T.C. Memo. 2004-3
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
PERRY GOLDMAN AND SANDRA GOLDMAN, Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 14639-02L. Filed January 5, 2004.
Perry Goldman and Sandra Goldman, pro sese.
Leonard T. Provenzale, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GERBER, Judge: Respondent, in a motion filed on October 27,
2003, moved for summary judgment on the question of whether he
may proceed with the collection process with respect to
petitioners. Respondent alleges that the section 6330
prerequisites have been met and that he should be allowed to
proceed with collection of petitioners’ assessed and outstanding
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tax liabilities. Petitioners’ objection to respondent’s motion
was presented at a hearing on December 1, 2003. Petitioners
contend that there was an abuse of discretion because
respondent’s Appeals officer refused to discharge or release the
Federal tax lien, notice of which has been filed, with respect to
certain real property. Petitioners resided in Florida at the
time they filed their petition.
Background
Petitioners’ 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994 income tax returns
were examined, and respondent determined income tax deficiencies
in each year. Petitioners petitioned this Court with respect to
the 1991, 1992, and 1993 years and, eventually, entered into an
agreed decision that was entered on July 16, 1998. With respect
to the 1994 year, petitioners attempted to petition this Court,
but the matter was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Based on
these events, petitioners’ 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994 income tax
deficiencies were assessed.
Respondent sent petitioners a Notice of Federal Tax Lien
Filing And Your Right To A Hearing Under I.R.C. section 6320,
dated March 27, 2002, advising that a Notice of Federal Tax Lien
had been filed on March 22, 2002. Prior to the filing of the
notice, petitioners submitted several offers-in-compromise with
respect to doubt as to collectibility of the outstanding
assessments. The offers were rejected because it was determined
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that petitioners were able to pay the outstanding liabilities in
full.
Petitioners’ requested hearing under sections 6320 and 6330
was held on July 25, 2002, and, again, petitioners offered to
compromise due to lack of collectibility. In a July 26, 2002,
letter, respondent’s Appeals officer rejected petitioners’ offer
on the grounds that petitioners were capable of payment in full.
The Appeals officer’s conclusion was based on information that
petitioners had purchased real property in Fort Pierce, Florida,
for $130,000 on August 10, 1999, and that the same property was
quitclaimed to petitioners’ son, Craig Goldman, on July 3, 2001,
for $100.
Petitioners contend that the Fort Pierce realty was actually
in their son’s name as well as their own since the purchase in
1999. Petitioners further contend that respondent should have
discharged or released the lien as it relates to that realty and
accepted their offer to compromise.
Discussion
Respondent seeks summary judgment with respect to whether he
may proceed to collect certain outstanding tax liabilities
against petitioners. Rule 121 provides for summary judgment for
part or all of the legal issues in controversy if there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact. Sundstrand Corp. v.
Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), affd. 17 F.3d 965 (7th
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Cir. 1994). In that regard, summary judgment is intended to
expedite litigation and avoid unnecessary and expensive trials.
Fla. Peach Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 678, 681 (1988). There
remains no genuine issue as to any material fact in this case.
Petitioners had the opportunity to contest the underlying
merits of their 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994 income tax
deficiencies. Accordingly, our review is limited to the
administrative determination for abuse of discretion. Sec.
6330(c)(2)(B); Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 610 (2000).
Petitioners allege an abuse of discretion by respondent due to
the fact that the Appeals officer rejected petitioners’ $1,800
offer in compromise. That decision was made based on information
available to respondent showing that petitioners owned real
property in Fort Pierce, Florida, which was sufficient in value
to satisfy all outstanding tax liabilities.
Petitioners contend, in effect, that their son was the true
owner of the Fort Pierce realty and that, in some manner,
petitioners were nominees and not true owners. Petitioners,
however, provided no evidence to respondent to verify or
substantiate their contention. Conversely, respondent provided
evidence to petitioners showing that they were the sole owners of
the subject realty at the time the Government’s assessments were
made and the Federal tax lien arose. Under the circumstances,
petitioners have not shown an abuse of discretion by respondent
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in refusing to accept their offer-in-compromise. In addition,
respondent has, in all other respects, complied with the
requirements of sections 6320 and 6330 so as to be entitled to
proceed with collection of petitioners’ outstanding tax
liabilities for 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994.
To reflect the foregoing,
An appropriate order and
decision will be entered granting
respondent’s motion for summary
judgment.