
tax disputes.” Blum v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1128, 1131 (1986).1
Rule 24(a)(4) provides:
No entry of appearance by counsel not admitted to
practice before this Court will be effective until
counsel shall have been admitted, but counsel may be
recognized as counsel in a pending case to the extent
permitted by the Court and then only where it appears
that counsel can and will be promptly admitted. For
the procedure for admission to practice before the
Court, see Rule 200.
Rule 200 restricts admission to practice before the Tax
Court to two classes of persons: (1) Attorneys in good standing
of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States, or of the
highest or appropriate court of any State or of the District of
Columbia, or any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the
United States; and (2) applicants, not attorneys at law, who pass
a written examination given by the Tax Court as well as an
additional oral examination if required by the Court. This Court
has stated: “The requirement that only qualified persons are
permitted to represent litigants before this Court is for the
protection of litigants by insuring that only persons able to
properly represent a party appear for him.” Cupp v.
1
Section 7452 specifically provides that the taxpayer shall be
represented in accordance with the Rules of Practice and
Procedure prescribed by this Court. See sec. 301.7452-1, Proced.
& Admin. Regs. Section 7452 further provides that “No qualified
person shall be denied admission to practice before the Tax Court
because of his failure to be a member of any profession or
calling.”
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Commissioner, 65 T.C. 68, 85 (1975), affd. without published
opinion 559 F.2d 1207 (3d Cir. 1977). Petitioners argue that the
requirements of Rule 24(a)(4) and Rule 200 conflict with their
religious rights under RFRA, that these Rules are invalid, and
that, therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction.
Congress enacted RFRA in response to Employment Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).2 In Smith, the Supreme Court held
that valid neutral laws of general applicability do not violate a
person’s religious rights even when the law is not supported by a
compelling governmental interest. See id.; Adams v.
Commissioner, 110 T.C. 137, 138 (1998), affd. 170 F.3d 173 (3d
Cir. 1999). Prior to Smith, the Government had to demonstrate
that the application of such laws to religious practices was
“essential to accomplish an overriding Governmental interest” or
represented “the least restrictive means of achieving some
compelling state interest.” Employment Div. v. Smith, supra at
899 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment); see also Adams v.
Commissioner, supra at 138.
RFRA restores the compelling interest test used prior to
Smith by prohibiting the Government from imposing a substantial
burden on the free exercise of religion unless it demonstrates
2
In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997), the
Supreme Court held that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993 (RFRA), Pub. L. 103-141, sec. 2, 107 Stat. 1488, currently
codified at 42 U.S.C. secs. 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994), was
unconstitutional as applied to State and local laws. Although
neither party has raised the issue, we note that RFRA has since
been upheld as constitutional as applied in the Federal realm.
See Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1221 (9th Cir. 2002).
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that application of the burden is the least restrictive means of
achieving a compelling governmental interest.3 See 42 U.S.C.
sec. 2000bb-1(b); Adams v. Commissioner, supra. In evaluating
whether the Government has met the compelling interest test,
cases decided prior to Smith are applicable, and the test “should
not be construed more stringently or more leniently than it was
prior to Smith.” Adams v. Commissioner, supra at 139.
1. Substantial Burden
To establish a violation under RFRA, a claimant must first
show that the Government “substantially burdened” his or her free
exercise of religion. 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000bb-1(a). A statute
burdens the free exercise of religion if it “puts substantial
pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his
beliefs”. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450
U.S. 707, 718 (1981). A substantial burden must be more than an
3
In addition to the compelling interest test provided for by
RFRA, petitioners rely on Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1207
(9th Cir. 1999), to assert a hybrid-rights claim and apply a
strict scrutiny analysis. In Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 881-882, (1990), the Supreme Court excepted a hybrid-rights
claim from its rational basis analysis and thus recognized the
applicability of the strict scrutiny analysis where a law
“[involves] not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free
Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional
protections”. Petitioners’ argument for strict scrutiny analysis
here amounts to a request for application of the compelling
interest test set forth by RFRA. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado,
530 U.S. 703, 748 (Scalia, J., dissenting)(2000), (referring to
“that stringent mode of constitutional analysis our cases refer
to as ‘strict scrutiny,’ which requires that the restriction be
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”); see
also Kessler v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1285, 1290 (1986), affd.
838 F.2d 1215 (6th Cir. 1988).
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inconvenience. Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1222 (9th Cir.
2002) (citing Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God,
Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000)).4
Petitioners present mere summary assertions that Rules 24
and 200 substantially burden their right to free exercise of
religion and fail to identify any aspect of their religion that
has been violated. At the hearing, petitioners sought to have a
religious adviser enter an appearance as their counsel. This
person was not an attorney, nor had he established his
qualifications by passing a written examination given by the Tax
Court, and the Court would not accept his formal appearance.
Nevertheless, the Court allowed petitioners’ religious adviser to
confer with petitioners at regular intervals throughout the
proceedings and to sit at petitioners’ counsel desk. Petitioners
stated that they had spoken with an attorney regarding this
matter, that the attorney was a member of the bar of the State of
Nevada, but that the attorney would have refused to pay the fee
4
RFRA originally defined the term “exercise of religion” as
“the exercise of religion under the First Amendment to the
Constitution”. 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000bb-2(4)(1994). The Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), Pub.
L. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803-807, currently codified at 42 U.S.C.
secs. 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2000), amended certain provisions of
RFRA, including the definition of “exercise of religion”. RLUIPA
secs. 7(a)(3), 8(7)(a). RLUIPA amends RFRA so that “exercise of
religion” now means “religious exercise, as defined in section
2000cc-5 of this title.” 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000bb-2(4) (2000).
“Religious exercise”, for purposes of RFRA, is defined to include
“any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or
central to, a system of religious belief.” RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C.
sec. 2000cc-5(7)(A).
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required to appear before the Court. Nevertheless, the attorney
was not present at the hearing.
On this record, we find that Rules 24 and 200 did not place
a substantial burden on petitioners’ exercise of religion. Those
Rules did not put substantial pressure on petitioners to modify
their behavior and to violate their beliefs. At most,
petitioners claim only that they may have been inconvenienced in
their search for an attorney who shares their religious beliefs.5
Rules 24 and 200 did not at any time interfere with petitioners’
observance of their religion. Moreover, none of petitioners’
constitutional rights have been violated. Petitioners
represented themselves pro sese before the Court. They had the
benefit of the advice of their religious adviser, and they had
ample opportunity to have their case heard. See Cupp v.
Commissioner, supra; Ruggere v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 979, 989
(1982).
Rules 24 and 200 do not violate RFRA’s substantial burden
test. Nevertheless, even if we were to determine that Rules 24
and 200 did substantially burden petitioners’ free exercise of
5
Petitioners are members of both the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter Day Saints and the First Christian Fellowship of Eternal
Sovereignty. Petitioners have presented no evidence suggesting
that members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints,
a large and prominent religious denomination, are not represented
in the bar of this Court. Petitioners have introduced into
evidence the Testament of Sovereignty with respect to beliefs of
the First Christian Fellowship of Eternal Sovereignty, but have
failed to show how Rules 24 and 200 interfere with their exercise
of religion as described therein.
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religion, respondent has satisfied the compelling interest test.
2. Compelling Governmental Interest Test
In cases where the claimants’ rights have been substantially
burdened, the Government may impose a substantial burden on the
free exercise of religion if it demonstrates that the application
of the burden (i) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest and (ii) is the least restrictive means of furthering
that compelling interest. 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000bb-1(b); see Miller
v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 511, 516 (2000). In addition to
holding that Rules 24 and 200 do not violate the substantial
burden test of the RFRA, we conclude that respondent satisfies
the compelling interest and least restrictive means test.
Respondent’s interest in administering the tax system
properly is a compelling governmental interest. See, e.g.,
Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699-700 (1989)(“[E]ven a
substantial burden would be justified by the ‘broad public
interest in maintaining a sound tax system,’ free of ‘myriad
exceptions flowing from a wide variety of religious beliefs.’”
(quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982))). This
Court has stated:
the Supreme Court has established that uniform,
mandatory participation in the Federal income tax
system, irrespective of religious belief, is a
compelling governmental interest. * * * As a result,
requiring petitioner’s participation in the Federal
income tax system is the only, and thus the least
restrictive, means of furthering the Government’s
interest. * * * [Citations omitted.]
Adams v. Commissioner, supra at 139; see Hernandez v.
Commissioner, supra; United States v. Lee, supra.
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Rules 24 and 200 exist for the protection of the litigants
practicing before the Court and contribute to the fair and
orderly trial of tax matters. Since the Tax Court is an integral
part of the Federal income tax system, the Government has a
compelling interest in the administration of the whole tax
system, including its trials. See United States v. Turnbull, 888
F.2d 636, 640 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the Government’s
compelling interest in a fair and orderly trial, in criminal
proceedings relating to a failure to pay Federal income taxes,
outweighed the taxpayer’s wish, contrary to the rules of the
court, to be represented by a lay person who shared his religious
beliefs). We hold that the Government has a compelling interest
in the fair and orderly trials of this Court, which are important
to the maintenance and the administration of a sound tax system.
Rules 24 and 200 are an integral part of the least restrictive
means of achieving that interest. Accordingly, Rules 24 and 200
do not violate RFRA.
B. Remaining Contentions Concerning Jurisdiction
The remaining contentions with respect to jurisdiction
raised by petitioners are shopworn, frivolous assertions that “we
perceive no need to refute * * * with somber reasoning and
copious citation of precedent; to do so might suggest that these
arguments have some colorable merit.” Crain v. Commissioner, 737
F.2d 1417, 1417 (5th Cir. 1984). Nevertheless, we briefly
address at least some of petitioners’ contentions and dispose of
them expeditiously.
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First, petitioners are taxpayers subject to the Federal
income tax. See secs. 1(c), 7701(a)(1), (14); United States v.
Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 937 (9th Cir. 1986). Their income from
labor or services as reported on their Form W-2 statements and
Forms 1099 constitutes income subject to Federal income tax. See
secs. 1(a)(1), 61(a); Craig v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 252, 263
(2002).
Second, the United States Tax Court is a legislative court
established under Article I of the United States Constitution.
Sec. 7441. It has jurisdiction to determine the correct amount
of a deficiency. Sec. 6214. The constitutionality of the Tax
Court repeatedly has been upheld on the basis of congressional
authority to create specialized courts under Article I of the
Constitution. Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 890-891
(1991); Rowlee v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1111, 1114 (1983); Burns,
Stix Friedman & Co. v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 392, 394 (1971).
Petitioners contend that only a court established under Article
III of the Constitution, rather than a legislative court
established under Article I of the Constitution, can adjudicate
the issues they have raised.6 Petitioners’ arguments have no
6
Petitioners’ reliance on the statutory language of RFRA is
erroneous. RFRA provides:
A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in
violation of this section may assert that violation as
a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain
appropriate relief against a Government. Standing to
assert a claim or defense under this section shall be
governed by the general rules of standing under article
III of the Constitution.
42 U.S.C. sec. 2000bb-1(c)(emphasis added). RFRA merely applies
the constitutional parameters of “standing” to any alleged
(continued...)
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merit.
Third, it is well established that there is no
constitutional right to a jury trial in a suit concerning Federal
tax liability in the Tax Court. Dawn v. Commissioner, 675 F.2d
1077, 1079 (9th Cir. 1982), affg. T.C. Memo. 1979-479; Rowlee v.
Commissioner, supra; Cupp v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. at 86 (“where
a taxpayer takes advantage of the procedure of filing a petition
in the Tax Court without payment of the tax, any deprivation of a
jury trial is due to his own act”).
For the foregoing reasons, petitioners’ jurisdiction motion
will be denied.
II. Summary Judgment Motion
Summary judgment is intended to expedite litigation and
avoid unnecessary and expensive trials. Pope & Talbot, Inc., &
Subs. v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 574, 575 (1995). Rule 121(a)
provides that either party may move with or without supporting
affidavits, for summary judgment upon all or any part of the
legal issues in controversy. Under Rule 121(b) decision shall
thereafter be rendered “if the pleadings, answers to
interrogatories, depositions, admissions, and any other
acceptable materials, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that a
decision may be rendered as a matter of law." See O'Neal v.
6
(...continued)
violation of the statute. The Tax Court clearly has jurisdiction
to hear an RFRA challenge. See, e.g., Adams v. Commissioner, 110
T.C. 137, 138 (1998), affd. 170 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999).
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Commissioner, 102 T.C. 666, 674 (1994) (quoting Kroh v.
Commissioner, 98 T.C. 383, 389 (1992)).
The moving party bears the burden of proving that there is
no genuine issue of material fact, and factual inferences will be
made in a manner most favorable to the party opposing summary
judgment. Dahlstrom v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 812, 821 (1985).
The nonmoving party, however, must do more than merely allege or
deny facts in its pleadings and must “set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse
party does not so respond, then a decision, if appropriate, may
be entered against such party.” Rule 121(d); FPL Group, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 115 T.C. 554, 559 (2000).
Petitioners assert in their response to the summary judgment
motion that respondent has:
acted in an invidious and/or covert manner * * * to
reduce, restrict and eventually eliminate all God given
rights guaranteed by the Constitution and also
privileges granted by the Constitution specifically or
even generally so the Governments could establish a
civil/socialist/secular/irreligion religion and
Government that are diametrically opposed to
Christianity and Christian liberty as originally
established in the Constitution and Bill of Rights
which are both integral parts of the religions of the
Petitioners. * * * And for all these reasons and more
the Petitioners challenge the appropriateness of
collection actions; and/or existence of amount of the
tax.
Petitioners, through the petition, response to summary judgment
motion, and oral argument, assert the following general issues:
(1) Whether respondent’s adjustments are barred; (2) whether the
alleged deficiencies are in violation of RFRA; (3) whether
petitioners have been denied due process; (4) whether respondent
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filed the summary judgment motion timely; (5) and whether the
representative of respondent has legal authority to act on behalf
of respondent. Petitioners, though, do not present the Court
with any specific facts showing any genuine issue for trial
despite this Court’s express requirement for such a showing. See
Rule 121(d). Petitioners’ repeated assertions of the existence
of questions of fact are insufficient and without foundation, and
we conclude that this case is appropriate for summary judgment.
A. Respondent’s Adjustments Are Sustained
1. Deficiencies
Gross income includes all income from whatever source
derived. Sec. 61(a). Respondent’s determinations in a notice of
deficiency are presumed correct. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S.
111, 115 (1933). Petitioners merely allege that respondent’s
determination of deficiencies in, and additions to, tax are
incorrect. The arguments they put forward are frivolous and
without merit.
Petitioners contend that the Individual Master File (IMF)
for each petitioner has incorrect information and that they have
no tax liability. Petitioners’ contentions, however, are blanket
statements, and they provide no support for their bare
allegations that there are genuine issues for trial. Moreover,
petitioners have not produced any information or set forth any
specific facts to contradict the gross income reflected on
petitioners’ W-2 statements and 1099 forms. We hold that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact.
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2. Additions to Tax Under Sections 6651(a) and 6654(a)
Section 6651(a)(1) imposes an addition to tax for failure to
file an income tax return. The addition to tax may be avoided if
the failure to file is due to reasonable cause and not willful
neglect. Sec. 6651(a). “Reasonable cause” contemplates that the
taxpayer exercised ordinary business care and prudence and was
nonetheless unable to file a return within the prescribed time,
United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 246 (1985); sec. 301.6651-
1(c)(1), Proced. & Admin. Regs., and “willful neglect” means a
conscious, intentional failure or reckless indifference, United
States v. Boyle, supra.
Section 6654(a) imposes an addition to tax for failure to
pay estimated tax. The imposition of the addition to tax under
section 6654 as to the years in question is mandatory when an
individual fails to make the required estimated tax payments
unless the petitioner falls within one of the exceptions set
forth in the statute. See sec. 6654(a), (e); Grosshandler v.
Commissioner, 75 T.C. 1, 20-21 (1980).
Petitioners do not offer any explanation that their failure
to file was due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect. The
record demonstrates, rather, that petitioners chose not to file
any returns in pursuit of what can only be regarded as a
religious rights protest against the Federal income tax.
Petitioner Hawkins did not pay any estimated tax during the years
at issue and did not show the applicability of any statutory
exception under section 6654(e). Petitioners have not assigned
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error or provided any statement of fact to dispute respondent’s
determinations with respect to the additions to tax.
Accordingly, respondent is entitled to summary adjudication as to
the additions to tax in question. Rule 34(b)(4), Swain v.
Commissioner, 118 T.C. 358, 364-365 (2002); see also Higbee v.
Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446-447 (2001).
B. The Federal Income Tax Does Not Violate RFRA
The gist of petitioners’ response to the summary judgment
motion, like the arguments made by petitioners in the
jurisdiction motion, is that the Federal income tax violates
RFRA.7 As previously discussed with respect to the jurisdiction
motion, supra p. 9, the uniform mandatory participation in the
Federal income tax system, irrespective of religious belief, is a
compelling governmental interest. Adams v. Commissioner, 110
T.C. 137, 139 (1998) (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,
260 (1982)). Requiring petitioners’ participation in the Federal
income tax system is the only, and thus the least restrictive,
means of furthering the Government’s compelling interest. Adams
v. Commissioner, supra (holding that RFRA does not exempt a
taxpayer from Federal income taxes). Regardless of whether the
7
Specifically, petitioners assert that the Government of the
United States, via respondent, has acted in “an invidious and/or
covert manner to establish a religion and/or restrain the
exercise of our [petitioners’] religion.” Petitioners also
assert that the alleged taxes are an attempt to support religious
activities or institutions and to compel petitioners to engage in
“conduct and/or to refrain from religiously motivated activities
we [petitioners] find objectionable.”
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petitioners’ religious beliefs are substantially burdened, the
Federal income tax system does not violate RFRA.8
C. Remaining Contentions in Response to Summary Judgment Motion
The remaining contentions raised by petitioners in the
response to summary judgment motion are shopworn and frivolous
assertions that do not deserve careful analysis. See Crain v.
Commissioner, 737 F.2d 1417 (5th Cir. 1984).
First, as previously discussed, petitioners’ contention that
RFRA provides for this matter to be heard by an Article III
court, and their argument about their right to a jury trial with
respect to this case are without merit. See supra pp. 10-12.
Second, petitioners have not been denied due process. The
provision of an administrative hearing before the Appeals
division is not essential to the validity of a notice of
deficiency and would have been futile since petitioners did not
dispute the computation or amount of the tax. See Cataldo v.
Commissioner, 60 T.C. 522, 523 (1973), affd. per curiam 499 F.2d
550 (2d Cir. 1974); see also Corcoran v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
8
Petitioners contend that the least restrictive means of
furthering the Government’s compelling interest is to simply
“waive” the determined deficiencies in, and additions to, tax.
In support of their argument, petitioners rely on the
unsubstantiated argument that during the previous years 1991,
1993, 1994, and 1995, respondent allegedly did not pursue any
adjustments. Petitioners’ argument, however, must fail because
it is well settled that each taxable year stands on its own and
must be separately considered. Respondent is not bound in any
given year to allow the same treatment permitted in a previous
year. Pekar v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 158, 166 (1999). The
circumstances of prior years are not relevant, and we consider
only the taxable years at issue before this Court.
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2002-18 (rejecting taxpayer’s due process claims that the notice
of deficiency was invalid and finding that an adminstrative
hearing would have been futile because the taxpayers never
disputed the actual amounts of the tax), affd. 54 Fed. Appx. 254
(9th Cir. 2002). The applicable provisions of the statute and
regulations are clear, and petitioners have no basis to assert
that they have been deprived of due process because their
inquiries about requirements that they keep books and file tax
returns allegedly have gone unanswered by the Internal Revenue
Service. See secs. 6001, 6011(a); secs. 1.6001-1(a), 1.6011-1,
Income Tax Regs. Petitioners are not denied due process simply
because they are not in an article III court. See supra p. 11.
Third, respondent timely filed the summary judgment motion.
Rule 121(a) states that a motion for summary judgment “may be
made at any time commencing 30 days after the pleadings are
closed”. Respondent filed the Answer on October 12, 2001, and
the summary judgment motion more than 5 months later on March 15,
2002. The pleadings in this case were closed long before
respondent filed the summary judgment motion. See Rules 34, 36,
37, 38, 121.
Fourth, petitioners’ contentions at the hearing that
respondent’s representative who prepared and issued the notices
of deficiency lacked the legal authority to act in the name of
respondent and petitioners’ requiring proof of the delegation of
authority from respondent are frivolous and without merit.
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See Nestor v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 162, 165 (2002).
In the absence of any valid issue for review, and for the
foregoing reasons, we conclude that respondent is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law sustaining each notice of deficiency
issued to petitioners.
III. Penalty Motion
Section 6673(a)(1) authorizes this Court to require a
taxpayer to pay to the United States a penalty not in excess of
$25,000 whenever it appears that proceedings have been instituted
or maintained by the taxpayer primarily for delay or that the
taxpayer’s position in such proceeding is frivolous or
groundless. A position maintained by the taxpayer is “frivolous”
where it is “contrary to established law and unsupported by a
reasoned, colorable argument for change in the law.” Williams v.
Commissioner, 114 T.C. 136, 144 (2000) (quoting Coleman v.
Commissioner, 791 F.2d 68, 71 (7th Cir. 1986)). This proceeding
was petitioners’ first appearance before this Court. Respondent
first raised the penalty motion at the hearing. In view of the
circumstances of this case and the nature of petitioners’ RFRA
arguments, we shall deny respondent’s motion and we shall not
impose the penalty. Nevertheless, we place petitioners on notice
that if petitioners institute or maintain a proceeding with
frivolous arguments in the future, this Court may impose such a
penalty.
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We have considered all of petitioners’ arguments and
contentions, and, to the extent not discussed above, conclude
they are irrelevant and/or without merit.
To reflect the foregoing,
An Appropriate Order and
Decision Will Be Entered.